Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825–6

Volume I: Introduction and Oriental Philosophy

G. W. F. HEGEL

Translated and edited by Robert F. Brown

LECTURES
on the
HISTORY
of
PHILOSOPHY
1825–6

Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825–6
Volume I: Introduction and Oriental Philosophy, Together With the Introductions from the Other Series of These Lectures

Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* offer one of the easiest points of entry to his philosophical system. The first volume completes the publication of this new edition, which sets forth clearly, and for the first time for the English reader, what Hegel actually said. It forms part of OUP's Hegel Lectures Series, presenting accurate new translations accompanied by editorial introductions and annotations.

These lectures challenged the antiquarianism of Hegel's contemporaries by boldly contending that the history of philosophy is itself philosophy, not just history. They portray the journey of reason or spirit through time, as reason or spirit comes in stages to its full development and self-conscious existence, through the successive products of human intellect and activity. Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* proved to be extremely influential on the intellectual history of the past two centuries. These lectures are crucial to understanding Hegel's own systematic philosophy in its constructive aspect, as well as his views on the centrality of reason in human history and culture. Volume I holds additional importance because it presents the interesting and significant changes that Hegel made to the stage-setting introduction to these lectures across the years from 1819 to 1831. This edition adapts the considerable editorial resources of the German edition that it translates, to the needs of the general reader as well as the serious scholar, so as to constitute an unparalleled resource on this topic in the English language.

Robert F. Brown is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Delaware.

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL

LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

1825–6

VOLUME I

INTRODUCTION AND ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY, TOGETHER WITH THE INTRODUCTIONS FROM THE OTHER SERIES OF THESE LECTURES

Edited by
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In memoriam
J. Michael Stewart
1920–1994

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PREFACE

This volume containing the *Introduction and Oriental Philosophy* completes the English translation of Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825–6*. First to be published was Volume III, *Medieval and Modern Philosophy* (1990), by the University of California Press. Oxford University Press is reissuing Volume III in a revised edition, as part of this Hegel Lectures Series. The revised edition eliminates the textual variants that are of little consequence, and incorporates other changes that bring it into conformity with the other volumes of the series. Second to appear was Volume II, *Greek Philosophy* (2006), published in this series at the Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. The appearance of these volumes in reverse order was dictated by the fact that the German series of four *Hegel Vorlesungen* volumes, of which this English edition in three volumes is a translation, published these materials in the same reverse order.

This *Introduction and Oriental Philosophy* volume is the English edition of *G. W. F. Hegel: Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Teil 1: Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie; Oriental Philosophie*, which is vol. vi of *G. W. F. Hegel: Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*, edited by Pierre Garniron and Walter Jaeschke, published by Felix Meiner Verlag (Hamburg, 1994). Whereas the previous volumes presented the reconstructed text of the 1825–6 lecture series alone, this volume includes the introductions to the other six series on this topic, given by Hegel in various years before and after the 1825–6 academic term, for which materials are available. This English edition translates in full the German edition's other introductions from 1819 and 1829–30, while abridging the rest somewhat in order to eliminate undue repetition. It also follows the practice of its predecessors by condensing the German edition's editorial footnotes, while adding others of our own suited to the needs of the

English reader. The very extensive Editorial Introduction that follows below is a full translation of its counterpart in the German volume, together with an account of the background and protocols of the English edition for all three of our volumes.

My faithful collaborator on this entire project, J. Michael Stewart, passed away after doing some preliminary work on the 1825–6 texts presented here. As editor and translator, I bear the ultimate responsibility for all aspects of this volume in its final form—revision of Stewart's work, translation of the rest, including the other introductions, and all the footnotes and other materials it includes. Therefore while Michael Stewart's name fully deserves to be on the title page, any shortcomings of this volume must be laid at my door.

We are indebted to the following institutions, which made the German edition possible in its present form by granting permission to use, and to publish the contents of, the transcripts utilized in constructing these critical texts: the Manuscripts Division of the Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin; the Hegel-Archiv of the Ruhr-Universität, Bochum; the Library of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Cracow Division; the Jagiellońska Library, Cracow; the Deutsche Literaturarchiv, Schiller-Nationalmuseum, Marbach am Neckar; the University Library, Munich; the St Petersburg Public Library; the University of Chicago Library; the Northwestern University Libraries, Evanston, Illinois.

This English edition in each of its volumes of course would not have been possible without the meticulous scholarship of the editors of the German edition. Our special gratitude goes to Walter Jaeschke, who not only handled all communications with us regarding this project, but also responded promptly and helpfully to queries about particular points.

Peter C. Hodgson, the General Editor of the Hegel Lectures Series published by Oxford University Press, was invaluable in every aspect of this project. He generously read and critiqued all of this volume, in several reiterations of each of its parts. His vast experience and wise counsel made it, and the other volumes too, far better than they otherwise would have been.

The expert secretarial assistance of Ms Darlene Reynolds at the University of Delaware kept things moving as she cheerfully typed what must have seemed like endless revisions over the past several years. My philosophy colleague Alan Fox helped with the transliterations of Indian and Chinese terms. The professionalism of the Oxford University Press editors and staff, who are so easy and helpful to work with, brought this volume, as well as the others, to a final publishable form.

Robert F. Brown

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

An.	Anonymous transcript (Cracow) of 1825–1826 Lectures
Berliner Schriften	*Berliner Schriften 1818–1831*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg, 1956)
Briefe	*Briefe von und an Hegel*, vols. i–iii, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister, 3rd edn. (Hamburg, 1969); vol. iv, pts. 1 and 2, ed. Friedhelm Nicolin (Hamburg, 1977–81)
Diels	Hermann Diels, *Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca* (Berlin, 1882 ff.)
DG	Hermann Diels (ed.), *Doxographi Graeci*, 3rd edn. (Berlin, 1879; repr. Berlin, 1958)
DK	Hermann Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Griechisch und Deutsch*, 3 vols., 5th and later edns. ed. Walter Kranz (Berlin, 1934–60)
Encyclopedia	*Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, trans. (from German 3rd edn.) with additions based on student transcripts and lecture manuscripts, W. Wallace and A. V. Miller, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1892 (repr. 1975), 1970, 1971)
Gr.	Griesheim transcript of 1825–6 Lectures
GW	*G. W. F. Hegel: Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Academy of Sciences of Rhineland-Westphalia in association with the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, 40 vols. projected (Hamburg, 1968 ff.)

Hoffmeister	*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*, vol. i, *Die Vernunft in der Geschichte*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg, 1955). (See Lasson for vols. ii–iv; vols. i–iv paginated cumulatively.)
KRS	G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 1983)
Lasson	*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*, vol. ii, *Die orientalische Welt*; vol. iii, *Die griechische und die römische Welt*; vol. iv, *Die germanische Welt*, ed. George Lasson, 2nd edn. (Hamburg, 1923). (See Hoffmeister for vol. i; vols. i–iv paginated cumulatively.)
Letters	*Hegel: The Letters*, trans. Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler, commentary by Clark Butler (Bloomington, Ind., 1984)
Lw.	Löwe transcript of 1825–6 Lectures
MS?	a passage in *W.* that may derive from Hegel's own lecture manuscript
Nisbet	*Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction: Reason in History*, trans. (from Hoffmeister) H. B. Nisbet, with an introduction by Duncan Forbes (Cambridge, 1975)
Phenomenology	*Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford, 1977)
Philosophy of Religion	*Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, 3 vols. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1984–7; repr. Oxford University Press, 2007)
Pn.	Pinder transcript of 1825–6 Lectures
Science of Logic	*Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (London, 1969)
Sibree	*The Philosophy of History*, trans. (from 2nd German edn. (1940)) J. Sibree, rev. edn. (New York, 1900)

Sv. Stieve transcript of 1825–1826 Lectures

W. Hegel, *Werke*, complete edition ed. an Association of Friends, 18 vols. (Berlin, 1832 ff.). Always refers to 1st edn., but some volumes issued in second editions. Vols. xiii–xv contain *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, ed. Karl Ludwig Michelet, 1st edn. (Berlin, 1833–6); 2nd edn. (Berlin, 1840–4)

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION[1]

I. The Importance of Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*

Hegel's interpretation of the history of philosophy clearly played a central role not only in shaping his own thought, but also in fostering greater emphasis on historical thinking generally among his contemporaries and successors. Nevertheless, the relation of these lectures to his philosophical system as such is today a matter of dispute. Some interpreters doubt that they form a part of the system at all, whereas others, in agreement with some of his students, view them as the system's crowning achievement or culmination. In any event it is certain that Hegel himself attached great significance to these lectures, no matter how he may have conceived of their relation to his system. In his view, the study of the history of philosophy is the study of philosophy itself. Had he not thought so, he would scarcely have lectured on the history of philosophy so regularly, and at such length: as early as at Jena (1805–6), where he spoke from a full manuscript; subsequently twice at Heidelberg (1816–17, 1817–18), where he used an outline; and finally, six times at Berlin (in the summer term of 1819, the winter term of 1820–1, and then at two-year intervals: 1823–4, 1825–6, 1827–8, 1829–30), where he drew upon the Jena manuscript and the Heidelberg Outline, with additions both written and extemporaneous. (A seventh series at Berlin, begun in 1831, ended early and abruptly on

1. This Editorial Introduction and the Preface combine materials composed for this English edition with translation of contents in the Preface (*Vorbemerkung*) and the Foreword (*Vorwort*) of the first volume of the German edition. The Preface to this volume covers some of the same ground as does the Preface to the third volume of our English edition. The first section of this Editorial Introduction, on the importance of these lectures, repeats material from the beginning of our Volume III. The second section translates the first part of the German edition's *Vorbemerkung*, followed by explanations of our own. Sections III through VI translate the *Vorwort* to the German edition, except for the last few pages of Section VI and the concluding Section VII, which explain the textual apparatus and conventions of this English edition.

account of Hegel's untimely death.) No topic other than logic and metaphysics commanded as much of his attention as did the history of philosophy. Hegel typically lectured on it in five sessions per week, although toward the end of the term he had to increase the number of sessions 'as is evident from his own handwritten remarks at the end of his notebook'.[2] He began yet another series in November of 1831, although his sudden death on the fourteenth of that month cut that series short even before he could complete the Introduction.

Hegel's own students apparently shared his view on the importance of the history of philosophy. No other topic of his lectures has come down to us today in a larger number of auditors' transcripts than has this one, and no other comprises as many pages in the first edition of the *Werke* prepared by the Association of Friends of the philosopher. So, a few words are appropriate here about the general significance of this material.

First, these lectures constitute the very first comprehensive history of philosophy that treats philosophy itself as undergoing genuinely historical development. (Schelling made a similar attempt—the traditional date of 1827 for his manuscript is now revised by recent scholarship to 1833 or later—but with less success and influence.) They depict philosophy as an integral intellectual activity that, despite its apparent diversity of contents and methods, has a distinctive unity and *telos* emergent precisely from its successive historical forms and schools. Hegel situates the varied philosophers and movements of the past within this progression, as at once conservers of previous insights and also critics and innovators. Thus the whole has movement and direction; the process is going somewhere specific. Philosophical thinking is historically produced and conditioned; it is an organic development over time, and the grasp of its history is itself a philosophical activity. It is easy to forget that Hegel's immediate predecessors, as historians of philosophy, treated the philosophical past mainly as a catalog of 'timeless' systems, or else as a temporal sequence of largely unrelated positions. It is a tribute to the power of Hegel's innovative perspective on this history that we (non-Hegelians included) have come to take so many of its elements for granted.

Second, these lectures are valuable for understanding Hegel's own systematic works such as the *Phenomenology*, the *Logic*, and the *Encyclopedia*. Central to his thought is the theme of spirit engaged in self-realization through the processes of historical change. These lectures give a concrete

2. This is Karl Ludwig Michelet's report, in his Foreword to his first edition of these lectures, *W.* xiii, p. xiii.

account of the historical pilgrimage of absolute spirit, in its highest expression as philosophical thought. They also enhance our understanding of Hegel's conception of his own place in the history of philosophy, as the beneficiary and culmination of his predecessors' work.

Third, these lectures are indispensable for a proper understanding and appreciation of the new consciousness of human life, culture, and intellect, as clearly historical in nature, an understanding that profoundly altered the nineteenth-century mind. They are indispensable because they are a principal cause of that very transformation. Although its earlier and simpler expressions appeared in the thought of Vico, Herder, and others, the new historical consciousness entered the European mind in full force through Hegel's thought, especially through these lectures, and also those on the philosophy of history. Chiefly because of them, subsequent intellectual life of the nineteenth century and beyond can be seen largely as the continuing effort to come to terms with this new historical consciousness.

II. The Concept of the History of Philosophy

In these lectures Hegel gives prominence to a characteristic of his presentation that is highly significant, namely, that philosophy is rational knowledge, and so the history of its development must itself be something rational; the history of philosophy must itself be philosophical. This view of the history of philosophy is the one that, even today, underlies the continuing great interest in Hegel's lectures. Only if the study of the history of philosophy is the study of philosophy itself—as it is for Hegel—can philosophy have a genuine interest in its own history, an interest qualitatively distinct from the involvement that other sciences have with their own histories.

At the outset of each of the lecture series, Hegel expresses this leitmotif that is to run throughout his historical presentation. It has been customary, in connection with Hegel's own practice, to designate this first part as 'Introduction to the History of Philosophy'. In the strict sense, however, it is not an introduction of the usual sort. Instead it is the formulation of the concept of the history of philosophy, placed right at the beginning. For that reason the appropriate heading for this initial portion of the lectures would be 'The Concept of the History of Philosophy'. Nevertheless, we have retained the traditional heading in order to avoid misunderstanding.

This conceptual character of the first part of the lectures is the basis for its special position in contrast to the historical sections that follow. The conceptual-introductory parts of the seven Berlin lecture series are related

to one another differently than are their corresponding historical parts. It is true that these seven 'introductions' do not vary from one another as much as do the different versions of Hegel's lectures on other topics, such as the *Philosophy of Religion*. Still, the variance here is much greater than it is among the historical parts of these lectures. For this reason the editors of the German edition organized their first volume differently from the others, which present the history of philosophy from the Greeks onward, by using the 1825–6 lectures as the representative text.

The first German volume uses the 1825–6 lectures (given during the winter term at the Königliche Universität in Berlin) to represent Hegel's discussion of the literature on the topic, and his presentation of Oriental philosophy. But it includes all seven of the 'introductions' from the various Berlin series, with their differing treatments of the 'concept' of our topic. By following this plan, the editors make available the varying treatments of the different lecture series that are of interest, but without repeating for each series the much bulkier historical sections that undergo less change, and for which the 1825–6 materials are capable of standing as mature representation of the whole. While the German edition gives each of the seven Berlin introductions in its entirety, this English edition, in order to avoid unnecessary repetition, translates in full the 1825–6 introduction while providing only some of the material from the group of other introductions. We present the 1819 introduction (the earliest one for which the German edition provides a text) in full, to furnish a baseline against which the others can be seen as modifications. We also present the 1829–30 introduction in full, as the last complete text. Selected passages (some quite extensive) from the other four introductions suffice to show their more interesting departures from, or additions to, the three complete versions. For fuller information on the conception of the German and English editions, see Sections VI and VII of this Editorial Introduction.

III. How the Lectures Developed Over Time

In Hegel's day the history of philosophy, like the philosophy of religion, was not an obvious topic for philosophical lectures. So it is all the more striking that he took up the history of philosophy on so many occasions. In his day the principal studies of the history of philosophy (those by Brucker, Buhle, Tennemann, and Tiedemann) were in books not linked to lectures. The philosophy of religion and the history of philosophy were not among the traditional, canonical subjects of school-philosophy. As a historical

discipline, the history of philosophy was not acknowledged by the prevailing conception of scientific method, which bore the stamp of rationalism. Only at the end of the eighteenth century, with the demise of the older school-philosophy and the incipient historicizing of the sciences, when the canon of philosophical disciplines was fundamentally reconfigured, did the history of philosophy win a position as a specific form of the scientific treatment of philosophy. Later, in the wake of historicism, this position became consolidated, but it was burdened by the assumption that the history of philosophy has to do with the history of reason.

Initially, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the hallmark of a theory of the history of philosophy was the link between rational, or a priori, elements and historical elements. On the one hand, a historical discipline is doubtless involved, and to that extent this history cannot be disengaged from the method of historiography as such. On the other hand, however, its particular object—in Kantian terms, the a priori, in Hegelian terms, the rational—separates the historiography of philosophy from all other historical disciplines. The central problem, indeed the measure of its philosophical dignity, concerns whether a history of philosophy must confine itself to reporting on the essentially contingent origin and demise of individual edifices of thought, or whether, over and above this, it also succeeds in reconstructing an actual history of the rational content of philosophy itself.

Hegel's treatment of the history of philosophy has this setting of the problem in common with the efforts of others in his day, although he does not debate with these competing projects to the extent we should have expected.[3] The Kantian style of philosophical historiography that prevailed, and that Hegel judges harshly—especially in his remarks about the literature (see below in our text)—seems unsympathetic to his own more profound discussion of the appropriate method of philosophical historiography. But surely the decisive factor in Hegel's distance from these other projects is his belief that, within the framework of his own system, he had solved this contentious problem of the relationship between reason and history.

In his first 'Lectures on the History of Philosophy' in 1805–6, Hegel may already have set forth the basic concepts of this solution, so far as we can judge from later reports and from individual fragments. Based on the perspective of his earlier work, it is surprising that Hegel so quickly

3. See esp. Lutz Geldsetzer, *Philosophie der Philosophiegeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert* (Meisenheim am Glan, 1968).

made this topic a focus of his teaching activity. In his early writings of the years at Tübingen, Bern, and Frankfurt, there is nothing about the problems of method in philosophical historiography. From the initial years of his docentship at Jena (1801–3), we do find scattered remarks on the history of philosophy, but not ones that suggest Hegel would soon apply himself to this topic. The earliest of these are in the introductory remarks of the *Differenzschrift*, which concerns the 'historical aspect of philosophical systems', and is Hegel's first philosophical publication under his own name.[4] In it he recognizes very well the historical character of philosophical systems, a character he regards as based in the way that living structures inevitably appear. His specific interest at this point is to counteract historical relativizing, namely, a teleological approach that employs an image of perfectibility, and takes continuous improvement to be possible by means of newly discovered techniques. He vehemently repudiates a historical treatment that views the beginnings as mere 'preliminary exercises' for a subsequent, perfected standpoint. Instead of demonstrating a progressive development of reason, Hegel takes as the task of our engagement with earlier systems the reaffirmation of 'the ancients'. It is true that by this time Hegel already regards philosophical systems as shapes that spirit creates from the building blocks of an age, as its way of overcoming the characteristic form of spirit's cleavage in that age. Nevertheless, this historical character of philosophical systems remains external to their truth; for reason expresses the absolute, inasmuch as reason frees consciousness from its limitations, even its historical limitations. Any reason that orients itself to itself in this way produces a true philosophy. 'Each philosophy is complete in itself and, like an authentic work of art, carries the totality within itself.'[5] In each philosophy there dwells the 'living spirit'. Making this known calls for a kindred spirit in the interpreter, for whom the otherwise hidden life becomes manifest. Without this kindred spirit, even the greatest system remains something merely past, sunk back into 'lifeless opinion'. Pronouncements about the actuality of the historical shapes of philosophy do not involve these shapes themselves, but instead involve the conditions under which a philosophy is received in a later time. They are every bit as much pronouncements about that later vantage point from which the judgments are made.

4. *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy* (1801), trans. H. S. Harris and Walter Cerf (Albany, 1977); see pp. 85–9. C. L. Reinhold is his principal target here.

5. *Difference*, p. 89.

This earliest view in the *Differenzschrift* does not provide a point of departure for developing a conception of the history of philosophy as a philosophical discipline in its own right, although by this time Hegel already had a very good command of a number of the shapes from ancient and modern history of philosophy.[6] Nor is there any such conception in the few fragments preserved from his lectures then on 'Introduction to Philosophy' and on 'Logic and Metaphysics'.[7] In his first lectures on the history of philosophy, in the winter term 1805–6, Hegel once again may have relied upon the viewpoint that there is in fact no historical development of philosophy, that all hinges on whether the recipient of the past chooses to turn that past into living spirit, or instead into dead ashes. The groundwork for turning to the history of philosophy was doubtless laid by his concept of spirit, which Hegel continuously worked out from 1803 on, in giving his conception of system a new orientation. Our information about his view of the history of philosophy at that time is available only from two reports that are neither very detailed nor very reliable (one of which just paraphrases the other), and from a few fragments probably belonging to these 1805–6 lectures.

The two reports emphasize the continuity between this first lecture series and his later Berlin conception. In the 1840s Karl Rosenkranz wrote in retrospect that in 1805–6 Hegel saw 'himself for the first time in his historical relationship to his predecessors'. Rosenkranz added that 'in his later presentations, in their printed form too, Hegel never essentially altered these lectures on the history of philosophy, but just elaborated them more fully'.[8] In the second report, one of Hegel's Jena pupils, who was his disciple in Berlin, Georg Andreas Gabler, in looking back from the 1840s, wrote this:

> The lectures that Hegel himself first worked out at that time, after the most diligent and incessant study of the sources, were heard by all with a most intense interest, one stimulated in particular by the new and unprecedented dialectical progression from system to system. I recall how one philosophical shape after another rose up, was allowed to occupy the stage for a time and to be considered, but then in its turn was relegated to the grave. One evening at the end of the session, a quite aged man

6. In addition to his familiarity with his contemporaries (Kant, Jacobi, Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling), the evidence includes his treatise, *Verhältnis des Skeptizismus zur Philosophie, Darstellung seiner Modifikationen, und Vergleichung des neuesten mit dem alten. Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie von Gottlob Ernst Schulze* (1802); see *GW* iv. 197–238. Also, he collaborated with H. E. G. Paulus in the latter's Spinoza edition, *Benedicti de Spinoza opera quae supersunt omnia* (Jena, 1802–3).

7. *GW* v. 257–65, 267–75.

8. Karl Rosenkranz, *G. W. F. Hegel's Leben* (Berlin, 1844), p. 201.

from Mecklenburg sprang up and cried out, 'That is death, and in this way all things must perish'.[9]

These reports see no basis for distinguishing between the Jena and Berlin conceptions, apart from the fact that in Berlin the 'dialectic' mentioned was no longer something 'new and unprecedented', and that the lectures there had much fuller material content. Neither of these reports should be rated very highly as a source. Rosenkranz may have based his report on Gabler's, which had been prepared expressly for Rosenkranz's Hegel biography. Also, Gabler himself very likely did not base his judgment on acquaintance with Hegel's lecture manuscript, the no-longer-extant 'Jenaisches Heft' ('Jena Notebook'), nor was he an auditor of the Berlin lectures. Instead he probably drew upon the published edition in the *Werke*, and on his own memory of the Jena lectures given almost four decades earlier.

Contrary to these reports, some parts of the edition of the Association of Friends, which is presumed to contain fragments from the Jena Notebook, allow us to conclude that Hegel's approach at that time was heavily dependent on the conception of logic outlined in his concurrent philosophy of spirit, and on the *Phenomenology* constructed upon this logic.[10] This means not only that the categorial apparatus must have been different from its later counterpart, oriented to the *Science of Logic*, but also that we can surmise that this earlier approach adopted a far less mediated connection between logic and history, with history placed, perhaps even forced, much more strongly into the service of system than is the case in the Berlin lectures. In addition, Michelet reported that subsequently Hegel no longer made use of his introduction from the Jena Notebook, and that, as editor he (Michelet) found it to be, in comparison with 'the clarity, sterling quality, and persuasive power of the later introductions, unusable except for individual passages'.[11] This indicates a greater discrepancy in Hegel's approaches than does Gabler's report. But since Michelet did not incorporate the introduction from the Jena Notebook into his edition, and neither fragments of this notebook nor student transcripts of this first lecture series have come down to us, we cannot today obtain any reliable information about Hegel's conception of the introduction in the 1805–6

9. Gabler's report is in 'Dokumente zu Hegels Jenaer Dozententätigkeit (1801–7)', ed. Heinz Kimmerle and published in *Hegel-Studien* 4 (1967), pp. 69–70.

10. An example of a presumptive fragment from the Jena Notebook comes in the conclusion of the lectures in *W.* xv. 686–92. For the outline of the logic, see *GW* viii. 286.

11. See *W.* xiii, p. vii for this assessment.

lectures. We also know nothing about Hegel's two Heidelberg lecture series on the topic.[12] Sources for the lectures on the history of philosophy are preserved only from the Berlin years.

At this already very extensive stage of their development in Berlin, the conceptual foundations of the history-of-philosophy lectures, and the basic model for the historical presentation, underwent no further alterations. The conceptual basis remained unchanged in all the Berlin introductions. The four-part arrangement more or less clearly underlies each of the series, and even the formulation of detail is sometimes identical among them. Along with these similarities, however, we find a number of shifts in emphasis. In the Foreword to his edition, Michelet remarks that in the Berlin lectures Hegel did most of his reworking on the introduction.[13] Clearly this is on the whole correct. In the later lectures, especially from 1825–6 on, Hegel's delivery gained greater independence from the manuscript that he had once again begun to write out in 1823. While familiar points are repeated, some themes get in part reworked, in part newly introduced. For instance, in the last two completed series, 1827–8 and 1829–30, the theme of 'philosophy and religion' moves strikingly into the foreground, surely as a result of the increasingly sharper tone of the general debate about this issue, and especially because of the polemic directed against Hegel.

One important aspect of this thematic expansion we can only indicate, but not document fully, in this edition. It is the growing attention Hegel pays to what he terms 'Oriental Philosophy', despite the fact that he never counts it as part of the history of philosophy proper, which for him makes its beginning in Greece with spirit's 'presence-to-self' there. To the first Berlin lectures in 1819 Hegel added a treatment of Oriental philosophy, which for him then comprised Chinese, Egyptian, Indian, and Persian religion. He inserted it in the middle of the introduction, between its second part and his discussion of the beginning of the history of philosophy proper.[14] This material is omitted from the 1819 introduction in this edition because the correlative treatments of Oriental philosophy in the lectures other than 1825–6

12. The fragment published by Johnannes Hofmeister (on which, see pp. 30–3 below), and called by him the *Heidelberger Niederschrift* ('Heidelberg Written Copy'), consists of two unrelated texts. The first is generally held to be Hegel's inaugural address at Heidelberg in 1816, and as such does not belong in our volume. The second, given synoptically in its entirety alongside the 1820 manuscript in the new German edition, and excerpted in this English edition, belongs to 1823, the third lecture series given at Berlin. Detailed evidence for this appears in the editorial report of *GW* xviii.

13. *W.* xiii, p. viii. 14. See p. 161 below.

could not be included as well. Its content reappears in the corresponding parts of the *Philosophy of Religion*. In the 1820–1 lectures, in two adjacent contexts, Hegel speaks first of Indian mythology and then of the religion of Zoroaster.[15] In the 1823–4 series he once again goes into the Iranian and Chinese religions, albeit very briefly and while discussing the concept of mythology in connection with the symbolic presentation of spiritual relationships. Only in the 1825–6 lectures does the treatment of Oriental philosophy find the place that it occupies thereafter, between the introduction proper, which concludes with remarks on the literature, and the first part of the history as such. There it no longer serves as a mere excursus within the introduction but instead becomes, in a meaningful sense, the 'pre-history' to the history of philosophy. It surely owes this new position not only to a shift in Hegel's plan of composition, but also to the circumstance that, in preparing these lectures, Hegel became aware of the most recently published information about Indian philosophy, which seemed to him for the first time to justify speaking of it as 'philosophy' and not simply as 'mythology' or 'religion'.

IV. Sources for Reconstructing the Lectures

A. MANUSCRIPT MATERIALS

Only five fragments remain from the manuscripts of the lectures. These are the 1820 and 1823 manuscripts of the introduction, and three short drafts of little significance for the content, which are not included in this edition but may be found in *GW* (xviii. 36–94, 95–106, 107–11) under the title 'Blätter zur Geschichte der Philosophie'. Others of Hegel's extensive lecture manuscripts and sheets of notes have not survived.

1. The 1820 Manuscript

This detailed though fragmentary manuscript comprises what Hoffmeister calls the 'Berliner Niederschrift' (here called the 'Berlin Copy' when referring to Hoffmeister's use of it). It comprises part of the introduction. Hegel gave it a title page with this inscription:

> History of Philosophy
> Berlin, begun 24 Oct. 1820

15. Passages omitted in this English edition.

Today the property of the Staatsbibliothek in Berlin, this fragment consists of two parts unequal in size: an extensive manuscript in quarto, and a shorter one in folio.[16]

Contrary to what Hoffmeister says in his edition of this manuscript, the numbering of the sheets does not agree with their original sequence. Proceeding on the basis of an erroneous pagination, Hoffmeister concludes that the lecture sequence first follows the quarto manuscript, then the folio, and finally returns to the quarto.[17] By comparing Hegel's manuscript with the 1820–1 transcript, probably written by Wilhelm Haering, it is evident that Hegel spoke first from the entire quarto manuscript, although with a different page sequence, and only at the end turned to the folio manuscript.

This comparison also shows that Hegel's written copy, quite apart from the folio additions to the quarto, is only fragmentarily preserved or, more likely, remained a fragment. It comprises almost fully the first of the two main sections of the introduction, 'I. The Concept (and Determination) of the History of Philosophy', and the beginning of the second main point, the demarcation of the history of philosophy from other and related themes, such as the history of the sciences and of religion, and entitled, 'II. The Concept of Philosophy'. Missing are the promised sections concerning the beginning of the history of philosophy and, in connection with it, remarks about Oriental philosophy. The plan developed at the outset wholly lacks the two briefer thematic parts, 'Division' and 'Sources' of the history of philosophy. Correlative manuscript parts, which most assuredly can be assumed to have existed, even though they were perhaps just outlines from preceding years, have not survived. The fragmentary character of this manuscript, which previously escaped notice, is of lesser importance now that we can fill the gap, at least in rough outline, from a transcript of the same lecture series.

The manuscript not only breaks off prematurely, but also has a sizeable gap at the end of the first part, one apparently already present when it was used in Michelet's first edition. While the text of the 1820–1 transcript (apart from ceremonial words of introduction, most likely written out with a view to publication) at first runs parallel to the manuscript, right up to the first break in it, there are five pages of transcript with no manuscript counterpart. Since the preceding parallels pair nine manuscript pages

16. The manuscript is identified in the library collection as *Hegel-Nachlass* vol. vi (sheets 9–41) and vol. ii (sheets 42–8). See the editorial report in *GW* xviii for a detailed description of it.

17. Hoffmeister's sequence is: quarto 10a–21b, 25a–32b; folio 42a–48b; quarto 33a–41b.

(33a–41b) with seven transcript pages, we can assume that at least one manuscript double sheet is missing, and more likely two. After this gap the parallelism resumes, though finally fading away into a very loose thematic correspondence.

Instead of conjecturing that the 1820–1 transcript contains materials going beyond Hegel's delivery, we should conclude that the manuscript itself is incomplete. The themes of the transcript are: the superiority of the newer and more concrete philosophy over the earlier and more abstract principles of mechanism and Atomism; the inadequacy of Plato's philosophy of nature; the historical refutation of philosophical principles, or the completion of one-sided historical principles through their respective counterparts. These themes are given somewhat different verbal expression in the series of 1819 and of 1823–4 that are close to 1820–1 in time; they are fixtures of the introduction in the various series.

Today for the first time, through comparison of the 1820 manuscript with the first edition, and by utilizing the two transcripts of 1819, we recognize that the Berlin Copy—whatever may be its relation to the lost 'Heidelberger Abriss' ('Heidelberg Outline') mentioned by Michelet (see below, p. 18)—does not sketch out a wholly new concept. The Berlin Copy is surely the reworking, or even more likely an extensive copy, of an earlier manuscript from Berlin, or even from Heidelberg. It probably relates to this predecessor much as Hegel's fair copy of 1823 (discussed below, p. 15) relates to the 1820 manuscript, namely, as a stylistically polished copy that incorporates earlier marginal notes into the text and occasionally expands upon them with wholly new explanations. That is because the Berlin Copy of 1820 agrees with the first Berlin lectures of 1819 not only in its general course, but also in individual turns of phrase. We even find points of agreement between the 1819 transcripts and the 1820 manuscript that are not reflected in the only surviving transcript of the 1820 lectures, such as the anecdote about the sick man who declines to eat cherries and pears because his prescription specifies fruit, or Hegel's wordplay on the 'Ego homuncio' of Terence.[18] Of course we should not exclude the possibility that, in the written copy of his 1820 manuscript, Hegel had drawn upon a transcript from 1819, perhaps that of Leopold von Henning. There is evidence that he

18. See this volume, pp. 139 and 170–2 below. The reference to the smallness of the human being, in contrast to the sensible presence of the deity, from Terence, *Eunuchus* 591, also appears as a marginal addition to Hegel's manuscript (1821) for the philosophy-of-religion lectures. See *Philosophy of Religion*, iii. 134.

did something comparable later on.[19] But then the close agreement between the manuscript for delivery and the lecture transcript, an agreement also noteworthy for the 1820–1 sources, suggests that the 1819 lectures may already have had as their basis a correspondingly extensive manuscript, one serving as predecessor to the 1820 written text. This could be identical with the beginning of what Michelet calls the 'Heidelberg Outline', though, if that were the case, Michelet might well have pointed it out.

The far-reaching agreement between the 1820 manuscript and the 1819 lectures makes it probable that Hegel first wrote out the manuscript immediately before the beginning of the lectures, in September and October of 1820. (The date on the title page, as always, indicates the first lecture's date and not when the writing of the text began.[20]) The early break in this manuscript may exist because, after the beginning, the copy for this occasion did not have to read continuously for oral delivery, since Hegel could have relied upon older texts. Michelet conjectures that some manuscript passages—in particular the introductory passages of the 1823 manuscript, but some from the 1820 manuscript too—seem 'to have been devised not for oral delivery but just for publication; at least they have to a much lesser degree the characteristics of a lecture'.[21] This conjecture gains support from the fact that the passages in question, which are ceremonious in tone, are reproduced in few words by the 1820–1 transcript, as well as by the notebooks from 1819 and from later years, and so probably were not spoken in full.

Comparison of the 1820 manuscript with the earlier Berlin transcripts leads not only to the insight that it is a copy, probably even the copy of an older text, one envisioned as preparation for publication. Comparison also shows that the manuscript in its present form does not belong exclusively to the 1820–1 winter term, but evidences reworking at a later time, indeed in preparation for the 1823–4 lectures. For, apart from some marginal notations that may have been made in producing the written text, or close to it in time, the 1820 manuscript exhibits a uniform stage of revision that is identifiable from the flow of the handwriting, and above all from use of a very dark ink. Since most of these revisions were probably made in 1823, and a minority of them surely then, this whole stratum of revision should be ascribed to 1823. This is probable for all those instances where the manuscript agrees with the 1823–4 transcripts but not with the transcript

19. See *Philosophy of Religion*, i. 15–16. According to Marheineke, Hegel used a copy of Griesheim's transcript of 1824 in this fashion, when preparing his 1827 series of those lectures.
20. See *Berliner Schriften*, p. 744. 21. In his Foreword, *W.* xiii, p. viii.

from 1820–1. Indicative of this is the heading 'Treatment of the Ancient Philosophies', articulated in 1823–4 as: 'A second consequence that arises from what we said concerns the mode of treating the ancient philosophies.' Clearer still is the agreement between the manuscript revision and the 1823–4 transcripts, in taking up for the first time in 1823–4 the phrase 'Ex nihilo nihil fit' that Brucker's *History* attributes to Thales. The transcript reads: 'So, if we want further examples, we could also say that Thales tacitly adopted the saying 'Ex nihilo fit nihil', for he considered water as something foundational. . . .'

In both these instances we can weigh whether or not the passages were already in the 1820–1 manuscript, and not just delivered orally or not conveyed by the one surviving transcript. Still, Hegel's mention in a marginal note of the *Geschichte der Jonischen Philosophie*, by his Berlin colleague Heinrich Ritter, published in 1821, substantiates that this stage of revision is to be reckoned not to the written text of 1820, but, as the aforementioned agreements with the 1823–4 lectures (but not with later ones) show, to the preparation phase for 1823–4.

Not only do the insertions from this revision stage point to the context of 1823–4; the folio sheets (42a–48b) that constitute the latter part of the manuscript also do so. It is noteworthy that close agreement of the manuscript with the 1820–1 transcript ceases shortly before the end of the quarto sheets. With the folio we find only quite isolated points of contact and, in light of the broad thematic similarities, rather unspecific ones, such as the mention of Osiris. The assumption that the folio sheets belong to an earlier reworking can be ruled out on formal grounds, and on the basis of content. For one thing, the text of the quarto manuscript passes seamlessly over to the beginning of the folio, so it is an extremely improbable assumption that this revision had already been carried out. For another, the 1819 lectures have no recognizable connections to the folio elaborations, whereas the 1823–4 lectures do. Singular instances of the latter include the mention (in this context) of the Platonic dialogue *Parmenides*, the designation of myth as superfluous adornment not required by science, and finally, Hegel's ironic remark that the whole mystery of Freemasonry consists in the impression that something lies behind it. We should consider also the circumstances that in the folio there are no traces of the quarto revision stages oriented to 1823–4, and that Hegel wrote the folio manuscript from 45b onward in the same dark ink, which supports the assumption that these folio sheets, very likely reliant on an original continuation of the quarto manuscript, were first written in preparing for the 1823–4 lectures. In contrast to this, we find no indication in the entire

manuscript of a yet later revision, in preparation for the lecture series from 1825 and thereafter.

2. The 1823 Manuscript

This fragment too is the property of the Staatsbibliothek in Berlin.[22] Johannes Hoffmeister attached it to the 'Heidelberger Antrittsrede' ('Heidelberg Inaugural Address'—in the aforementioned *Nachlassband*), and interpreted it as the main constituent of a so-called 'Heidelberg Written Copy of the Introduction' to the History of Philosophy. But both the paper quality and the assessment of its content call for a later date for this fragment. It amounts to an augmented copy of the beginning of the just-discussed 1820 manuscript. Its multiple parallels with the Hotho and Hube transcripts of the 1823–4 lectures speak for its assignment to this series; it lacks such parallels with transcripts of other series. Thus in the 1823–4 transcripts too we find the thought that the history of philosophy's productions are the finer to the extent that they bear less of the stamp of particular individuality. The individual character of the philosopher disappears, 'for each deed is the finer to the extent that the subject has to a lesser degree impressed its particularity upon it'. Also, the fragmentary articulation of the introduction finds its parallel in the 1823–4 transcripts. As his first point, Hegel mentions 'the characterization of the history of philosophy . . . , from which flow consequences for how one treats it'. Corresponding to this are the three consequences discussed by the transcripts.[23] A further and conclusive indicator for dating the fragment in the 1823–4 setting is the marginal notation, referring to Marheineke's *Lehrbuch des christlichen Glaubens und Lebens* (Berlin, 1823), §133.4, a notation unquestionably in the handwriting of the original written text.[24] In any event, neither of the two transcripts includes this reference, nor do they include the newly sketched opening passages that Hegel had written down with a view to publication and not for the lectures themselves. Michelet surmised as much, and the confirmation is this insight into the relationship of the two fragments, since it seems quite unlikely that Hegel should have written out for a second time the comparatively

22. It is identified as *Hegel-Nachlass Mappe*, folder 2, sheets 2–10. See the editorial report in *GW* xviii for a detailed description of it.

23. Compare the first of the two immediately preceding quotations (which comes verbatim from a passage in the 1823 introduction transcript not translated in this volume) with its alternative version in the 1823 manuscript, on p. 208 below. The second quotation comes from the 1823 manuscript itself (p. 210 below).

24. See the editorial report in *GW* xviii for a fuller proof of this point.

clearly written 1820 manuscript, just for the purpose of giving these lectures.

3. Lost Materials: The Jena Notebook, the Heidelberg Outline, Individual Sheets, Miscellanies

For none of Hegel's lectures other than those on aesthetics is the loss of materials as momentous as it is for the history of philosophy. Aside from the two manuscript fragments just discussed, as well as three brief sheets of notations, all of Hegel's own written work on this topic, from more than two decades, is lost. We do not know whether the loss is the result of sheer misfortune, or of Hegel's family having intentionally destroyed portions of his literary remains. Supporting the latter explanation is the fact that not even single sheets from the abundance of this material have been found. Supporting the former is the fact that Michelet's set of lecture transcripts has not survived, which could indicate that Hegel's manuscripts were lost together with Michelet's transcripts.

Our knowledge of the original sources rests exclusively upon Karl Ludwig Michelet's Foreword to his edition of the history-of-philosophy lectures. For this reason we reproduce his report about the sources, which at that time were still complete.

> From these different years we possess only the Jena Notebook, executed in quarto in his own hand, and written almost throughout in good style. At that time he did not yet venture into free oral delivery. Attached to it is a shorter outline of the history of philosophy in quarto, compiled in Heidelberg and designed to be expanded upon in oral delivery. It contains, in carefully worked out, concise language, the chief moments of importance for each philosophy. All the additions that he made, in the course of later iterations, are in part either spelled out, or indicated in the margins of the Jena Notebook or of the Outline, and in part entered on a number of individually inserted sheets that are seldom in good style, and most of them contain only thoughts jotted on paper in sketchy fashion. These sheets are of inestimable value, because they document in his own hand the extremely abundant additions to all the lectures of later years. We can always see clearly what his free delivery, as we find it in the transcript texts, has made out of these sketches, and where and how, if need be, that delivery, or rather its transcribed image, must be corrected by them....
>
> The sources of the introduction in particular are comprised by... a portion (in the best condition) of Hegel's manuscript partly in quarto, partly in folio, almost exclusively from Berlin, with the rest at least from Heidelberg. He never made later use of the introduction in the Jena Notebook, and it was in fact unusable by the editor, even down to individual passages. Clarity, high quality, and persuasive power emerge especially in the later introductions. Of all his lectures, he reworked these introductions the most. Perhaps more than half of this Jena introduction, as with

the foreword, is written and not just spoken words, and for the rest too, as in the case of the introduction to Greek philosophy, the sketches, right down to individual items, are so elaborated that only a few brush strokes wait to be added. Some sheets, namely, what stands between the foreword and the introduction, and then a few initial parts of the introduction itself, seem as if Hegel himself did not intend them for oral delivery at all, but directly for publication; at least the atmosphere of the lecture hall slips into the background.

The presentation of Oriental philosophy, derived from the transcript notebooks, affords more specific evidence for a rich assemblage of miscellaneous items, excerpts from English and French works on the Orient as such. The pertinent ones, furnished with brief marginal notes, he took with him to the rostrum in order to speak freely from them, partly by direct oral translation and partly by inserting his own remarks and judgments.[25]

Unfortunately Michelet's statements are not sufficiently illuminating to enable us to gain from them a full picture of these four lost manuscript groups, and especially of the Jena Notebook. We do not learn how close the early Jena draft stands to the later elaborations, and whether Hegel had from the beginning included all of the philosophies he treated later on. In contrast to his practice with the *Philosophy of Religion* lecture manuscript,[26] Hegel apparently revised the Jena Notebook further, right up to the last of his different lecture series, or based himself upon it, albeit in conjunction with other manuscripts. This indicates a compatibility of the earlier outline with the later ones, at least in their basic features. Michelet even reports that Hegel 'in the later Berlin lectures... more and more went back to this notebook and spoke literally from it, as he often did in the intervening years'. This picture is somewhat modified when Michelet continues that Hegel 'certainly always had it with him on the rostrum, as he did the Outline'.[27]

Michelet's further comments about this indicate a certain aloofness with regard to the Jena Notebook, when it comes to its terminology, construction, and scientific reliability. He says the Notebook employs 'Hegel's initial terminology as it is conceived partly for its own sake, partly in transition to the terminology of the *Phenomenology*—as compared to the more mature terminology of later years'.[28] Michelet says that Hegel's translations of ancient philosophers show 'a freshness of first-hand impression in the Jena

25. See Michelet's Foreword (in *W.* xiii, pp. vi–viii) for these quotations.
26. See *Philosophy of Religion*, i. 13. 27. *W.* xiii, p. vii.
28. *W.* xiii, p. x, which refers to its characteristics as discussed in the 'Introduction to Hegel's Philosophical Treatises' (*W.* i, pp. xlvi–l). This separately edited treatise is often bound together with *W.*; it is not included in the Glockner edition of the *Werke*.

Notebook that does not go unnoticed by the reader'.[29] This commendable characteristic also serves to set the original freshness of Hegel's labor over against the 'excessive erudition' of the more recent historians of philosophy, and thereby to render understandable and excusable any shortcomings in Hegel's elaboration. Michelet's aloofness is more overt when he remarks 'that very often the earlier lectures—namely, the Jena Notebook, not to mention the Outline—set forth the most abstract and simple concept of the subject matter, whereas the later lectures contain its development'. He says he could 'call the Jena Notebook the foundation—but only the foundation—or, so to speak, the skeleton, on which the tasty meat of the later fullness of thought found its place'.[30]

Michelet's statement is unambiguous in only one aspect: 'He [Hegel] never made later use of the introduction in the Jena Notebook, and it was in fact unusable by the editor, even down to individual passages. Clarity, high quality, and persuasive power emerge especially in the later introductions. Of all his lectures, he reworked these introductions the most.'[31] But, since Hegel developed the foundations of his overall conception precisely in the introductions, the unusability of the Jena Notebook for the introductory parts of Michelet's edition reflects a profound change in conception.

Also, we can gain no clear picture of the character of the individual sheets inserted into the Jena Notebook, or of the Heidelberg Outline.[32] Michelet seems not to have assigned them to the manuscripts for the 1820 and 1823 introductions, because he writes that these sheets are 'seldom in good style, and most of them contain only thoughts jotted on paper in sketchy fashion', and because he contrasts them, as sketches, with the elaborated transcripts.[33] It is questionable whether the three surviving fragments not included in this volume[34] are to be assigned to this sheaf of materials, or have come to us by another route.

We are to understand as belonging to the Miscellanies and Excerpts, such notes as Plutarch's report on Iranian religion, or the excerpts with the cosmogonies of Sanchuniathon and Berosus that Michelet has interwoven into passages of the 1823–4 lectures.[35] There is evidence for a comparable

29. *W.* xiii, p. xv. 30. *W.* xiii, p. xiii. 31. *W.* xiii, pp. vii–viii.

32. Hoffmeister has spoken eloquently about the imprecision of Michelet's accounts (pp. viii–xiii).

33. *W.* xiii, p. vi. 34. See *GW* xviii. 107–11.

35. See *W.* xiii. 100–4. In 1819, and perhaps also earlier, Hegel reported on these cosmogonies in an addendum to remarks on Oriental religions; see n. 38, p. 161 below. Hegel no longer mentions them in the subsequent lecture series, presumably because he rejects the ethnographic treatment of the history of philosophy by some of his contemporaries; see below,

collection of sketches and excerpts for the philosophy-of-religion lectures too.[36]

B. LECTURE TRANSCRIPTS

Because almost all of Hegel's manuscripts for the history of philosophy have been lost, in this case the lecture transcripts gain even greater significance than they do for the philosophy of religion or for the philosophy of history. It is fortunate that few transcripts have been lost. Missing are the transcripts by von Henning (1819), Michelet (1823–4), and Kampe (1829–30). The last of these is 'missing' only if it is not identical with the Berlin Anonymous transcript of the same series.[37]

The transcripts are named and characterized as indicated below. They fall into three groups. The first group consists of verbatim transcripts (*Mitschriften*), which were written down while the lectures were given. They have the advantage of being a direct record of the actual words and sequences of a lecture series, but are for the most part defective in their syntactic structure. There are only a few of these verbatim transcripts. The second and most numerous group consists of fair copies (*Reinschriften*), whose authors reworked them later, while nevertheless striving to follow and reconstruct the original wording of the lectures as far as possible. The third group contains freely edited transcripts (*Ausarbeitungen*). They were completely reformulated later, and not with the intention of extensively reconstructing Hegel's delivery. Instead, their authors sought to grasp the lecture's thought-sequence in its own form, and they sometimes formulated it better than Hegel may have succeeded in doing in his oral delivery.

The following transcripts are known to have existed for the seven lecture series given in Berlin.

1. The 1819 Lectures
 a. *Jürgen Bona Meyer* (Me.). 'Die Geschichte der Philosophie geschrieben nach dem Vortrage des Professor Hegel Berlin im Sommer 1819.' (University Library, Munich.) A full, carefully done fair copy,

p. 248 with n. 142. One representative of this orientation, Friedrich Ast, cited the fragments of Berosus' cosmogony in a similar form; see his *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, 2nd edn. (Landshut, 1825), pp. 38–9. Hegel's formulation, however, in part goes beyond Ast's version.

36. See *Philosophy of Religion*, i. 12–13.

37. Hoffmeister rejected the identification (p. xxii).

it confirms and enlarges upon the transmission of the introduction by the 1819 transcript Ca. Subsequent passages, in contrast, show a degree of agreement with Ca. that could be achieved only by copying (perhaps even from He. as a common source?), or by collaboration with He. on the written text. Me. contains sections on Oriental philosophy—namely, on Chinese, Indian, and Iranian mythology—that are surprisingly full for this comparatively early lecture series. Ca. provides only rudimentary confirmation for this Oriental material. Nevertheless the flow of the written text does not justify the assumption that it incorporates later material, all the more so because, in Hegel's partial treatment in 1820–1 of thematic sources from 1819, he covers this material much more briefly. Certainly later in date are the marginal additions referring to publications that had not yet appeared, and which are thus not taken into consideration in the 1819 text of this edition. (Lead text in this edition. Used in the first edition.)

b. *Moriz Carrière* (Ca.). 'Hegels Vorlesung über die Geschichte der Philosophie.' (Hegel-Archiv, Ruhr-Universität, Bochum.) Not actually a transcript, this is instead a copy of a transcript, as shown by an entry at the end that reads: 'Transcribed from Henning's notebook from the eleventh to the twenty-third of April, 1820.' It offers a transmission that is on the whole reliable, and is independent for the introduction but not for the subsequent parts. The text is somewhat less comprehensive than the parallel in Me.; the elaboration of Oriental philosophy is much briefer. (Used in the first edition.)

c. *Leopold von Henning* (He.). This transcript is lost. Ca. mentions it, and presents itself as a copy of He. Nothing is known about the character of He. The fair copy character of Ca. may have come about in the copying. It is more likely, however, that, for copying, Carrière chose as his model a text that was already a fair copy.

2. The 1820–1 Lectures

d. *Wilhelm Haering* (Ha.). (Northwestern University Libraries, Evanston, Illinois.) This transcript bears the notation in pencil: 'Winter 1820/21 [...] Haering'. The library catalogue entry states: 'Haering (probably Häring, Wilhelm, 1798–1871)'. He was the author later known by the pseudonym Willibald Alexis. A transcript of 317 pages, it is the only one from this lecture series, and is a carefully made fair copy, probably written out by a secretary. For some of the technical terms (Cabala, Scholastic, noumenon, and

others) the copyist left small gaps most of which were filled in by another hand (Haering's?), but not always correctly. For instance, one gap is filled in with 'the matter', when it should surely read 'a son'. (Used in the first edition.)

3. The 1823–4 Lectures
 e. *Heinrich Gustav Hotho* (Ho.). 'Geschichte der Philosophie Nach dem Vortrage des Herrn Prof. Hegel. Im Winter 1823/24.' (Staatsbibliothek, Berlin.) It consists of about 360 pages, many of which lack numbers. This is a carefully done fair copy, and not an elaboration as in the case of Hotho's notebook on the philosophy of religion. Ho. shows few gaps in understanding, but frequently condenses the spoken word. (Used by Hoffmeister. Lead text in this edition.)
 f. *Romuald Hube* (Hu.). 'Geschichte der Philosophie.' (Jagiellońska Library, Cracow.) A carefully done fair copy that is independent of Ho., its formulation and orthography show throughout that the author is not a native speaker of German. As a transmission, Hu. is equal in value to Ho., but on stylistic grounds it is inferior to it. More complete than Ho. in rendering details, Hu. is unfortunately less precise. Thus it functions as a very good supplement to Ho. Several repetitions, even departures from Ho., indicate that Hu. worked from multiple sources. (Used by Hoffmeister.)
 g. *Karl Ludwig Michelet* (Mi.). This lost transcript is mentioned and used in the first edition.

4. The 1825–6 Lectures[38]
 h. *Anonymous* (An.). 'Geschichte der Philosophie von Hegel.' 484 pages. (Polish Academy of Sciences, Cracow Division.) The lower part of the first sheet is cut away, which likely resulted in the loss of the author's name. A dedication written in Polish on the back side of this sheet bears the name Zygmunt Helcel. (In the first volume of the edition of the Association of Friends, a Joseph Thadäus Helcel of Cracow is mentioned as being among the subscribers.) This is a full and directly verbatim transcript, in German handwriting. We conclude from this, as well as from its error-free German (in

38. For several of these transcripts from 1825–6 we use different abbreviations than does the German edition. This is to preserve consistency with our practice in the English edition volumes already published. Those affected are: Anonymous = An. (German edition has 'Hc.'); Löwe = Lw. (German 'Lö.'); Pinder = Pn. (German 'Pi.').

contrast to Hu.), that the transcript had a German author. By literal standards it is not so carefully formulated, but it is sometimes more faithful than Gr. On the whole, Gr. is broadly confirmed by An., and in part corrected and augmented by it. (Used in Hoffmeister's edition.)

i. *Karl Gustav von Griesheim* (Gr.). 'Geschichte der Philosophie.' 387 pages (vol. i) plus 259 pages (vol. ii). (Staatsbibliothek, Berlin.) This transcript is a very full, and on the whole reliable, fair copy, about 50 per cent fuller in content than An. or Pn. In a few places it revises stylistically, and even augments, Hegel's delivery. The editors of the present German edition do not concur with Hoffmeister's criticism of Gr.[39] While it is correct that Gr. contains all the usual flaws of transcripts—mishearing, misunderstanding, errors in deciphering the notes written down during the actual lectures—we emphasize strongly that on the whole Gr. is still the most valuable transmission of the 1825–6 lectures. (Used in the first edition and in Hoffmeister's edition.)

j. *J. C. Löwe* (Lw.). 'Geschichte der Philosophie nach Hegel. (Written in another hand: W. S. 1825/1826.) J. C. Löwe.' 312 pages. (Staatsbibliothek, Berlin.) It is a full, fair copy that, on the one hand, is related to Gr. and, on the other hand, is in some spots inferior to the transmission by Gr. For that reason it cannot corroborate Gr., but in a few passages it can augment and correct Gr. (Used in the first edition.)

k. *Moritz Pinder* (Pn.). 'Geschichte der Philosophie von Prof. Hegel. Berlin. Winterhalbjahr 1825/26. Moritz Pinder.' 438 pages. (Hegel-Archiv, Ruhr-Universität, Bochum.) It is a very full source, although in formulation somewhat strongly inclined to terseness. It is probably a directly verbatim transcript. Pn. evidences great similarity to Gr. and even more to Hu., but without being related to them. For that reason it serves for corroboration and correction of Gr., and occasionally to supplement it. (Used in the first edition.)

l. *Friedrich Stieve* (Sv.). 'Geschichte der Philosophie. Vorgetragen von Herrn Prof. Hegel Berlin den 31.10.1825.' 238 pages. (Staatsbibliothek, Berlin.) It is a fair copy that clearly abbreviates the text and is, in its reproduction of the wording, inferior to the other sources. (Hoffmeister regards it as a direct transcript and uses it in his edition.)

39. Hoffmeister, pp. xvi–xviii.

5. The 1827–8 Lectures

m. *August Diecks* (Di.). 'Geschichte der Philosophie. Vorgetragen von Herrn Professor Hegel zu Berlin, im Wintersemester 1827/8 August Diecks, philol. stud.' 151 pages. (Privately owned.) It is a fair copy that is carefully done, yet spare and also loosely worded. The transcriber's goal seems to have been not a word-for-word transmission, but a substantively correct and exacting reproduction of pertinent points. Thus Di. can be adopted into the text in only a few passages where the transmission by Hk. is insufficient. (Used in the first edition.)

n. *A. Hueck* (Hk.). 'Geschichte der Philosophie nach den Vorträgen des Herrn Prof. Hegel Berlin im Winterhalbjahr 1827/28.' (St Petersburg Public Library.) It is a full and carefully done fair copy. (Hoffmeister regards it as a direct transcript and uses it in his edition. Lead text in this edition.)

o. *K. Weltrich* (Wh.). (Formerly in the possession of Hermann Glockner, it was lost to fire in the Second World War. On this, see Glockner's notice in *Hegel-Studien*, Beiheft 2:505.) It was used by Hoffmeister in his edition. He characterizes it as follows: 'Comparable in scope and character to the Stieve notebook, it serves mainly to support Hueck's text, with which it strongly agrees. It has the added advantage of providing the individual lecture dates and the topic for each.'[40]

6. The 1829–30 Lectures

p. *Anonymous* (As.). It is transmitted via the St. transcript for 1831 (on which, see below). David Friedrich Strauss, who had come to Berlin at the beginning of the 1831–2 winter term in order to hear Hegel, reported on 15 November 1831, the day after Hegel's death, in the postscript of a letter to his friend Chr. Märklin, that 'a lawyer and long-time disciple of Hegel' had entrusted to him notebooks for copying. In another letter to Märklin (6 February 1832) he was more specific about these notebooks, saying: 'In addition, I have studied thoroughly, and made extracts from, good notebooks of a number of Hegel's lectures—those on logic, the history of philosophy, the philosophy of world history, and the philosophy of religion—since

40. Hoffmeister, p. xx.

these will not soon appear in published form.'[41] (Used in the first edition.)

q. *Anonymous* (*Berlin*) (Ab.). 'Geschichte der Philosophie, vorgetragen vom Professor Hegel zu Berlin im Winter semester 1829–1830.' (Staatsbibliothek, Berlin.) It is a direct, verbatim transcript, very full and difficult to decipher, that is very faithful to Hegel's delivery. (Used in Hoffmeister's edition. Lead text in this edition.)

r. *Anonymous* (*Chicago*) (Ac.). 'Geschichte der Philosophie nach Hegel.' (The University of Chicago Library.) A fair copy, it is independent and of limited scope, although in formulation it agrees closely with Ab. and We. (Used in the first edition.)

s. *J. F. C. Kampe* (Ka.). This lost transcript is mentioned by, and incorporated into, the first edition. (Possibly identical with Ab.)

t. *A. Werner* (We.). 'Geschichte der Philosophie vorgetragen von Professor Hegel auf der Universität zu Berlin im Wintersemester 1829/30, angefangen den 26. (?) Oktober 1829. A. Werner.' (Hegel-Archiv, Ruhr-Universität, Bochum.) A full reproduction with gaps in a few passages, this fair copy is inferior to Ab. in directly reproducing Hegel's delivery, but surpasses it in accuracy of formulation. (Hoffmeister used it in his edition, and surmised—p. xxi—that the writer is Franz A. Werner, an Austrian author.)

7. The 1831 Lectures

u. *David Friedrich Strauss* (St.). 'Hegel's Geschichte der Philosophie in Auszug. Berlin Winter 1831.' 137 pages. (Deutsche Literaturarchiv, Schiller-Nationalmuseum, Marbach am Neckar.) Pages 3–11 of this text transmit the initial lecture sessions of November 1831. Then, after Hegel's death cut the series short, it continues with the introduction and actual historical discussion, according to an unidentified transcript (As.) that is from the 1829–30 lectures, as is evident from comparison with the other series. Strauss's work is not, as the title suggests, an 'extract' from the 1829–30 lectures, but instead a very compressed version of the whole, similar to what he provided in his notebooks on Hegel's philosophy of religion, and those on Schleiermacher's lectures on the life of Jesus. Thus St. affords a supplementary control on the 1829–30 lectures, but is not included in the text of

41. J. F. Sandberger, *D. F. Strauss als theologischer Hegelianer* (Göttingen, 1972). Includes previously unpublished correspondence. See pp. 192, 194.

them for this edition, because they are transmitted so well by others. (Used in the first edition.)

V. Previous Editions

There are two previous German editions of Hegel's lectures on the history of philosophy in their entirety, compiled by Karl Ludwig Michelet, as part of the *Werke* editions under the auspices of the Association of Friends.[42] Johannes Hoffmeister edited the introduction and the section on Oriental philosophy only, in 1940.[43] The following report concerns these three editions.

A. THE WERKE *OF 1833–6 (W.)*

The first two volumes of Michelet's edition appeared in 1833, just a few months after Marheineke's edition of the philosophy-of-religion lectures. Like it, Michelet's volumes vacillate between the character of a book and that of an edition of lectures.[44] We must regard their rapid appearance as an amazing accomplishment on the part of the editor, not only because the history-of-philosophy lectures are more extensive than the philosophy-of-religion lectures, but also because just before, in 1832, Michelet had already edited the initial volume in the Friends edition that contains Hegel's early Jena treatises. Another reason is that Michelet's first

42. The first edition has been reprinted, with minor editorial emendations in the footnotes, in vols. xviii–xx of *Hegel: Werke in zwanzig Bänden. Theorie-Werkausgabe*, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt am Main, 1971). The second edition has been reprinted as *Georg Wilh. Friedr. Hegel's Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, ed. G. J. P. J. Bolland (Leiden, 1908). For a long time the sole English translation of these lectures has been *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, 3 vols., made from Michelet's second edition of 1840, by E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (London, 1892; repr. London and New York, 1955, 1963). Recently it has been reissued (Lincoln, Nebr., 1995) with an introduction by Frederick C. Beiser.

43. The *Theorie-Werkausgabe* edition, mentioned in the preceding note, incorporates those parts of Hoffmeister's edition that contain the two manuscripts of the introduction by Hegel himself. Quentin Lauer, SJ, published an English translation of Hegel's 1825–6 introduction as given in the Nicolin-Hoffmeister edition (on which see below), in his *Hegel's Idea of Philosophy* (New York, 1971; 2nd edn. 1983). A somewhat fuller English version of this Hoffmeister text is *Hegel's Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, trans. T. M. Knox and A. V. Miller (Oxford, 1985).

44. See *Philosophy of Religion*, i. 20–4 for an account of Marheineke's editorial method. See also *W.* xiii, p. xvi.

edition of the history of philosophy included in its scope (reduced in the second edition) not only the transcripts but also Hegel's extant manuscripts, whereas Marheineke confined himself at first to readily decipherable transcripts, especially from the later lectures (leaving it for Bruno Bauer to include Hegel's handwritten material in the second edition of the philosophy of religion, with its wider scope).

So Michelet's first edition of these lectures is the one richest in materials. Unfortunately much of this material is no longer identifiable as to its source. This is partly because of the skimpy information he provides, and partly because of his method.[45] In his Foreword Michelet names and classifies Hegel's remaining manuscripts, but he leaves us in the dark as to his use of the lecture transcripts. He writes that he has 'drawn chiefly from three: 1) a notebook from the 1829–30 series by Dr. J. F. C. Kampe; 2) the notebook transcribed in winter 1825–6 by Captain von Griesheim; 3) my notebook from the 1823–4 winter term, in which I attended these lectures of Hegel's. I have not set eyes on notebooks transcribed in Heidelberg, and those transcribed in Jena will be made redundant by Hegel's own notebook.'[46] Based on this report, we may assume that all the notebooks Michelet utilized stem from the Berlin lectures. But it is an open question whether he made use of additional notebooks of the 1823–4, 1825–6, and 1829–30 lectures and, above all, whether he inserted supplementary material from these three series. So, those passages for which the extant lecture transcripts offer no parallel can be isolated. However, as we infer from his explicit statement, since Michelet also drew upon other transcripts unavailable to us, we can conclude with some assurance only that he used Hegel's manuscript for passages where we have additional criteria for identifying it.[47] Such criteria include express indications by Michelet or others,[48] peculiarities of terminology or of the sequence of thoughts,[49] or the presence of specific literary forms, such as translation with commentary.[50]

45. See Hoffmeister's criticism (pp. xxiii–xxxi) of Michelet, which is harsh and often justified, but sometimes misses the mark.

46. *W.* xiii, p. vii.

47. An example of such additional material (in this case from An. and Pn. of the 1825–6 lectures) is the formulation of *W.* xiii. 15 (lines 13–15), in the context of material from Griesheim's transcript but not found in it: 'What makes human beings nobler than animals is something we have only through the medium of thought.'

48. See as examples, Michelet's remark on the Jena lectures (*W.* xv. 680–1), and Karl Rosenkranz's identification of the final parts as a component of the Jena Notebook, in his *G. W. F. Hegel's Leben* (Berlin, 1844), p. 202, remarking on *W.* xv. 689.

49. The final part of the lectures (*W.* xv. 686–9) shows great affinity with the terminology and thought-sequence of the *Phenomenology*.

50. As one example of many, see *W.* xiv. 267–8.

In these instances, however, it remains uncertain whether the fragmentary manuscript in question stems from the Jena period, or from Heidelberg, or only from Berlin. As a further criterion, the source critic could rely upon Michelet's statement 'that very often the earlier lectures, namely, the Jena Notebook as well as the Outline, set forth the abstract, simple concept of the subject matter, whereas the later lectures contain its development. Thus, not infrequently, the sequence of elements for one and the same material can be chronological, with the Jena Notebook contents followed by those from one or several other lecture series, as their completion....'[51] One final guidepost could be the distinction between regular and italic type in the footnotes, although the reliability of this criterion is open to question.[52]

It would be a mistake to suppose that we can discover Hegel's manuscripts only where there are no parallel transcript texts. Working with parallel texts from distinct lecture series, Michelet's method is to interweave the sources he has at hand into a single text, indeed in such a way 'that the external juxtaposition not be noticeable to the reader, but, on the contrary, for it to seem as if the whole has issued from the spirit of the author in a single outpouring.... The editor's task consists generally in the art of interweaving not only larger pieces of different lecture series, but also, where necessary, individual sentences.'[53] Alongside longer passages that Michelet adopts from a single source, we find others in which he has welded several lecture series into one text that is no longer resolvable into its original elements, or in which he 'rectifies' the elaborated version of the transcripts by means of pages from the bundle of individual sheets.[54] So we are uncertain whether texts not based on the transcripts known to us trace back to Hegel's manuscripts, and we do not know whether the frequent emendations in the transcript texts are based on such manuscripts, or are simply drawn from other transcripts that have not come down to us.

This lack of clarity does not permit us to identify Hegel's handwritten materials with sufficient precision by a process of subtraction—at least not with the same assurance and the same scope as was possible in the

51. *W.* xiii, p. xiii.

52. According to *W.* xiii, p. xiii, footnotes set in regular type are supposed to designate notations in Hegel's own hand. This holds true for the reference to Marheineke in *W.* xiii. 21, but not for that to Flatt in xiii. 55; in any event, the reference is not found in Hegel's manuscript. Also, the footnote in *W.* xiii. 75, set in regular type, is not found in Hegel's manuscript of the introduction, but does occur word for word in Gr., and in similar terms in the other 1825–6 transcripts; see p. 74 below 'In my thinking...'.

53. *W.* xiii, p. xii. In the German edition, and here too, the statements quoted are presented in inverse order from their sequence in Michelet's Foreword.

54. *W.* xiii, p. vi.

philosophy-of-religion lectures.[55] Such a procedure would let us identify individual passages that we are justified in supposing to belong to Hegel's manuscript, passages that Hegel no longer included in the later lecture series. But those manuscript passages that Hegel delivered in the Berlin lectures too we can identify as belonging to Hegel's manuscript, not by the aforementioned subtraction procedure, but instead by showing that they underlie the delivery of multiple series. In these instances some word sequences are substantiated by the transcripts of one series, others by those of a second, others by a third. So, that a manuscript of Hegel's underlies such a passage is a conclusion proceeding from different parts of a mosaic handed down in the transcripts, to a pre-existing whole. This procedure is particularly fruitful for analysis of quotations fully attested from no single lecture series, but rather from their entirety.[56] Though we can be confident that such analyses, carried through with exactitude, yield glimpses into Michelet's editorial method, the philosophical harvest from this procedure is not commensurate with the requisite expenditure of effort. In any event, a comprehensive, yet still necessarily problematic, identification of such Hegel manuscript material would be the task of a source-critical treatment of the edition of the 'Friends', and not one for this editorial introduction.[57]

B. THE SECOND EDITION WERKE *OF 1840–4*

Apart from Hotho's edition of the *Lectures on Aesthetics*, in the 1830s all the first editions of lectures that Hegel delivered from manuscripts, and not from a textbook or compendium, received severe criticism, including the history-of-philosophy lectures in *W*. One exception was Ludwig Feuerbach's review in the Berlin *Jahrbüchern für wissenschaftliche Kritik (1835)*. It addresses almost exclusively the content of Hegel's lectures, but ends with the friendly remark: 'Finally, we cannot refrain from mentioning, with fulsome acknowledgment, the merit of the editor of these lectures, and from expressing to him the most heartfelt thanks for his editorial accomplishment, done with so much diligence, with such great care, and insightful

55. Because of such imponderable factors, the historical-critical edition of Hegel's lecture manuscript (in *GW* xviii) has not undertaken this sort of identification task either.

56. Many of the passages of *W*. marked in the editorial footnotes by the sign (MS?) have been identified by this procedure.

57. For an example of this work of identification, see Pierre Garniron, 'Hegels Geschichte der Philosophie der Moderne. Eine Untersuchung auf der Grundlage verschiedener Berliner Nachschriften', in *Logik und Geschichte in Hegels System*, ed. Hans-Christian Lucas and Guy Planty-Bonjour (Stuttgart, 1989), pp. 227–58.

criticism.'[58] In contrast, Johann Eduard Erdmann, following the appearance of the second edition, and thus in a time when controversy about Hegel's philosophy had already become sharper, attributes to Michelet's treatment part of the blame for mistakes commonly ascribed to Hegel: 'Many of the objections that a fair critic could make to Hegel's presentation of the history of philosophy are provoked by the manner of the editing.'[59] Criticism of this sort—above all about the failure of the lectures to have the character of a book—may indeed have been widespread considerably earlier. It gave Michelet the impetus to counteract it with a second edition. The description of his new editorial principles, in the Foreword to the second edition, served as an acknowledgment of previous mistakes:

> In presenting these lectures of Hegel's to the public a second time, I have only to remark that, with the exception of certain parts of the introduction, which come from Hegel himself already in the style of a book, I have thoroughly reworked the sources I used for the first edition. In doing so, I blended phrases more fully than in the first edition, where I just passed on the raw material, the aphoristic and fragmentary shape of which must very often have been a hindrance to ease of understanding.... Also, I have frequently had to position individual sentences or elements better, and to draw up a different sequence of material, and I have eliminated or compressed many long and repetitive passages....[60]

Precisely these principles of thorough revision and the blending of expressions are what today cause the second edition to be regarded as unsuccessful.[61] Michelet made a series of refinements and corrections in it, because of which the later edition deserves preference over the first in this one regard—although it does not remove the objectionable conceptual and textual features of *W.* to the requisite degree. We can see evidence of this failure from Kuno Fischer's critical judgment about it.[62] We can also

58. See *Ludwig Feuerbach: Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Werner Schuffenhauer, *Kleinere Schriften I (1835–1839)*; 2nd rev. edn. (Berlin, 1982), viii. 61.

59. Johann Eduard Erdmann, *Die Entwicklung der deutschen Spekulation seit Kant* (Leipzig, 1853), ii. 845.

60. *W.*, 2nd edn., pp. xviii–xix.

61. Hermann Glockner saw this in compiling his 'Jubilee Edition', in which he included Michelet's first edition of these lectures, while using the second edition of the philosophy-of-religion lectures.

62. See his *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, vol. viii, pt. 2: *Hegels Leben, Werke und Lehre* (Heidelberg, 1911), p. 1151. We should note that Hoffmeister's appeal to Fischer in his criticism of *W.* is quite overdrawn. Of the four passages to which Hoffmeister refers, the first two (pp. 1026, 1033) are not critical of Michelet but of Hegel, the third citation (p. 1133) is erroneous, and the fourth (p. 1151)—in which Fischer, in speaking of the erroneous information there about Schelling's birthplace and scientific activity (errors traceable to Gr.), speaks of a 'multitude of inaccuracies' (although there are in fact only two)—is what gives

see it especially from Georg Lasson's wish, expressed in the appendix of Fischer's volume, 'that a correct and reasonable new edition of this epoch-making labor of Hegel's would be made possible'.[63] Unfortunately Michelet undertook the improvements not on the basis of newer and better sources, but as merely an editorial reworking of the earlier edition. In doing so, Michelet compromised the authenticity and source character of *W.* Thus the hope Michelet expressed at the conclusion of his Foreword was not fulfilled. He wrote: 'May these lectures too, in this new form, one I hope more worthy of Hegel, and one more nearly approaching the consummate form of his other writings, have the beneficial effect of allowing the spirit of authentic scientific knowledge to disseminate itself ever wider, and to strike deeper roots.'[64]

C. HOFFMEISTER'S EDITION

Hoffmeister made a start at the new edition called for by Lasson. His 1940 volume included only the introduction and the section on Oriental philosophy.[65] He did not continue this work after the war. Of the lectures that Hegel delivered from his own revised manuscripts, rather than from a printed compendium as text, only these on the history of philosophy remained in the framework of the edition by the 'Association of Friends of the Departed', and were not editorially revised again as a whole. This may be less from a lack of interest in them than it is from unfortunate circumstances. Because of the loss of the most important sources, no revised edition could be produced that follows critical principles for establishing the text and yet equals or surpasses the material richness of *W.*

Hoffmeister's edition already suffers from the serious loss of almost all of Hegel's manuscripts. His edition of the introduction lacks that part of the Jena Notebook, and contains only these elements: the two fragmentary

rise to Hoffmeister's expression 'multitudes of inaccuracies' (p. v). Incidentally, Kuno Fischer's comment is based on the second edition and not, as Hoffmeister has it, on *W.*

63. Hoffmeister refers (p. xxxi) to a 'judgment concerning Michelet's text in the appendix of the second printing of Kuno Fischer's *Hegel* (p. 1246)', without noting that the context is an appraisal by Georg Lasson that will prepare the way for Lasson's future revision of portions of the edition of the Association of Friends.

64. *W.*, 2nd edn., xiii, pp. xvii–xviii.

65. *Hegel: Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie. Einleitung: System und Geschichte der Philosophie* (Leipzig, 1940; repr. unchanged, Leipzig, 1944). The part of this edition comprising the introduction has more recently been obtainable under the title *Hegel: Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister, 3rd, abbrev. edn. (1959), prepared by Friedhelm Nicolin (unchanged repr., Hamburg, 1966).

manuscripts of Hegel from 1820 and 1823–4, as well as the pertinent parts of the Ho. and Hu. transcripts from 1823–4; the Gr., An., and Sv. transcripts from 1825–6; the Hk. and Wh. transcripts from 1827–8; the Ab. and We. transcripts from 1829–30; and one other fragment not included in our new edition (but given in *GW* xviii. 108–11). Since Wh. was subsequently destroyed, Hoffmeister's edition has today the character of a source, though only a minor source, for the 1827–8 lectures.

Hoffmeister's is the only one of the previous editions of Hegel's lecture transcripts that evidences a critical character. He separates Hegel's manuscripts from the transcripts, and does not simply combine the transcript texts of the different series into one continuous text as does Michelet, but instead identifies the individual units of text with symbols in the margins. Hoffmeister sees in this the advantage of his edition: 'What thus distinguishes the layout of this edition's text from that of all earlier ones is the fully explicit juxtapositions and sequences; in other words, it constantly indicates the underlying sources, right along with the text itself in every instance.'[66] But Hoffmeister's method, fusing the texts of different lecture series into one apparently continuous text, stands in unresolved tension with his previously expressed judgment about the relationship of the lecture series sequences. 'Precisely the introduction, in which Hegel was not yet so tied to concrete historical material as he was in the later parts, evidences such an abundance of possibilities of application and execution, of conceptual movement and verbal configuration, that it is impossible to dam up these diverse streams of thought, or to make them converge in such a way that they can constitute "at the same time a whole", namely, a readable book.'[67] One indicator of the accuracy of this assessment is that, when Hoffmeister nevertheless undertook to combine these 'diverse streams of thought' into one continuous text, the result was multiple instances of violence to the text.

So Hoffmeister frequently abrogates his principle of 'juxtaposition and sequence'. Where distinct passages show detailed agreement in vocabulary and sequence of thought, even though not literally agreeing, he declares it 'obligatory' to work these distinct series together into a single text.[68] Otherwise, frequent repetitions in his continuous text would be disturbingly noticeable. But where he cannot construct such an integrated text, and to avoid those sorts of repetitions, Hoffmeister intervenes by abridging the

66. Hoffmeister, p. xl. 67. Hoffmeister, p. xxxii.
68. Hoffmeister, pp. xxxviii–ix.

text.[69] He even alters expressions of an organizational nature in order to produce the character of a flowing text.[70] Despite his sequential principle, the fusing of the lecture series into one continuous text nevertheless necessitates multiple silent transpositions—even with disregard for the dates of the lecture sessions given in the margins.[71]

Hoffmeister strictly follows the principle of sequential order only in the case of the 1829–30 series, which he does not fuse with the three other series. We cannot understand why, since he gives no basis for a separate treatment of this series. He even banishes it to the appendix of his edition and, in doing so, creates the unwarranted impression that it has a lesser status, whether in regard to its content or to the circumstances of its transmission. Moreover, the 1829–30 series shows, in many respects, a closer agreement with the 1827–8 series than the latter does with its predecessors, so that the 1827–8 series would better have been linked with the 1829–30 lectures than with the earlier ones.

Also, Hoffmeister's edition leaves much to be desired with respect to source criticism. Sometimes he fails to recognize that passages taken from *W.* belong in the text, and relegates them to the footnotes.[72] Hoffmeister not only errs, above all, in the thought-sequence of the 1820 manuscript, by getting the manuscript sheets in the wrong order, making it appear that Hegel made major transpositions of this material.[73] He also turns upside down this manuscript's relation to the 1823 manuscript. Michelet does indeed place at the beginning of his edition the 'Heidelberg Inaugural Address', which has as little to do, content-wise, with the history-of-philosophy lectures as the 'Berlin Inaugural Address' has to do with lectures

69. One example is the abbreviation of Hegel's 1823–4 remarks on Renaissance philosophy; see Hoffmeister, p. 144, lines 7–11.

70. For instance, he replaces the well-documented enumeration 'the second' with 'the first' (p. 122, line 5), and consequently substitutes 'the second' for 'the third' (p. 123, line 7). The elucidation belonging to 'the third' he then attributes to 'the second', and further confusions ensue as to the proper sequence, and order of dependence, of these elements.

71. One example is the transposition of a text from the 1827–8 lectures, belonging between pp. 134–5 of his edition, to a location after pp. 145–6. The words 'third consequence' on p. 145, line 1, belong not to 1827–8, but to 1823–4.

72. Examples are the following. Hegel's fragmentary introduction is the proper locus for materials in Hoffmeister, p. 141, n. 2, and p. 142, n. 1. Michelet (*W.* xiii. 58) does designate the material appearing in Hoffmeister, p. 143, n. 2, as a footnote deriving from Hegel himself, but takes this reference on Hegel's part out of his text and presents it (in slightly altered form) as a footnote. The result is that Hoffmeister ends up giving Hegel's presentation once in his text (p. 69), and then again in the footnote. His n. 1, p. 169, comes not from the 1823–4 lectures, but is a variant from Gr. that is garbled by *W.* In similar fashion, the second sentence, p. 233, n. 2, comes not from the 1823–4 lectures but from Gr.

73. See p. 11 above.

on the *Encyclopedia* that follow upon it. But he clearly segregates it from the actual introduction. Hoffmeister criticizes Michelet for having thereby disrupted the connection with the 'Heidelberg Copy', and he attaches the '1823 manuscript' (which he does not recognize as a copy of the 1820 manuscript) to the Heidelberg Inaugural Address.[74] Thus Hoffmeister concocts a 'Heidelberg Copy of the Introduction', since doubted by no one, although there is no such thing.[75]

VI. The New German Edition

A. NATURE AND ORIGINS

Because of the severe deficiencies of the previous editions of these lectures, this new edition should be viewed as a replacement for Hoffmeister's edition rather than as a continuation of it. This comment applies to its methodology as well as to its content. Materially this edition surpasses Hoffmeister, in that it includes the introductions from 1819, 1820–1, and 1831, and it enlarges the set of sources for 1825–6, 1827–8, and 1829–30, to include the transcripts Pn., Lw., Di., Ac., As., and St. Methodologically, it carries out strictly the principle of separating the distinct lecture series, without 'touching up' the inevitable repetitions from one introduction to another.

Despite the severe loss of manuscripts, the current favorable status of transmitted materials, at least of the transcripts, allows the editing of the seven Berlin lecture series as a group, based on distinguishing the transcripts by their historical development, similar to how this was done with the *Philosophy of Religion* in this same series. In these history-of-philosophy lectures too, Hegel never simply repeated his previous delivery without altering the ordering of the historical shapes, or even how he spoke about them. Even so, this new edition does not follow the same plan as those other lectures, because the difference between the various history-of-philosophy lecture series is of another sort than that for the philosophy of religion. There are three reasons for this.

74. For the Heidelberg Inaugural Address, see *W.* xiii. 3–6; *GW* xviii. 1–8. In his second edition, Michelet modified his table of contents to make clear this special locus of the Address. The Berlin Address is found in *GW* xviii. 9–31. For Hoffmeister's criticism of Michelet, see p. xxiii.

75. It also is included in this incorrect form in xviii. 11–28 of the *Theorie-Werkausgabe* edition or, as the editor instead puts it (xx. 525), has been 'reconstructed' there.

The first reason can be illustrated by a comparison with the four philosophy-of-religion lecture series. In them we see at a glance a pronounced development, both in the systematic form given to the philosophy of religion, and in the structuring of the history of religion together with the presentation of Christianity. The trajectory of this development levels off by the fourth series. For the history of philosophy, however, the first Berlin lectures are already the fourth series given on this topic. We can assume that there was development in this discipline too, prior to the standpoint Hegel reached by 1819, and we can infer it from indications concerning a few details. Yet such development occurred in the Jena and Heidelberg antecedents to our lectures, from which no testimonies remain. Michelet himself knew no lecture transcripts from these prior periods.

A second reason is that, apart from the introduction, the development of this discipline may have taken a less dramatic course than did the lectures on other topics for which Hegel had in hand a manuscript, such as the aesthetics and the philosophy of religion. Much more strongly than these others, the history-of-philosophy lectures have the character of an instructional presentation. Together with unfolding the thought of the history of philosophy as a process in which spirit attains its own self-consciousness—'tantae molis erat se ipsam cognoscere mentem' ('what a struggle it was for mind to come to know itself')—the lectures pursue the goal of making the new generation of students acquainted with the great thought-edifices of the past.[76] This calls for a great deal of repetition of instructional material. Plato's theory of Ideas and Aristotle's categories must ever be presented anew, no less so than Spinoza's definitions, Kant's antinomies, and Fichte's taking the I as his starting point. Hegel had written down a series of key citations, probably as early as the Jena Notebook, but at least by the time of the Heidelberg Outline, citations that Michelet called the 'skeleton on which the tasty meat of the later fullness of thought found its place'.[77] In the later lecture series Hegel always presented these key passages anew, sometimes paraphrasing and enlarging upon them. This circumstance sets far narrower

76. Hegel's play on a well-known quotation from Vergil (*Aeneid* 1. 33), cited by the German editors because of its appropriateness here, comes near the end of other lecture series than that of 1825–6 (see the second edition of the *Werke*, xv. 685). Vergil writes: 'tantae molis erat Romanam condere gentem' ('What a struggle it was to found the Roman race'). Commentators suggest that Vergil has in mind not just the founding of the city of Rome, but also the centuries it took to establish Roman supremacy. Hegel no doubt chose *mentem* over Latin alternatives for mind because it rhymes with *gentem*.

77. W. xiii, p. xiii.

boundaries to possible variations in the history-of-philosophy lectures than is the case for his lectures on other topics.

As a third and final basis for the lesser variance in the history-of-philosophy lectures, their structural principle resides primarily in the chronology of philosophies, rather than in the unfolding of a thought that is first and foremost systematic. This certainly does not preclude any new organization of historical material, though such alterations almost always remain within the systematically relevant level. It does shed light on the different lines of continuity in the development of the concept that Hegel takes into consideration when, for instance, Kant's three Critiques are treated as a whole, or the doctrine of postulates is only taken up in connection with the *Critique of Judgment*, or, after treating individual parts of Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy, the corresponding themes in Fichte and, in part, in Jacobi, are considered too. The same comment applies to Hegel's portrayal of the stance of eighteenth-century Scottish and French philosophy vis-à-vis Hume. In the final analysis such alterations have their bearing not on the systematic shape of the history of philosophy, but only on the historical fidelity and elegance of its presentation.

A serial printing of the whole of these lecture series did not seem advisable, and not just because of the burden that would place on the editor and on the reader. It would result in vastly inflating the size of this edition without anything close to a proportional increase in its philosophical fruits. For these reasons the present edition opts for a modified procedure. In the German edition, the introductions (which, despite all their continuity, Hegel revised the most, as Michelet informs us[78]) are given fully for the first time. In this English edition, only the 1825–6 introduction and those of 1819 and 1829–30 are translated fully; parts of the others, with emphasis on especially interesting or novel passages, are provided as appropriate. In both editions the main treatment of the history of philosophy, including also the discussion of the literature and the account of Oriental philosophy, is based on Hegel's 1825–6 lectures, which thus stand for the whole.

B. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TEXT

This new edition originally grew from a plan to publish only one of the 1825–6 lecture transcripts. Comparison of it with the other transcripts of this lecture series, and of the other series too, made it apparent that

78. *W.* xiii, p. viii.

publication of a single transcript—whichever one it might be—would convey too many errors and thus not be justifiable. This observation is pertinent not just to the history-of-philosophy lectures. Publication of a single transcript would call for extensive corrective intrusions into the text, in the form of variants from other transcripts. Thus the original plan was considerably expanded. The text of the history of philosophy as such, from the Greeks up to Hegel's German contemporaries, is based on the five surviving textual witnesses to the 1825–6 lecture series. The texts of the various introductions are based on the whole set of Hegel's manuscripts that have come down to us and on the transcripts of all the Berlin series. From collation of all the testimonies to a series, even covert errors have become discernible and been removed.

The primary reason for choosing the 1825–6 version is not that it enjoys a special advantage over the others with respect to its content. The reason is pragmatic, namely, that this version is today by far the best attested, by five transcripts, three of which (Gr., Pn., An.), despite all their errors in individual instances, are still the pre-eminent sources when taken in concert. Because of the good condition of this transmitted material, the text constituted from it can attain a high degree of authenticity. The extensive textual apparatus for this lecture series in the German edition makes possible comprehensive controls that permit the reconstruction of a lead text, previously not a feasible goal. Another consideration in favor of the 1825–6 lectures is that they agree in their basic features with most of the other series. We cannot say the same for the 1823–4 lectures, which have features peculiar to themselves (for instance, in their outline of modern philosophy) but were nevertheless made the basis for the conception of the whole by Michelet in his editions.

Because the treatment of Oriental philosophy and of the history of philosophy proper (Greek, Medieval and Modern philosophy) in this edition is confined to a single lecture series, these sections consist of somewhat less material than they do in Michelet's editions. Unlike them also, it does not vacillate between an edition of lectures and a book. For the first time it provides a glimpse of Hegel's actual delivery of this part of his philosophy in the course of a single academic term, in place of the previously published compilations of Hegel's lecture manuscripts and student transcripts from nearly three decades. Furthermore, it not only authentically reproduces the conception of a single series, but also reconstitutes the text in much more reliable form than did Michelet.

With efforts limited to one lecture series (apart from the several introductions), the richness of content of Michelet's edition is, to be sure,

unattainable. Also unattainable for an edition predominantly based on transcripts, is much of the literal authenticity of Hegel's manuscripts. The somewhat reduced content is not a drawback, because this new edition—unlike the new edition of the *Philosophy of Religion* in this same series—should be understood not as a superior replacement for Michelet's edition in *W.*, but instead as a corrective to his practices of amassing material indistinguishably, and of failing to correct numerous errors in his sources. In any event, an objection to it based on lesser literal authenticity of manuscripts carries little weight for contemporary Hegel interpretation, because only on the basis of exacting text-critical procedures, and even then only in outline, can one discern from Michelet's edition which passages derive from Hegel's own handwritten texts—in fact, from Michelet's reproduced version of them!—and which derive from transcripts.

The text of the German edition for Hegel's 1820 and 1823 manuscripts of the introduction is based on the text in the new historical-critical edition (*GW* xviii. 35–106), and it is presented there in synoptic form, together with a transcript of the 1820 lectures. In it, orthography and punctuation have been modernized.

The text of the individual lecture series for other versions of the introduction, and for the 1825–6 version of the whole, is based in each case on the known sources indicated above in this editorial introduction. The editors of the German edition departed from the lead text (for 1825–6 it is Gr.) when the other sources agree on a different reading, or when there is a compelling reason for taking exception to it, for these are instances in which the lead text is evidently defective.

The text for the 1825–6 lectures in this first volume, as in subsequent volumes, has been established by integrating the five transcript sources. Each source, taken by itself, exhibits a number of the sorts of defects mentioned above. But four of the transcripts (Gr., An., Lw., Pn.), when taken together, give a quite extensively parallel transmission of the text. Hence any errors embedded in one of them can be spotted from a collation of all of them (including Sv.), and thus rectified by checking questionable passages against the others. Erroneous transmission in the broadest sense is any departure from the wording of the lecture series as it can be reconstructed with a high degree of probability. The edited text generally follows Gr., although the difference between the role of Gr. as lead text, and that of An. and Pn. as supplementary texts, is comparatively slight. The text follows An. and Pn. when they agree over against Gr. It also follows one or the other of them in cases where there are grounds for assuming that the transmission of Gr. is incorrect. Only infrequently is Lw. incorporated into the text, at

those few places where the other transcripts offer an unsatisfactory text, and their relationship to Lw. supports the supposition that Lw. is authentically reproducing the original wording of the passage, or at least its correct sense. The wording of Sv. is chosen for the text even more infrequently, although that transcript does provide valuable hints for the attempt to establish the authentic transmission.

The transcripts are not mutually consistent with respect to their paragraph divisions, and they have only a few section headings. The fair copies show that these headings result from subsequent organization of the text by the notetakers. Evidently it was not Hegel's general practice to indicate section headings himself, either in these lectures on the history of philosophy, or in those on other topics given from handwritten notes. For this reason the editors of the German edition themselves established uniform headings and paragraph divisions, taking their cues wherever possible from indications in the transcripts.

The text has been standardized according to the general principles employed for the *Philosophy of Religion*. By far the greater part of our text is attested by several transcripts. We may justifiably assume that reconstruction of that part successfully recaptures the original wording from its refracted expression in the sources. There are, to be sure, additional sentences, or sentence fragments, transmitted only by a single transcript. When these come from a fair copy (Gr., Lw., or Sv.) we cannot be certain that they actually belong to these lectures; when they come from An. or Pn., we cannot be certain of the authenticity of the specific wording. The textual apparatus of the German edition gives information on these matters, although it contains only the more important variant readings. Its editors judged it impractical to provide in the apparatus detailed explanations as to how in each instance they constituted the text, or how they reconstructed the lead text as a separate entity.

VII. This English Edition

The English text follows the German, but has been edited in a somewhat different format, one comparable to that employed for the *Philosophy of Religion* and other volumes in this series. The most obvious difference is that the German has two separate footnote systems, while the English has but one. The German edition identifies all footnotes by a line-count system, leaving the text free of footnote numbers and editorial symbols, but with the disadvantage of making it more difficult to locate the textual passages with

which footnotes are associated. The German footnotes that indicate textual variants appear at the bottom of the page, keyed to the numbered lines to which they apply, whereas the editorial footnotes appear in a separate section at the back of the book, and are keyed by page and line numbers to the appropriate passages. In contrast, the English edition employs a single type of editorial footnotes located at the bottom of the page, with footnote numbers that also appear in the text above. Like Volume II (*Greek Philosophy*), this book discontinues the practice in earlier volumes of the Hegel Lectures Series by which textual variants in the German edition are indicated in the English edition by use of special symbols in the text, and special footnotes giving the variant readings. (The first edition of Volume III of these lectures, published in 1990, followed that earlier method of indicating textual variants. The revised edition of Volume III discontinues that practice too, and so conforms to the protocols of the other two volumes.) Only a few textual variants matter very much and are of interest to the English reader, while the specialist concerned with variant readings can consult the German volumes. The result is a cleaner, clearer text for the English reader. Those few textual variants of real consequence we discuss within editorial footnotes of the usual sort. In any event the main text of the German edition, which is what we have translated, presents the most likely reconstruction of what Hegel actually said in these lectures. Also, in several instances this English edition uses abbreviations for several 1825–6 transcripts (An. for 'Anonymous', Lw. for 'Lowe', Pn. for 'Pinder') that differ from those in the German edition. Editorial additions to the text, intended to help it read more smoothly or to provide apparently missing terms, are enclosed within square brackets.

The footnotes identify specific passages in the works of individual philosophers, or in secondary sources, that Hegel is quoting, paraphrasing or obviously discussing, as well as other passages that likely form the background for a particular portion of text. The German edition quotes these passages extensively in the original languages, as well as furnishing German translations from other languages, either drawn from modern editions or, where necessary, made by the editors themselves. This practice inevitably adds greatly to the length of these notes, which are sometimes appreciably longer than Hegel's correlative text itself. The English edition identifies these passages, but only occasionally quotes or paraphrases their contents. For the most part, however, we translate in full the remarks of the German editors themselves, which often disclose the general contents of the quotations in any event. Primary and secondary works are cited in the original editions, or in the ones most likely used by Hegel, as well

as in the best and most readily available modern editions. The full title and facts of publication for a work appear with its first citation in a given footnote series (except for certain works of classical authors, and for several other frequently cited works, which have their own abbreviations and listing in a table at the front of the volume). Easily recognized abbreviated titles and references are used for subsequent citations. In the rare case where confusion between similar titles by the same author is possible, the abbreviated title used is indicated at the end of the corresponding full entry in the Bibliography of Hegel's Sources. The Bibliography includes all the cited modern editions of works likely used by Hegel, or related works by those same authors. They are listed in conjunction with the older editions. Other works cited appear only in the footnotes. Also, cross-references to Volume III are given here in the pagination of the revised edition.

There is no direct correlation between individual editorial notes in the German and English volumes respectively, for we frequently combine into one footnote several German notes on adjacent or overlapping passages that are closely related in their contents. We also add (without identifying them as such) a few editorial notes of our own, or supplementary remarks to the German notes, in cases where further background information is helpful to the English reader. We also correct a few errors detected in the German editorial notes, and in several cases add what seem to us citations preferable to those provided there. Biblical citations and quotations are according to the Revised Standard Version.

Both editions modernize spelling and punctuation, and standardize names and expressions in foreign languages. The English italicizes words and phrases for emphasis according to its own editorial needs, sometimes where the German does not, and vice versa. Apart from full bibliographical citation, books and essays are mentioned by the full or abbreviated title most familiar to the English reader. Occasionally we add a subject heading of our own to those of the German edition, or deviate from its paragraphing or punctuation to form units of more manageable size. Except for passages from Hegel's own manuscripts of 1820 and 1823, these are not, in any event, features of the lectures as spoken by Hegel, but ones affected by the judgments and conventions of auditors or editors. Added subject headings are not indicated by square brackets, whereas other additions within the text are so indicated.

To facilitate comparison with the original, we give the page number of the German edition in the outside margin where that page begins in our text, and indicate the page break by a vertical rule within the text. In the case of

those introductions not translated in full, the German edition pagination is indicated within square brackets in the text itself, or otherwise given by our own editorial summaries set in bold type and interspersed within the translated material.

This translation strives to be faithful to the German without unduly sacrificing English style, and without enforcing a one-to-one equivalence of English to German terms. Some technical or quasi-technical terms have several English equivalents each, and these are shown in the Glossary, which we used as a guide in our work, and which was taken over and adapted from that developed in the course of work on the *Philosophy of Religion*. For German-speakers it will be possible in most instances to infer the German wording from the English; in a few cases where, for instance, there is a play on words, or an important nuance that could not be captured well by the English, the German wording has been inserted in square brackets.

In keeping with the standard set by the English edition of the *Philosophy of Religion*, we eliminate unwarranted gender-specific language wherever possible, when referring to God and to human beings. 'God' can be repeated in place of 'he' or 'him', 'God's' in place of 'his'. But since the important reflexive and intensive pronouns cannot suitably be avoided or made impersonal, 'God himself' and the like occurs a number of times. *Mensch* is often 'human being' or 'one', and sometimes we use plural forms. For the sake of variety, and to avoid the singular masculine pronoun, we sometimes shift to plural forms. These choices are especially painful in passages about Adam, who is spoken of both as a male individual and as ungendered human nature itself (in theological resonance with the traditionally rendered Platonic 'Man'). Here we use our best judgment and a variety of expressions, without assurance of hitting on the happiest solution.

We began this project as an English version of a new German edition of the 1825–6 lecture series. The first volume to be completed (actually the last, chronologically) in German, and then in English, was that on Medieval and Modern Philosophy (our Volume III). The German editors followed this with two volumes on Greek Philosophy, likewise confined to the 1825–6 lecture series, which, as combined into one in the English edition, became our Volume II. When the German editors finally came to work on this first volume, they elected to present the introductions to each of the Berlin lectures on this topic in their entirety and in their chronological sequence, followed by the 1825–6 treatment of Oriental Philosophy. In this English edition we present the 1825–6 Introduction and treatment of Oriental Philosophy first; these would then be followed directly by our Volume II, *Greek Philosophy*. Materials from the other introductions are placed in a

separate section of this volume. The introductions from 1819 and 1829–30 are translated in their entirety, as the earliest and latest surviving examples of the full introduction, and to facilitate their comparison with their 1825–6 counterpart. The other introductions, of 1820–1, 1823–4, 1827–8, and 1831, appear only in part. Presentation of these partial introductions is interspersed with editorial comments that explain the setting of their excerpts here. As with the main text of 1825–6, these other introductions are accompanied by appropriate footnotes, and by signs correlating them with the pagination of the German edition. We hope the reader will find this arrangement satisfactory.

Our colleague, J. Michael Stewart, contributed to this first (and final) volume before his untimely passing, by completing a first draft translation of the text for the 1825–6 materials that it contains. Robert F. Brown revised Stewart's work and prepared the footnotes. Our consultant, H. S. Harris, critiqued some early versions of these 1825–6 materials, except for the notes on Oriental Philosophy. Brown prepared the translations and footnotes for the other introductions, and is responsible for the final form of this volume. The general editor of this series, Peter C. Hodgson, guided our work throughout all stages of this three-volume English edition, in particular by reviewing all aspects of this first volume, and, in doing so, he suggested many helpful improvements to it.

THE LECTURES OF 1825–6

I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY AS A PHILOSOPHICAL TOPIC

Introduction

These lectures are devoted to the history of philosophy. What we have to consider is history: deeds that can pass in review before our imagination. Here we have the deeds of the thought that is free; it is the history of the world of thought, of the intellectual world, how it arose, how it engendered itself—therefore, the history of thought. It is an ancient conviction [*Vorurteil*] that thinking is what distinguishes human beings from animals. What makes human beings nobler than animals is something we possess only through the medium of thought. However else we may be constituted, it is only by virtue of thought that we are human. Only by thought does humanity distinguish itself from the animals.

Even though thought is the essential, substantial, and operative factor, it nevertheless has to deal with many kinds of objects, with an endless or manifold host of objects. But thought is at its best when it occupies itself exclusively with the best thing that human beings possess, with thought itself—when its intent is only itself. Thought's occupation with itself is a self-producing, a self-discovery, something that takes place only when it brings itself forth. Thought is only actual itself when it produces itself by its own activity; it does not exist immediately, but only as brought forth by itself. Thought brings itself forth, and what it produces in this way is philosophy. The sequence and the labor of this bringing-forth, the voyage of discovery on which thought sets out in order to discover itself, is a labor of two and a half millennia. This is the general statement | of our topic. 206
But it is so general that we need to delineate more precisely the goal.

Of course in the general account just given we have the occasion for further reflection. A feature of the philosophical mode of treatment is that we likewise reflect upon what we have thought, and do not leave it as it immediately is. I have stated that our topic is the sequence brought forth by the thinking that is free, or the history of the intellectual world. This looks simple enough, but on closer examination it seems to involve a contradiction. Thought that is essentially thought is in and for itself, is eternal. What is true is contained only in thought, and is true not only today and yesterday, but true outside all time; insofar as it is in time, it is true always and at every time. This contradicts the view that thought has a history. What is presented in history is changeable; it has taken place, is

gone, has been, has perished in the night of the past, is no more. Thought that is essential and true, however, is susceptible to no change, is eternal, is not merely past and done with, but simply *is*. So our question concerns how things stand with this thought that lies outside history, since it is removed from change.

The second reflection concerns the point that human beings think, and that what is human is human only to the extent that thought is operative in it. Therefore we have to deal not just with the goal for philosophy, but with a host of other things too. There are many other productions of spirit that are works of thought too, ones we must nevertheless exclude from our examination of the history of philosophy, such topics as religion, constitutional law, political history, art, and science. Yet these works of spirit too are products of the spirit that is thinking essentially. So the question is: How do these topics differ from the spiritual productions that are our
207 topic? | Also: What connection do they have with our topic, particularly in history? What historical connection is there between the philosophy of an age and the religion, political constitution, art, and so forth, of that age? This is the second reflection.

In the Introduction we will delineate these two aspects, in order to get our bearings on how the history of philosophy should be dealt with in these lectures. These two aspects lead on to a third, to the general overview and division of the historical course [of philosophy]. In any event I will not concern myself here with external reflections about the history of philosophy, about its uses, and so forth, because its uses will be self-evident. But I will say something at the end about the [secondary] sources, since that is the standard practice.

The purpose of this Introduction is just to provide a more specific or more definite view of what is our aim. It involves thoughts and concepts with which we must directly concern ourselves, ones that cannot be proven here because their proof finds its place in the science of philosophy itself, in logical philosophy. Through argumentation one can take what is presented and indeed make it acceptable and plausible, by appealing to the familiar and commonplace assumptions of the educated consciousness; what I will say here can be made plausible in this way too. But even though linking something to current views contributes to its clarity, still that is not philosophical understanding. The first topic, therefore, is the concept and aim of the history of philosophy, and the second is the relationship of the philosophies to the other aforementioned products of the human spirit—religion, art, science, and so forth, particularly with reference to their
208 history. |

1. The Aim of the History of Philosophy

What we will consider here is a succession of configurations of conceptual thinking. This is the first, and so the most superficial, way of proceeding. Linked to it is the need to know the goal, to come to know a universal element through which the manifold that emerges in this succession is bound together, through which a whole, or something universal, comes about and a totality is formed; this unity or this universal element then constitutes the goal or the concept. We are quite right in wanting to have a goal or a concept specified in advance before we come to grips with individual details, just as we first see the forest before we consider the individual trees. Otherwise what can happen is that we do not see the forest for the trees—something that readily happens in the case of philosophies, of which there are an endless number, with the result that we do not see *philosophy* on account of the philosophies.

Because of that people set forth, with the air of an expert, the shallow 'proof' that nothing can come of philosophy, that philosophies refute one another.[1] The multitude of philosophies is said to be a proof of the error of the philosophical enterprise. People speak this way inasmuch as they are interested in | truth, or seem to be. They say, then, that there is only one 209
truth, and that the multiplicity of philosophies, with each maintaining its own version of truth, is directly opposed to the principle that truth is only one. The main topic that we have to deal with in this Introduction is then how things stand with the unity of truth and the multiplicity of philosophies. What has come of this long labor of the world spirit, and how are we to grasp its results?

The first question, therefore, is this: In what sense do we wish to treat the history of philosophy, namely, the history of free, concrete thought, or of reason? Nothing counts as reason that is not the result of thinking. Thought that is free is thought that relates itself to itself. So we have expressed the question as follows: In what sense do we wish to treat the history of thinking reason? What is its significance? The answer is straightforward. This history can be expounded in no other sense than that of thought itself. Alternatively, we can say that the question itself is inappropriate. In all other instances we can ask about the sense or the significance of the object. Thus in the case of a work of art, or of language, or religion too, or other

1. Here Hegel is likely alluding to popular skepticism with respect to philosophical presentations, not to adverse judgment on the part of contemporary historians of philosophy. Even Tennemann, whom Hegel frequently criticizes, states the historian of philosophy's aim as that of presenting the formation and development of philosophy as science. See Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, 11 vols. (Leipzig, 1798–1819), preface to vol. i.

enterprises and so forth, we ask about their sense or significance, about their value, their moral value. This significance or this sense is the essential
210 thing; it is what is universal or substantial | about such an object, and this substantial aspect of the object is the concrete thought of the object. In such cases two factors are always in play: the sense or the thought, and the presentation or expression of the phenomenon in perception. We have something outward and something inward; we have an external phenomenon, and a significance on its own account that is quite simply the thought.

But since our topic now is thought itself, we do not have two factors, an inward element and an outward reality. Thought alone has significance on its own account. In this case thought is the universal element, and so we cannot speak of the significance or the sense in what we have to consider. So the history of philosophy has no other significance, no other determination, than that of thought itself. No further reflection about it is called for. We can reflect about a work of art, can stand above it. But here we are dealing with thought, and it is the highest and inmost thing, hence something no thought can set itself above. Instead of sense and significance, what comes into play here is the determinate quality that thought itself is.

We have to indicate the more specific aspects of this determinate quality, which are what matters with respect to this thought. At this point we must provide a series of thought-determinations or categories [*Gedankenbestimmungen*] and, by means of them, come to know these aspects. Here is not the place for speculative consideration of these concepts; we must instead be content with a preliminary, historical account. Our topic is thought, the act of thinking, the free thought that occupies itself with itself. Thought is nothing empty or abstract, but is determinative, indeed is self-
211 determining. In other words, thought | is essentially concrete. However abstract it may appear to be, thought must be a concept, must be internally concrete. On the one hand it is correct when one says that philosophy occupies itself with abstractions. On the other hand, however, this is quite false, for philosophy does not deal in *mere* abstractions. Abstractions are the province of reflection. 'Reflective persons' are those who get stuck in abstract categories, all the while believing themselves to be involved with the most concrete content. Philosophical thought is essentially concrete, and this is the definition to which we must, above all, hold fast.

Expressed more precisely, concrete thought is the *concept* and, specified still further, is the *idea*. The idea is the concept insofar as it realizes itself. Its realizing itself involves its determining itself, and this determination, or its thought, is none other than it itself. Here we have its infinite relation to itself, in that it determines itself only out of itself. The idea is then also

what we call 'truth', which is a grand word. To the unsophisticated person the word 'truth' must be forever grand and heartwarming. More recently people have come to the conclusion that we cannot know [*erkennen*] truth, although the object of philosophy is concrete thought, which, in its fuller determination, is the idea, is truth. This contention that we cannot know truth will crop up within the history of philosophy itself, and we shall then consider it in more detail.[2] | 212

We need only mention here that when this principle is presupposed, as it is, for instance, by Tennemann, then one cannot see why one should be concerned with the history of philosophy.[3] Such a principle leaves the history of philosophy as just a narration and enumeration of opinions of all sorts, each of which asserts falsely that it possesses the truth. In this regard I appeal simply to the alternative prejudice or conviction [*Vorurteil*] that one can, to be sure, know [*wissen*] the truth, but can know what is true only to the extent that one has thought about it. There is an ancient conviction that truth cannot be learned from immediate perceiving or intuiting, either from outer, sensible intuition or from the inner, intellectual sort, because every intuition is, as such, sensible. We know truth only through meditative thinking [*Nachdenken*]. This conviction has been upheld from time immemorial.

The first definitions that we have in hand, then, are that thought is concrete, that the concrete is truth, and that this truth is brought forth only by means of thinking. The further definition is that spirit develops itself out of itself. So the first point was that thought, free thought, essentially is internally concrete. Its correlative is the fact that free thought is living, that it is internally self-moving. The infinite nature of thought, or of spirit, is its own inner process, which is not a being-at-rest but essentially a producing and an existing simply as activity, only through its own production.

We can comprehend this movement more precisely as development. As active, what is concrete exists essentially as self-developing. There is, accordingly, a distinguishing involved. When we have a more specific grasp of the distinctions that arise, and grasp that in a process something other necessarily emerges, then the movement presents itself | as development. These 213
distinctions emerge even when we simply keep to familiar representations. What matters is that we reflect upon the representation of 'developing'. In 'developing' we initially have something enveloped, the germ or seed,

2. See Hegel's presentation of the Sophists and of Skepticism in Vol. II, pp. 111–24 and 294–316, and of the limits to cognitive knowledge in the Kantian philosophy of his own time, in Vol. III, pp. 184–6, 188–9, and 201.

3. See n. 20, p. 63 below.

the tendencies [*Anlagen*], the capacity, the possibility. It is, however, real possibility, not just possibility in some perfunctory sense. It is what we call the being-in-self, what at first is only implicit. The customary view of the in-itself is that it is something sublime, the real truth, and we are enjoined to know the world as it is in itself. Still, what has only being-in-self is not yet something concrete, something true, but is instead something abstract. The germ or implicit being is a content that is still enveloped, and it is simple, is in a onefold form.

The seed provides an example of this. The entire tree is contained within the seed. Nothing comes forth from the seed that is not in it, and this seed is simple, is a point. Even under a microscope we discover little in the seed, and yet this simple thing is pregnant with all the qualities of the tree. Its branches, the shape of its stem and leaves, its blossoms, their scent, taste, and so on, all inhere in the simple seed, of course not yet sensibly present but still wholly contained therein. It is essential to know that there is something wholly simple that contains multiplicity within itself, but in such a way that the multiplicity does not yet exist.

A more important example is the 'I'. When I say 'I', this 'I' is something wholly simple; it is the wholly abstract universal, common to everyone. Yet
214 it is the manifold wealth of the individual's representations, | impulses, desires, and the like. Each 'I' is a whole world, and this whole world is contained within this simple point, within the 'I', which has in itself the energy of all that comes forth from it.

We can say with Aristotle that, according to the δύναμις or *potentia*, everything is already contained in the tendency, that nothing emerges but what is already implicit.[4] In the second stage, however, what has implicit being steps into existence, develops or unfolds itself, posits itself, exists as something differentiated. It is only implicitly differentiated and so far exists only in this unity, just as water is clear and transparent, yet contains so many possibilities. So in the second stage what is in-itself attains determinate being, exists in relation to what is other, steps outward into multiple distinctions so that it exists as something distinct. As such, the content remains the same and the only difference is one of form, as to whether the content is enveloped or is made explicit; but this is a huge difference, and everything depends on it.

The human being is essentially reason. The child is reason implicitly, and the person of culture, the noblest character, is no more reason than is the most unrefined or least cultured one, the child. The distinction is simply

4. See Hegel's account of Aristotle in Vol. II, pp. 235–6.

that what is in the child only as natural tendency, or as in-itself, becomes developed and passes over from the form of possibility into the form of existence. All the distinctions in world history depend on this distinction. All human beings are rational; the formal aspect of this rationality is that the human being is free. Although freedom belongs to our nature, many peoples have practiced slavery and some still do, and they are content with it. The entire distinction between them and those without slavery, is just that the latter know that they are inherently free. The former too are free implicitly, but they do not exist as free. The sole distinction is just that the latter know their freedom, and so it is explicit for them. What makes for such an enormous variance in | condition is whether people are free only 215
implicitly or by happenstance, or whether they know instead that it is their concept, their nature, to have their being as free individuals. This, then, is the second point, simply this distinction with regard to existence [*Existenz*], to the [elements] standing out from each other [*Aussereinander*].[5] I am free implicitly, and it belongs to my essential nature that *I am* only insofar as *I am free*.

The third definition is that both what is implicitly, and what is now existing object for me and so is something other, are one and the same. This is precisely what we call 'development'. If the I were no longer the I, then it would be some other thing, which is 'change' as such. In change there is something, and from it some other thing comes to be. In development, on the contrary, the very 'other' that emerges is identical with what is implicit. Thus the seed develops and does not change; if it is changed, pulverized, crushed, and the like, then it is not developed. This unity of distinct elements is the essential feature of development; it is a speculative concept. In this unity of distinct elements, of the seed and what is developed, they are two and yet one. This is a concept of reason, whereas all other definitions of development just pertain to the understanding. But the abstract understanding cannot grasp this concept; it does not get beyond the distinction and can only grasp abstractions, not what is concrete, the concept. This, then, is the characterization of development as such.

Development also involves mediation; one element exists only in connection with the other. What is implicit has the | drive to exist; it wants 216
to exist, to pass over into the form of existence, and only by virtue of this tendency does existence come about. In more recent times there has been much talk about immediate knowing or intuiting, which is, however,

5. Perhaps Hegel is playing with the root meaning of *Existenz* ('existence'), from the Greek *ec-stasis* ('standing out').

only an impoverished abstraction of the understanding; immediacy is only a one-sided abstraction. There is not actually anything immediate. Philosophy deals only with what is actual, with concepts. Something immediare is something non-actual. What we call 'immediate knowing' is only mediation, and [this is] easily shown. Every immediacy also involves internal mediation, and every mediation, unless it is abstract, likewise involves immediacy.[6]

The concept of development is a wholly universal concept. Development is the movement or vitality of spirit, of nature, because everything living, from the feeblest to the noblest, is development. The inner life of God in itself is this very development, for God in his universality determines himself, that is, God posits a distinction and brings himself to determinate being, to being for another. In this determinate being there is the eternal creation of the world, in the other form of God's Son, and at the same time there is absolute identity with self—an absolute movement that is at the same time absolute rest. God is an eternal mediating of himself with himself, an eternal coming together [*Zusammenschliessen*] of himself with himself. This is the self-communion [*Beisichsein*] of the idea. It is the eternal return of spirit to itself, spirit's freedom in communing eternally with self, in maintaining itself in what is other, in communing with self in the negative
217 of itself, in having the strength to do this. |

At this point we are specifically concerned only with the formal aspect. Absolute development, the life of God or of spirit, is simply a process, a universal movement and, as concrete, it is a series of developments. This series is not to be represented as a straight line but as a circle, as a return into itself. This circle has on its circumference a large number of circles; one development is always movement through many developments. The entirety of the development is a sequence of developments that returns into itself. Each development is a stage of spirit. The progression of development does not proceed into abstract infinity, but returns into itself. The entirety of the progression, the goal in this development, is none other than spirit's coming to itself, knowing itself (for then it is present to self), in that it has consciousness of itself, that it becomes object for itself, namely, brings forth what it is, and that it empties itself out, becomes wholly object for itself, wholly discloses its innermost being, that it descends into its depth and, in doing so, its depth comes forth. The more highly it is developed, the deeper it is. Spirit is then actually deep and not just implicit, for implicitly it is neither deep nor high. This very development is spirit's plumbing of its own depth. When spirit is down there in its depth, then the depth exists *for it*;

6. See n. 38, p. 76 below, and n. 15, p. 149 below.

spirit has brought its depth to consciousness. So the goal of spirit is for it to apprehend or grasp what it is, for it should no longer be concealed from itself, but know itself. The path to this goal, the series of developments, is to be grasped as *stages of its development.*

In the third place, we have the fruit of the development, for this totality is a result of movement, is brought forth by means of the process. | First 218
there is the in-itself of the actualization, the seed and the like. Second is the existence, what issues from it. Third is the identity of the two, and thus is their product. This product I call, abstractly, the being-for-self, spirit's own being-for-self. If we are speaking in terms of consciousness, then a plant does not have this being-for-self. Only spirit is for itself, is identical with itself. The third is therefore the result, the last of these stages.

But insofar as something is the result of one stage of development, it is in turn the starting point of a new development; the end of one stage is what comes first in another. Hence Goethe rightly says somewhere: 'What is fashioned will itself always become in turn raw material.'[7] Material that is fashioned, that has form, becomes in turn the material for a new form. So the stages are distinct, and each successive stage is more concrete than its predecessor. What is first is always the most abstract; for instance, children are the most abstract, and sensible intuition is what is poorest with respect to thought.

At the outset of our lectures we shall have plentiful materials from sense experience; they are the poorest thoughts. Thus the first topic we encounter is the definition of 'thing'. There is no such thing, for 'thing' is only a thought. So what crop up at the outset are only such abstract determinations of thought. In philosophy the first thoughts are the most abstract, the simplest, the most insubstantial ones. The following stages are more concrete. Each new stage is development. This development or movement introduces a distinction, or determinations. So a new development adds a new determination | to the initial one, and thus each successive 219
stage of development is richer, is augmented by this determination, and is

7. Hegel probably is alluding not to Goethe but to one of Schiller's *Votivtafeln* from the *Musen-Almanach für das Jahr 1797* (Tübingen, 1796), which is number 68 in the *Schiller-Nationalausgabe*, vol. i, ed. Julius Petersen and Friedrich Beissner (Weimar, 1943), p. 300, and which reads:

> The Imitator and the Genius
> Everyone can judiciously cultivate something good from what is good,
> But the genius calls forth good from what is inferior.
> You, imitator, venture only to make use of what is already fashioned,
> But the fashioned thing is just raw material for the formative spirit.

consequently more concrete. Thus there is no thought that does not progress in its development.

These are the definitions that I wished to set out in advance. I have not proved them, but have simply enumerated them in historical fashion and sought to make them plausible from our perspective. We must now see their application and what are their concrete consequences. That is why I have introduced them. So we can pass over to the more specific part of our discussion.

Philosophy as such is the thought or νοῦς that brings itself to consciousness, that occupies itself with itself. Thought proceeds by making itself into the object, by thinking itself, and by doing so in different determinations. The science of philosophy is, accordingly, the development of the thought that is free. The whole [of this science] is the totality of this development, the circle that closes back upon itself, that remains wholly present to self, that is wholly itself, that seeks only to come to itself. In contrast, when we occupy ourselves with the sensible domain, we are present to something other and not present to ourselves. Only in thought are we present to ourselves. So philosophy is development of the thought that is untrammeled in its freedom, that develops itself freely. Philosophy, then, is a system.

In recent times 'system' has become a term of reproach because it is associated with the idea of adhering to a one-sided principle.[8] But the proper meaning of 'system' is 'totality', and only as such a totality
220 [is 'system'] something true. |

So philosophy begins from what is simplest, and through development proceeds to the concrete. The history of philosophy is wholly the same and not the same. Philosophy as such, the contemporary or latest philosophy, contains the very fruit of the labor of millennia; this philosophy is the result of all that has gone before. There is a development in it too, but one that is occurring in the present day. The history of philosophy is this same development, for there is but *one* reason, although in its case this development is presented historically, in the way that these moments or stages have ensued in time. Philosophy, however, presents the development

8. Hegel's reference to system as a 'one-sided principle' alludes to a contemporary aloofness from systematic thinking, as is evident, for example, in Romanticism. See the following passages in the *Athenäum: Eine Zeitschrift*, by August Wilhelm Schlegel and Friedrich Schlegel, vol. i, pt. 2 (Berlin, 1798). 'According to the way many philosophers think, a regiment of soldiers on parade is a system' (p. 13). 'It is equally fatal for the spirit to have a system, and to have none. So the spirit must indeed resolve to combine the two' (p. 15). See *Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe*, ed. Ernst Behler, with the assistance of Jean-Jacques Anstett and Hans Eichner (Paderborn, Munich, and Vienna, 1958 ff.), ii. 172–3 (nos. 46 and 53).

of thought in the shape of simple thought, apart from side issues [*Beiwesen*]; the history of philosophy is this development as it has taken place in time.

It follows that the history of philosophy is the same as the system of philosophy. That philosophy must be system is something we have already noted. This identity of the two, of the science of philosophy with the science of the history of philosophy, is the main point, although we cannot provide the speculative proof for it here; that concerns the nature of reason, of thinking, a topic to be treated within philosophy itself. But the history of philosophy itself has to provide the empirical proof. It has to show, in its course, how the development of thought is comprised within it. Thus the history of philosophy | presents the same thing as does philosophy, 221
but together with various side issues arising from the time, locale, country, and so forth. The fact that philosophy itself emerges in the course of time is a further point that we shall consider in the second part of this introduction.

Spirit, in and for itself, is thoroughly, wholly, fully concrete. In its operations and activity, therefore, spirit not only has to become self-conscious of its own form in pure thought. It also brings itself forth, and is operative in the entire range of all that pertains to its concrete shape. This shape is world history. When spirit advances, the whole must therefore advance; the outward aspect takes place within time, and the whole of spirit's development thus takes place within time. The thought or the principle of an era is the one spirit permeating everything. This spirit has to advance in consciousness of itself, and this advance is the development of that whole body of material, of the concrete totality, a development that occurs within externality and therefore within time. Thought is essentially result, must be brought forth, and for the reasons given the bringing-forth, so far as its phenomenal aspect is concerned, takes place within time. The unity of the two aspects is the main point.

Hence the history of philosophy is, properly speaking, science. It deals with the history of thought, and thought's development is necessary in and for itself. We need to call attention to this necessity. Because these lectures are to be historical in nature, we have to conduct ourselves historically, by taking up the shapes as they follow upon one another in time, in their appearing as contingent. But we must also notice the necessity of their issuing from one another. | 222

That is the sense or the meaning of the history of philosophy. Philosophy and history of philosophy are mirror images of one another. The study of the history of philosophy is the study of philosophy itself, and especially of its logical aspect. We will have more to say about the concrete aspect later

on. In order to be able to comprehend them in this way, we must know beforehand what philosophy is and what history is. But it is not necessary to presuppose one philosophical viewpoint. This is the meaning of the history of philosophy.

In the case of thought, we do not properly inquire about the meaning, for the thought is itself the meaning. There is nothing more behind it, but in a sense opposite to that in which we usually employ this expression. Thought *is* what is ultimate, what is deepest or hindmost; it *is itself*. But thought has a phenomenal aspect too. By distinguishing this phenomenal aspect from it, we can indeed speak of 'meaning'. One phenomenon of thought is the ordinary representation that we have of thinking or of thought, and the second is the historical aspect.

The first phenomenal aspect of thought is its appearing as something particular, and then as subjective; we think, but we also have feelings, sensations, imagination, and so forth. In addition to there being thoughts, there are also sense perceptions, inclinations, impulses, and determina-
223 tions of the will. So here thought stands alongside other things. | Thus thinking is something particular alongside other particulars. This is the handiest image; we speak of many faculties of the soul, and each of them is supposed to possess rights equal to those of thought. But in philosophy a wholly different view of thinking or of thought must be grasped, one that we will come to in due course.

Thinking is the activity of the universal, and the universal is indeed, from one angle, one particular among others when it stands alongside the particular, is itself particular. Its nature, however, is to extend over the particular, to pervade it. So everything that is human comes within the sphere of thinking. It is through thinking that human beings distinguish themselves from animals. Feelings and impulses pertain to both, but such particular feelings as religious or humane feelings pertain only to human beings. Feeling as such is nothing worthy or true, for what is authentic in it stems essentially from concrete thinking. Animals have no religion, just feeling, and human beings have religion only because they think. That feelings have a religious character derives solely from thinking.

Concrete thinking, as we shall explain in more detail, is nothing abstract, and has the particular within itself; it does not stand alongside it. Thinking at first seems to be subjective, but we must also take thought in the objective sense, as it occurs from Anaxagoras onward.[9] Thinking is not a feature of natural things. Thought, not in the form of consciousness but in and

9. Hegel is referring to Anaxagoras' concept of the *νοῦς*; see Vol. II, pp. 102–4.

for itself, is the universal as such; it is what is substantial, objective. There is reason in the world. Reason in the world is not subjective reason. In nature things happen rationally, for there are laws, species and the like, which are then what is rational, universal, | and enduring, as opposed to 224
what is singular. Recognition of the nature of thought dispenses with the subjective mode of its appearing. So, the significance of thought is that it is not something particular or subjective, but what is universal in and for itself. Thought is not merely a feature of our consciousness but is what is objective, what has being in and for itself.

Now, as we said, the second phenomenal aspect of thought is its historical mode, the fact that thoughts have emerged under specific circumstances, at specific times, within specific environments, in the minds of specific individuals, so that the emergence of the thoughts appears as a random sequence. But we have already stated how this appearance is to be correctly understood. It is a development in time, but according to the inner necessity of the free concept itself.

This is the only worthy view of the history of philosophy, or what is of genuine interest about it, the fact that what has taken place in the world has done so rationally in this respect too. There is a strong presumption in favor of this view. The history of philosophy is the development of thinking reason; the coming-to-be of thinking reason has indeed taken place rationally. The temple that self-conscious reason has erected for itself is loftier than the temple of Solomon.[10] It was constructed rationally and not, so to speak, in the way that the Freemasons build. That this construction must have taken place rationally is a belief that we can take with us in this study, for it is faith in providence, albeit providence in another guise: what is best in the world is what thought has produced. It is foolishness to suppose that providence operates in irrational nature but not | in what 225
is noble, in what is rational. Otherwise, saying that providence has ruled the course of the world would be idle chatter, would be superficial, or not in earnest. What has come about has done so through the thought that belongs to providence.

The second thing to note is that in the history of philosophy we are not dealing with philosophical opinions. Those who speak of 'opinions' in philosophy cannot be very advanced in their education. Opinions [*Meinungen*] are what is mine [*mein*], what belongs to me, to me as a subject. All of us have opinions of our own. In everyday life we have opinions about external things, and we operate on the basis of opinions. But in the business of the

10. See 1 Kgs. 5–8 for the account of the construction of Solomon's temple.

world spirit there is an entirely different seriousness, an entirely different universality; here one speaks not about the opinion of this or that person, for one is dealing only with universal categories of thought. Universal spirit does not proceed at random but develops within itself, according to its own necessity. The 'opinion' of universal spirit is the truth and nothing but the truth.

The third thing to note, as a consequence of the foregoing, is how things stand with the diversity of philosophies, which is something spoken of as if it
226 is a disproof of philosophy. The relationship of the diverse philosophies | to the one truth that they know [*das Eine der wissenden Wahrheit*] is inherent in what we said before. So, the first thing to be said is that there is only one philosophy, that philosophy is only one. This statement has indeed a formal sense, for each philosophy is at the least philosophy as such, provided that it is, as such, philosophy at all; very often what one calls 'philosophy' is only chatter, caprice, fancies and so forth; but in fact every philosophy is, at the least, philosophy.

It is as if a physician prescribes fruit for a patient, and brings him grapes, cherries, apples, and the like, but the patient refuses to eat, supposing that these are apples but not fruit.[11] People suppose they have said something clever when they maintain that philosophy does not amount to anything because of the diversity of philosophies. The sense of 'many philosophies' is that there are distinct but necessary stages in the development of reason as it comes to consciousness of itself, as we have already grasped this point previously—one that is ever the same.

These stages become distinct only through further development, further determinations. Philosophies are not contingent, by the standard of external necessity. Their succession is through the inner necessity of the concept itself. No philosophy can emerge sooner or later than when it does appear. Therefore it would be inept if, in the present day, we sought to make the Platonic philosophy into the philosophy of our own time.[12] In the fifteenth

11. See the *Encyclopedia*, 1817 edn., para. 8; cf. *GW* xx. 55; see the translation of pt. I of the 3rd edn. (1830), as *The Encyclopedia Logic*, by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis, 1991), p. 38.

12. Hegel's reference to the demand for a return to Plato, as a way out of contemporary complexities, could have in view Friedrich Schlegel, for two reasons. One is Schlegel's project of translating Plato expressly as a corrective to the most recent philosophy, namely, that of Fichte. See the beginning of Schlegel's 'Ankündigung der geplanten Uebersetzung des Platon', in the *Intelligenzblatt der Allgemeinen Literatur-Zeitung*, no. 43 (25 March 1800), Sp. 349, where he says this explicitly; *Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe (KFSA)*, iii. 334. The second reason involves Schlegel's later summons to return to Plato, as a political expression directed against the French Revolution. See his *Geschichte der alten und neuen Literatur*, lectures given in Vienna in 1812 and published there in 1815, in which he comments most favorably

and sixteenth centuries the old philosophies were dusted off and brought out once again; there were Platonists, Stoics, Aristotelians, and so forth.[13] That was requisite in the advance of European culture, even though these are only mummies of earlier | thought when they are held to be still valid 227
in their form today. The world spirit has moved on, and this is no longer the form in which it in fact finds its consciousness.

You may now ask what this reciprocal refutation on the part of philosophies means. This has happened. The philosophies have not only contradicted one another, but also refuted one another. To what extent? What in them is open to refutation? Only the fact that some principle or some concrete mode of the idea, the form of the idea, now has validity as the highest idea, and as the idea as such. In its own era it is, to be sure, the highest idea; but because we have grasped the activity of thinking as self-developing, what was highest steps down, no longer being the highest, although it remains a necessary element for the following stage. So the content has not been refuted; all that has been refuted is the philosophy's status as the highest, the definitive, stage. So the refutation is just the demotion of one determination to a subordinate role, to being an element. Thus the principle of a philosophy has not been lost, for it is essentially preserved in what follows, except that its status is now different. We have gone beyond the principle of the One, and beyond the principles of matter, the atom, the Fichtean I, and so forth. The One nevertheless remains in its infinite concrete form, according to which it is I, an abiding, essential determination. Nothing gets lost; only the relative position changes. Refutation takes place and has taken place, but only in this sense.

This refutation occurs in all development, hence also in the development of a tree from the seed. Trunk and branches are refutation of the seed. The blossom is refutation of the leaves, such that they are not the highest or true existence of the tree. Finally, the blossom is refuted by the fruit. The fruit, which is the last stage, comprises the entire energy of what went before. In the case of natural things these levels occur separately, | because there 228
nature exists in the form of externality [*Aussereinander*]. In spirit too there

upon French literature's return to the sublime, moral, and purified Platonic and Christian philosophy, following upon the abyss of revolutionary atheism (ii. 229); *KFSA* vi. 346. In a different passage (*W.* xv. 445; see our Vol. III, p. 163, n. 240), Hegel remarks that Ralph Cudworth sought to present warmed-over Plato in England, as 'an insipid metaphysics of the understanding'.

13. See Hegel's presentation of Renaissance philosophy in Vol. III, pp. 57–9, especially on Ficino and the founding of a Platonic Academy, and the work of Pomponazzi, Gassendi, and Lipsius.

is this succession, this refutation, yet all the principles are preserved. The most recent philosophy, the philosophy of the current age, must therefore be the richest and most concrete philosophy, containing all the earlier philosophical principles within itself, although only as elements that previously presented themselves as the whole. Refutation exhibits the limitation of a determination, the fact that it is not the universal determination. Refutation is the negative side. Hence it is far easier than justification; 'to justify' means [to] discern the affirmative element in a determination and to call attention to it.

So, on the one hand the history of philosophy displays the limitation, or the negative, of the principles, but on the other hand, the affirmative side too. In short, it gives them their rightful place. Exhibiting the negative is much easier than highlighting what is affirmative; valuing or respecting something is more difficult than rejecting it. That is why young people turn first to criticism, refutation, condemnation, which is not difficult. The result is the negation of everything determinate. Doing so gives one satisfaction, or the consciousness of one's superiority to that on which judgment is passed, which flatters one's vanity. In contrast, it is more difficult to recognize the affirmative side, in religion and in all else too; yet if something had no authenticity to it, it could not truly have existed. By refutation one disposes of something easily, that is, has not fathomed it. The affirmative consists in fathoming the object and justifying it, which is far more difficult than refuting it.

Insofar, then, as the philosophies are shown to be refuted in the history of philosophy, they are also shown to be preserved. There is yet another specific feature to note with regard to the refutation of one philosophy by another,
229 a feature that we shall encounter in the history of philosophy itself, | and that shows us in what relationship the philosophies stand to one another. Refutation is the exhibiting of the negative, of the limitation of a content.

This negation or this limit has two different forms. In one form, the 'other' to some philosophy is placed in opposition to it, the negative to it is asserted, and this other principle then asserts itself and refutes its counterpart. Each principle of the understanding, what is not itself totality, is one-sided in itself, and this one-sidedness is displayed by the other principle being set over against it. Both principles are then one-sided. But totality exists only as completeness, and in this setting totality is not yet present as the unity that conjoins them. Totality is, however, also present in philosophy itself. Periods of this sort are to be found in the history of philosophy. Stoicism stands opposed to Epicureanism. Spinoza's substance, or absolute unity, stands opposed to the 'one' taken abstractly, or taken concretely as

the monad of Leibniz.[14] Individuality emerges over against the annulling of individuality. Spirit integrates the one-sidedness of one principle in this way, by making the other principle appear too.

The second way in which the negation of a philosophy is posited is the higher way. In it, the one-sided principles are united, are present there only as moments of a unity, no longer as independent but instead as downgraded to moments or elements of the one idea that embraces both principles, downgraded to being determinations or aspects of this one idea. A principle of this kind, one that unites the others within it and is the genuine unity of these determinations, is a higher, more concrete principle; not external unification, it is instead genuine unity of those principles. What is concrete is to be distinguished from what is eclectic, from a | mere ragbag of diverse 230
opinions and principles. What is concrete involves the absolute, complete identity of these distinct elements. The human being is what is concrete, as opposed to inorganic nature; the vegetative soul is also comprised within the animal soul, and both in turn within the human soul. This human soul, moreover, is spirit, and is concrete, not an external combination. Thus the negation of the principles is posited, but at the same time the unification of these opposed principles.

We shall become acquainted with the nodal points in the series of philosophies at which particularities of this sort come together. One of them is the Platonic philosophy. When we examine Plato's Dialogues, we find that some are wholly Eleatic, others Pythagorean, still others Heraclitean.[15] The Platonic philosophy unites all these philosophies within itself; it is not, however, eclectic, but is instead an absolute, genuine penetration of them, forming a concrete idea. Another nodal point occurs in the Alexandrian philosophy; they [these philosophers] have been called Platonists, Pythagoreans, and Aristotelians alike. In their philosophy they united the antithesis of Platonists and Aristotelians, and they included the principle of Stoicism in it too, for each philosophy includes the earlier principles within itself.[16] We must grasp this abundance concretely, as a unity, and know the idea as the fullness that contains all the other principles within itself. In any event, such

14. In the 1825–6 lectures, Leibniz is grouped with Locke and others, in the 'Second Period' of Metaphysics, which comprises the defenders of 'the particular, finite determinateness, and the singular', and is set over against Spinoza (and others in the 'First Period'), for whom 'the singular or the individual ... only perishes and is transitory' (see Vol. III, p. 133).

15. Hegel characterizes Plato's *Parmenides* as Eleatic, and his *Timaeus* as Pythagorean (Vol. II, pp. 205–8). On Plato's position in relation to Heraclitus, the Pythagoreans, and the Eleatics, see also pp. 177–8, 182–4.

16. On this aspect of the Alexandrian philosophy, see Vol. II, pp. 330–1, 334.

categories as plurality, diversity, and the like, are superficial categories of the understanding, and nothing can truly be defined by means of them.

A third consequence of what was stated previously is that we are not dealing with something past but with the present, with thinking, with spirit proper. This is a history [*Historie*] that is at the same time no history; it is
231 historical [*geschichtlich*]; it has taken place, but, | equally so, the thoughts, principles, and ideas, are not over and done with [*Geschehenes*], but are something present, [are determinations] with which we as thinking beings likewise have to deal. Because *we* are thinking, each determination is, and remains, present within our spirit.[17]

In our day the abstractly historicizing [*historisch*] tendency has become very widespread. It involves dealing only with the past as such, although the past as such *is not*, for it exists no more, is devoid of life. Dealing with what is lifeless is itself devoid of life. The heart must be dead if it is said to find its satisfaction in dealing with cadavers. In contrast, the living spirit says: 'Leave the dead to bury their dead, and follow me.'[18] When I examine the past as such, my acquaintance with it remains only external, and possessing it resembles the possession of things in a legal sense. When I know thoughts, truth, knowledge, and spirit, only in the historicizing sense, then they are external to my spirit, and my spirit is suppressed; my own thinking •r my own spirit is not involved; my inmost being is not present. In that case it [my spirit] occupies itself only with the thinking of others, with what has been truth for others. In a purely historicizing treatment I have before me only the thoughts of others, not my own spirit. Were we to ask a historian of this sort what his truth or his knowledge might be, the question would have a strange ring in his ears. He would reply that it is not a matter of satisfying his own spirit, of being personally involved; instead the point is what has been truth for others.

When theological cognition [*Erkenntnis*] is taken to be only the knowing of historical facts, then we give up having for •urselves any cognition of the nature of the divine life. We can, to be sure, have edifying thoughts

17. Here, and in the next few paragraphs, Hegel draws upon the different senses of *Historie* and *Geschichte*, with their correlative adjectival forms. The past as over and done with, as subject to an empirical study in which it remains external to the investigator, is *Historie*. Hegel declines to treat the history of philosophy in this historicizing way, as some of his contemporaries have done it. Philosophy is, and has been, historical (*geschichtlich*), embedded in the twists and turns of the human past. As such, its past moments remain of concern to us because they have shaped our present thought, our spirit. With this conviction and interest we study philosophy's *Geschichte*, which is for us something living, not something dead and gone. Cf. *Philosophy of Religion*, iii. 232–3 with n. 190.

18. See Matt. 8: 22: 'Follow me, and leave the dead to bury their own dead.'

about it, even religious feelings. But to have them we do not need to concern ourselves with historical erudition. | So, when the historicizing 232
tendency predominates in a given era, we can surmise that spirit has become demoralized, has fallen into despair, has died out, that it has abandoned the attempt to satisfy itself, since people busy themselves only with external things, with external information. In the history of thought, we deal with thoughts in which human beings render to themselves an account of the consciousness of their spirit. We must examine how spirit has plumbed its own depth and worked its way to consciousness of itself. In order to grasp this we must be wholly present with [our own] spirit. Do individuals seek to value their spirit, to satisfy it, or not to do so and be content with external information? Needless to say, I have not been speaking against history [*Geschichte*] as such, but only against the purely historicizing attitude. We ourselves are of course occupied here with the history of philosophy.

One requisite for the history of philosophy is impartiality. A teacher of the history of philosophy is supposed to have no philosophical system of his own, lest he be one-sided; so, philosophy gets treated as something external to one's own spirit. What one calls 'impartiality' in this sense is the stance that approaches philosophy in spiritless fashion, that is not present to it with one's own spirit. Tennemann assumes the guise of impartiality, and yet on closer examination he sticks wholly to the Kantian philosophy, the chief tenet of which is that one cannot know what is true.[19] But philosophizing is then actually a sorry business when one knows in advance that one's endeavors will miscarry. Tennemann extols the various philosophies for delving into the depth of spirit, but he also reproaches them, in particular because they were not yet at the Kantian standpoint that we cannot know the truth, in short because they philosophized at all.[20] | 233

Impartiality consists, then, in neutrality with respect to thoughts, to concepts, to thinking spirit. But if one actually wants to study it [philosophy],

19. Tennemann does not enunciate the principle that a historian of philosophy must be impartial. It is absent from the extensive introduction to his *Geschichte der Philosophie* in the first volume, where he discusses the concept and method of writing a history of philosophy. Hegel's contention in our text may refer to vol. viii, pt. 1, p. xiv, where Tennemann rejects a critic's demand that the latest philosophy be used as the basis for the history of philosophy, and he says that 'the historian of philosophy may import no system into its history'. In the next few pages of this same section, in responding to this critic's assertions about Plotinus, Tennemann expresses a Kantian view on the nature and limits of knowledge.

20. Perhaps Hegel is referring to Tennemann's retrospective comment on Greek philosophy (*Geschichte*, vi. 483–4), in which he praises its great achievements but criticizes it from a Kantian standpoint, for lacking a fundamental theory of knowledge that sets forth the conditions, laws, and limits of knowledge, one that clearly distinguishes thinking from knowing, the empirical from the a priori, and so forth.

one must have taken the side of thinking spirit and thought. One actually knows philosophy when engaged with spirit. Mere information is no evidence of actual engagement.

Finally, I have to add yet a fourth comment here, about the way the history of philosophy is to be treated. The time limits of one semester prevent us from fully setting forth the opinions of the philosophers over the millennia. It is indeed evident from the outset that there is a lot of ground to cover in letting the philosophies of 2,500 years pass in review before our spirit, and so the field must be limited.

(1) In light of this our treatment, more specifically, is as follows. In the case of the more ancient philosophies we shall confine ourselves in particular to the principles, not so much because of lack of time but because only the principles can be of interest to us. The most ancient philosophies are the most abstract and the simplest, the ones that have not yet grown into the fuller development of thought. They are also the least specific philosophies, or the sort in which determinateness is not yet posited, even though they potentially contain every determination. Their abstract principles suffice to a certain degree, [are] universal, advance to a certain point that is still of interest. But because they are still abstract they come before us with the quality of particulars, especially inasmuch as their application is of limited range.

That is the case with the principle of mechanism as such. Descartes knew with clarity the principle of mechanism, which suffices in the mechanical
234 domain. But if we sought to examine further in what way he | grasped the nature of plants and animals in terms of mechanism, we would not find equal satisfaction there.[21] The organic realm calls for a more concrete principle, a concept that has attained more inner depth than the principle of mechanism. An elucidation of higher domains on the basis of mechanism would not satisfy us, even though an abstract principle of this sort does actually have its own domain, in which it holds good.

The existence of nature has different levels too, one more meager than the others. In nature the inorganic is what is abstract, the living what is

21. Hegel may be referring to the end of Descartes' *Principia philosophiae* (Amsterdam, 1656), pt. 4, pp. 231–7 (§§188–99); see *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1985), i. 279–86. This section of the *Principles* does not give a full presentation of plant and animal life, although Descartes does claim to have omitted no natural phenomenon from his treatise. He understands these brief comments to be only an anticipation of the fifth and sixth parts of the *Principles*, which he never wrote, and were to have concerned plants, animals, and human beings, as he indicates in §188.

concrete. In such abstract existence the abstract principle of thought holds good. But the application of such an abstract principle to higher domains holds no interest. The ancient philosophies were even more abstract, and construed the universe on the basis of this principle. The Atomist philosophy's principle of the 'one' is an example of a principle that is utterly insufficient and meager for spirit, for the living realm.[22] Hence it is in the interest of philosophy itself that, in this instance, we consider only the principles of the philosophies. Then, in the case of more concrete philosophies, we have to take into account as well the main developments, applications, and basic theses.

(2) We want especially to highlight, and confine ourselves to, the philosophical element of the philosophies, particularly in the case of the ancient philosophies. We have to confine ourselves exclusively to the philosophy, and not to take up what is written about it. A host of incidental matters, discoveries, hypotheses, and the like, are none of our concern. All manner of things have been added on, such as that Thales is said to have been the first to predict a solar eclipse, or that Descartes and Leibniz were supposed to be skillful at mathematical analysis.[23] All of this we omit. | 235

(3) The history of the dissemination of a philosophy cannot interest us either; we will occupy ourselves solely with the content of philosophy. For instance, we know a great many teachers of the Stoic philosophy, famous men of their time, some of whom elaborated its more specific aspects, such as the Stoic logic.[24] We set aside this detail and pass over such men, particularly where they are famous only as disseminators.

This may suffice concerning the first heading, that of the aim, or the spirit, of this history of philosophy.

2. The Relationship of Philosophy to Religion, History, Art, and Constitutional Law

The second point to be covered in this Introduction is the relationship of philosophy to religion, history, art, constitutional law, and so forth, indeed the relationship of philosophy generally to the configurations of spirit, and the stance we take particularly with regard to this issue. We know that the history of philosophy has a connection with external history;

22. In his discussion of modern philosophy (in Vol. III, pp. 116–18), Hegel repeats in greater detail these remarks on the limitations of the Atomistic or mechanistic worldview, and on the confining of Descartes' philosophy of nature to mechanism.

23. On Thales and the eclipse, see Vol. II, p. 17 with n. 7. On the mathematical analysis of Descartes and Leibniz, see Vol. III, pp. 104 and 145–6.

24. On Stoic logic, see Vol. II, pp. 267–71.

and it is natural, in studying philosophy, to call to mind also the principal moments of political history, the character of the age and its condition, in order to envisage the characteristics of its philosophy even more concretely. Besides, the historical connection is not simply external but is instead an inward, essential, deep, and necessary connection, and it has two aspects or
236 elements that we must consider. |

The first is the properly historical aspect of the connection, and the second is the connection to the subject matter, the connection that philosophy has with religion, with science, in general with what is more closely akin to it. The latter aspect has to be defined more precisely in order to know what other spiritual forms we have to exclude from our examination and to circumscribe and elucidate the concept of philosophy.

a. The Historical Relationship: Philosophy and the Spirit of the Age

1) The first aspect that must be noted regarding the historical relationship is the general relationship of philosophy to these other configurations. It is commonly said that political circumstances, religion, and the like, should be taken into account because they have had a great influence on the philosophy of an age, and because the philosophy of the age exerts an influence on them too. To be content with such categories as 'great influence', however, is to place philosophy, religion, and the other spheres into an external connection with one another, and to proceed from this vantage point as if each of them were independent, something by itself.

One must, however, examine this relationship from a different aspect than that of an influence or effect upon one another. The essential category is rather the unity of all these different configurations—the fact that there is but one spirit manifesting itself in different elements, that there is but one principle placing its stamp upon the political situation and upon religion, science, art, and so forth. Political institutions, religion, ethical and social life, commerce, art, and industry are, all of them, simply different branches of one main trunk. This is the major point. Spirit is one only; the substantial spirit of a period, of a people, of an age, is one only, although it takes shape in many ways and these different configurations are the aforementioned elements. One must not envisage political constitutions or religions
237 as having been the cause of philosophies or, vice versa, philosophies | as having been their basis; instead all have one and the same root or one specific character for their foundation, a root that pervades every aspect and presents itself only in diverse elements. Nothing is foreign [*heterogen*] to the substantial spirit. Philosophy is but one of the aspects of the whole; it is the highest flowering of spirit's shape, for it involves being conscious,

thinking and knowing, *that* spirit is and *what* spirit is. Our human dignity consists not only in our being what we are but also in our knowing what we are, and our knowing this in the purest way, namely, by arriving at *thinking* what we are. This is philosophy's place among the configurations of spirit.

A second point follows from what has been said. Philosophy is wholly identical with the spirit of its age. It does not stand above its age, but is instead the consciousness or knowing of what is substantial in its age, namely, the thoughtful knowing of what is in that age. Individuals do not stand above their own time any more than philosophy does, for human beings are children of their time; what is substantial in them is their very own being, manifested only in their own form. It is wrong to stand on tiptoe, so as to look out beyond one's own time. One cannot leap out of one's own time any more than one can jump out of one's own skin.

With respect to its form, however, philosophy does stand above its age, in that philosophy consists of thinking what is the substantial spirit of the age, insofar as philosophy makes this spirit its object. The spirit of its age is its specific, worldly content, although at the same time philosophy as knowing is outside the age, which it sets over against itself; however philosophy does this only formally because it truly has no other content. This very knowing is, to be sure, the actuality of spirit, the self-knowing of spirit; so the formal distinction is also a real, actual distinction. This knowing is then what brings forth a new form in spirit's development. | The developments of spirit are 238
simply ways of knowing; in the course of knowing, spirit posits a distinction between knowing and what is, and that knowing involves, in turn, a new determinacy, which is how a new philosophy emerges.

So philosophy is indeed in itself a further determinacy of spirit, the inner birthplace of the spirit that emerges later as actuality. Later we shall have the more concrete expression of this point. We shall see that what had been Greek philosophy entered into actuality in the Christian world.[25] But these characterizations are still wholly abstract: philosophy is in the first instance only thinking; it does not stand above its age; and it brings forth in thinking fashion only the content of its age.

The third point to note about the historical relationship concerns the time at which philosophy comes on the scene in relation to the other configurations of spirit. The spirit of an age is immediately this living, actual spirit, the substantial life of the age. So, for example, we assign Roman life particularly to the time extending [from] the expulsion of the kings up to the

25. See the account of 'The Idea of Christianity' in Vol. III, pp. 15–23, which serves as the introduction to 'The Second Period: Medieval Philosophy'.

fall of the Republic, and Greek life in its freshness, energy, and youthfulness, to the time before the period when decay set in. [In each case we see] the onset of the way in which a specific spirit is present as an actual vitality. Philosophy, however, is only the thinking of this spirit. But thinking or conceiving, even in its a priori form, is essentially spirit's *result*. Thought is movement, vitality, activity, the bringing-forth of itself.

This activity [of thinking] includes the essential moment of a negation, of
239 coming to be itself via the sublation of something. Thinking is | negation of the immediate, natural mode. The child must be trained and so forth; the immediate mode [of being] must be superseded. In this fashion all discipline includes the element of the negation of this natural mode, and it is this way too with thought as movement, as bringing-forth of itself, beginning from a natural shape of spirit. Spirit is what thinks; at first this spirit is only immediate; it has not yet gone any further, has not yet sublated anything. So it is in its own natural shape, namely, its own living vitality, from which it passes over to reflecting, to conceiving; it passes beyond its natural shape, that is to say, it negates it. The consequence is that the mode of the real world's existence, spirit in its real ethical life, in its vital energy, passes over to the reflection that assails and undermines this substantial mode of spirit, this ethical life, this faith. Thereupon the period of decay makes its entry.

The further progress of thought is then the collecting of itself inwardly, [becoming thereby] something concrete. In this way thought brings forth for itself an ideal world in contrast to that real world, and it takes flight into the ideal world. So, if a philosophy is to emerge, a breach in the real world must have occurred. Philosophy, then, is the reconciliation of the decay that thought has initiated, a reconciliation taking place in an ideal world, one into which thought takes flight when the earthly world no longer satisfies it.

A philosophy now makes its entrance in this epoch when the real world is in decline. When philosophy comes on the scene to display its abstractions, painting gray in gray, the freshness of youth and vitality is already past. Philosophy does indeed bring forth a reconciliation, albeit a reconciliation not in actuality as such but only in the world of thought.[26]
240 In the Greek | world the philosophers withdrew from the affairs of the

26. The famous image of philosophy coming on the scene subsequent to the actuality that it interprets, as alluded to earlier here, has its primary statement in the Preface (dated 25 June 1820) to Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*: '... it is only when actuality is mature that the ideal first appears over against the real and that the ideal apprehends this same real world in its substance and builds it up for itself into the shape of an intellectual realm. When philosophy paints its grey in grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood. The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk.' Quoted from *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford, 1952), p. 13.

state. They were 'idlers', as people called them, and they retreated into the world of thought when everything outside was stormy and wretched, as at the time of the Peloponnesian War.[27]

This is an essential characteristic, one confirmed in the history of philosophy itself. Upon the decline of Ionian life in Asia Minor, the Ionian philosophy emerged. A similar thing happened in Athens. Upon the ruin of the Athenian people there begins the era in which philosophy emerges in Athens in a reconciling role. In the Roman world philosophy was introduced in similar fashion, upon the downfall of properly Roman life, of the Roman republic; philosophy first gained a footing there when spirit no longer found satisfaction in actual, present circumstances. The revival of the ancient Greek philosophy was tied to the decline of the Roman Empire, which was so vast, wealthy, and splendid, but inwardly dead; the greatest flowering of philosophy, the Alexandrian philosophy, emerged only then. We find philosophies making their appearance in similar fashion in modern times, after the Middle Ages. This is the more specific historical connection that philosophy has with the other forms of existence.

b. Philosophy and the Other Configurations of Spirit

2) The second aspect involves defining more precisely philosophy's connection with the other configurations of spirit. Here we have the sciences, art, religion, mythology, and so on, and their general connection with philosophy has to be set forth. We now intend, however, to examine what *distinguishes* philosophy from these other configurations, so that in this way we may get a more precise hold on the concept of philosophy, may highlight the elements that are of importance in philosophy; but we also have to highlight this specific concept with more explicit reference to our history of philosophy, so as to be able to separate off, to exclude, what has no place in it. | 241

It seems easy to say that in the history of philosophy we only have to treat the progress of philosophy, and can leave these other configurations aside, a statement which, on the whole, is quite correct. And yet, what is philosophy? To answer, we must know just where the boundaries of philosophy lie. A great deal that gets counted as philosophy we exclude; if we just went by the name, we would have to bring in much material that we nevertheless disregard. In the same way we could say about religion

27. Hegel has in mind Plato, as exemplifying a withdrawal of this sort. He draws attention to the fact that Plato was born in the year of Pericles' death, in the initial period of the Peloponnesian War, and that, following an early interest in public affairs, he soon withdrew from public life, and devoted himself to philosophy and the sciences. See Vol. II, pp. 176–8.

that, on the whole, we can leave it alone, although in history, religion and philosophy have not left one another alone. The two have often been at war or in alliance with one another, in the Hellenic age as well as in the Christian era, and the antithesis of philosophy and religion constitutes an essential element. Neither has left the other untouched; hence we may not do so either.

We have to speak about two main subjects that are connected to philosophy; the first is science as such, and the second is religion in particular and the relationship of philosophy to it; there must be open, direct, and honest consideration of this latter point. One must not seek to give the impression of wishing to leave religion as sacrosanct. This impression is tantamount to seeking to gloss over the fact that philosophy has set itself in opposition to religion. [Those who speak for] religion, that is, the theologians, make it out to be thus [sacrosanct] by ignoring philosophy, but only in order not to be inconvenienced in their arbitrary reasoning.

So, the first subject that we intend to treat is that of scientific culture
242 in general, and then, in more detail, the observations of the empirical | sciences and their reasoning, particularly so far as these sciences too have been called 'philosophizing'. The scientific enterprise or impulse has in common with philosophy the formal element, thinking. Science begins from experience, but it *thinks about* experience and seeks for what is universal in what it examines. Thus the scientific side has the formal element in common with philosophy.

In contrast, the other side, religion, shares with philosophy the substantive element, namely, God or the absolute, what is in and for itself. This substantive element is the content of religion and philosophy; it is the essential being of the world. Their common ground is the relationship to truth, to the absolute idea.

i. *Scientific Culture in General, and the Empirical Sciences* The first subject, then, involves the following points. General principles have been established with regard to natural things, to duties, relationships, and so forth; there is right or morality, and, correspondingly, the laws, forces, and configurations of nature, the causes of things, are known. Factors in external nature are 'causes', and the motive power in the ethical world, the moral element, the enduring element, is called 'cause' too. Here thinking shares this content with philosophy, and everything that has been thought in this regard has been called 'philosophy' too.

Thus in philosophy we encounter first of all the seven sages. Their philosophy primarily consists, on closer inspection, of a few moral aphorisms and

axioms with a general ethical content, ones involving duties and essential relationships.[28] In later times we see, in another context, that the world has begun to give its attention to natural things. People gave up reasoning in an a priori way about natural things in accord with the metaphysics of Scholastic philosophy or the axioms derived from religion, and turned to nature itself, observed it and sought to recognize its forces and laws; they likewise delved into ethical relationships, into the essence of the state, and called this 'philosophy' too, 'Newtonian philosophy'.[29] | 243

On the whole, [this procedure] takes the form of expressing general propositions about nature, the state, right, and religion, as formal, wholly universal propositions. People say that philosophy treats causes, the ultimate grounds of things. So, where universal causes or grounds, the ultimate grounds of things, get expressed, they share with philosophy precisely the feature that they are universal and, more specifically, that propositions or grounds of this kind are drawn from experience and inner sensibility. However much this [way of thinking] may seem contrary to the principle of philosophy, it does nonetheless involve the fact that *I* have had the experience, that it resides in my senses, and thereby it is *for me*.

This form of knowing or being convinced is opposed first and foremost to what is positive, and it came on the scene especially in opposition to religion and to the positive element in religion, but also in relation to other philosophies. 'Newtonian philosophy' simply comprises what we now call 'natural science', that is, acquaintance with the laws, forces, and general properties of nature, an acquaintance based on sense perception, on experience. This was a great epoch, and it begins a new period in that people gained the confidence to see, feel, and taste for themselves, to grant validity to the domain of the senses, to the testimony of the senses, testimony from which in particular the natural sciences have sprung. Linked to it is the fact that only what is universal and discerned through the senses gets singled out and firmly established. This testimony of the senses was set in opposition to the previous ways of treating nature, | in which one started out from 244 metaphysical principles.

This testimony of the senses, however, is not the only factor that bolstered confidence in opposition to the metaphysics of the understanding. Another kind of testimony was highly regarded too, insofar as [confidence] is placed

28. On the seven sages, see Vol. II, pp. 17–23.

29. This expression derives from the great influence of Isaac Newton on experimental science, especially in England, where the term gained the wider usage discussed here. See Hegel's account of Newton in Vol. III, pp. 143–4. See also the additional examples just below in our text.

in the human understanding or mind [*Gemüt*], an understanding, thinking, or feeling of one's own by which people came especially into conflict with the positive element in religion, in political institutions, and so forth. In the Middle Ages people had adhered to a positive version of the Christian religion; over against its dogmas, they [now] came to have confidence in their own thinking, in the testimony of their thinking, their own feeling and imagining, their own understanding, and so on, insofar as it is their own.

This principle was applied in similar fashion against the prevailing system of public law, or at the very least new principles were sought for the old system, in order thereby to rectify it. In the very same respect in which religion is positive, the basis for the subject's obedience to the prince and to the magistrate is positive too; it too is based on authority. Kings are the anointed of the Lord, as were the Jewish kings, and the magistrate is installed by God. The Jewish laws were normative as the essential point of departure particularly in the case of marriage.[30]

One's own free deliberation set itself in opposition to this authority. Hugo Grotius discusses the *consensus gentium* (what counts as right among all peoples) and, by his own reasoning, supports what this consensus found to be valid.[31] The purpose of the state came to be based more on the purpose immanent in human nature. In this way the basis of [legal] recognition was
245 completely altered. | People called this 'philosophizing', and because of it philosophy was even called 'worldly wisdom'; [it is called 'worldly' because it is] the wisdom that knows about what is worldly, and also because the content had been produced by the activity of worldly understanding, of

30. See the account in Vol. III of Bacon on Jewish marriage laws (p. 91), and that of Hobbes on the right of the monarch to command obedience (p. 142). Hegel's reference to a continuing validity of Jewish marriage laws may be a misconstrual of passages in *Das Erbrecht in weltgeschichtlicher Entwickelung*, 4 vols., 1825–35, by his pupil and friend, Eduard Gans. Gans treats Mosaic and Talmudic marriage laws in vol. i. 128–47. Gans actually says (iii. 75–6) that in the Oriental world the wife is absolutely subordinate, in the Roman world she is absolutely independent, and that the Christian world synthesizes the two, so '... there is finally unity and difference in one', an interpretation that draws fundamental distinctions with respect to Mosaic, Roman, and Christian marriage laws. Karl Friedrich Eichhorn, in the second volume of his *Deutsche Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte*, 3rd edn. (Göttingen, 1821), refers to a coexistence of different traditions of laws governing the family during the period AD 888–1272, but does not include a 'Jewish' tradition among them (p. 527). In the 1823–4 lectures, in a parallel context, Hegel mentions the Mosaic Law, in a manner indicating he may be agreeing with the view of Adam Heinrich Müller who, while not writing specifically about marriage laws, juxtaposes the 'personal' character of the Mosaic revelation to the 'impersonal' character of Roman legislation, with regard to the treatment of persons. See Müller's *Die Elemente der Staatskunst*, pt. 2 (Berlin, 1809), pp. 224–5.

31. On Grotius, see Vol. III, p. 140.

human, worldly reason. So it is correct to call philosophy 'worldly wisdom', although philosophy does not restrict itself merely to the worldly domain but, as Spinoza says, considers what is worldly *sub specie aeterni*, as abiding within the divine idea, for philosophy has the same aim as religion.[32]

Friedrich von Schlegel has restored 'worldly wisdom' to currency as a term of disparagement. He wants to indicate by it that worldly wisdom must stand aside when talk is of higher things, namely, of religion, and many have followed his lead.[33] In England everything pertaining to nature is called 'philosophy'; one philosophical journal in England has essays about agriculture, about manure, and publishes discoveries about such things; optical instruments, barometers, and thermometers are called 'philosophical instruments'.[34] Theories too, but particularly [those of] morals (Scottish moral philosophers are well known), which derive from the feelings of the human heart or from experience, from concepts of legal right, also belong to philosophy, as when Cicero invokes what is *insitum homini a natura*.[35] The

32. On the title page of *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy* (1801), Hegel designated himself as 'the doctor of worldly wisdom'. On the expression *sub specie aeterni*, see his discussion of Spinoza's *Ethics* in Vol. III, pp. 128–30.

33. No passage can be cited that supports this contention, which perhaps relies upon interchanging *Weltweisheit* ('worldly wisdom') with *Weltwissenschaft* ('worldly knowledge'). Schlegel frequently opposes the true (namely, the Christian) philosophy to the 'false philosophy and epidemic mania for reason'; see, for instance, his *Geschichte der alten und neuen Litteratur* (Vienna, 1815), ii. 237. In a subsequent passage (p. 312), he chastises the successors to Kant who resurrect pure rational knowledge, in the double guise of the I and of unconditional 'worldly knowledge'. He echoes this theme soon after (p. 322), in ascribing to Schelling a 'hasty *Weltconstruiren*', or world-construct. (For these passages, see *KFSA* vi. 353, 399, 407.) However, we cannot exclude the possibility that Hegel in fact had in mind a treatise by Gottlieb Schlegel, *Abhandlung von den ersten Grundsätzen in der Weltweisheit und den schönen Wissenschaften* ... (Riga, 1770), which is critical not of 'worldly wisdom' as such, but of the contemporary methods, speculations, and controversies that characterize it (pp. iii–iv).

34. In a footnote to para. 7 of his *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1827–30), Hegel refers to the *Annals of Philosophy; or Magazin of Chemistry, Mineralogy, Mechanics, Natural History, Agriculture, and the Arts. By Thomas Thomson*, 16 vols. (London, 1813–20). See *GW* xix. 34 and xx. 47. See also the excerpt in the *Berliner Schriften*, p. 701.

35. The Scottish moral philosophers, including Adam Smith, receive considerable attention in Vol. III, pp. 164–5. Hegel correctly identifies Cicero as the source of the view that nature has placed in human beings drives, inclinations, and insights of this kind. See Cicero's *Tusculanarum quaestionum* 1.14.31; see *Tusculan Disputations*, trans. J. E. King (Loeb Classical Library, rev. edn.; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1945), pp. 36–9. According to this passage, nature silently attests to the immortality of the soul. The passage that Hegel probably has in mind, however, occurs in the *De natura deorum* (1.13.35) in a different context, namely, the Epicurean criticism of the Stoics' reduction of the divine realm to the sphere of nature. See *De natura deorum and Academica*, trans. H. Rackham (Loeb Classical Library, rev. edn.; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1951), pp. 38–9, where Strato is said to hold the view that 'the sole repository of divine power is nature' ('omnem vim divinam in natura sitam esse').

new political economy as instigated by Adam Smith, for instance, counts as philosophy, and at least in England the name of philosophy is honored in
246 this way. Everything that can be traced back to general principles | is called 'philosophy'. Lord Liverpool presided at a banquet attended by Minister Canning, who, in his words of acknowledgment, congratulated England for putting the philosophical principles of government into practice.[36] So at least in England 'philosophy' is no term of disparagement. But despite the fact that all of these aspects bear the name of 'philosophy', we wish to exclude them from the history of philosophy. Later on I will explain why more precisely.

Inherent in all of these instances, however, is an element that they share with philosophy, that of 'seeing for oneself'. I must be involved myself; this is the great principle set over against authority in any domain. I myself must sense and see; something must be in my own understanding, feeling, and thinking, in my reason. 'In my own thinking' is really a pleonasm; we all have to think for ourselves, since no one can think for someone else. So this element is the self, and then also [it is] the form produced by thinking, the universal laws, basic determinations, and so forth. This self and this form of universality are what philosophy shares with these sciences, perspectives, principles, and the like, of which we have been speaking.

ii. *Religion and Mythology* The second sphere of configurations of spirit akin to philosophy is the domain of religion, including religious representations, mythology, and the like. Just as the first domain under this heading shares with philosophy the I and the form of universality, so the shared feature here is the other one, namely, what is substantial, the content. The peoples [of the world] have declared in religion what they thought about the essential being of the world, the substance of nature and of spirit, that which has being absolutely in and for itself, the cause or the substantial element of nature and of their own spirit, and then too [they declared] how the human spirit or the human heart relates to these
247 objects. |

In the case of religion we notice right away two definite features. The first is the object for consciousness; God, as known and represented to us, thus as object, is 'over there', is something other, and human beings stand 'on this side'. The second feature is devotion and the cultus, and they involve the transcending of this opposition. People transcend it in devotion, wherein

36. In Vol. III, p. 144, Hegel repeats much of the foregoing discussion of 'philosophy' in England, concluding there with the same anecdote about Canning.

they raise themselves up to the consciousness of unity with this being. This is the meaning of the cultus in all religions. For the Greeks, the cultus was the enjoyment and partaking [*Genuss*] of beautiful objectivity.

Philosophy has the same object as religion, namely, spirit, or what has being in and for itself. Because people have brought forth in religion their consciousness of what is supreme, the religions in their own right involve the witness of the individual's own spirit, and to this extent religions are the supreme accomplishment of substantial reason. So it is absurd to suppose that priests invented religion for purposes of deception, as if people allowed something concerning what is ultimate and supreme to be foisted upon them.[37]

As we said, philosophy has the same object [as religion], but it is common knowledge that philosophy and religion have diverged in various ways concerning this object, and that will become more evident in the history of philosophy itself. The issue now is, on the one hand, how philosophy differs from theology or from religion as such and, on the other hand, to what extent then we have to take the religious sphere into account in the history of philosophy.

The first point is therefore how philosophy and religion differ. | I will 248
state the general features of this difference and, as far as possible, explain them. Religion and philosophy share the same object, what God is in and for himself, namely, what is in and for itself, the universal, absolute spirit. This object is spirit, but it at the same time encompasses nature within itself; it is both spirit itself and the inward encompassing of nature. Spirit is not identical with nature in a superficial sense, in the manner of something that is chemically neutral; instead, spirit is inwardly identical, is one with itself in the kind of identity in which nature is only the negative aspect, is only as ideal. This is the idealism of spirit.

This absolute, universal spirit is the divine spirit. This universality of spirit is not external but is absolute, is an absolute universality, which

37. In the *Philosophy of Religion*, Hegel says (ii. 491–2, n. 673) that Voltaire and other French authors are especially responsible for the charge of priestly deception. Voltaire is most concerned about priests' worldly power, about 'l'accord du sacerdoce et de l'empire'. See the *Dictionnaire philosophique*, vol. vi, the articles on 'Pierre, Saint' and 'Prêtes', pp. 307–13, 400–1, in vol. xlii of the *Œuvres complètes* (1784), and 'Superstition', in xliii. 236–52. Hegel may also have in mind Paul Henri Thiry d'Holbach, author of *Le Christianisme dévoilé* ... (London, 1756) under the pseudonym 'Boulanger' (esp. ch. 15), and of *Théologie portative; ou, Dictionnaire abrégé de la religion chrétienne* (London, 1768) under the pseudonym 'Abbé Bernier' (esp. the articles 'Sacerdoce' and 'Sacrilege'). Hegel may not have had first-hand acquaintance with these sources. But he did know of this accusation from Reimarus, in Lessing's publication of the *Wolfenbüttel Fragments* (1774–8); see *Reimarus: Fragments*, ed. Charles H. Talbert, trans. Ralph S. Fraser (Philadelphia, 1970), pp. 67–9 (pt. 1, no. 5).

is all-pervasive, is present in everything. We have to represent spirit to ourselves as free, which means that it is present to itself, it apprehends itself, it extends over what is other, and in the other it finds its own self, enjoys and possesses itself. Even though individuality as singularity gets represented as being something inflexible, something single, we must part ways [*abstrahieren*] with this atomistic principle if we are to represent spirit to ourselves in its truth. Spirit is what is universal, is self-apprehending [*sich selbst Vernehmende*]. The distinction of the singular aspect from the universal aspect is expressed by saying that the subjective, singular spirit is the divine spirit insofar as it [the divine spirit] is apprehended. The spirit apprehending universal spirit would then be subjective spirit.

By taking this definition as our starting point, we then have in addition only particular forms of apprehending; what we call faith, religious faith in its proper sense, is spirit apprehended in a substantial, universal way. The divine spirit is not [present] apart from faith, as the church formerly put it,
249 for the divine spirit is a spirit of | humankind and lives in its community, is present in it. The single spirit then apprehends the divine spirit, the essential being and truth of its own spirit; this essential being, this substantial aspect of spirit, is not something particular [*Partikularität*] but is instead what has being in and for itself, what abides universally. This [apprehending] is what was called faith, especially in the Lutheran Church; it was no faith in historical things, for Lutheran faith is instead the faith of spirit itself and the apprehending of the substantial aspect of spirit, not of just any content. In keeping with our contemporary theory of immediate faith, a person says, 'I believe, I know immediately, that I have a body'; the fact that the external senses give rise to the belief gets called 'having faith'.[38] The religious meaning of 'faith', however, is precisely this knowing of the absolute spirit and this certainty of [spirit's] immediate presence. Religion is authentic for human beings only in virtue of the witness of the spirit, which is a deep root of spirit's identity. Spirit shows itself, manifests itself, and bears witness to itself; it has the consciousness of unity with this object, inasmuch as it is itself its own object.

What now emerges and takes shape is consciousness of this object. This content can only show itself as a given, as something received, represented in sensible form, coming from without, as occurs in mythology or in the historical mode of origins. It comes to the individual in this external way. But the witness of the spirit is integral to faith. So the content is at first

38. In Vol. III Hegel criticizes, in various contexts, the claim to immediate knowledge, especially as it appears in the 'faith philosophy' of his older contemporary, Jacobi (pp. 195–200).

in an external mode, but in such a way that spirit witnesses to it. Jesus says, 'I am with you always, even unto the end of the world'; he also says, 'Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them', as well as stating, 'When I am no longer with you, the Spirit will come and will guide you into all truth'.[39] On one side there is a representational consciousness, in which this content is object. | Then it is 250
outside us, separate from us. The other side involves devotion, the cultus, the witness of the spirit, which elevates itself and, in doing so, transforms the externality into inwardness. In devotion, in the cultus, in the partaking of the sacraments, the feeling of unity with the object is produced. In this setting there is a vacillation; sometimes externality predominates, sometimes devotion. In one phase the indwelling spirit is sent back historically some 2,000 years, to a foreign land and its environment, to Palestine. In the other, however, in devotion, in the cultus, in the sacrament, there is the feeling of spirit's presence.

Consequently an antithesis is found here. The form of philosophy distinguishes itself from this religious form, and this distinction has to be comprehended with greater precision. The basic relationship on which everything hinges here is the nature of spirit as such; for spirit the point of departure must be the fact that spirit apprehends itself, and that this self-apprehension is *one* substantial identity. In the apprehending, spirit distinguishes itself, apprehends itself, and subjective, finite consciousness finds its place within this distinction. The 'finite' is what has a limit in another, a limit the other side of which an other commences; this is the case only where there is a distinction or a determination. Spirit, however, is this lucid self-manifesting and self-apprehending, this remaining present to itself in distinction. What is distinct is transparent to spirit, is something lucid to it, not something obscure; in it spirit is present to itself. | 251

In one sense it is correct to speak of limits to spirit, to human reason. Human beings are limited and dependent in every respect except insofar as they are spirit; finitude affects all the other modes of our existence. To the extent that, as spirit, one functions in spiritless fashion, one takes up a relation to external things, although, as spirit, one is infinite, without limitation. The limits of reason are limits in this one specific [human] subject, although insofar as this subject is wholly rational, it is infinite. However, the reference here is not to the 'bad infinite' of the understanding.

In the universal, substantial spirit, however, there is distinguishing [*Unterscheiden*]. As subjective, it is still spirit, and pure spirit is *for* it;

39. See Matt. 18: 20 and 28: 20, and John 16: 13.

the object or content is at once immanent to it, but not in a natural or an immediate way. This is the basic determination, the fact that human beings are illumined by grace or, as it is said, by the Holy Spirit; we discover objective spirit within our own spirit. What is object for us, what is essential being, is *our* essential being, is essential spirit, and so it is our own spirit. This living spirit of humankind is, as it were, flammable material or phosphorous, which is susceptible to a kindling that can come from without by the external stimulation of feeling or of representation. This content comes from without, and people are taught it; they accept it on authority. In contrast, by taking up a spiritual attitude one is set on fire inwardly, and the manifestation is then one's inmost being or very own self.[40]

The next point, the second one, concerns the manner in which spirit is objective to itself, how it comports itself in its being-for-self. This manner can take various [forms] and, if spirit be transparent to itself, the shape spirit has can be distinctive. In spirit's being conscious of the essential being of its essence [*des Wesen seines Wesens*], there is distinction, or form. Here comes
252 into play more precisely | the distinction between religion and philosophy. In religion, spirit has a characteristic shape, one that can be sensuous, for instance in art, where the shape of the deity is sensuous. In poetry too the sensuous representation is primarily what dresses up the poetic portrayal. We can say in general that the shape exists for representation, which is one's own representation although it can be universal [as well]. This form indeed belongs to thinking too, although it embodies a certain external content. Right and ethics are supersensible, as we say, but my representation of them proceeds from custom, from the characteristics at hand, from feeling.

What makes philosophy distinct is that in philosophy the same content is grasped as posited in the form of thought. In religion two elements must be distinguished. (1) One is an objective form or determination of consciousness, in which the essential being or the absolute exists as object, coming before the representational faculty as a historical shape, distant in time and space. (2) The second determination or arena is that of devotion or inwardness, in which this separation is removed or superseded. In devotion the individual is filled with the spirit, and has the feeling of being thus fulfilled. In philosophy these two arenas in religion are united into one. What philosophy thinks or conceives is objective in accord with the first determination of consciousness, but it is a thought that is objective; the content has superseded or removed the form of its objectivity; it [the thought] is posited in oneness [*Eins*], in

40. This theme of an inward, spiritual fire occurs in Meister Eckhart, Jacob Boehme, and a number of other medieval, Renaissance, Reformation, and early modern figures in the religious tradition. See Cyril O'Regan, *The Heterodox Hegel* (Albany, 1994).

this inwardness. It is thinking inasmuch as even the *content*, namely, *what* I think, is at the same time in the form of thinking, and exists as *thought*. [So] the content does not stand over against me.

In accord with these two forms, philosophy and religion go their separate ways. Their substantial content is one and the same, and what differs is only the mode of its configuration. These | configurations are not only divergent, 253
for in their divergence they can even appear to be opposed, indeed mutually contradictory, because the content is represented as essentially bound to this [religious] shape. Even within religion itself, however, it is conceded that many such modes of representation are not to be taken in the strict sense. For instance, God is said from all eternity to have begotten, and to beget, his son. The self-knowing on the part of divine spirit, its making itself into an object, is here termed 'begetting a son'; spirit knows itself in the 'son', for it is of the very same nature [as the son]. This relationship of father and son, and of begetting, is drawn from living nature, not even from spiritual relations but from what is natural and living. This is how it is stated for purposes of representation, and one says it is not to be taken literally. What, then, is the proper sense of this thought-category? The proper sense is that it is to be taken in the form of thought. Thus when mythology speaks of the wars of the gods, it is readily conceded that what is meant are various natural forces or spiritual forces, which were interactive with, or even opposed to, one another.

It is natural for these different forms, in their initial determinate emergence, to be aware of their differences and so to be mutually antagonistic; that is necessarily the case. The first emergence of thinking itself is abstract, therefore not perfect in its form, and even more imperfect is religious consciousness as it exists initially and immediately, even though it be consciousness of God, of what has being in and for itself; as initial consciousness it is still intertwined with the sensuous shape in a sensible way.

On the side of thinking there is, as we said, the drawback that thinking is abstract in its first appearance. Spirit is only result. Later on thinking grasps itself more concretely, becomes inwardly deeper, and brings the concept of spirit as such to consciousness. When it has grasped itself | 254
concretely, it is then no longer ensnared in abstract determinacy. Concrete spirituality can comprehend the substantial element of the shape because the concept of concrete spirit includes the point that spirit itself essentially conceives itself as having determination within itself—and determination is something counted as belonging to the understanding or the essence of the appearance. The abstract understanding is soon done with this, for it denies all determinacy; little then remains of God, who is but the most abstract

and highest essence, lacking all determinacy. Concrete spirit deals not with such a *caput mortuum* of the *être suprême*, but instead with active, inwardly self-determining spirit.

Later on, therefore, the concept, the self-conceiving thought, recognizes in the content of religion something concrete, the determinacy in the universal, not something sensuous but something essential. God the father is the abstract product of the understanding, is the Jewish God, the highest being. What is concrete is not merely God as such, but the fact that God determines himself, namely, that God posits an other to himself. As spirit, however, God does not leave the other as something other because, in the third place, God is present to himself in the other, and this is spirit. This concrete element in religion can then be known and recognized only by the concept that is itself concrete. Herein lies the possibility of the reconciliation of philosophy with religion, and of religion with philosophy.

This is the historical sequence. At first thinking emerges to some extent within religion, although in an unfree manner or side-by-side with religious representations, so that the opposition does not yet enter consciousness. Then, however, thinking gains strength on its own account and so, in its self-reliance, it turns against the form of religion, becomes hostile to it, and
255 seeks to know for itself the concept inherent in religion. |

In Greece thinking arose in an unsophisticated fashion; it posited itself on itself and took up a stance in opposition to religion at a very early date. Xenophanes attacked religious representations vigorously indeed. Later the antithesis became even starker, when many atheists came forward who expressly denied the gods and thereby the divine as such. Socrates was accused of having introduced new gods. His principle, his δαιμόνιον, is wholly at odds with the form of Greek religion and ethical life, although he participated quite honorably in the practices of his religion, and we know that in his dying moments he ordered a cock to be sacrificed to Aesculapius.[41]

This opposition to religion goes back a long way. Only later do we see the Neoplatonists recognizing the universal content in the mythology that the philosophers had attacked or disregarded. The Neoplatonists translated the mythological images into the signification or mode of

41. See Vol. II of this edition for these accusations concerning religion. On Xenophanes, see p. 58. Protagoras cast doubt on the existence of the gods, and his book was burned as a result; see p. 120. On Socrates' 'daimon', and the accusations against him, see pp. 148–56. On Socrates' tribute to Aesculapius, see Plato's *Phaedo* 118a; *Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus*, trans. H. N. Fowler (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1914), 402–3.

thought, and then employed mythology as a figurative language for their philosophy.[42]

The same thing occurred in the Christian religion. At first thinking is not independent but is directly tied to the shape of the religion, such that thinking takes the Christian doctrine as its absolute presupposition. In this setting, especially in the church fathers, thinking initially elaborated the elements of the religion; so this religion became for the first time a system at the hands of the philosophizing fathers of the church.

In more recent times some have sought to return religion to its initial shape. The idea behind this was a very good one, especially at the time of the Reformation, although it also involves the spurious sense of repudiating the elaboration, of cutting off the development of thought. At first thought elaborated the doctrine and developed it into a system. So the first point is the development, and the second is that the developed doctrine came to be firmly established and upheld, that thinking made this doctrine into the absolute presupposition. | Only later arose the antithesis between faith—or 256
doctrine—and so-called thinking or so-called reason.

Thinking then posited itself on its own account. Its raptor eyes are sharp, and the young eagle of reason for the first time soared up on its own, into the sunshine of truth, but as a bird of prey that attacks religion. The last stage consists in justice being done once again to the religious content by means of the speculative concept, when the latter has perfected itself into the concrete concept of spirit.

So religion has a content shared with philosophy; only their forms differ, which means simply that the form of the concept is so far perfected that it can comprehend the content of religion. The content religion shares with philosophy is most especially what we call the religious 'mysteries', namely, the speculative element in religion. A superficial understanding of 'mysteries' embraces, first of all, something done in secret and remaining secret, not known openly. In keeping with their nature as speculative content, the mysteries are something opaque for the understanding but not for reason. The mysteries are precisely the rational aspect of religion, in the sense of what is speculative, namely, in the sense of the concrete concept.[43]

Philosophy, however, is opposed to the so-called rationalism in recent theology that has the word 'reason' constantly on its lips despite the fact that its 'reason' is only arid, abstract understanding. No reason is discernible

42. For the Neoplatonists' use of mythology, see Vol. II, pp. 340–1, 344–5.

43. For this sense of the 'mysteries' as the speculative element, see *Philosophy of Religion*, i. 382 n. 44, and iii. 280–2, as well as further discussion of the issue in our text, pp. 85–6 below.

in it apart from the element of thinking for oneself [*Selbstdenken*], and [here] that is just wholly abstract thinking. In both form and content this rationalism is antithetical to philosophy. It has no content; it has made heaven empty, into a *caput mortuum*, and degraded everything to finite
257 relationships. With respect to form too, it is antithetical to philosophy, | for its form is argumentation, an argumentation that is not free, and this is not philosophizing, not conceptual thinking.

Supernaturalism in religion is antithetical to rationalism. It is, however, akin to philosophy with regard to the authentic content while being quite different in form, since supernaturalism has become wholly devoid of spirit and quite petrified, owing to the sheerly positive authority accepted as its attestation and justification. Later on we shall speak of the Scholastics, who were not supernaturalists of this sort, but sought instead to grasp the church's dogma conceptually.[44]

As conceptual thinking of this content, [speculative] philosophy has the advantage, in comparison with the representational thinking of religion, that it understands both [conceptual content and representation]; it can understand religion and do justice to it. Philosophy also understands rationalism and supernaturalism, and it understands itself too, but they do not understand it. Insofar as religion as such occupies the standpoint of representation, it expresses only itself; it understands itself in what comes under the heading of representation, but it does not understand philosophy, that is, the concept, the universal categories of thought. So people often did philosophy the injustice of reproaching it for its opposition to religion. Because it does not understand philosophy, religion cannot judge it. Yet the form of religion is requisite for the absolute idea, for absolute spirit. In other words, religion is the consciousness of what is true, in the way that consciousness exists for all human beings.

The general cultivation of a human being involves first the cultivation of the senses, and then, in the second place, the infusion [*Einmischung*] of the
258 form of the universal | into sensible appearance, the incipient reflection or apprehension of the universal.[45] Hence religion must have consciousness of what is true, of the spiritual; it must have the form of reason. In other words, religion must be consciousness of what is true in and for itself, and that is

44. On the Scholastics, see Vol. III, pp. 32–54.

45. An. reads, with a marginal addition: 'the supervention [*Hinzutreten*] of speculation, by which one learns to think, but at first only to think abstractly, about the true essence of things, and this thinking is still infused with much externality. Then one passes over to a more concrete cultivation or thought, in speculating about what is true and becoming conscious of it.'

the general justification of the shape of religion. Speculative consideration, however, is not the general form of thinking for everyone.

We have now analyzed the distinction between philosophy and religion. But there are still a few more points to note with reference to topics we intend to take up in the history of philosophy, ones linked to what we have been discussing.

The first point concerns mythology as such, which is said to contain implicit philosophical themes [*Philosopheme*]; to that extent mythology may be considered in the history of philosophy. My friend Creuzer is renowned for his special project of treating the mythology or, in general, the religious representations, of all peoples, so as to recognize the philosophical themes or the rational element in them.[46] Others attack this kind of treatment, declare it misguided, and reproach it as an unhistorical procedure. Their objection is that it is unhistorical to give philosophical themes of that sort a place here. The mystery cults of the ancients in particular belong to the mythological sphere too, and one can readily see that even more philosophical themes have been set forth or portrayed in them than in mythology.

This first point, namely the objection that it is unhistorical for philosophical themes to be included in mythology, is disposed of by what has in general already been stated. The religions of the various peoples, and their mythologies too, are products of rational human beings who have set down in mythology their highest consciousness, a consciousness of what is true. It follows that in any event mythology does contain reason, thoughts, general insights and determinations, in short, what one calls 'philosophical themes'. To find fault with the methodology of a | Creuzer, 259
by saying that these themes are just 'read into' mythology and are not themselves in it, that this is 'allegorizing', is in one sense quite correct, for that is a methodology of Creuzer as well as of the Alexandrians who carried on this practice.[47] But these thinkers did not merely 'read into'

46. Friedrich Creuzer, Hegel's Heidelberg colleague and friend, authored the widely known and influential *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker, besonders der Griechen*, 2nd edn., 4 vols. (Leipzig and Darmstadt, 1819–21).

47. In the 1819 lectures (pp. 157–8 below), Hegel remarks at this point on how the Alexandrian philosophers used the rational interpretation of ancient Greek and Roman mythologies in response to criticism of these myths by their philosophical and Christian opponents. Those in Hegel's day who commented on this practice include not only Creuzer (*Symbolik*, i. 207–8) but also Friedrich Schlegel, in his *Geschichte der Poesie der Griechen und Römer* (Berlin, 1798), vol. i, pt. 1, p. 82 (*KFSA* i. 458), and later Schelling, in his *Philosophie der Mythologie* (1842), on which see *Sämmtliche Werke*, ed. K. F. A. Schelling (Stuttgart and Augsburg, 1856–61), xi. 33.

the material, since what they studied had the instinct of rationality as its basis. That must be accepted universally and absolutely in the case of religions, however sensuous they may appear to be. All religions, no matter how natural, simple, or even childish they may seem, are products of the reason that is becoming self-conscious, however meager their religious configurations may still be. So Creuzer should be acknowledged for employing the methodology that is, in and for itself, authentic and essential.

It is therefore quite mistaken to say that what has been *thought* with respect to mythology is external to its configurations. Linked with this point is the fact that, because the mythological element passes over into the sensuous mode of presentation, a variety of contingent and extraneous material gets mixed in with it. The sensuous is not the authentic element in which thought or the pure concept can be presented, for presentation of the concept in sensuous fashion always involves something incommensurate with spirit. The sensible shape, which is produced in a historical or natural mode, must be described from many sides. This external shape is then a
260 contingent accompaniment of the inner concept and clashes with it. |

The Neoplatonists in particular dealt with pagan mythology in such a way as to recognize their own philosophy in it and to present this philosophy symbolically in the forms of mythology, in order to express in them their own concepts. It is natural to assume that a great deal of error is to be found in those [sensible] configurations attached to an inner concept, particularly when it comes to single details. The host of customs, activities, implements, vestments, sacrifices, and the like in public worship can surely present a somewhat parallel situation. All these elements may be interconnected, but only remotely so, and many chance features and much arbitrariness have found their way into the picture. It is essential to see, however, that there is reason in all this; so grasping mythology in this manner is a necessary way of treating it.

Essential though it be to discern the philosophical dimension in it, mythology must nonetheless be excluded from our treatment of the history of philosophy. It is not our task to deal with philosophical themes as such, that is, with general ways of representing what is true or with thoughts presented in just any fashion. Instead, we deal with thoughts that are out in the open [*heraus sein*] and only to the extent that they are out in the open—only insofar as reason has attained consciousness in the form of thought. This is a momentous distinction. Reason is present in the child too, but in the child it is merely the capacity for reason; in the history of philosophy, however, we are dealing with its form, with the fact that this content is set

forth in the form of thought. Philosophical themes contained implicitly in religion are not our concern.

It is credible [to say] that philosophy is contained in the mystery cults; but this is not the place to pursue the point, except to state that they did contain symbolic | portrayals, in sensuous fashion, of higher representations. Much 261
of the old nature religion, which by then had receded into obscurity, may also have been preserved in the mysteries. On the whole, what the mysteries contain stands far back from the content of public religion. The mysteries of the true religion, of the Christian religion, essentially contain speculation. The Neoplatonists called the speculative concept 'mystical'; μυεῖν or μυεῖσθαι, 'to be initiated', means 'to engage in speculative philosophy'.[48] In its superficial meaning, the term refers to something unknown; a 'mystery', however, is by no means truly unknown or incomprehensible. Thus all Athenians were initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries, Socrates alone being a particular exception.[49] The one thing forbidden was disclosing the mysteries publicly, in the presence of foreigners. Aeschylus was reproached for having divulged something from the mysteries, namely, that Proserpina is the daughter of Diana, even though every Athenian already knew that.[50]

48. See Vol. II, p. 345.

49. Lucian of Samosata (born c. AD 120) reports the accusation against Socrates, that 'one had never seen him make a sacrifice, and that he was the only person in Athens who did not allow himself to be initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries'. See Lucian, *Opera graece et latine*, in the edition of Tiberius Hemsterhusius and Johann Friedrich Reitzius, 9 vols. (Zweibrücken, 1789), v. 237. But Socrates was not the only exception; see the following note.

50. Proserpina is not, according to Aeschylus, the daughter of Diana; Diana is the daughter of Ceres (= Demeter), or of Proserpina. A number of ancient sources mention this declaration of Aeschylus. Herodotus, in describing an Egyptian temple and the stories of the gods associated with it, says (2.156): 'It is from this story and nowhere else that Aeschylus, son of Euphorion, who in this differs from the poets who preceded him, stole the thing that I tell; for he created Artemis [Diana] as the daughter of Demeter'; quoted from *The History*, trans. David Grene (Chicago, 1987), p. 200. Pausanius refers to Herodotus' remark, in his *Graciae descriptio* 8.37.6; see *Description of Greece*, trans. W. H. S. Jones and H. A. Ormerod (vol. ii only), in 4 vols. and a companion vol. by R. E. Wycherley (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1918–71), iv. 86–7. In Cicero's *De natura deorum* 3.23.58, the character Cotta refers to a 'Diana, daughter of Jupiter and Proserpina', but without mention of Aeschylus; Rackham, pp. 340–3. We do not know the basis for the statements of Herodotus and Pausanius, since there is no evidence for them in the tragedies of Aeschylus that have come down to us. The statements do not refer to any betrayal of the secrets of the Eleusinian mysteries. Instead, they seem to arise from an effort to uncover the origin of the theogony that Aeschylus affirmed. That is the view of Alan B. Lloyd's commentary, *Herodotus, Book II* (Leyden, 1975–6). But perhaps they intend an implicit defense of Aeschylus, since we do have sources indicating that he was reproached for this disclosure. See, for example, Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1111a8–10, which reads: 'But of what he is doing a man might be ignorant, as for instance people say "it slipped out of their mouths as they were speaking", or "they did not know it was a secret", as Aeschylus said of the mysteries. . . .'; quoted from *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed.

In the Christian religion too the dogmas are called 'mysteries', a term referring to what in the Christian religion is known about the nature of God. So they are not something unknown but instead something revealed, something well known. In this case 'mystery' is by no means something secret, for Christians are those who are insiders to the mystery. It is known to all the members, and this is what distinguishes Christianity from the other religions. The 'secret' is then the speculative element, wherein one does not stop short with the standpoint of the senses. For the senses and for natural human beings, for their sensible representation and desires, the speculative element is assuredly a secret, as it is in another way for the understanding
262 that thinks abstractly, that separates and | holds fast to what is separated, whereas speculation is concrete. So the mystery or the speculative element is not our concern in the way it is comprised within a religion, but instead insofar as it is set forth in the form of thought.

The mythological element can [in the second place] even make a pretense to being a kind of philosophizing, as if it were a way to portray philosophical ideas. Plato speaks in mythic terms with the intention of stating a philosophical idea. Others too have spoken in mythic terms; Jacob Boehme in similar fashion expresses the purely speculative element in unalloyed Christian religious forms. But this is not the form appropriate for philosophy. The thought that has itself for its object must be object for itself in the form of thought too; it must even have raised itself up to its own form. Mythic expression in Plato, which some have held to be appropriate for philosophy, is, on the one hand, philosophical naiveté, and on the other, the inability to express oneself in the pure mode of thought. But Plato knows perfectly well what he intends by myth, and where he expresses pure thought it could not be done better.[51] Aristotle sums up the matter by stating in the *Metaphysics*: περὶ τῶν μυθικῶς σοφιζομένων οὐκ ἄξιον μετὰ σπουδῆς σκοπεῖν, 'it is not worth the effort to treat seriously those
263 who philosophize in myth'.[52] | Myth is not a suitable form for the delivery of thought, but only a subordinate mode. That is true. Nevertheless, Plato certainly had good reasons [for using myth].

Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1984), ii. 1754. See also Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 2.14, which, as an example of not knowing what one does, mentions '... Aeschylus, who divulged the mysteries on the stage, who, being tried in the Areopagus, was absolved on his showing that he had not been initiated'; quoted from *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, vol. ii. (repr. Grand Rapids, 1962), p. 361. See also the comments on this issue in *Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 177–8, 180–1.

51. Hegel counts the dialogues *Sophist*, *Philebus*, and *Parmenides* as examples of Plato's expression of pure thought; see Vol. II, pp. 202–3.

52. Here Hegel quotes *Metaphysics* 1000a18–19 (Barnes, ii. 1580).

Similar to mythic portrayal is the portrayal of thoughts by means of numbers, lines, and figures. The circle—or the snake that bites its own tail as a portrayal of eternity—is indeed a symbol of eternity, but not one that measures up to thought. We shall come across this again with Pythagoras. The Chinese too still use lines to express thought. The mythic as such, or the mythic form, is excluded from our presentation.

A third remark is that religion as such contains thoughts, just as does poetry. Religion's portrayal is not just in the mode of intuition or of art, for it contains thoughts too, as well as universal perspectives. In the same way too poetry, the art form that has language for its element, can pass over to the expression of thought, for in poets too we find profound, universal thoughts, while in other respects they give voice to feelings. Thoughts of fate, life and death, the cycle of coming to be and passing away, the resurrection of the dead, and so forth, are abstract, weighty thoughts. We can even find thoughts of this sort figuratively expressed in religion and in poetry, for instance in India.[53] But we shall not examine this mode of thought either. We could speak in this vein of a philosophy of Aeschylus, of Euripedes, of Schiller, of Goethe, and so on, although theirs are more in the nature of incidental thoughts. Their universal ways of representing what is true, the human vocation, the moral domain, and so forth, are all just put somewhat incidentally, and so have no place in our presentation. In addition, these thoughts have not found their proper form, which is of course the form of thought, namely, the form in which what is expressed is ultimate, constitutes the absolute | foundation. In the poetry of India the 264
relationship that the universal power of thought has to fanciful imagination is not evident.

Philosophies finding their origin within the church are likewise not our concern, although the church fathers, for instance, were great philosophers, and the development of Christianity owes much to the philosophers. In this setting, however, philosophy finds itself within an established, given doctrinal system within a presupposed structure that is made the foundation. This is not thinking proceeding freely from itself, any more than, in the case of the medieval Scholastics, it is thought constituting itself on its own account. It is thinking in relation to presuppositions.

This, then, is what I have had to say in introducing the treatment of the history of philosophy. Two points especially are to be highlighted in the

53. The text actually reads: 'among the Indians [*bei den Indiern*]'. The term 'Hindu', while more appropriate in the *Philosophy of Religion*, is less so here in these lectures, where not all 'Indian' thought considered is Hindu thought. See the discussion of this issue in n. 14, p. 110 below.

topics of this section. One concerns the formal element as such, namely, thinking, or thinking for oneself. Natural science and popular philosophy share directly with philosophy the form of thinking as such, whereas they derive their material from elsewhere. Their specific contents are not developed out of thought itself, but are worked up from nature or from feeling. This is the case with the Scottish and the Ciceronian philosophies, which take sound human understanding as the criterion but nevertheless have formal thinking in common with philosophy.[54] The other point is the substantial aspect, which is contained most notably in religion, but which lacks the form of thought.

c. Why the History of Philosophy Begins With the Greek World and Leads to the Germanic World

Our concern now is where we have to begin the history of philosophy.
265 This issue was, to be sure, directly involved in our previous discussion. | The history of philosophy begins where thought emerges freely for itself, where thought comes into existence in its freedom, where it tears itself loose from its submergence in nature, from the unity that it has with nature, and constitutes itself on its own account. The history of philosophy begins where thinking goes within itself, is at home with itself. On the practical side the emergence of thought in its freedom correlates with the blossoming of actual freedom, or political freedom. This process is integral to freedom. Freedom begins only where the individual as subject on its own account knows itself as universal, as an individual within universality, as essential, as the sort of thing that, as individual, possesses an infinite worth. In other words, freedom begins where the consciousness of personality makes its appearance. Being a 'person' means that, as this subject, I know myself to have an infinite worth, and therefore that I posit myself utterly on my own account and, purely and simply, will to be of value for my own sake.

Because the principle of political freedom holds that the subject has value for its own sake, this principle also includes freely thinking the object, the absolute, universal, essential object. 'Thinking' means bringing something into the form of universality; so 'thinking oneself' means knowing oneself inwardly as universal; it means knowing that 'I' am something universal, a

54. Hegel has in mind the Scottish philosophy based on moral sense or sentiment. See Vol. III, pp. 163–5, where he calls attention to its agreement with the view that religion too concerns immediate knowing or feeling, a view he criticizes in Jacobi and Schleiermacher especially. See also *Philosophy of Religion*, i. 136–7. For Cicero on the universal belief in the divine as implanted in people by nature, see *Tusculan disputations* 1.13.30; King, pp. 36–7.

relating of myself to myself, thus that I am infinite, am free. This knowing involves the element of practical freedom. It is connected with philosophical thinking in that, as thinking, thought thinks the universal object, that it makes what is universal its object, or determines what is objective to it as what is universal. The singularity of natural things in sensible consciousness it determines as something universal, as a thought, as an objective thought, what is objective albeit as thought. | 266

The second determination reaches the point where *I* am now cognizant of this universal element, *I* determine it, *I* know it. A noetic or cognitive relationship to what is universal comes about only insofar as I hold to, and maintain, myself on my own account, only insofar as, at one and the same time, what is objective over against me remains objective *and* I think it, whereby it is mine. Notwithstanding its being something objective, it is thought by me; I possess myself in it; I have maintained myself in that I am in this objective element, this infinite element; I possess a consciousness in it, and remain at the standpoint of objectivity. I maintain the stance of knowing over against it. Here we have the general connection of political freedom with the emergence of freedom of thought. So philosophy comes on the scene in history only where, and to the extent that, free political institutions are formed.

What comes to our attention first in history is the Oriental world. No philosophy in the proper sense, however, can be found there. The character of this world is, in short, such that while spirit does arise in the Orient, nevertheless in this relationship the subject, or individuality (my I on its own account), is not a person but is simply submerged, is determined only as negative, as submerged in the objective domain as such. In the Oriental character the substantial relationship prevails; substance is represented as supersensible, as thought, or even in a more sensuous way. The individual, what is particular, is then only negatively related to what is substantial, and the highest state to which individuality can attain is eternal bliss as an immersion in this substance and a passing away of consciousness, thus a passing away of the distinction between substance and individuality—submergence in substance, and thus annihilation. To this extent the relationship is devoid of spirit, is one where substance is what has being in and for itself. Thus the highest degree of the relationship is absence of consciousness. | 267

Over against this substance, then, human beings exist and discover themselves as individuals; substance, however, is what is universal, the individual what is singular. To the extent that Indian people have not achieved this bliss but are still individuals, they are outside this unity of the substantial and the

individual, and have then no worth; they are only something negative and devoid of right, only determined as finite. For their own part, they are the epitome of something spiritless, in that, subsisting by themselves, they exist as devoid of substance, as accidental, and with regard to political freedom they are defined [as] without rights. In this case will is not substantial will but caprice or contingency, and people find themselves defined by nature, for instance, placed in castes. The will is abandoned to external and internal contingency.

Put in general terms, this is the basic circumstance in the Oriental character. Substance alone is affirmative; the individual is devoid of substance, of rights, is negative, is in the relationship of dependence. For the emergence of political freedom, right, and ethical life in the proper sense, however, and together with these free thinking, the subject must remain over against substance, must remain distinct from it as consciousness on its own account, positing itself as substantial, essential, inwardly infinite, and must exist there as something recognized. Being thus for itself or knowing for itself, however, does not count for anything in the Oriental character, which does not have a sense of itself as consciousness. That does not preclude the Oriental subject from being noble, great, and sublime. But the main Oriental characteristic as such is simply that the single individual is without rights, and that whatever one makes of oneself is either determined by nature or is one's own caprice. All noble sensibility, high-mindedness, sublimity, or independent disposition is one's own caprice or that of one's character.

Right and ethical life are something quite different, for they consist in objective or positive specifications to be respected by everyone, which hold good for everyone, and in terms of which everyone has recognition. The high-mindedness of the Oriental person is the contingency of particular
268 character, | not ethical life or right. So the Oriental subject has the prerogative of perfect independence; nothing there is fixed and nothing is definite; just as its substance is free and indeterminate, so too its character can be indeterminate, free and independent, although just like the substance, the subject lacks the character of objectivity, of legitimacy, of universal validity for all. What we think of as justice or ethical life is present in the Oriental state too, in a substantial, natural, patriarchal fashion, and not in objective freedom. Conscience does not exist there, nor do morals. There is only a spiritual natural order, in which the highest nobility and blind caprice each has a place.

Consequently we see that here there can be no philosophical knowing, for that involves knowing substance and the universal, what is objective and remains so, what—so far as I know it and in that I think it, develop

it within myself, determine it—remains on its own account. The result of philosophical knowing is that, in the substance, I have at the same time a determination of my own and I am upheld affirmatively in it, such that not only do I have my own subjective characteristics and thoughts, hence *my* opinions, but also, in their being my thoughts, they are likewise thoughts of what is objective and therefore substantial—that they are objective thoughts.

So the Oriental domain is on the whole to be excluded from the history of philosophy; later we shall offer just a few comments about Indian and Chinese thought. On earlier occasions I have passed over this topic, for we have only recently been in a position to form a judgment about it.[55] For many millennia Indian wisdom enjoyed the greatest renown, although more specific knowledge of it was acquired only a short time ago, a knowledge that falls in line with its general character. | Not only can the universal 269
concept be set in opposition to this so-called renown of Indian wisdom; one must also treat it in historical fashion.

Philosophy proper first emerges in the West with the dawn of spirit, in which spirit goes down within itself and plumbs its own depths, posits itself as free, and is on its own account. This first makes it possible for philosophy to exist. Connected with it is the fact that there are free political institutions in the West, and they go hand-in-hand with philosophy, with the subject persevering in what is substantial and not devaluing itself, where the absolute is objective but my relation to it is not just that of a slave, of being dependent and doomed to annihilation in order that, in simply being with the absolute, I might relinquish myself totally; instead, in the West bliss is defined as the condition in which the subject as such is steadfast and endures in a substantial way.

In the West we are on the proper soil of philosophy, and here we now have two major epochs or two major configurations that confront us. One epoch is Greek philosophy and the other is Germanic philosophy, or philosophy within Christendom as related to the Germanic nations, since Italy, Spain, France, England, and others, have received a new shape through the Germanic nations.[56] Hellenism extends into the Roman world too, and

55. Hegel is referring especially to Henry Thomas Colebrooke's *On the Philosophy of the Hindus*, which appeared in issues of the *Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland* during 1824–9, as well as others of his writings. Hegel refers extensively to Colebrooke in the section on Indian thought in these 1825–6 lectures. He made use of other writings by Colebrooke a bit earlier, beginning with his 1824 lectures on the philosophy of religion.

56. Hegel uses the term 'Germanic' [*germanisch*] as somewhat equivalent to 'European', but clearly with the emphasis on northern Europe rather than on the Mediterranean region.

we have to speak of philosophy on the soil of the Roman world, although the Romans as such, who form the point of connection between the two epochs, produced no proper philosophy of their own, any more than they had proper poets of their own. Even Roman religion itself is in fact also Greek religion.

These two epochs constitute the principal contrast. What characterizes
270 these two great contrasting epochs more explicitly is that the Greek | world developed thought to the point of the idea, while the Christian or the Germanic world, to the contrary, grasped the thought of spirit. So 'idea' and 'spirit' are the distinctive features. In more detail, the progression is as follows. The first result is necessarily what is most abstract, as what is simplest; it is opposed to the concrete, which contains multiple determinations within itself. For there to be an 'increase' [*ein 'Mehr'*], there must be progression from one to another. So the first stage is the simplest, the most abstract, the poorest; and the most ancient philosophies are the poorest of all. We shall tarry with them only briefly, and only insofar as they lead to thought.

So what comes first is wholly simple [or onefold]. What comes next is that, on this simple basis, more specific determinations and figurations present themselves, and the universal gets defined, though only qualitatively, even abstractly. For instance, the absolute is said to be the boundless, or to be water, or being, and so forth. This absolute is still quite general, devoid of inner concreteness, lacking any concept, ideas, or spirit; it is indeterminate; so too, the universal is 'one'. 'The universal' is of course a determination such as being, even though only the determination of indeterminacy. In the next stage following upon this general foundation, the universal is grasped as self-determining, as active thought, the universal as active. It is already what is concrete; it is the νοῦς of Anaxagoras, and still more that of Socrates.[57] Here begins a subjective totality in which thinking apprehends itself. The definition of νοῦς is that it is thinking activity.

What comes third is this initially abstract totality realizing itself through active thought. That is to say, active thought is determining, is the making of distinctions, and these distinctions are mutually opposed elements or
271 characteristics. These distinct characteristics | themselves are for the time

Germanic (or European) philosophy, as distinct from the 'Greek' philosophy of the ancient classical world, he regards as largely the product of the interaction of the Germanic peoples and culture with the peoples and culture of southern Europe. The term also has a linguistic meaning for him—Germanic in contrast to Greek and Italic, as the chief Western forms of the Indo-European language family.

57. See Vol. II, pp. 102–6, and 136.

being elevated to totalities, with the quite general forms of the antithesis as the universal and what is singular [*das Einzelne*] or, in another form, thinking as such and external reality, sensation, perception. So what happens is that each of the distinctions in turn gets elevated into being a system of totality. The Stoic and Epicurean philosophies enter into mutual opposition.[58]

The higher stage is then the unification of these distinctions, which can take place in the nullifying of the antitheses—in Skepticism.[59] The higher stage, however, is affirmative unification, is the idea, namely, the idea in relation to the concept. The concept is the universal that determines itself within itself, but in doing so still remains in unity, in ideality, in the transparency of its own determinations. Thus, when I say 'I', the I contains all determinations. I am perfectly identical with myself; I determine myself within myself and posit distinctions within myself. But they are *my* determinations, and they remain within me, do not become independent of me. Now, however, the differentiation itself enters into existence. The next step is the realization of the concept, in that the distinctions themselves become a totality. This is the infinite bountifulness of the concept, that it imparts its own aspects fully and makes them into a totality, so that they can be separate from one another, whether as mutually indifferent or as contending against one another.

The third stage is the unification of the idea, such that the distinctions are totalities, are concrete, and yet at the same time they are contained within the unity of the concept. This is the idea. It is the point to which Greek philosophy progressed. The intellectual or ideal world in the Alexandrian philosophy brings Greek philosophy to its conclusion, at which point Greek philosophy completed its task and fulfilled its vocation.[60]

But this idea still lacks one determination. I have stated that the idea consists in the concept determining itself and making itself particular, | 272
thus developing its two major aspects and positing them as identical. In this identity, the independent totality also is posited as negative,

58. See the explication of this point in Vol. II, pp. 265–93, where Stoicism and Epicureanism are introduced not as an opposition constituting a third phase of development, but as distinct expressions of dogmatic philosophy, which is the first shape occurring in the second major subdivision of Greek philosophy. The 1823–4 lectures articulated this second subdivision in triadic form, as Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Skepticism, and there too they are not said to constitute a third phase.

59. Hegel links Stoicism and Epicureanism with Skepticism, as a third philosophy related to them negatively, and also with Neoplatonism as a third philosophy that is their positive unity.

60. On the Alexandrian school as the culmination of Greek philosophy, see Vol. II, pp. 330–46.

and this negativity existing for its own sake is subjectivity, an absolute being-for-self, hence actuality. Through it the idea is elevated to being spirit. Spirit is subjectivity, is self-knowing, although it only exists as spirit in that it *knows* its object (that object being itself) as totality, and *is* totality for itself.

This higher principle of absolute freedom is the principle of the Christian religion. One thing the Christian religion specifies is that human beings as such have infinite worth and are the object of divine grace and mercy, that each person should come to be blessed, and thus that infinite worth is ascribed to the single individual as such.

Greek philosophy is idea, so the second epoch is therefore the self-knowing idea, the principle of Christian philosophy. If we wish to represent this progression figuratively, we can put it as follows. At the outset thinking as such is abstract, like space, in which appear the most abstract and simplest spatial determinations—points, lines, angles. Second, then, is their combination to form a triangle, which is of course already concrete, although it is still embodied in the wholly abstract element of the plane; the triangle corresponds to νοῦς. After that, each of the enclosing lines now develops itself into a whole triangle or a whole figure to which it belongs; [triangles are] realized upon the sides. So in this third phase these triangles constructed upon the sides close together to form a body, a totality.[61] This is as far as Greek philosophy gets. Directly with the body arises the concept of the center and the rest of the surrounding body. What emerges now is the contrast between the real corporeality and the center, this simple point; the totality is now the unification of the center
273 with | substantiality, is the knowing idea. This is no natural unification, however, for its center is personality, is knowing on its own account, is knowing as opposed to what is objective—the fact that knowing is what is substantial.

So then, the idea is this totality and is the self-knowing idea, is essentially distinct from subjectivity, from this self-positing for its own sake, albeit distinct in a way that it as such is thought substantially on its own account. At first the idea is only formal, although it is the real possibility of substantiality, or of what is implicitly universal; it has the characteristic of fulfilling or realizing its universal aspect, of positing it as identical with substance. The principle of the modern era includes the fact that subjectivity is free, is posited for its own sake. Knowing, the moment of ideality, comes to the

61. The triangles constructed on the sides of the original two-dimensional triangle come together to form a three-dimensional object—a geometrical solid, in this case a tetrahedron—which Hegel uses as a representation of totality.

fore; the subject, the human being, is self-subsistent in its own existence or singularity; subjectivity is now infinitely self-apprehending. Related to this determination, the fact that the human being as such is free, is the representation that human beings have the infinite vocation of becoming substantial by means of their own inherent capacity—the fact that a human being is spirit.

It is noteworthy, with reference to the practical form of freedom, that the freedom of the subject was in fact contingent in the Greek world, where some are free. In the Orient only a single one is free, is substance. The Spartan or Athenian citizen is free, but there are also slaves. It is something infinitely different when the human being as such is said to be free—when the characteristic of freedom is thought of as wholly universal, the subject thought of as free. This, then, is the further, and more precise, basic determination.[62]

This principle resides in the Christian religion, although more as feeling, as representation. The human being as such, every single individual, is destined for eternal blessedness, is an object of divine | grace and mercy, 274
of divine interest. Thus each one is a subject on its own account, and has an infinite, absolute worth of its own. This principle rests specifically on the fact that Christianity has the dogma, the faith, the inward consciousness, of the unity of the divine nature with human nature. This has been revealed to humankind through Christ, in whom human being and God are one. This is the Germanic principle, in which the objective idea and subjectivity are thus united.

This principle is found in a different guise in the ancient story of the Fall. The story speaks of 'the tree of the knowledge of good and evil'; it is the essential feature of the story, and the rest is imagery. Accordingly, the serpent did not deceive the human beings, for God says: 'Behold, Adam has become like one of us; he knows what good and evil are.'[63] The infinite, divine worth of subjectivity resides in this feature. The issue is this unity of the subjective principle with substantiality, the unity of knowing and knower. Initially [this unity is] a formal principle; however, the process of spirit involves this oneness of the subject divesting itself of its immediate mode, and bringing itself forth as identical with what is substantial. So the

62. See p. 195 below with n. 96 for a fuller version of this theme of the progression of freedom, which is central to Hegel's *Philosophy of World History*.

63. The story is in Gen. 3: 1–22. Hegel's German (of verse 22) is very close to Luther's. The English of the Revised Standard Version ('knowing good and evil') could have a different nuance, if 'knowing' is construed differently as 'having experience of'.

human goal is the highest perfection; subjectivity, at first only implicitly the infinite possibility of perfection, is thus determined as having infinite worth.

From this we see that speculation and religious representations are not as far removed from one another as they are commonly believed to be. I introduce these representations so that we will not be ashamed of them despite their being our own. If we have dispensed with such forms, then we at least need not be ashamed of our forebears from the earlier Christian world, for whom these religious representations were the supreme definitions. The principle of the modern age is thus subjectivity, | free on its own 275 account, with its inner freedom defined as the positing of itself as identical with substantiality.

Thus we have, properly speaking, two ideas, the subjective idea as knowing, and the substantial or concrete idea. Our concern now is with the development or elaboration of this principle. That this substantial element attains conscious thought, the knowing of what is free on its own account, is the principle of modern philosophy. These distinctions are of a much more concrete sort than those of ancient times, namely, the distinction of thinking and being, and that of individuality and substantiality. Whether human beings are free, or stand under necessity, and so forth, resides in the subject itself. Knowing as immediate certainty, and as the knowing that has first to develop itself, stand as the contrast between immediate certainty or faith, and the knowing that develops and cultivates itself inwardly. The unity of thinking or subjectivity with truth or objectivity is posited in both forms of knowing. The difference is that in the first form it is said that faith, namely, the natural human being or the existing Adam, just as one immediately is, thus knows what is true, that how one believes something to be is how it truly is. In the second form, however, while it also surely involves the same unity of knowing and truth, the subject rises above sensible consciousness, above the immediate mode, in such a way that it develops itself to that unity only by thinking, and gains or obtains truth only by thinking.

So we have, by and large, two configurations, Greek philosophy and Germanic philosophy. We can begin Germanic philosophy only where it emerges as philosophy in the proper form. Between the two falls an intermediate period, one of fermentation. Our contemporary standpoint is the result of the entire course and the entire labor comprised in some 2,300 years; it is what the world spirit has produced for itself in its thinking consciousness. We need not be surprised at the slow pace of the world 276 spirit. | The universal, knowing spirit has time aplenty, and is in no hurry. It also has the wherewithal to make its way through a multitude of nations, peoples, and the like, whose development is a medium for producing this

result. Keeping this in mind can help us to be patient if our convictions do not so quickly become universal because this or that piece is still missing. In world history, where great multitudes are in motion, the advances take place slowly.

B. THE DIVISIONS OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE LITERATURE ON IT [64]

The first topic we have to discuss is therefore Greek philosophy from the time of Thales, from about 600 BC (he was born in 640 or, according to other reports, in 629, and he died in 553 BC, in the 59th Olympiad) down to the Neoplatonic philosophy, to Proclus in the fifth century AD, which coincides with the migration of peoples and the fall of the Roman Empire. The death of Proclus [is put at] AD 485, and that of Odoacer, who overthrew Rome, in AD 476.[65] This is the first period, which consequently embraces approximately 1,000 years.

The second period is that of the Middle Ages, the preparation for the emergence of modern philosophy,—[the latter commencing with a] time of fermentation. To the second period belong Scholastic philosophy, Arabs, Jews, and, most especially, the Christian church. It embraces in turn a timespan of more than 1,000 years.

The third period, the modern era in which philosophy emerges on its own account, begins only with the time of the Thirty Years War. Descartes died in 1650, Bacon in 1626, and Jacob Boehme in 1624. | 359

I mentioned that I wish to comment on a few sources. My general observation is that, in this case, the sources are different in kind from the sources for political history. What lie before us in the history of philosophy are the achievements themselves, whereas in political history the historians are called the sources. Herodotus and Thucydides brought the achievements of their time into history, or into the form of representation. The word

64. The first three paragraphs of this section conclude the main part of the 1825–6 introduction on p. 276 of the German edition. We place them as the opening to Hegel's ensuing discussion of contemporary histories of philosophy (pp. 359–64 in the German edition), for they flow seamlessly into it in 1825–6, although in the German volume the two sections are separated by materials from the 1827–8 and subsequent introductions. Another reason for this decision is so that their rather pedestrian summary does not detract from the high note struck by the ending of the immediately preceding paragraphs. The discussion of the literature is actually the concluding part of the introduction as Hegel conceived it.

65. For the dates of Thales and Proclus, see Vol. II, pp. 23 and 340. Odoacer actually died in 493. In 476 he deposed Romulus Augustulus, the final ruler of the western Roman empire.

'history' has this double sense of the achievements and events themselves on the one hand, and these achievements as given imaginative shape by and for representational thinking on the other. In the history of philosophy, we have before us not the writers of history but the achievements themselves. We possess the works of the important philosophers, and these are the authentic sources. If we want to study the history of philosophy seriously, we must go to these sources themselves.

There are admittedly periods for which the works themselves are not extant, for instance, the earliest Greek philosophy, where we must then have recourse to the historians. In this case Aristotle and Sextus Empiricus are the only important sources; we can dispense with all the others.[66] Aristotle expressly treats the earlier philosophies at the beginning of his *Metaphysics*. He introduces philosophical propositions of the ancient philosophies elsewhere too, in the *Physics* and other places.[67] To sagacious persons who, wishing to be erudite, criticize Aristotle and maintain that he has not rightly comprehended Plato,[68] one can simply say that perhaps no one knew Plato better. For one thing, Aristotle kept company with Plato, and it may well be that no one was better acquainted with him than he was, with his profound, painstaking intellect. Sextus Empiricus is likewise very important. There
360 are other periods too | for which it is desirable that we should read later accounts of this sort.

With regard to the abstract philosophies, the essential thing is to become familiar first with the principles, then, in the second place, [with] their development, and, in the third, with their application to concrete topics up to a certain point. Insofar as abstract principles are no longer suitable for grasping what is concrete, however, one loses interest in learning about their application of the abstract to the concrete; for instance, the logic and dialectic of Stoic philosophy are of no interest in their application to

66. As is evident from Vol. II, Hegel makes extensive use of Sextus Empiricus for his information about earlier philosophies.

67. See Books 1 and 3 of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, as well as his *Physics*. Perhaps Hegel particularly has in mind Book 6, chapter 9, of the *Physics*, which contains Aristotle's critical discussion of Zeno's paradoxes; see *Physics* 239b5–240b7; Barnes, i. 404–6. See also Vol. II, pp. 66–9.

68. This is probably a reference to Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann, who, in his *Geschichte der Philosophie*, 11 vols. (Leipzig, 1798–1819), reproached Aristotle for not having understood Plato. In a lengthy passage (iii. 25–6) Tennemann says Aristotle had from the outset an inclination toward natural science that was not characteristic of Plato and, what is most important, he did not correctly grasp Plato's theory of Ideas. He concludes that Aristotle did not deliberately misconstrue the Ideas, nor was he incapable of grasping them. Instead, he simply did not fully enter into the spirit of Plato's speculation, and thus construed the Ideas as being constitutive, rather than regulative, principles.

nature.[69] When I refer you essentially to the sources, that seems to call for a vast labor; however, in that effort one can be content with getting to know the principles and following the development only up to a certain point. The extracts that others have made from major works are very valuable. We have Scholastic works in great number—18 folios by one author, 24 and 26 by another, and so on; here one must confine oneself to the work of others. Moreover, many philosophical works are rare and difficult to come by, so here too it is advantageous to get citations to them from others. Works on the history of philosophy fall more under the heading of literature, and I must at least mention Tennemann's *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, and the abstract of it by A. Wendt (Leipzig, 1820).[70]

One of the oldest treatises is Thomas Stanley's *Historia philosophiae* (English edition, London, 1701), translated into Latin by Godfrey O'Leary (Leipzig, 1711; quarto). Its dominant viewpoint is that there are only ancient philosophies, and the era of philosophy was cut short by Christianity. So this treatise only contains the ancient schools, as though philosophy had been a topic just for the pagans and was not to be found in | Christianity. With the revival of the sciences, however, the ancient 361
philosophies were resuscitated too. There were Christian Aristotelians, Stoics, and Epicureans too, and only later had philosophy proper gotten under way.[71]

A major work is J. Brucker's *Historia critica philosophiae* (Leipzig, 1742–67; 6 volumes, quarto). It is indeed of considerable scope; in it are found many citations, and indication of the views of scholars of his day about one or another of the philosophies. It is useful for anyone who wants to become familiar with an individual philosophy. The presentation derives, by and large, from the form of Wolff's philosophy, and is extremely unhistorical throughout. Where only the principal thesis of a philosophical system was known—for example, when Thales said that the principle of everything is water—it was then the fashion to deduce from this simple thesis what sorts of premisses belong to it, and what follows from it. From Thales' thesis Brucker adduced some twenty or thirty premisses

69. See Vol. II, p. 267, on Hegel's refusal to go into detail on Stoic logic. He treats the Stoic philosophy of nature only briefly (pp. 271–3), because he views it as a 'thoroughgoing pantheism' that is open to 'every kind of superstition and of belief in miracles'.

70. This and the other histories of philosophy that are discussed in the following paragraphs are listed in the Bibliography for this volume.

71. On the revival of the sciences, see n. 13, p. 59 above. The mention of 'philosophy proper' is a reference to the seventeenth century, since modern philosophy begins not with the humanists, but with Bacon and Boehme as transitional figures, and modern philosophy proper begins with Descartes; see Vol. III, pp. 131–2.

and as many inferences, all supposed to be those of Thales, though not a word of this is true.[72] Yet nowhere should the procedure be more historical than in the history of philosophy. After all, everything hinges expressly on what a philosopher has said; the premisses and consequences belong to the further development of philosophy, and are somebody else's philosophy.

Another work on the history of philosophy is Tiedemann's *Geist der spekulativen Philosophie* (Marburg, 1791–7; 7 volumes, octavo). It has the merit of containing excerpts from a number of rare works, from Cabalistic writings and medieval texts in particular, which is a very useful feature.[73] His style, however, is formal and affected; he treats political history, but presents it in a wooden and spiritless style; the whole thing is a sad example of how a learned professor can busy himself with speculative philosophy for
362 years | and yet have no inkling as to what it is, or what the concept is. He writes his *Argumenta platonica* in 12 volumes (Zweibrücken) in the same manner. [He] breaks off at the speculative aspect, right where things begin to get interesting, as though it consisted of mere subtleties.

A better spirit informs Johann Gottlieb Buhle's *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie*, in 8 volumes (Göttingen, 1796–1804); however, it is not in proper proportion, since ancient philosophy is discussed only very briefly, while toward the end he becomes more expansive. He too provides many excerpts from works of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and excerpts from English and Scottish works that are in the Göttingen library; for instance, the writings of Giordano Bruno.[74]

The most comprehensive work is Tennemann's *Geschichte der Philosophie*, in 12 volumes (Leipzig, 1798–1817). As in the other authors, the history of more recent philosophy gets better treatment than does that of ancient philosophy. It is much easier to give excerpts from recent works than it is excerpts from the ancients; one only needs to transcribe excerpts from the works of recent philosophers, abridge them, and go into the

72. For Thales' thesis, see Vol. II, pp. 24–30. In his presentation, Brucker differentiates distinct teachings of Thales (such as doctrine of God, knowledge, astronomy, ethics), and for most of these teachings he enumerates a multiplicity of theses, partly in a deductive sequence, partly through simply stringing them together. See, for instance, *Historia*, i. 472.

73. Tiedemann treats the Cabala (iii. 137–63) by discussing, among others, the *Porta coelorum* of Rabbi Cohen Herrera (Irira) (mentioned by Hegel; Vol. II, p. 327), and the *Cabala denudata* of Knorr von Rosenroth. Tiedemann's extensive presentation of medieval philosophy comes in his vols. iv and v.

74. Hegel's treatment of Bruno in Vol. III, pp. 61–72, relies extensively on Buhle's presentation. In this review of the literature, Hegel does not mention Buhle's *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie seit der Epoche der Wiederherstellung der Wissenschaften*, in 6 vols. (Göttingen, 1800–4), which, to be sure, is in large measure similar to Buhle's *Lehrbuch*.

material to a certain extent. The editing and the translation into German present no difficulty. It is a different matter with the history of ancient philosophy. There one cannot translate literally, because it is not appropriate to do that. The representations of the ancients have to be converted into alternative expressions without their being distorted, [something that] is very difficult to do while maintaining historical accuracy. This is where Tennemann's greatest deficiencies lie, for text and translation often contradict one another, and by sticking with Tennemann we would, for instance, get a quite false view of Aristotelian philosophy. | Also, this work is in fact only 363
a compilation. His excerpts are very extensive, but he has no understanding at all of the authors he cites.

Ast's 'compendium'—Friedrich Ast, *Grundriss einer Geschichte der Philosophie* (Landshut, 1807)—has, in comparison, many advantages.

Most worth recommending is Rixner's *Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie*, in 3 volumes (Sulzbach, 1822–3), which is not to say that he satisfies all the requirements of a history of philosophy. Some aspects of it are not praiseworthy, but he is a man of intelligence who provides a particularly useful selection of key passages. He has of course interspersed in this work a great deal about other sciences that are not part of philosophy, so [there is] a lot of extraneous matter, although the accuracy of the citations and the other features make it highly commendable.

At this point we conclude our introduction. I have already explained how I will treat the history of philosophy. In what follows I shall assume familiarity with political history. The principle of the spirit of the peoples is quite another matter, and it is more pertinent to our discussion. At key points I shall also give biographical accounts of the philosophers, but only as a sideline, for this is not a history of philosophers but a history of philosophy. I shall also omit many names that have found a place in learned discourse, since reference to them is profitless with respect to philosophy. Our main interest is in philosophy as such, and in the specific thought or the specific stage of the development of reason in each age.

Just giving excerpts in a history of philosophy seems at first glance to be the most suitable course. As with | political history, however, we cannot 364
restrict ourselves to becoming acquainted, in mere chronicle fashion, with the events, because the events directly embody a purpose or aim. Thus, in Livy the main topic was Rome, the Roman imperium, and it stands before us in his *History*, wherein we see Rome rise, defend itself, and exercise its dominion. The general aim is Rome, and what interests us is the maintenance and expansion of its dominion, the development of its political

institutions, and so forth.[75] So, in the history of philosophy, self-unfolding reason of its own accord makes itself into the purpose. This is no alien purpose that we just drag in from without. Instead, as what is universal, the subject matter itself is the foundation here, thus appears as aim and purpose, and of their own accord the individual developments and shapes align themselves with it.

75. What Hegel says here touches upon Livy's interest, as stated in the preface to book one of his *Ab urbe condita*, but does not capture the moral point that Livy makes there. Livy states (*Praefatio* 9–10): 'Here are the questions to which I would have every reader give his close attention—what life and morals were like; through what men and by what policies, in peace and in war, empire was established and enlarged; then let him note how, with the gradual relaxation of discipline, morals first gave way, as it were, then sank lower and lower, and finally began the downward plunge that has brought us to the present time, when we can endure neither our vices nor their cure.' For this quotation, see *Livy*, in 14 vols., trans. B. O. Foster et al. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1919–59), i. 4–7. In this same passage Livy goes on to say that the profit we derive from the lessons of the past is the opportunity to choose which practices to imitate, and which to avoid.

II. ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY

A. INTRODUCTION

What comes first is Oriental philosophy, although it is not an integral part of the presentation as a whole. Instead Oriental philosophy is only preliminary, and we speak about it only in order to provide the justification for not occupying ourselves with it more extensively, and to explain the relationship in which it stands to thought, to authentic philosophy. In speaking of Oriental philosophy, we should be speaking precisely of philosophy, although here it must be noted that what goes by the name of Oriental philosophy is, on the contrary, the Orientals' religious mode of representation as such, a religious representation or worldview coming very close to counting as philosophy. We have already distinguished between the configuration in which what is true receives the form of religion, and the form that it receives in philosophy by means of thought. So, Oriental philosophy is religious philosophy or religious representation, and the reason must be given as to why it is not inappropriate to consider the Oriental religious view as philosophy too.

In the Roman, Greek, and Christian religions, we are much less reminded of philosophy; they are less suited to it. The Greek and Roman deities are configurations in their own right, just as are Christ and the God of the Jews. So, by and large, we can let them stand as they are; we do not need to take them as likewise being philosophical themes [*Philosopheme*]; it would be an odd business indeed to interpret the configurations of Greek mythology and of the Christian and other religions by transforming them into philosophical themes. With the Oriental religions, in contrast, we are much more directly reminded of a philosophical representation; they come closer to it. | 366

The distinction in this case is grounded in the fact that the principle of freedom and individuality emerges in the Greek element, and even more so in the Germanic element. Hence the Greek deities appear indeed to be more individualized, more in the mode of persons. In the Oriental character, however, where the element of subjectivity has not yet emerged, the representations are not individualized; instead they still have the character of general representations, which appear therefore more precisely as philosophical representations or philosophical thoughts, because they are more in the element of universality—and the latter predominates for reflection.

Of course the Oriental representations also have individual shapes, such as Brahmā, Vishnu, and Shiva, although the individuality is only something quite superficial—so much so that, when one believes that one is dealing with quite definite persons, individuality nevertheless directly fades away

and expands into something boundless. Two persons greet one another and speak together; but suddenly we see that we are dealing with gods, with wholly universal beings.[1] Because freedom is lacking, individuality is not stable. Where universal representations take on individual shapes, the form is nevertheless only superficial.

This is the main reason why, to us, Oriental religious representations likewise appear to be philosophical thoughts, and why [Oriental] religion seems to have such affinity with philosophy. When we hear talk about Christ, we have in mind a specific, individual character. The Greek [god] *Χρόνος* is indeed more individualized, as is Titan too, whereas with the Oriental deities we fall back on abstract characteristics. Indeed, the Persian Zurvan Akarene is unlimited time. With the Persians we have Ormazd and Ahriman, Ormazd being light and the good, Ahriman darkness and evil.[2]
367 Here | we are dealing directly with wholly universal modes or wholly universal representations that appear as universal principles, ones that are either akin to philosophy or are themselves philosophical themes.

One speaks of Oriental philosophy especially in the historical period in which this grand, universal Oriental perspective [*Anschauung*] came into contact with the West, with the land of singularization, of setting limits, where the spirit of subjectivity predominates. These grand Oriental perspectives made their way over to Italy, especially in the first centuries before Christ; in the Gnostic philosophy they began to spread within the Occidental spirit the theme of the boundless, until that spirit succeeded in

1. This remark may refer to an episode in the Hindu epic *Rāmāyana*, one Hegel mentioned in his review, 'Ueber die unter dem Namen Bhagavad-Gita bekannte Episode des Mahabharata, Von Wilhelm von Humboldt'; see *Berliner Schriften*, pp. 137–8. In this episode the god Brahmā appeared in physical form to the sage Vālmīki, entered his ashram, 'was seated in a place of honor', and the two conversed as two human persons do with one another. See *The Râmâyana of Vâlmiki*, vol. i, trans. Robert P. Goldman (Princeton, 1984), pp. 128–9.

2. For Ormazd and Ahriman, see *Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 352–8, 609–21, 737–8, where Hegel does not, however, mention Zurvan Akarene, unlimited time. Zurvan Akarene derives from an ancient Iranian depiction of God, probably antedating Zoroaster, which developed in its own antidualistic religious form as Zurvanism, only after the time of Zoroaster and in opposition to the religion he instituted. Hegel puts Zurvan together with Ormazd and Ahriman, and is not clear about the tension between the two religious forms. He could have drawn upon Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride* 46–7, for information about Zurvan; see *Moralia*, trans. Philip H. DeLacy et al., 15 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1927–69), v. 110–15. It cannot be shown that Hegel knew the extensive presentation by Eznik Kolbatski, translated from Armenian as *Wider die Sekten*, 2.1.8. But he did utilize the German translation of the Zend-Avesta, made from the French edition of Anquetil du Perron, and edited by J. F. von Kleuker, in 5 vols. (Riga, 1776–83); see the text (with commentary) that refers to 'time without limits' as the primordial being and author of all beings, including Ormazd and Ahriman (i. 185–6), and that reflects on why Zoroaster himself had so little to say about this 'being of beings' (i. 198).

regaining the upper hand in the church, and securely defined the divine and its historical shape.[3] It is by all means a significant epoch when Oriental philosophy began to penetrate into the West. The first point is this enduring character of the universal element in the religious representation of the Orientals.

The second point, then, is the more specific content of the Oriental religions, above all the Indian religions. These Oriental religions are allegorical, except for Judaism. The main thing in them, as in all religions, is what has being in and for itself, the eternal, the One, God. In the Orient it is grasped for the most part as having the character of universal substance. To be considered now is the relationship that the individual has to that substance. In the Orient the principal relationship is as follows. Only the one substance as such is what truly is. Individuals have no inherent worth and cannot gain any, to the extent that they maintain themselves over against what has being in and for itself. Instead they can have genuine worth only by unification [*Ineinssetzung*] with this substance; in this state they cease to be consciousness, to be subjects on their own account, for in it they vanish into what is unconscious. | This is the basic relationship in the Oriental 368
religions.

In the Greek and the Germanic spirit, in contrast, when the subject knows itself to be free, it is also supposed to be maintained, not simply to annul itself. When the individual thus breaks loose on its own and is for itself, it then surely becomes more difficult for thought to disengage itself from personality and to constitute itself on its own account. The inherently higher standpoint of Greek individual freedom—that freer, happier life—intensifies the work of thought in validating its universality. In the Oriental context, on the contrary, the substantial element by itself is the main thing, and the individual's lack of right, of will, of consciousness, its submergence in the substantial element, is directly bound up with it. In religion the substantial element is directly posited as what is essential. This substance is, to be sure, a philosophical idea; the relationship of the individual to it, and the negation of the individual, are important points.

To the extent, then, that reflection and consciousness in the Oriental spirit do, by means of thought, arrive at distinction and definition (the definition of principles and the like), such definitions, categories, and specific principles are disconnected from the substantial aspect. Either there is an immersion in the substantial element, the annihilation of everything particular, a boundlessness, the Oriental sublimity; or else—to the extent

3. See Vol. II, pp. 328–9, 338–40.

also that what is posited specifically on its own account is known—it is for its own part something arid, rationalistic [*Verständiges*], spiritless, that is
369 for that very reason incapable of accepting the speculative concept. | This finite element can become something true only by immersion in substance; maintained apart from substance, it remains impoverished, arid, and just a matter for the understanding. For this reason we find, on the part of Orientals, only reflections, only arid understanding, a completely external enumeration of elements, something utterly deplorable, empty, pedantic, and devoid of spirit, an elaboration of logic similar to the old Wolffian logic.[4] It is the same with Oriental ceremonies.

This is the general character of Oriental religious representations and philosophy. There is, as in their cultus, on the one hand an immersion in devotion, in substance, and so the pedantic detail of the cultus—a vast array of the most tasteless ceremonies and religious activities—and on the other hand, the sublimity and boundlessness in which everything perishes.

There are two Oriental peoples whom I wish to mention, the Chinese and the Indians.

B. CHINESE PHILOSOPHY

Like the Indians, the Chinese are very renowned for their cultural development, although better information has greatly diminished this reputation, just as it has reduced the vast timespan of their history. The great cultural development of the Chinese lies in such fields as religion, science, public administration, judicial procedure, poetry, technical and artistic fields, and commerce. But comparison of the Chinese political institutions with those
370 of a European state can only be made in a formal way, | because the content is quite different. The situation is the same when comparing Indian poetry with European poetry.

Indian poetry can be deemed as cultivated, brilliant, and rich as the poetic literature of any people. Formally, it and their statecraft too can be placed on a par with their European counterparts. These literatures are, however, quite dissimilar in content and spirit. The content of ancient Oriental poetry can be treated as a mere play of the fanciful imagination and, as such, it is extremely brilliant. What is essential in poetry, however, is the content, and that must be taken seriously too. Even Homeric poetry is not something

4. See Christian Wolff, *Philosophia rationalis sive logica*..., 3rd edn. (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1740). Hegel discusses Wolff's arid brand of Enlightenment philosophy in Vol. III, pp. 155–8.

serious for us, not something whose content we can acknowledge, although that is not because the poetry lacks genius. Howsoever great the genius, the content cannot be our content, because we will not be praying to Jupiter and the like. So, although Indian or Oriental poetry can be very highly developed in point of form, the content remains at a very meager level, and cannot satisfy us.

As for their legal institutions and political institutions, we discover right away that, however splendidly they may be elaborated in a formal sense, they would not suit us—that we would not be content with them. Instead of right, they would involve a suppression of our rights and of our freedom. This is, above all, a general observation regarding comparisons of this sort. One must pay attention to the content in the remaining branches of culture too, and not let the form beguile us into putting the Oriental elements on a par with our own, or even preferring them to our own.

We will mention two points about the Chinese. The first concerns the figure of Confucius, a person of ancient renown in philosophy, 500 years before Christ. | His books count among those most honored by the Chi- 371
nese. Confucius wrote commentaries on basic works, on historical works in particular, and he wrote a history. His other efforts pertain to philosophy, and they too are commentaries on earlier, traditional works. His instruction in morals has, over time, made him the absolute authority for the Chinese. The French missionaries published his 'Life and Teachings', translated from the Chinese originals, with excerpts from his teachings. One of his most famous works has been translated from Chinese into English.[5]

Confucius lived about the sixth century BC, at the same time as Thales.[6] His writings include first-rate historical works. For a time he was a minister of state, and after leaving government service he spent his time philosophizing with his friends. What matters most in his works are the moral

5. From the greater detail in the *Philosophy of Religion*, we see that Hegel's main source for his knowledge of Confucius is *Confucius Sinarum philosophus, sive scientia Sinensis, latine exposita*, by Christian Herdtrich, Francis Rougement, and Philip Couplet, SJ (Paris, 1687). Hegel's mention of French missionaries is more likely based on *Mémoires concernant l'histoire, les sciences, les mœurs, les usages, etc. des Chinois par les missionaires de Pekin*, 16 vols. (Paris, 1776–1814), esp. vol. xii, *Vie de Confucius*. Confucius left no writings of his own. That 'his books count among the most honored' is a reference to the Confucian canon. His commentaries are mentioned in the later version of the *Yi-Jing*. By 'historical works', Hegel probably means the *Chun-qiu*, a chronicle of the State of Lu, ascribed to Confucius. The English translation referred to is that of Joshua Marshman, *The Works of Confucius* (Serampore, 1809), containing the *Lun-yii*, or *Analects*.

6. Confucius' traditional dates (*c.*551–479 BC) could scarcely overlap with the lifetime of Thales, who died sometime in the period 562–550 BC; see Vol. II, p. 23.

teachings, devoid of further philosophical speculation, and they are good, sound moral teachings. He should not be looked to for profound philosophical inquiry; we have nothing to gain by doing so. Cicero's *De officiis* is perhaps better for us than are all the works of Confucius. The verdict of competent judges about the translations is that the reputation of Confucius would have been better served had he not been translated, for the moral lessons are quite conventional and long-winded.[7] A moralizing book of sermons offers us something more and better than this.

A second point to note is that the Chinese were also occupied with abstract thoughts, with pure categories, for they have an ancient *Y-jing* or *Yi-jing*, which passes for the oldest book of its kind. Four of these *jing* possess the most absolute authority, and one of them also prescribes conduct at court.[8] The *Yi-jing* contains the wisdom of the Chinese, and its origin
372 is ascribed to the elder Fu, or Fu Hsi. This narrative | by Fu Hsi passes over wholly into the mythological and fabulous realm. The main thing is that he [is] credited with the discovery of a panel on which certain signs were found engraved. The Chinese say that Fu had the body of a dragon and the head of a bull, and that he had a case (a tortoise shell) on his back. This panel contains diagrams, lines that are alongside, or above and below, one another. The diagrams are symbols that have a certain meaning, and they are the foundation of Chinese wisdom.[9] These meanings are quite abstract categories, the most abstract, and consequently the most superficial, categories of the understanding.

In any event we should take note of the fact that pure thoughts are also brought to consciousness in this way, although only to the level of the

7. See the third book of Cicero's *De officiis*, a work that was widely read in the German Enlightenment, in the translation of Christian Garve (Breslau, 1787). We do not know who are the 'competent judges' of translations, mentioned here and in other passages.

8. We do not have a source for Hegel's statement that there are four *jing*. Of the thirteen canonical books (*jing*), the Chinese set apart a group of five as especially significant: *Yi-jing*, *Shu-jing*, *Shi-jing*, *Chun-qiu*, and *Li-ji*. Conduct at court is a topic of other 'Books of Ritual' included among the thirteen.

9. Hegel appears to have no first-hand knowledge of the *Yi-jing*, and probably bases his remarks on reports in an accessible edition of the *Shu-jing*, by M. De Guignes, *Le Chou-king*... (Paris, 1770). This volume contains footnotes (on pp. 169–70) that link the eight Gua (the diagrams, discussed below in our text) with marks on the shell of a tortoise. According to Fung Yu-lan, early Chinese divination involved heating a tortoise shell in a fire, and making prognostications based on the number and position of the cracks that appeared in the burnt shell. Since these configurations could be quite varied, it was difficult to associate them satisfactorily with the limited number of the Gua and their combinations in the *Yi-Jing*. Hence the tortoise shell method came to be replaced by manipulation of yarrow stalks, which better corresponded with the symbols of the text and their predictive senses. See Fung, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, trans. Derk Bodde, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1952), i. 379–80.

most abstract understanding. Then follows progression to what is concrete, although this concrete element is not conceived, not examined speculatively, but instead taken from ordinary representation, and spoken about in terms of the intuitions of everyday perception and the ordinary categories of the understanding. This takes place in such a way that, in the resolution of the concrete principles, the impulse of the concept is not discernible, nor is there even found a sensible grasping of universal powers, whether natural or spiritual.

For curiosity's sake, I will set forth this foundation in greater detail. The first sign is Yang (——), and the second is Yin (— —). The first designates unity and the second duality, just as with the Pythagoreans. The lines are then further combined, first in pairs, yielding four images: ⚌, ⚍, ⚎, ⚏; these are the first four basic concepts. The first one signifies perfect matter, indeed as young and strong; the second is the same matter, but as old and weak; the third and the fourth are imperfect | matter, the negative 373
as such, the former being strong and the latter old.[10]

These lines are further combined in threes, giving rise to eight images, the eight Gua: ☰ Tian, ☱ Tai, ☲ Li, ☳ Tschin, ☴ Sinn, ☵ Kan, ☶ Ken, ☷ Kuen. Combining them in fours yields the 64 Gua, and these are said to be the foundation of all their characters.[11]

I will indicate the significance of the eight Gua in order to show how superficial it is. Yang is unity, perfection, father, masculine, the origin of all things, and also reason, the void, nothing. Yin is the feminine, imperfection, mother, duality. The first sign is Tian [Qian], or heaven, which is what is supreme in Chinese religion; there is a great dispute among the missionaries as to whether or not they ought to call the Christian God 'Tian'. The second sign is pure water, the third pure fire, the fourth thunder, the fifth wind, the sixth water in general, the seventh the mountains, and the eighth the

10. *Le Chou-King* mentions Yin and Yang on p. 353. The previous page insert contains table IV, which has diagrams of the various sign combinations. See also the diagrams in *Confucius Sinarum philosophus*, pp. xlii–xliv.

11. See the diagrams mentioned in the previous note. Our text does not give the eight signs (trigrams) in the correct order, or in the usual phonetic transcription. It also errs in saying that the 64 Gua are formed by 'combining them in fours'. Each of the 64 Gua consists of two trigrams, one above the other, hence of six levels (whether continuous or broken lines). See *The I Ching, or Book of Changes*, the Richard Wilhelm Translation from the Chinese, rendered into English by Cary F. Baynes (3rd edn.; Princeton, 1967), pp. l–li. Wilhelm gives the eight trigrams in this order, and with these transcriptions (the Pinyin transcriptions follow in parentheses when they differ): ☰ Ch'ien (Qian), ☶ K'un, ☱ Chên (Ken), ☵ K'an, ☳ Kên, ☴ Sun (Xun), ☲ Li, ☱ Tui.

earth.[12] We would not place heaven, thunder, wind, and mountains on the same level.

The *Shu-jing* contains the ancient Chinese representations too, namely, the five elements: fire, wood, metal, water, and earth.[13] We would be just as reluctant to give these the status of principles. This, then, is the mode of universal abstraction. With the Chinese it proceeds to the concrete, but only in accordance with an external arrangement and without involving anything meaningful. This is the foundation of all Chinese wisdom and all Chinese
374 learning. |

C. *INDIAN PHILOSOPHY*[14]

Introduction

As for the antiquity of Indian wisdom, many have repeated the huge numbers reiterated by the Indians. In recent times especially their works on astronomy have become known, and it is evident in them that their huge numbers are not in fact chronological in our sense.[15] Nothing can be more

12. Hegel actually begins this paragraph not with the Gua as such, but with the Yin and Yang. He then mentions just the cosmological significance of the Gua, and with some errors in the sequence. The fourth (in his order in the text) signifies wind (not thunder), the fifth signifies mountain (not wind), and the seventh thunder (not mountain). The missionary dispute began with the missions to China of the Franciscans, Dominicans, and Augustinians, from 1663 on, and the decision went against the Jesuits in the papal bull *Ex quo singulari* (1742). The dispute was primarily about the compatibility of Chinese rituals (of Confucianism and of ancestor worship) with Christianity, not the designation of God. The fact that Hegel takes the dispute to revolve around the appropriateness of designating God as 'heaven' may show that he obtained his primary orientation from the *Allgemeine Historie der Reisen zu Wasser und zu Lande; oder Sammlung aller Reisebeschreibungen* ..., vol. vi (Leipzig, 1750); see pp. 386–7, a depiction of the emperor (in 1700, in response to a query from the apostolic vicar) as drawing a clear distinction between the visible, physical heaven, and the lord of heaven to whom the sacrifice is offered.

13. This list of five elements appears in *Le Chou-King*, p. 165, as well as in *Mémoires concernant l'histoire ... des Chinois* ..., ii. 167.

14. Most of the contents of this section derive from the religion of Hinduism, and from philosophical reflection rooted in it. Nevertheless, we render *indisch* and its noun counterpart as 'Indian' rather than 'Hindu', since Hegel's concern here is with philosophies originating in the part of the world known as India, rather than with Hinduism exclusively. This practice parallels the terminology of 'Greek philosophy' for thought originating in the Greek world, and of 'Chinese philosophy' for a complex in which Hegel does not distinguish fully the Confucian elements from the Daoist ones.

15. In the 1830–1 *Philosophy of World History*, Hegel says that there is no historical foundation to '... other scientific (e.g. astronomical) knowledge (such as astronomers themselves, including Bailly, have fancifully attributed to the Indians) ...' (Nisbet edn., p. 133); see *GW* xviii. 189. J. S. Bailly's *Histoire de l'astronomie ancienne* ... (Paris, 1775), appeared in a two-volume German translation (Leipzig, 1777). Bailly dismissed as idle fancy the huge

perplexing than the Indian chronology. No people accomplished in poetry, astronomy, mathematics, and the like, is less capable than they are in the historical domain. For them, there is no fixed point [in history] and no coherence; not a single date is trustworthy.

They have many eras. People believed that they possessed a fixed point in the era of Vikramāditya, who supposedly lived about 50 BC, and in whose reign lived the poet Kālidāsa, author of the *Shakuntala*. This writer is said to have been one of 'nine stars' at the court. But closer investigation uncovered half a dozen 'Vikramādityas', and other investigations have placed the origin of this work in our eleventh century after Christ.[16] The Indians have a vast sequence of kings and an enormous host of names, but everything is indeterminate.

Indian culture is highly developed and magnificent, but their philosophy is identical with the religion, with the result that the religious interests are the same as those we find in the philosophy. Because the mythology includes the aspect of incarnation, of individuality, one could take it to be contrary to the universality of the mode of ideas in the philosophy. But one

numbers of the Indian kalpa doctrine. At the same time, however, he readily accepted somewhat more moderate, but still very large, figures, and did so in the interest of proving his thesis that the traditional astronomical representations are merely the remains of a prior, consummate science; see Bailly, i. 123–5, ii. 39–40, 85, and *Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 530–1. But Hegel may not have had first-hand knowledge of Bailly's work, and might have relied on the critique of it in J. J. Delambre, *Histoire de l'astronomie ancienne*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1817). The footnote to the above citation from the *Philosophy of World History* (Hoffmeister, p. 160; Nisbet, p. 232), attributable to an auditor's transcript of the lectures, mentions [J. H.] Lambert's *Kosmologische Briefe über die Einrichtung des Weltbaus* (1761), with reference to Indian astronomy. But no critique of Indian astronomical representations is to be found in this book. So perhaps Hegel's auditor misunderstood 'Lambert' for 'Delambre'. For criticism of Bailly, see J. Bentley's article, 'On the Antiquity of the Suryá Siddhánta, and the Formation of the Astronomical Cycles therein contained', in *Asiatic Researches*, vi. 540–93, especially p. 541. On the reliability of Indian chronology and the views circulating about it, see also Bentley's article 'On the Hindu Systems of Astronomy, and their connection with History in ancient and modern times' (utilized by Hegel), in *Asiatic Researches* (viii. 244), which says that 'the general opinion of the Hindus... when thoroughly sifted and examined to the bottom, proves at last to be founded, principally, in vanity, ignorance, and credulity'.

16. For Hegel's opening statement on the era of Vikramāditya, see W. C. Seybold, *Ideen zur Theologie und Staatsverfassung des höhern Alterthums* (Tübingen, 1820), who puts him in 56 BC (p. iv). Friedrich Schlegel, in *Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier* (Heidelberg, 1808), makes him a contemporary of Caesar Augustus (pp. 151–2, 210–11), whose dates are 27 BC–AD 14); see *KFSA* viii. 253, 308–9. More recent opinion places him, and likely also the poet Kālidāsa, in the fourth or fifth centuries after Christ. Bentley ('On the Hindu Systems of Astronomy...') recounts various reports and, based on the words of 'an intelligent pandit' with whom he conferred, concluded that Vikramāditya, and hence the 'nine gems' (Hegel's 'nine stars'), probably lived between 700 and 800 years ago, thus about the eleventh century; see *Asiatic Researches*, viii. 242–3, and also 198–9.

should not put too fine a point on this 'incarnation'. Everyone renowned as a king, and the like, counts as an incarnation of Brahmā, of Vishnu, or of
375 another deity; and what seems to define itself | as individuality completely evaporates into the mist of the universal.

It is noteworthy that, just as the religious representations have the same general foundation as the philosophy, so too the holy books, the Vedas, are the foundation for the philosophy. Colebrooke has made us better acquainted with them. Their primary contents are prayers to the many representations of God, as well as prescriptions for the ceremonies, sacrifices, and the like. The Vedas come from the most disparate historical periods, and they are disjointed, lacking coherence; many parts are of great antiquity while others originate only later, for instance, those concerning the service of Vishnu. The Vedas are the foundation of Indian philosophies, even for the atheistic philosophies, because these too are not lacking in gods, although the atheists explain God in their own way.[17] So Indian philosophy stands within religion, just as Scholastic philosophy in the Middle Ages stood within Christian dogmatics, because it presupposes the faith of the Christian church.

In more specific terms, the Indian view is as follows. There is a universal substance that can be grasped more abstractly or more concretely, and from which all things have their origin; these productions are gods, powers of nature, configurations, phenomena, and on the other side, animals and inorganic nature, with humanity standing in an intermediate position. The highest point in religion, as in philosophy, is where human beings, as consciousness, make themselves identical with substance by means of devotion, sacrifice, and rigorous penance, and by occupation with pure thought, that is, with philosophy.[18]

Not long ago we first obtained specific information about Indian philosophy. It was understood to be mainly religious representations, but more recently people have become acquainted with the Indians' own
376 | philosophical writings. In particular, Colebrooke, the President of the [Royal] Asiatic Society in London, in the *Transactions of the Asiatic Society*, vol. i, has provided excerpts from two Indian philosophical works, and

17. Hegel's knowledge of the Vedas relies primarily on the extensive report of Henry Thomas Colebrooke, 'On the Vedas, or sacred writings of the Hindus', in *Asiatic Researches*, viii. 377–497. Colebrooke discusses the fourfold nature of the Vedic scriptures, and describes the individual Vedas with their subsequent elucidations, their prayers and ritual prescriptions, while interspersing his account with extracts from numerous passages.

18. This statement is probably not taken from a source, but is a summation of Hegel's own account of Indian religion in *Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 316–52 (the 1824 lectures) and ii. 579–608 (the 1827 lectures).

these are in fact the first examples of Indian philosophy that have come into our possession.[19] What Friedrich von Schlegel says about Indian wisdom is drawn more from their religious representations. He is one of the first Germans to have occupied himself with Indian philosophy, though this activity has not borne much fruit. It is evident that he has read only one part of the synopsis of the *Rāmāyana*.[20]

Colebrooke says that the Indians possess ancient philosophical systems, that they consider some of them to be orthodox, namely, those agreeing with the Vedas, while other systems count as heterodox because they do not harmonize with the teachings of the holy books. Thus one part of Indian philosophy is essentially orthodox, and its sole objective is to facilitate and support Vedic interpretation, or else to extract from the text of these basic books above all a refined, more freely thought-out, psychology.[21]

This system is called Mimamsa, and it is reported to comprise two schools. Distinct from it are other systems, the two main ones being Sāmkhya and Nyāya. Sāmkhya falls in turn under two heads, although these two differ only with regard to their form. Nyāya counts Gotama as its founder, and it is particularly complex, as a system that develops the rules for reasoning; Colebrooke says it bears comparison with Aristotelian logic. [It falls into] two subdivisions, that of Gotama and that of Kanāda, [and it is] atomistic. Colebrooke has given us excerpts from both of these systems. He says | that we have very ancient writings about both systems, and that 377
the *Kārikas*, [in particular] the *versus memoriales* from them, are widely disseminated and have been the subject of commentaries.[22]

19. See Henry Thomas Colebrooke, 'On the Philosophy of the Hindus', *Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society*..., vol. i, pts. 1–2 (London, 1824). Because the very many citations of Colebrooke in the following footnotes come from pt. 1 (pp. 19–43) and pt. 2 (pp. 92–118)—the Bibliography in our volume lists all the parts—our notes omit the title and just state 'Colebrooke', followed by the page numbers.

20. Hegel is referring to *Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier* (Heidelberg, 1808). Hegel's harsh criticism is not wholly unjustified because, in the second book of this work, 'Concerning the Philosophy', Schlegel deals less with philosophy than he does with the religious representations of the Indians (and in doing so implicitly attacks Schelling sharply). But Hegel's remark is not justified when it comes to the philological significance of Schlegel's work.

21. The contents of this paragraph derive from Colebrooke, p. 19.

22. See the continuation of the passage cited in n. 21. But Colebrooke attributes atomism only to the school of Kanāda, not to all of Nyāya. And the last sentence of this paragraph is a misreading. After referring to other authors and works, Colebrooke says (p. 23): 'The best text of the *Sánc'hya* is a short treatise in verse, which is denominated *Cáricá*, as memorial verses of other sciences likewise are.... This brief tract, containing seventy-two stanzas in *áryá* metre, has been expounded in numerous commentaries.'

1. The Sāmkhya Philosophy of Kapila

The founder of the Sāmkhya system is named Kapila. He was an ancient sage. The Indians report various things about the circumstances of his life. Some say that he is a son of Brahmā, and is one of the seven great holy men, the Rishis. Others say he is Agni, an incarnation of Vishnu, and is identical with fire (the Latin *ignis* is cognate with this name). His disciple Asuri is likewise an incarnation of Vishnu, or of Brahmā. Colebrooke says nothing about the antiquity of the aphorisms that are ascribed to Kapila and are also called Sutras. He mentions only that they are cited in other very ancient books, but that nothing more precise can be stated about them.[23]

Sāmkhya divides into different schools, two or three of them, which deviate from one another only on a few singular points. Sāmkhya is held to be partly orthodox, partly heterodox. Colebrooke says that the aim of all the Indian schools and systems of philosophy, both theistic and atheistic, is to indicate the means for attaining eternal bliss, before or after death. The Vedas say that what is to be known is the soul, which must be disengaged from nature so that it will not return; in other words, so that it is delivered from metempsychosis, from immersion in corporeality. Then the soul does not appear again as another individual. Liberation from this metempsychosis is the essential goal in all of the atheistic and theistic systems.[24]

They say, then, that complete liberation from ills can be achieved solely through [philosophical] science. Temporal means of procuring satisfaction, or of warding off mental and physical ills, such means as medicine, are
378 insufficient for that purpose. | Even the spiritual means that the Vedas give are not completely effective for that purpose; that is to say, the revealed methods too are insufficient. These revealed methods consist in performance of the religious ceremonies as they are given and prescribed in the Vedas. In this regard the Sāmkhyas put no stock in the Vedas.[25]

Prominent among these ceremonies are animal sacrifices. They are paradoxical because they involve the death of animals, and yet it is a main precept not to harm or kill any animal. Thus the sacrificial method is not entirely pure. Sāmkhya says this, and so does not give full recognition to the

23. Once again the transcripts do not convey with exactitude the text presumably used by Hegel, which is Colebrooke, pp. 20–2. Colebrooke suggests that Kapila may have been a mythological figure, and that the Sutras could have been composed by someone else, who ascribed them to Kapila (p. 22).

24. On the schools of Sāmkhya, see Colebrooke, pp. 25–6. Colebrooke says, however, that attaining eternal beatitude is the goal of all Sāmkhya schools (not, as our text says, 'of all the Indian schools'), and that the Vedanta teaches 'exemption from metempsychosis'.

25. See Colebrooke (pp. 26–8) for this Sāmkhya view of 'true knowledge'.

Vedas.[26] Other means of liberation from ills include the Indians' stupendous acts of penance, such as a person's holding his arms vertically above his head for ten years' time and traveling about in that fashion. An Englishman came upon someone journeying around most of Asia in that manner. Other acts of penance include standing continuously for ten years without lying down, or else staying seated for years, motionless in one spot and gazing at the tip of one's nose. In this state of withdrawal into oneself, they find bliss.[27]

Brahmā is represented mainly as one, as utterly without sensible features, as this highest being or *l'être suprême*, as the understanding calls it. When they compose themselves in thought and in meditation [*Andacht*] and concentrate fixedly within themselves, in an unconscious state, the moment of this pure concentration is thus Brahmā; then, 'I am Brahmā'.[28] Achieving bliss by means of thinking is a principal goal of Indian philosophy. About this | bliss that human beings acquire, they say that it is what is supreme, 379
that even the gods are subordinate to this blissful state.[29] Other deities, such as Indra, the god of the visible heaven that is only transitory, are far lower than is the soul in this life of inner contemplation. Although many thousands of Indras have come and gone, the soul is exempt from all change, is perfect and endures.[30]

26. These statements about animal sacrifices come directly from Colebrooke, p. 27. At the end of this passage, Colebrooke cites a few Vedic texts on the necessity of the sacrifice, with which he juxtaposes the philosophical schools' statements of their superiority to these texts. See also n. 30, just below.

27. For these accounts, see Wilhelm Harnisch, *Die wichtigsten Reisen*, pt. 6 (Leipzig, 1824), which contains 'Des Hauptmann Samuel Turner's Reise in Bhutan und Tibet' (pp. 287–362); see esp. pp. 350–1. See also Samuel Turner, *An Account of an Embassy to the Court of the Teshoo Lama*... (London, 1800), pp. 270–2. The fuller accounts of such 'penances' (*Büssingen*) in *Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 342–3, 596–7, make it clear that they are not acts atoning for sin, but instead are 'austerities' (*Strengigkeiten*), strenuous feats performed to attain oneness with Brahman.

28. See Francis Wilford, *An Essay on the Sacred Isles in the West*..., Essay VI, Part I, Ch. III, 'Swetá Devi; or the White Goddess', in *Asiatic Researches*, xi. 110–31; the account of becoming Brahmā in this way occurs on pp. 125–6.

29. This is probably an allusion to an episode in the *Rāmāyana*, to which Hegel refers a number of times. In it the sage Vishvamitra, through meditation and austerities, attains the rank of Brahmā, and by doing so he brings consternation to the world and the gods, who say: 'If the desire of his mind be not granted, he will by his austerities destroy the universe.' See *The Ramayana of Valmeeki*, vol. i, trans. William Carey and Joshua Marshman (Serampore, 1806), pp. 457–546; the quotation is from pp. 538–9. For a fuller account of this passage, see *Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 597–9.

30. See Colebrooke, p. 27, where it states that the gods perish along with the periodical dissolution of the world, for they are 'overcome by time'.

Complete liberation from ills of every sort is thus bliss for the Indian. According to Sāmkhya, this bliss is attained through the true [philosophical] science. Hence this science differs from religion only by virtue of its having a detailed doctrine of thought, one not making the abstraction into something utterly empty, but elevating it to the significance of a definite thought. According to them, this science consists of correct knowledge of the principles that are outwardly perceptible and of those that are not perceptible, knowledge of the material and the non-material worlds.[31]

The Sāmkhya system has three components: (1) the method of knowing; (2) the objects of knowing; (3) the specific form of knowing these principles. About the first, they say that there are three kinds of evidence: (a) perception, *perceptio*; (b) indifference or reasoning; (c) affirmation [of reliable authority]. Comparison, analogy, and the like are, by contrast, totally disregarded. Sāmkhya holds that respect, learning, tradition, and so forth, all lead back to these three.[32]

The first kind of evidence, perception, needs no elucidation. The second one, reasoning, is a conclusion from cause and effect, in which the thinker only passes over from one determinate element to another. Mediating knowledge of the latter has three forms: (α) from effect to cause, or (β) from cause to effect, or (γ) a conclusion from the diverse relationships
380 causes | and effects have with other causes and effects. Rain is presumed when a cloud is on the point of discharging its contents, or fire when one sees a hill giving off smoke. Lunar motion is inferred when the moon is seen at different times in different places, and the salinity of the ocean from a sample of seawater.[33] These are simple and arid relationships of the understanding.

The third kind of evidence is 'affirmation', which is understood as reference to authentic tradition or revelation. The orthodox understand it to refer to the Vedas. Others understand by it simply the assurance of some truth or other (what recent writers call 'immediate certainty'), its affirmation

31. These remarks on Sāmkhya are taken from the continuation of the passage cited in the preceding note.

32. Colebrooke (p. 28) says that 'exclusive of intuition, which belongs to beings of a superior order', the three kinds of evidence are 'perception, inference, and affirmation'. A more recent account gives the three as perception, inference, and reliable authority; see Gerald J. Larson, *Classical Sāmkhya: An Interpretation of Its History and Meaning* (Delhi, 1969), p. 170. Our text gives the second as *Indifferenz oder Räsonnement*. 'Indifference' is likely a misconstrual of 'inference', or else a mishearing of it by the auditors.

33. Hegel follows Colebrooke (p. 29) in going directly from simple mention of perception, to elucidation of inference or reasoning. The examples come directly from Colebrooke.

in my own consciousness. The assurance comes from oral communication or from tradition. These are the three methods of knowing.[34]

As for the second section, the objects of knowing or the principles, Sāmkhya enumerates some twenty-five principles. I shall name them, as a way of showing the lack of order in the list.

1. Nature, the foundation, the absolute as such. It is the root, or the plastic origin, of all things. They say it is the universal material cause, Brahmaya (which some want to bring into connection with Maya, *maja*, 'illusion', or 'principle of change'). United with it is Brahmi, the force of Brahmā, which is eternal matter, the undifferentiated, what has no parts. Nature is productive but is no production; it is the absolute substance.[35]

2. Intelligence, the first production of nature, and itself productive of other principles. They say that it can be differentiated as three deities, via the distinction of the three qualities: goodness, passion or efficacy, and darkness. These are one person and three deities. The one person is called Murti, and so this one, as triad, is also called Trimurti. In mythology the triad is Brahmā, Vishnu, and Mahâdeva (Mahadöh).[36] | 381

3. Consciousness or, properly speaking, selfhood [*Ichheit*] or self-consciousness. It is a belief that I am conceived, and am present, in every perception, in every meditation, just as are the objects of sense, since they concern *me*, the 'I'. Consciousness derives from the power of the intelligence, and brings forth the following principles.[37]

The five principles that follow are free beginnings, rudiments, or atoms, which are perceptible only through senses of a higher order and not through

34. This account of 'affirmation' comes from Colebrooke, p. 29.

35. This account of 25 principles, and of 'nature', the first, comes from Colebrooke, pp. 29–30.

36. See Colebrooke, p. 30, on 'intelligence' and the Trimurti. He renders the second of the qualities as 'foulness'. 'Mahadöh' was, in Hegel's day, a customary way of rendering Mahādeva or Maheśwara. See e.g. the opening lines of Goethe's poem, 'The God and the Bayadere [temple dancer], an Indian Legend':

> Mahadöh, Lord of the Earth,
> Descended for the sixth time,
> So that he would be our equal,
> To feel joy and pain.

In *Musen-Almanach für das Jahr 1798*, ed. Schiller, pp. 188–93; Goethe, *Werke* (Weimar, 1887ff.), I, 1. 227–30.

37. See Colebrooke on consciousness and on the five principles of the following paragraph (p. 30).

human senses. They stem from the principle of consciousness, and they themselves bring forth others; they are productive of the five coarser elements: (4) earth; (5) water; (6) fire; (7) air; (8) space.

Next come eleven principles, the eleven sense organs, also produced by the I. Ten of them are external, inclusive of the five sense organs and the five organs of activity, which are: (1) the voice or the mouth, the organ of speech; (2) the hands; (3) the feet; (4) the intestinal tract; (5) the genitals. The eleventh organ is an interior sense organ, the inner sense.[38]

Finally come the external elements, numbers twenty through twenty-four, which are brought forth from the beginnings already mentioned. They are: ether, air, fire, water, and the palpable element, earth. The twenty-fifth principle is the soul.[39]

This is a quite disorganized approach. We have here only the very beginnings of reflection, just principles that, in their aggregation, appear to be something universal but are not brought together in a systematic and judicious way. Sāmkhya assigns the following attributes to the soul. It is not produced nor is it productive. It is individual, and so there are many souls. It is sentient, and yet it is eternal, immaterial, immutable. At this point the theistic and atheistic systems of Sāmkhya differ, because the theistic system defines one soul as what is true, as
382 God | or Ishvara. The soul is the most important thing, and should be known and exalted. That should take place through contemplation [*Betrachtung*] of nature and through concurrent abstraction from it. This in turn brings forth the oneness of the soul with nature, and this oneness brought forth by the soul is then, in and for itself, the mainstay for whatever there is, for the producing and creating of what is, and for its preservation.[40]

It is a great thought that the negation of the object is contained in thinking, that thinking involves a negative stance, and this is a necessary moment in conceptual thinking. It is already speculative. This development involves a very great idea, one much more profound than is talk of immediate consciousness. It is the bringing forth of all principles.

38. See Colebrooke, pp. 30–1.

39. See Colebrooke, p. 31. Each successive element in the list possesses an added quality, and so is accessible to one more of the senses than is its immediate predecessor. Thus earth, 'the palpable element', is accessible to all five: hearing, touch, sight, taste, and smell. On the soul, see the following note.

40. In stating these attributes of the soul, and the means of its unity with nature, Colebrooke (pp. 31–2) draws a parallel with John Scotus Erigena's *De naturae divisione* that Hegel does not mention.

When people say, on the contrary, that the Orientals lived in oneness with nature, that is a very superficial and misleading expression. Although activity, soul, or spirit is undoubtedly in relationship with nature, and intelligence is unity with the idea of nature, this genuine unity still essentially involves the moment of the negative stance, of abstraction from immediate nature. Such an immediate unity with nature is just sensuous, crude life, or even animal life and perceiving.[41] The spiritual element is one with nature only when it is for itself at the same time, and has posited the natural element as the negative. The idea thus found among the Indians is the unity of nature and the soul, and this unity is then creative [*schöpferisch*].

They say that the soul's wish or goal is enjoyment or even liberation. To this end the soul is thus endowed with a subtle personality, and with subtle surroundings containing all the principles we have listed, although their development proceeds | only to the elementary, initial stage; they are only 383
rudimenta. Something of our ideal realm, of the in-itself, is ideally present in this idea. [What is unfolded is] by no means [present] except in an ideal way, as the blossom is indeed in the seed ideally, yet is operative and real. This person, the subtle configuration, gets expressed in the system as 'Lingam', the power of procreation or the effective power of the natural domain, which is emphasized in all the Indian perspectives. They say that this subtle shape is what then assumes grosser corporeality, and so passes through many particular corporeal forms in succession, like a comic actor who puts on different masks.[42] The methods for overcoming the descent into grosser corporeality are contemplation, philosophy, and thinking. These are the abstract principles.

Several more points need to be made about the creation and the concrete actuality of the universe. The corporeal creation consists of souls clothed in grosser bodies. It comprises eight orders of higher beings and five orders of lower beings; together with human beings, these make up fourteen orders, which are apportioned among three worlds. To the eight higher orders of beings belong, among others, Brahmā and Indra, and the subordinate deities

41. In the *Philosophy of Religion*, Hegel elucidates this thought of a natural state, depicted more precisely as a unity of human beings with nature and with God, '... a natural, unmediated unity, an intuition of untroubled human beings, an intuition in which the heart of nature, and the nature of God, was laid bare before them, namely that at the center of nature and at the divine center stood *humanity*' (ii. 243; 1824 lectures). There Hegel implicitly criticizes the views of Friedrich Schlegel and Schelling on an original state of nature (ii. 240–1). But he also fuses with those views the distinct conception of a oneness with nature, based on Jacob Boehme's mystical experiences, one that is expressed in the above quotation.

42. The account, up to this point in the paragraph, is from Colebrooke, p. 32, who emphasizes the contrast of the subtle person with the grosser body.

and demons. Brahmā himself, however, stands in the first order of created beings. The five lower orders are: (1) and (2) the four-footed animals in two classes; (3) birds; (4) amphibians, fish, and insects; (5) finally, plants. As we can see, this is a ranking of what is sensible. The eight higher classes dwell in heaven, and enjoy virtue, goodness, and happiness, although their happiness is only imperfect and transitory.[43]

This system now posits another creation over against these three worlds,
384 namely, the intellectual creation, which includes the | characteristics of the understanding, the faculty of sensation. These in turn are arranged in four orders: (1) those that hinder intelligence; (2) those that incapacitate [it]; (3) those that satisfy [it]; (4) those that perfect intelligence. Some fifty such characteristics are enumerated.[44]

The characteristics that hinder intelligence are error, deception, passion, hate, and fear. They count eight classes of error and deception, ten of passion, and eighteen species of hate, each of which in its turn subdivides into many parts.[45] This approach is more one of psychological, empirical observation.

Second is the incapacity of intelligence, which consists in absence or impairment of organs, and has twenty particular classes.

Third is satisfaction, which is either inner or outer. Four classes are assigned to inner satisfaction; the first satisfaction concerns nature, the wholly universal, substantial domain. This satisfaction is based on the belief that cognition of nature is a modification of the principle of nature itself, linked to a consequent anticipation of a liberation and satisfaction through the action of nature. The belief is that in philosophical cognition nature will impart liberation.

Authentic satisfaction belongs to the fourth class. Liberation is not to be anticipated from an action of nature; the soul has to bring forth satisfaction through itself, through its own thinking activity. The second satisfaction is the belief that ascetic practices suffice to ensure liberation, through suffering,

43. See Colebrooke, p. 33. In his account, the final group includes not only plants but also inorganic substances. Colebrooke is consistent in his use of 'orders' and 'classes', whereas Hegel is not. All groupings in this paragraph Colebrooke refers to as 'orders' in his statements that are Hegel's source here, including the two instances Hegel refers to as 'classes'. Colebrooke reserves 'classes' for the four factors for the intellect and sensation, introduced in our following paragraph, whereas Hegel refers to them as 'orders'.

44. Colebrooke says (p. 33): '... an intellectual creation... consisting of the affections of intellect, its sentiments or faculties, which are enumerated in four classes, as obstructing, disabling, contenting, or perfecting the understanding...'.

45. Again, the remarks in this paragraph, and in the two short paragraphs that follow it, are taken from Colebrooke, pp. 33–4, although the account does not tally well with the details of Colebrooke's version of the subdivisions and numbers.

torture, and penances. The third satisfaction concerns time, and involves the view that liberation follows in the course of time, without study. The fourth satisfaction concerns the view of fortune; it presupposes that liberation depends upon fate. The outer mode of satisfaction is related to abstinence from pleasure, or from giving in to sensuality and doing so out of earthly motives, when the sensuous element is moderated, as, for instance, by a distaste for | the restlessness of acquisitive behavior, the fear of work, or 385
the fear of the ill effects of pleasure.[46]

The fourth is the perfecting of intelligence. This again is of several kinds, in part very convenient ones, including the direct psychological method for perfecting the mind, for instance by argumentation, oral instruction, friendly conversation, and attentiveness, methods one can readily find in our own applied logic. These, then, are the representations of the two kinds of creation.[47]

There are a few more things to note about the main point of the system. Indian systems occupy themselves in particular with discussion of the three qualities or elements of the absolute idea, which are called *gunas* and are presented as modifications of nature, sometimes as substance, sometimes as mythological personifications.[48] It is most noteworthy that, for the observational consciousness of the Indians, what is true, what is in and for itself, comprises three attributes, and that the absolute idea has its consummation only in three elements. This triad, this consciousness, is an important consciousness that we find again in Plato and elsewhere in very diverse forms.[49]

This consciousness was induced by a merely sensible observation, and then it more or less disappeared in the region of thoughtful consideration, with the result that this threefold determination was only preserved in

46. Here Hegel passes over what Colebrooke terms the five external forms of satisfaction. His highlighting of the fourth form of inner satisfaction finds no support in Colebrooke. Hegel's contention that 'authentic satisfaction belongs to the fourth class' is not precisely formulated. Probably it is to be understood not as pointing to the fourth form of inner satisfaction, but as anticipating the opening sentence of the next paragraph of our text ('The fourth is the perfecting of intelligence'), although Colebrooke does not say that this yields 'authentic satisfaction'. The second through fourth forms that Hegel mentions (those involving ascetic practices, time, and fate) do come from Colebrooke, p. 34.

47. See Colebrooke, pp. 34–5. Hegel criticizes 'applied logic' in the *Science of Logic*, p. 52; see *GW* xi. 23. There he has in mind J. G. C. Kiesewetter, *Logic zum Gebrauch für Schulen* (Berlin, 1797), pp. 92–156. See also Christian Wolff, *Vernünftige Gedancken von den Kräften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihrem richtigen Gebrauche in Erkenntnis der Wahrheit* (Halle, 1713); repr. ed. Hans Werner Arndt (Hildesheim, 1965).

48. See Colebrook, p. 35.

49. On the triad in Plato, see Vol. II, pp. 209–10 and 213, as well as Hegel's remarks there on Pythagoras and on the Neoplatonists, pp. 42 and 341–2.

religion, but as something 'over there', as something positive. The understanding then came along afterward and declared it to be absurd; Kant just drew attention to the threefold determination in a formal way.[50] Everything of an essential nature in heaven and [on] earth, the totality of the concept of everything, considered in its substance, finds its resolution [*wird absolviert*] only through the threefold determination, and the concern of recent times is to bring it to consciousness once again.

This consciousness was indeed present among the Indians. They define these three qualities more precisely in the following way.[51] The [Sāmkhya] system says that the first and highest quality is goodness, or *sattva*, which
386 is | uplifting and illuminating, and is bound up with joy, happiness, and virtue. It is predominant in fire, and emerges where flames ascend. When it predominates in human beings, as it does in the eight higher orders, it is the cause of virtue. It is what is thoroughly affirmative in every respect, the universal in abstract form.

The second quality (*rajas* or *tejas*) is impulse, inclination, passion, activity that is of itself blind, the unclean, the noxious ('foulness'). This principle is active, impulsive, changeable, linked with trouble and misfortune, predominant in air. In living beings it is the cause of evil.

The third quality is darkness, *tamas*. It is linked with grief, torpor, decay, and deception. It is predominant in earth and water, insofar as these have a downward tendency. In living things it is the cause of folly.

The first quality is thus unity with self, and the second is activity on its own account, differentiating or manifesting, the principle of difference. The third, however, is then sheer negation, the negative. In the concreteness of mythology this third quality is represented as Shiva or Mahâdeva (Maheshvara), the god of destruction, of change, also of bringing forth.[52] The important distinction [from our point of view] is that the third principle is not the return into the first, nor the unity of the first two, as is the case with the concept, the idea, or spirit. What is affirmative [for us] is the mediation of itself with itself, through sublation of the negative. These three qualities are represented as the essence of nature. The Sāmkhya philosophy

50. See Vol. III, pp. 175–7, on Kant's employment of it in his triads of categories.

51. The account of the three qualities or *gunas*, in this and the next two paragraphs, is from Colebrooke, p. 35. The English word 'foulness' in the next paragraph appears in parentheses in our German text; see also n. 36, p. 117 above. Colebrooke says the third quality is the cause of 'stolidity' (not 'folly') in living things, and that is a more accurate depiction of Sāmkhya teaching.

52. This comparison of the three principles with mythology is not found in Colebrooke.

says: 'We speak of them as we do of the trees in a forest.'[53] This, however, is a faulty comparison because a forest is only something abstractly universal, and the individuals ([in this case,] the trees) are independent things.

These qualities are found in the Vedas too, in religious representations, where they are spoken of as successive modifications. At first all was a darkness that then | received the command to transform itself, whereupon 387
it took on the shape and color of passion, of impulse, of efficacy, which is, however, a degradation, and only at the command of Brahmā did it assume the form of goodness.

Intelligence comprises eight kinds of effects or properties, four of which pertain to goodness: (1) virtue; (2) science, information, and the like; (3) passionlessness, which can also be outward, insofar as it derives from an external motive (for instance, from aversion to putting oneself to any trouble), or from a mental impetus (for instance, one growing from the conviction that nature is merely a dream, merely illusion); (4) power. The last is eightfold, and eight extraordinary properties of power are indicated: (1) the ability to contract oneself into a quite small shape able to penetrate every thing; (2) the capacity to expand oneself to become a gigantic body; (3) the ability to assume such a lightness that one can mount up to the sun, on a sunbeam; (4) the possession of an unlimited range of action with one's bodily organs, such as touching the moon with one's fingertips; (5) an irresistible will, as in, for instance, sinking down into the earth as one does into water; (6) lordship over everything animate and inanimate; (7) the power to alter the course of nature; (8) the ability to bring to pass whatever one wishes.

Sāmkhya ascribes this power to human beings. When, by cultivation of their thinking, human beings elevate themselves to an independence of inner being, they have this power. This viewpoint is in fact characteristic of all the systems and religious representations, not only of Sāmkhya. Narratives and beliefs attribute power of this kind to many holy persons and Brahmans, who have acquired it by austerity and penance, by the sort of thing we call 'magical practices'.[54] The Indians put no stock in the evidence of the senses, the laws of nature, and experience. What we call 'sense perception' is not as such a feature in Indian thought. Sensible intuition parodies itself in the images of fantasy; | whatever fantasy creates counts for them as 388

53. This example, and the statements in the next paragraph about religious representations in the Vedas, are in Colebrooke, p. 35.

54. The preceding accounts of the properties of intelligence and of power, and of how widespread these views are in Indian thought, come directly from Colebrooke, p. 36.

truth and actuality. They cite a number of exercises by which such power is obtained. For example, by deep meditation, or by continually murmuring 'Om', the mystical name of God, a person attains inward bliss, the power of knowing all things past as well as future, the strength of the elephant, the courage of the lion, the swiftness of the wind, the facility of the eagle, so as to swim in water, fly up to the sun, behold all worlds in a single glance, and possess all of the above-mentioned eight properties; in short, one becomes capable of all things.[55] This is a universally held view.

Colebrooke mentions in greater detail the theistic and atheistic divisions of Sāmkhya. There is disagreement as to whether or not to believe in a God who rules the world by volition. In the atheistic system they deny the existence of Ishvara, a sovereign of the world through the medium of his will. They argue against this belief. He is not evident in sense perception, and thinking affords no proof for the belief. They have creation and the like too, although they say: 'We have reasons for arriving at such a creation. The existence of the effects, however, depends on consciousness, on the soul—not on Ishvara but on intelligence, on the individual soul, which activates consciousness.'[56]

So, the first point in Indian philosophy was the form of cognitive knowledge, the second is its object, and the third is the more specific method by which the principles are known. I will make a few more remarks on this topic that may be of interest.

We have already referred to the method of knowing. There is observation or perception, then inference or reasoning, and finally, a truth known immediately without perception or reasoning, namely, immediate revelation. The
389 principal moment here is knowledge | of reasoning, of connection in inference. The relationship of cause and effect is the principal category in inference, and I will indicate how they grasp this relationship. Intelligence or understanding, and all the other principles, are effects. From them we infer their cause, which is analogous to the effect in some respects, divergent from it in others.

The principal thesis here is that the effects already exist prior to the operation of the cause. What does not exist can in no way be brought forth.

55. These exercises, and the powers that derive from them, come from Colebrooke's account of Patanjali's *Yoga-śastra* (p. 36).

56. Colebrooke (p. 37) discusses this distinction in terms of the schools of Patanjali (theistic) and Kapila (atheistic). He says that Kapila regards 'a being issuing from nature, who is intelligence absolute', as the source of all individual intelligences (souls), hence that from which everything derives.

One consequence of this thesis is the eternity of the world. 'Ex nihilo nihil fit' is a proposition linked to the eternity of the world. This proposition contradicts the world's creation out of nothing in our own religious form. The image in this case is that of the effect already being in the cause: oil in the sesame seed before it is pressed out, rice in the hull before the threshing, and milk in the cow's udder before the milking. The content or essence of cause and effect is one and the same. A piece of a garment is not essentially different from the thread of which it is woven, not so different as an ox is from a horse.[57] This is how the Indians grasp this relationship. So, in saying 'Ex nihilo nihil fit', one must at the same time say that therefore God does not create the world 'out of nothing', but instead 'out of himself'. It is his eternal idea that God lets come forth.

The distinction between cause and effect is therefore only a distinction of form, although identity of cause and effect is manifest to us. The understanding segregates them from one another, not reason. Rain is the cause of wetness. The wetness is water, which is the same water that we call 'rain'. The content is the same. In mechanics we speak of 'different motions', although the motion has the same velocity before the impact and after it. | Our ordinary consciousness does not yet have this insight. Inference 390
proceeds from effect to cause.

The Indians also then draw inferences to universal causes, for instance, the fact that things, different things, are all finite, and that finite things therefore presuppose a universal cause. Even intelligence is the effect of a cause, and this cause is soul, so far as soul is creative in its identity with nature. [Soul] is identical with nature, and thus nature or, perhaps better still, soul in its identity with nature, is the cause of those things. The effects therefore proceed from the cause and are not independent, but instead return again into the universal cause. The creation of the three worlds comes to the fore, although posited with it at the same time is universal destruction, the reversion to the elements, like a tortoise that extends its legs and draws them in again, all in reverse order from how they emerged.[58]

First there is nature, from which everything proceeds. We noted that three qualities [are] attributed to nature: goodness, passion, and darkness. The

57. Colebrooke, who provides a fuller account (pp. 38–9) than does Hegel, is the source for these remarks about inference, about effects existing prior to the operation of causes, and the examples of effects already being in their causes. Only the discussion of 'Ex nihilo nihil fit' ('nothing comes from nothing') is Hegel's expansion upon Colebrooke's remarks at this point, and it expresses his own view of creation.

58. Colebrooke (p. 39) is the source for this discussion of the interdependence of cause and effect, culminating at the cosmic level with the cycle of creation and return to the source.

authentic relationship among these determinations would be very interesting, but it is grasped only very superficially. [As a second point,] nature is said to operate by the mixing of these three qualities. Each thing has all three within it, universally, like three streams that flow into one river, together making up one stream.[59] So all we have here is the category of mixture, of modification.

The third point is nature's relationship to spirit. They say that nature has these three qualities in its own right, whereas they are in the other
391 things only as effect. Although nature | as such lacks soul (because soul is, on its own account, no object of enjoyment, and is neither generative nor generated), nature nonetheless performs the office of preparing the soul for its liberation. Just as milk, which lacks sensation, nourishes the calf, so nature serves the soul. The Indians compare nature to a bayadere who exhibits herself to the soul, as in a theatrical performance. She is rebuked and reviled for her shamelessness in offering herself to the rude gaze of the spectators. Yet she does so until she has been adequately seen, until her delight in letting herself be seen has passed. She breaks off the performance when she has let herself be seen fully. She takes her leave because the show is over. The spectators depart because they have beheld her, and she is of no further use for the world. This is how it is with nature and the soul. Nature displays herself to the soul and then takes her leave; the soul likewise takes its leave.[60]

So nature is only the means by which the soul is liberated. What is learned amounts to this: that I am not, nor is something mine, nor do I exist. Selfhood [*Ichheit*] is distinct from the soul, from subjectivity as such. So selfhood or self-consciousness ultimately ought to disappear. All that is found in consciousness, in the understanding, is reflected by the soul, although as an image that does not sully the crystal of the soul nor does it even belong to it. Possessing this self-knowledge, though without selfhood, the soul considers nature, but nature free from all other form and operation or characteristic of the understanding. This is the delivered or liberated

59. This discussion, including the terms 'mixture' and 'modification', and the image of the three streams, is all in Colebrooke, p. 39.

60. See Colebrooke, pp. 41–2. Colebrooke recounts these features of nature and of the soul, as well as the comparison with milk ('an unintelligent substance'). In Hegel's comparison of nature to a bayadere (temple dancer), his initial statements appear to be in Colebrooke's own words. But Colebrooke's counterpart to our text's 'Yet she does so . . . ' is directly about nature and the soul again; whereas Hegel continues the simile with the dancer and the spectators. Colebrooke's final sentence concludes differently from our text: 'There is no further use for the world; yet the connexion of soul and nature still subsists.' Hegel's conclusion to this paragraph anticipates the soul's complete liberation.

knowing of the content, and this content itself is spiritualized in this way—a knowing without selfhood, without consciousness. When the soul attains this knowing it does indeed still remain clothed with the body, still under the force of impulse, but only in the way the potter's wheel continues to turn even though the pot is already finished. The soul no longer has | to do with 392
the body; their relationship is superfluous. But when the separation of this instructed soul from its body occurs, and for the soul nature is no more, then the complete, infinite liberation is accomplished. This is the presentation of the principal moments of the Sāmkhya system.[61]

2. The Philosophies of Gotama (Nyāya) and Kanāda (Vaiśesika), Which Belong Together

The philosophy of Gotama is called Nyāya, and is a philosophy of reasoning. That of Kanāda is called Vaiśesika, and is more a philosophy of the particular. The former, the Nyāya of Gotama, is an especially elaborate dialectic, whereas the latter occupies itself more with particular objects, with principles. Colebrooke says that no branch of the sciences has attracted the attention of Indian thinkers more than has Nyāya, with the result that countless texts are related to it.[62]

The order in which the materials are then dealt with is based on a passage of the Veda, in which these three stages of investigation are set out: (1) enunciation, the designation of the name, which is something revealed; (2) definition, the indication of a particular determinacy that constitutes the essential character of a thing; (3) investigation, consisting of inquiry as to the correctness of the definition. Philosophical treatment takes place in accordance with this method. The name [is] stated, the definition given, and the investigation [proceeds by] comparing the definition with the representation conveyed by the name. Next come the topics to be treated, the first of which is the proof or the evidence, thus the formal aspect, and the second is that which is to be proved.[63]

These are the two main points. Several others follow them, but they are only accessory to the confirmation of truth. The Nyāya philosophy

61. The majority of this paragraph is a very close paraphrase from Colebrooke, pp. 42–3.

62. Colebrooke says (p. 92) that Nyāya 'is chiefly occupied with the metaphysics of logic', and Vaiśesika with 'physics: that is, with "particulars" or sensible objects'. See also p. 94, for his statement about the countless Nyāya texts ('an infinity of volumes').

63. See Colebrooke, p. 94, for these stages.

says that bliss, final perfection, liberation from finite ills,[64] is the effect of knowledge of its principles, that is to say, of truth. It says that ultimate
393 truth is conviction of the eternal existence of the soul as | separable from the body, as spirit for itself alone. So the soul is what ought to be known and proved.

The specifics remain to be given. The first important point is that there are four kinds of proof, or evidence: (1) perception; (2) syllogism or inference, which is of three kinds, (a) consequence (from cause to effect), (b) antecedence (from what follows to the cause), (c) by analogy; (3) comparison; (4) assurance or affirmation, which includes the tradition of the concepts, and revelation. The various kinds of proof are presented very fully in the ancient treatise ascribed to Gotama, and by countless commentators.[65]

The second point is the object that is to be proven, that is supposed to be evident. Here Gotama lists twelve objects. The main one, however, is the soul, which is the seat of sensation and of scientific knowledge, and which is distinct from the body and from the senses. They [namely, sensation and scientific knowledge] prove the existence of the soul. Knowledge, aversion, will, and other characteristics of this sort, are made the foundation. The soul has fourteen qualities: (1) number, (2) magnitude, (3) particularity, (4) connection, (5) understanding and (6) intelligence, (7) pleasure, (8) pain, (9) desire, (10) aversion, (11) volition, (12) merit, (13) fault, and (14) the capacity for imagination.[66] As we see, this list is wholly without order, for these are just the very beginnings of reflection. There is no coherence to be discerned in these characteristics, nor any totality either. What is essential is only known cognitively.

The second object of knowledge is the body, and the third the organs of sensation, with five external organs being named. They say that the eyeball is not the organ of vision, nor the ear the organ of hearing. Instead, the organ of vision is a ray of light that goes out from the pupil toward the

64. The translation renders the same German adjective (*endlich*) first as 'final', then as 'finite'; it can have either meaning. This is consistent with Colebrooke, once again Hegel's source (p. 95), who says 'beatitude, or ... final excellence, and ... deliverance from evil ...'.

65. See Colebrooke (pp. 95–9) for the four kinds of proof, as well as for statements about the soul, and about the bodily organs and sensation, that occur in the next two paragraphs of our text. Colebrooke does not say, however, that 'knowledge, aversion ...' are basic characteristics. He says these are not 'universal attributes', but are 'characteristic qualities' that provide evidence for the existence of soul.

66. Colebrook does not supply an enumeration of fourteen qualities of soul in this form. (Our text has original numbers for the first three only, the remaining eleven being numbered by the editors.)

seen object; so the ray is the organ. In the same way, the ether in the cavity of the ear communicates | with the object heard, through the medium of 394
the ether in the intervening space; this ether is the organ of hearing. Usually the light ray is invisible, like a flare in the sunshine, although in certain circumstances it lights up like a cat's eyes at night; then the organ itself is luminous. Water or saliva is the organ of taste. A similar account of vision is found in Plato's *Timaeus*.[67] There are also interesting conclusions about vision in Goethe's *Morphologie*, in an essay by Privy Councillor Schultz about the phosphorous of the eye, which states that a material principle is an illuminating element.[68] There are a number of instances of people seeing at night, in such a way that their eyes illuminate the object, but the phenomenon calls for special circumstances.

The third object of knowledge is—in the third place—the organ of sensation. The fourth object of proof consists of the objects of the senses: smell, taste, and so forth.

Interpolated at this point are the principles of Kanāda, in which the objects are dealt with more fully. The first of them is substance, and nine substances are enumerated: earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, soul, understanding. These are the material substances, the basic elements of which are the atoms. Kanāda's philosophy is atomistic. Much is then added about the way the atoms are bound together, and in this context too are found the motes in sunbeams.[69]

The second of Kanāda's principles is quality, of which there are twenty-four [kinds]: color, taste, smell, feeling, number, magnitude, individuality, combination, separation, priority, posterity, heaviness, fluidity, viscosity, sound, intelligence, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, volition, virtue

67. *Timaeus* 45b–d; cf. 67e–68b. See *Timaeus, Critias, Cleitophon, Menexenus, Epistles*, trans. R. G. Bury (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1929), pp. 100–3, 174–7.

68. A treatise by C. F. L. Schultz, 'Ueber physiologe Gesichts- und Farbenerscheinungen', was published in the *Journal für Chemie und Physik*, ed. J. S. C. Schweigger, vol. xvi (Nuremberg, 1816), pp. 121–57. Written in the spirit of Goethe's theory of colors, this treatise deals with vision, but not with 'the phosphorous of the eye'. Instead it concerns, among other issues, the connection between the color of an object and its apparent size. It does not deal with 'a material principle' as an 'illuminating element'. It was not included in Goethe's *Morphologie*, although Goethe did help arrange for its publication in the journal and wrote a postscript to it. He did refer to the treatise in his works on color theory, and in his journals; see Goethe's *Werke* (WA II/5, 2, pp. 388–9; II/5, 1, pp. 253, 405; III/8, p. 241.)

69. See Colebrooke, pp. 100–5. 'The mote, which is seen in a sun-beam, is the smallest perceptible quantity.... The atom then is reckoned to be the sixth part of a mote visible in a sun-beam' (pp. 104–5). Hegel's remark at the end of this paragraph should probably be understood to mean that motes in sunbeams are likewise mentioned in Greek Atomism; see Aristotle, *On the Soul* 404a1–4 (Barnes, i. 644).

and vice, and the twenty-fourth, which embraces three features—velocity,
395 elasticity, and motion.[70] |

The third principle is action, the fourth is association, the fifth is distinction, the sixth is combination, and the seventh, according to some, is negation. This is the type of philosophy we see among the Indians.[71]

In the philosophy of Gotama two points are highlighted: evidence, and what it is of interest to know. The third topic is doubt. Another category, a fourth, is genuine proof or formal reasoning, which is none other than the formal syllogism. Five propositions are given [in his sample syllogism that] The hill is on fire because it gives off smoke, and what gives off smoke presupposes fire. (1) The hill is on fire; (2) because it gives off smoke; (3) what gives off smoke is on fire; (4) but the hill gives off smoke; (5) therefore it is on fire.[72] This is propounded just as our syllogisms are, but put forward in such a way that the point at issue is posited beforehand. We, in contrast, would begin with the universal element and proceed from there. It is the customary form. We can be content with these specific details from Indian philosophy, although, before we pass over to the Greek world, let us once more summarize briefly the main content of the Indian world.

3. Conclusion: Summary of Indian Philosophy and Comparison with European Philosophy

In Indian philosophy, then, we have seen that thinking, the soul's inward concentration, its elevation to universality, thinking on its own account, is self-constituted, and that this thinking is the ultimate goal and the main thing. This abstraction, and the soul's coming to be for itself in the most abstract fashion, is the goal. So, inasmuch as spirit is for itself in this way, albeit for itself wholly abstractly, we can call this 'intellectual substantiality', although in a different sense of 'substantial' than when we use that term for
396 the philosophy that says that matter | is one. The main goal here is not, however, a unity of spirit with nature, nor is it matter; instead we have seen the direct opposite to be the case. Spirit raises itself up to itself and, to be

70. See Colebrooke, pp. 105–6. Motion, the final element in this paragraph, is 'imagination' in Colebrooke. In Indian philosophy it is actually an attribute whereby the soul remembers and recognizes things it has experienced previously.

71. See Colebrooke, pp. 111–12.

72. See Colebrooke, pp. 114, 116. Here Colebrooke resumes discussion of Gotama, which he broke off where n. 68 appears in our text. Colebrooke numbers the genuine proof as 'seven', not 'four' as in our text. For his own presentation of Indian philosophy, Hegel does not take into account any further material from this article, or the next three of Colebrooke's articles on the topic.

sure, contemplates nature, but only as the means for the liberation of spirit, as the exercise of thinking that has for its goal spirit's being for its own self.

This intellectual substantiality is the goal. In philosophy, however, it is on the whole the essential foundation, the starting point; it is the idealism in which thinking is for itself, in which thinking is the foundation of truth. This is a great discovery on the part of the Orient as such. So the Oriental perspective consists essentially in this universal intuition, which is an *intuition* because this perspective is, in its abstraction, essentially self-identical and inwardly immobile. Arriving at this ground is therefore something essential to the philosophy. European reflection or understanding is to be inundated in this substantiality, in which the I as such disappears. In European philosophy there is the opposite perspective, namely, reflective subjectivity. This subjectivity in its contingency is what counts in European philosophy, where the I ranks so highly, the fact that *I* believe something, will it, know or intend it, [where the issue] concerns the reasons and the intention that I have in doing so. In this European subjectivity an infinite worth is ascribed to *me*.

Intellectual substantiality is the extreme position here, for in it all subjectivity of the I perishes. This subjectivity is the subjective vanity for which everything objective has become empty, in which everything objective is true only in accord with my reflection, is objective only according to my caprice. | There is then no objective truth or obligation, no right in and for 397
itself but only right within me, so that subjective vanity is all that remains standing. This subjective vanity is mobile, with its sudden fancies, reasons, and reflection, although they just hinge on the subjectivity of the single individual. The concern is to arrive at intellectual substantiality in order to inundate that subjective vanity in it, in order for that vanity, together with all its cleverness and reflection, to perish. That is the good thing about this standpoint.

The second point, however, is its defect, which consists in representing intellectual substantiality simply as an endpoint or goal for the subject, simply as a subjective condition that ought to be brought about in the interest of the subject. So, here objectivity as such is lacking. Inasmuch as this intellectual substantiality is what is inherently most objective, it is still only something abstractly objective and it lacks objective form, the essential form of objectivity. Precisely the intellectual substantiality that remains in abstraction in this way has, for its existence, only the subjective soul. For this reason it is escape, emptiness, absence of attributes, and is disorganized, indefinite; everything is supposed to perish in substance. Just as everything perishes in vanity, where only the subjective power of

negating remains and all else perishes, so too everything must perish in this substantial intellectuality; but this vain subjectivity contains no form within itself.

Likewise, this abstract condition of intellectual substantiality contains nothing specific, is empty. Therefore, within itself, it lacks formative objec-
398 tivity. | What is needed now is the emergence of this determination, this ground, the infinite form, which is called thinking, self-determining objectivity. This thinking is then 'my own'; my soul thinks, and the thinking is 'I', is then subjective too, for *I* must be present in it. But this thinking is also, in the second place, what is universal; in it is the universality encompassed by intellectual substantiality.

In the third place, however, thinking is formative activity, the defining principle. By our calling that initial unity 'intellectual substantiality', what we now have is thinking. So we have a second mode of objectivity, namely, infinite form within itself. Thinking is the authentic ground that ought to be reached, that unfolds itself and determines itself, and in this way provides a place for the particular content, giving it scope within itself and containing it within itself. In Oriental intuition the particular just whirls about; for the Indians it is specifically to be disregarded. On the contrary, because thinking is formative, the particular too has its place in the soil of thinking. Thinking can root itself inwardly, can take hold, and this is the solid European understanding; those Oriental views promote its undoing, whereas in the soil of thinking it [the understanding] is kept fluid and should not come to be on its own. So that particular element is contained within thinking, but only as a moment of the whole system and not as subsistent on its own. The fact that thinking becomes the ground that unfolds itself is the point of interest.

In Indian philosophy we have found specific content dealt with too: intelligence, consciousness, and so forth. This specific content is considered as well, although, to the extent that is done, this consideration of the
399 particular is quite arid, devoid of thought, | unsystematic, because the treatment stands 'over here', outside the unity, whereas the substantial element stands 'over there', and 'this side' is then arid and meager. Then the particular has only the stilted form of argumentation, of formal inference, as it also has in the Scholastics. In the soil of thinking, however, the particular can gain its rightful place; it can be viewed and comprehended as an element of the entire organization of things. So, for instance, [the Indians say that] nature is only a vehicle for the soul, an occasion for it to concentrate itself inwardly, to determine itself. This expresses the idea—but it [the particular] is only said to be a condition, not something

considered in and for itself. So the content has not become object for its own sake. Outwardly objective things, such as water and so forth, likewise have not been considered or conceived within the idea. Here we have therefore what is most admirable in Oriental philosophy, and what is deficient in it.

The truly objective ground of thinking is rooted in the actual freedom of the subject, in the fact that what is universal or substantial itself ought to have objectivity. Thinking is none other than this universal element as such; *I* am the ground of the substantial and, at the same time, I am self-thinking; thus what is universal has, at the same time, existence too. Thinking is what is universal, and it exists as *I*, as free subject; thus the universal has immediate existence; it is not merely an endpoint or state into which one is to pass over; instead it has immediate existence. Absoluteness is present here and now [*gegenwärtig*]. In grasping myself as thinking and as universal, I grasp myself as free, and thereby the universal itself has presence [*Gegenwart*].

Now this latter quality is what we encounter in the Greek world, and its elaboration is the topic for our further consideration. At first the universal comes on the scene as wholly abstract, | and it is thus set over 400
against the concrete world. But the universal holds good as the common ground of both, the concrete world and what has being in itself [*das Ansichseiende*]. It is not something otherworldly; instead its quality of presence [*das Gegenwärtige*] means that it is situated in the in-itself or, in other words, that the in-itself or the universal is the truth of objects [*Gegenständige*].

INTRODUCTIONS TO THE OTHER LECTURE SERIES

I. EXPLANATION OF EDITORIAL PRACTICES

The German edition of these lectures includes all the available materials from the introductions to the other series in addition to the lectures of 1825–6. These materials comprise the transcripts from 1819, 1820–1, 1823–4, 1827–8, 1829–30, and 1831, as well as manuscripts from 1820 and 1823. The German edition included them because, over the course of the successive series, Hegel varied the introduction more than he did the rest of these lectures. Despite the variations there is nevertheless substantial repetition or close similarity of many passages from these separate introductions. In this English edition we have chosen to present some of these materials in an abridged form, by a combination of translated passages and editorial summary of repetitive parts that are not translated. The 1819 transcript is included in its entirety, as the German edition presents it, because it is the earliest introduction for which materials of any extent survive. The German edition omits from the 1819 text portions on Oriental philosophy and on the history-of-philosophy literature, because these reappear in fuller form in the 1825–6 lectures. The 1819 introduction in our edition has the same editorial format for indication of page breaks as that of the 1825–6 materials. It furnishes a baseline for the identification of interesting variations in the other introductions. We also translate in full, with the same editorial format, the 1829–30 introduction, which is of special interest as the last version of the introduction that Hegel was able to complete prior to his death.

Excerpts represent the other four introductions rather than full translations. The editorial statements that introduce these excerpts, or that are interspersed within the translated text to discuss omitted parts, are in **bold** type so they will not be confused with Hegel's own words. The portions of the translated text itself are in regular type. Two practices facilitate comparison of this material with the German edition. Where the German page breaks occur within the introductions translated only in part, they are given in square brackets placed within the text itself, unlike the system locating page break numbers in the margins throughout the rest of the volume. Editorial commentary in **bold** that discusses an expanse of omitted text indicates the pages affected. The footnotes to these other introductions indicate clearly, by use of quotation marks, specific statements attributable to Hegel himself, in distinction from our editorial remarks.

II. THE INTRODUCTIONS

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A. THE 1819 LECTURES

Introduction

The history of philosophy represents for us the successive struggles undertaken by the human spirit in gaining the wealth of rational knowledge that we now possess. What we are in historical terms we have as a heritage from all the past endeavors of the human race. This hallowed tradition is what passes scientific knowledge down to us. It is a mighty river that grows ever mightier and greater the more distant it becomes from its source. It never stands still. A single nation can become static, can come to a halt as the Chinese have done, but the world spirit does not sink into this apathetic repose. Its life is action directed to an object that it transforms. What each generation brought forth another generation finds as its material; but this later generation is spiritual, assimilates that material and, in doing so, enriches it. What we are is to this extent only something historical, something passed down. The history of philosophy has to present our coming-to-be, namely, the coming-to-be of our scientific knowledge. We see from this history that in it we are not dealing with knowledge of what is bygone. The content is a scientific content, and that is nothing transitory. What was brought forth is true, and what is true is eternal. The embodiment of this labor, its temporal life, has passed away, but not so its achievement, the fact that it has nurtured what is inherently rational, that it has raised that rationality up from the depth of spirit and into consciousness. So this achievement is not enshrined in the temple of Mnemosyne as something no longer alive, as an image of what once was. Instead it is as vital as is our
110 own spirit. We are dealing here with what is living. |

1. The Concept, Purpose, and Significance of Scientific Knowledge

What confronts us directly at this point is the insipid and superficial view that the history of philosophy recounts for us a multitude of random philosophical opinions. Some even regard the history of philosophy as a gallery of intellectual errors that people arrived at by chance. Seen from this standpoint, that history amounts to mere lifeless erudition, to useless dead things. To insist that the many philosophical opinions be useful is to be confronted in turn with the great diversity of their uses. One is thrown into confusion when faced with the implicit requirement of adopting one philosophical system for oneself. So many great minds are seen to have

gone astray (for they are contradicted), and so one says: 'How am I (*ego homuncio*—one little person[1]) to find a system of lasting value?' This way of looking at things is one of the commonest objections made to the study of philosophy. Some suppose it would be a good thing if there were a single philosophy, but because there are many different systems they have no way of deciding to which one they should turn. One philosophy must be the true one. Yet each calls itself true, and all have different criteria for truth. Everyday understanding offers no clarification. Its reputedly impartial, prosaic attitude is entirely baseless, is sobriety without desire, as is everything lifeless. It shows that the matter is not taken seriously. It is a subterfuge, just as when the physician prescribes fruit for a patient who then refuses cherries, pears, and the like, declaring that they are not 'fruit'. We must renounce superficial expressions of this kind when we speak in the interest of knowledge. There are no philosophical opinions as such. An opinion [*Meinung*] is a personally satisfying, subjective view that is simply mine [*mein*], and that is how it gets its name. Philosophy is objective cognition, knowledge of truth, not something subjective; it is directly antithetical to opinion, as Plato's φιλοσοφία is antithetical to δόξα.[2] Truth is assuredly only one, and philosophy is in fact | diverse, from which it seems to follow 111
that only one philosophy can be the correct one. Must the others then be erroneous? At any rate all this may be very enlightening to everyday understanding.

The actual study of philosophical systems exhibits the same issue in a different sense than that of the antithesis of truth and error. Truth is assuredly only one, but it is not a simple, abstract proposition or thought. Reason and truth are utterly, internally concrete. The understanding deals in sheerly abstract propositions, and so is antithetical to reason. The concreteness of reason consists in its being a totality, organic, a series of stages, internally a system. The organic body is living only by virtue of its being internally concrete. So then, philosophy is the development of this concreteness, this living progression. The more this developing flourishes, the more complete is the philosophy. Its development does not proceed in external fashion but instead stays within its universal ground; in its diversity philosophy is

1. The phrase *ego homuncio* is an allusion to Terence, *Eunuchus* 3.5.42. It also appears in a marginal note to Hegel's manuscript of 1821 for the philosophy-of-religion lectures. See *Philosophy of Religion*, iii. 134, n. 188. The speaker in Terence, after describing deeds of Jupiter, then says: 'Why should I, little man, not do the same?' Hegel's early essay, 'The Positivity of the Christian Religion', ascribes this passage to Plautus; see *Frühe Schriften*, in *GW* i. 379; see also *Hegel: Early Theological Writings*, trans. T. M. Knox (Chicago, 1948), p. 157.

2. For this distinction in Plato, see Vol. II, p. 188 with n. 35.

something inclusive, intensifying, self-contained. Development brings forth distinctions within the idea, and through them the idea becomes determinate; the further development of the idea is therefore a greater determinacy.

The beginning of all development is something simple, that which is most abstract, most universal. Everything living is an instance of this. The seed is the plant in its simplicity. The plant subdivides itself above and below, sprouts leaves and blossoms, and so the emergence of multiplicity takes place. But nothing emerges that is not completely determined by the seed; the whole remains present to itself. It is the same with animal species. The simplest living thing is a spot of slime with hardly any distinct parts or organs.

This, then, is the historical path of philosophy as such. Philosophy presents what is rational, setting out from what is simple, developing but not departing from its initial concept. So the ensuing philosophy always bears within it the preceding one. The history of philosophy becomes scientific knowledge and not a sheer aggregation of information only when, as indicated, this history is grasped in a concept. In order to comprehend the history of philosophy one must in any event bring in this concept, lest
112 | only what is external and contingent be found in it. Hence it should not be surprising that there are so many shallow histories of philosophy. Lacking this philosophical spirit, the historians could not comprehend as something rational what the thinkers have produced.

This leads to more specific points. The first concerns why there is a history of philosophy and what philosophy's place is in history, in what is external. Two [kinds of] development are evident in philosophy. One is philosophy in the form of pure thinking, indeed in time though not in the externality of history but in the internal consciousness of single individuals as such. In the other development a condition of an entire people is presented as a moment of philosophy. Its necessary form is that thinking must occur in time. A higher level is evident in another people or in another individual, perhaps centuries later. The fact that thinking as such emerges in time, in external circumstances, is the basis of this thesis. It entails, first of all, that spirit's nature as such is to be only that of which it is itself conscious, and that its being consists in apprehending itself as object; spirit is not only *in* itself but is also essentially *for* itself. So freedom is not an immediate being, but a knowing of oneself. The life of universal spirit is like that of the individual. Natural things exist, but what they are is not something *for* them; they do not turn back into themselves. To the extent that spirit enters into existence, it makes itself objective, and only in doing so does it come to be *for* itself. Existence, separation, and externality come into

play inasmuch as spirit knows its own being and accordingly has its place in time. Although what it knows is something positive, spirit *comprehends* it and, in doing so, makes it into something ideal that is sublated as an existing being. With respect to time, what is abstract is something ideal, is nothing [existing in time]. Something that is not ideal does exist [in time].[3] Therefore, by its existing [in time] spirit distinguishes [itself] from itself. Its movement or externality resides in this externality [of self-distinction]. Inasmuch as thinking is something systematic, we have to consider it as a totality of stages. In that | the stages are ideal, they do not exist [in time]. 113
The concept of time is thereby removed from philosophy.

From this standpoint some have held the view that falling into time is to be ascribed to finite thinking alone, and that intuition of the whole [*Universum*] is free from this characteristic of temporality. They (the French and Schelling) have fixed this fall into time as a state occurring prior to history. For them the lightning bolt of self-consciousness is an intuition of the totality of the whole in its entire development. They represent the initial, original condition as a state of both ethical and intellectual innocence, one first obscured for us by reflection. In this initial state the world would have been something transparent for self-consciousness. So, this intuiting would be something timeless, instantaneous, unitary. In later history some sought to discover in ancient traditions and scriptures the fragmentary remainders of that ancient glory, by which humanity could endeavor to work its way up and out again from the fallen condition. They depict such a state as the consummate philosophy.[4]

As something timeless such a state would fall outside history, because history begins with temporal separation. However glorious it may seem, a portrayal of this sort is nonetheless baseless and only arises from misconceiving the true nature of spirit. What is called the fall, the descent from the original unity of spirit with nature, is none other than the very awakening

3. The freely translated sentences here express the distinction between a concrete existence in time and an abstract, non-temporal, ideal state of being that, strictly speaking, does not 'exist', a distinction clearly drawn as early as Plato.

4. Because Hegel mentions 'the French and Schelling' in discussing this image of an original state of perfect knowledge, we can surmise that he is alluding here to the views of Abbé Lamenais and Baron von Eckstein, as he also does in the *Philosophy of World History*; see the Nisbet edn. (Cambridge, 1975), p. 133 with n. 47; see also the note to *GW* xviii. 188 f. Schelling's theory concerning an original state of this sort appeared in his 1803 popular lectures, *Vorlesungen über die Methode des academischen Studiums*, in *Sämmtliche Werke*, v. 287; see *F. W. J. Schelling: On University Studies*, trans. E. S. Morgan (Athens, Ohio, 1966), p. 83. See also his 1815 essay, *Ueber die Gottheiten von Samothrace*, in *Sämmtliche Werke*, viii. 362 and 416 f.; see *Schelling's Treatise on 'The Deities of Samothrace': A Translation and An Interpretation*, by Robert F. Brown (Missoula, Mont., 1977), pp. 25, 39.

of consciousness itself. The truth in this representation is that a unity lies at the foundation of every inwardly substantial reality. But spirit in this unitary form does not yet have genuine subsistence. Cognition or knowing involves the moment of opposition, without which there is no consciousness, no spirit. That initial love is [only] one state with respect to spirit. Spirit's vocation is to go beyond this original state, to make itself an object, to overcome the estrangement and, in doing so, to come to be *for* itself. So this representation cannot be our starting point. Nature remains in its initial harmony, in other words, is innocent. Human beings must become culpable, that is, must step forth from the original unity, must reflect themselves inwardly; clinging to the state of separation is what is evil, is subjective
114 free will [*Willkür*]. |

Nevertheless it can strike us that things have gone rather slowly up to now with the development of philosophy, of spirit. This seems particularly the case when we review more carefully the concepts that have been brought to light over the course of the past century and come to be currently accepted. The situation is comparable to that of our wholly external knowledge, for instance of the American continent. The image of spirit's slow development we draw primarily from our own purposes, our own labor, and it does not apply to spirit. The world spirit is beyond time. Consummate spirit needs no practice run, and to it a thousand years are as one day.[5] Spirit is unconcerned that it engages in such a vast outlay of arising and perishing. The world spirit carries out its deeds on a large scale. Time, effort, and labor are characterizations taken from finite life and have no place in this sphere.

At this point we have to highlight two elements. The first is the concrete shape that the idea takes on in history. In general when I know something, when I bring it into consciousness, this content has but a perfectly simple, abstract existence in my inner thought alone. Representations that I do not call to mind have no such existence. A mode of the idea of concrete, universal spirit involves an existence of a different sort. History, in particular the history of philosophy, is the history of spirit, of the spirit of the world, of how it grasps itself. This is not subjective spirit but universal spirit. *Γνῶθι σεαυτόν* is not just a call to the single individual but is the absolute command to universal spirit, whereby spirit is grasped.[6] So, on the one hand spirit has its blossoming life in pure consciousness. On the other hand, when spirit gives existence to one of its characteristics this existence

5. The allusion is to Ps. 90: 4, which reads: 'For a thousand years in thy sight are but as yesterday when it is past, or as a watch in the night.' See also p. 180 below.

6. On the Greek motto, see Vol. II, p. 150 (where the Greek appears in the contracted form, without the epsilon), with n. 75.

is something wholly concrete. In the latter case spirit makes one stage of its consciousness into the totality of shapes, into complete actuality. Here belong the system of government, right, ethics, art, religion, the needs of a people, its wars, its deeds, and what befalls it. In philosophy this concrete shape has the simple form of thinking, whereas in history it has the concrete shape itself. In its determinate | idea, wherein it possesses its actuality, spirit 115
has to prepare and work through the entire range of its actual existence, and working through it is principally what takes place in the externality of time. Its elaboration is spirit's positive action, its making itself into its own object.

This very objectification of spirit, however, involves at the same time a further departure. Its life is at the same time the onset of its death, the negative beginning for a higher level. An individual accordingly starts out as a human being only implicitly, and is not yet for self. When one has brought into existence all that one is implicitly then one is finished and has achieved one's vocation; in other words, one's being-in-self has become being-for-self. This is the case when one's existence has come to correspond to what one ought to be. But then there is no more antithesis, no more activity, but a unity that is one's fossilization. In completing themselves human beings extinguish the fire of their activity. When [they] have reached this commensurability of concept and activity there is no antithesis, no activity. It is the same with the universal spirit as it is with the individual. When spirit has become wholly objective to itself, it then lacks the process of vitality. The consummation of its beginning is the dying of its existence. This is therefore the decisive moment in the life process of universal spirit. But precisely because living spirit is what does this, it does not remain in its death but instead withdraws back into itself from its consummation, stands above it, and so makes the transition to a higher level. Simple existence is thinking. In the history of philosophy the philosophical concept has this concrete shape. All aspects of spirit are presented in it.

A second element is the contingency in which what is also in the concept, as thought, presents itself in history. The sequence in the system of thought and that in history must be identical, but identical only in essence. The main stages must exist in both. The initial philosophical concepts are the most abstract; the [logical] progression yields the more concrete ones. It is the same in history. The most recent philosophy is always the result of all preceding philosophy. A principal distinction prominent here involves the apparent contingency in history. Each [event] appears as something contingent and independent vis-à-vis the others. External history | shows how 116
something arises from proximate causes. These causes themselves, however,

are in turn finite and contingent and, to the extent they are psychological, their explanation belongs to the superficial psychology that derives the products of spirit from outside of spirit. In that manner Homer's poetry has been attributed to the clear sky of Ionia, without any thought given to the fact that for millennia afterward this sky has not produced another Homer.[7] That philosophies are juxtaposed to one another contingently is because the necessity of their interconnection lies concealed, and operates, in what is inward, and only the higher spirit grasps this inner concept. The same applies to external nature, where everything is in the mode of contingency and only the concept seeks to know, in the necessity of its stages, what seems to be haphazard. So, in the history of philosophy what stands in essential connection with something else can surface far distant from it, with each unknown to the other. Only the concept exhibits their necessary connection. We can also see now and then quite sudden stoppages and apparent relapses in the progress of culture. Spirit seems to take great backward strides and only after centuries does it rescue itself from an age of barbarism, apparently having made a foolish detour. Those retrogressive eras indicate the dying out of stages with which spirit is done and beyond which it makes its way in preparing for higher configurations. Spirit is not idle. If the lofty shape has fallen into decline, then spirit labors from within. In eras of that kind spirit endeavors to preserve a people in whose original nature resides the ability to develop the higher principle. Such a people must have developed itself beforehand for this role if it is to attain the culture in which philosophy can emerge. To that end, however, it must have passed through earlier stages of culture. Only at its apex does such a people exhibit its relation to the apex of another people. Each people undergoes all the stages of development, though each only presents itself creatively in one of them. A people becomes dominant by embracing a definite principle of this sort. The Romans embraced Greek art, though not in a fresh way [but instead] in lifeless fashion; and we, the Germanic nations, have done likewise.

7. The allusion is to a widely held view that Homer comes from the Ionian region of Asia Minor, a view based on Thomas Blackwell's *An Enquiry into the Life and Writings of Homer* (London, 1735), translated into German by Johann Heinrich Voss (Leipzig, 1776). *An Essay on the Original Genius and Writings of Homer*... (London, 1775), by Robert Wood, a traveler in Ionia, supported the view of Homer's Ionian origins (pp. 5–6), although Wood did not ascribe Homer's poetry to the climate and landscape of Ionia as such, in the way Blackwell had done so extravagantly. Johann Gottfried Herder echoed Blackwell's assessment in various of his essays; see his *Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Bernhard Suphan, 33 vols. (Berlin, 1877–1913), xvii. 161, 175; xviii. 437, 444–5, 453–6. Friedrich Schlegel took a similar view in his *Geschichte der Poesie der Griechen und Römer* (1798); see *KFSA* i. 524–5.

We already noted that the ancient | philosophies are the abstract ones 117
and the later philosophies are the developed ones. This means that the later philosophy is also the more determinate philosophy. Later philosophies no longer recognize their principle in the earlier ones. Thales called water the absolute. Consequently there has been controversy over whether he was an atheist and whether the later and more determinate concept of God is applicable to his simple form.[8] Greater determinateness presupposes greater internal antithesis. The determinate character of the individual too is one that has overcome a profound antithesis within itself. How things appear in history follows this pattern. So, the more profound the determinate form of the idea becomes, the greater the cleavage and inner strife from which it must emerge. Thus we see spirit in ever greater barbarity and fissure, and its various configurations in greater mutual hostility, because spirit's distinctions have gone more deeply within themselves; each makes itself into the infinite totality, although at the same time they cannot do without one another. So they engage in the struggle from which there emerges for the first time the higher, determinate form that has overcome the antithesis. Thus in the Middle Ages [we find] barbarians and the conflict of principles, and for that reason a greater profundity that has grasped spirit in its essential being. The mightiest spirit is the one that has bound the most hostile element within itself. This also applies to the reconciling aspect that philosophy alone provides.

The history of philosophy is determined by the concept and presents the system of philosophy in its outward aspect. Its distinction [from the concept] is that its historical sequence appears as something contingent.

From these general observations we now proceed to specific consequences. In the way it appears in history each philosophy is a limited and particular standpoint, one stage in the system. Only at this one stage does a philosophy have meaning and belong to its time. Each philosophy is like an individual person. No matter how much one stretches out, one cannot get beyond one's own time. The same substantial spirit permeates everything in that time. The greatness of an individual lies in grasping this spirit in its fullness. What follows in turn is that earlier systems of philosophy such

8. Thales did not speak of 'the absolute', but instead called moisture or dampness the ἀρχή of all things. See Vol. II, pp. 27–8, where Hegel cites Aristotle's view that Thales came to regard water as the origin of all things, because 'water is the principle of what is moist', and all nutriment comes from what is moist. While the controversy over whether or not Thales was an atheist cannot be settled, Hegel may have been aware of it from a 1785 dissertation by his teacher, Johannes Flatt, as well as from the writings of Brucker (*Historia* i. 469) and Tennemann (*Geschichte* i. 62–3). See n. 28, p. 157 below.

118 as Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Neoplatonism, live on and are | ever with us, even though philosophy no longer takes on these particular shapes but instead has assimilated them as elements within itself. In later times philosophy became more highly developed. There can no longer be Stoics, Epicureans, or Skeptics. To espouse these philosophies once again would be a foolish endeavor, as when adults seek to recapture their youth. In the era of the revival of the sciences, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a new period of development began that sought to refurbish the ancient systems of philosophy. Ficino was a Platonist, Lipsius was counted among the Stoics, and Gassendi as an Epicurean. Ciceronian philosophy in particular was resuscitated at that time.[9] This whole endeavor was nothing but a transitional phase. That era intended to become acquainted with the ancient forms, not to stand pat with them. Also evident from this is that people who turn to ancient philosophies are not satisfied by them. The spirit of one's age dwells in every individual. To find an earlier philosophy satisfactory one must occupy [*kennen*] the standpoint from which alone that philosophy could prove satisfactory. A more abstract philosophy is in no position to comprehend the deeper phenomena of living nature and of spirit, for that requires knowledge of the concept; it does not get beyond a certain stage in its grasp of the concrete, and when it seeks to comprehend everything the inquiry becomes still more unsatisfactory. The atomic principle leads to knowledge of the mechanical, and the principles developed from that knowledge extend as far as the proofs of Newton; but what is living cannot be conceptualized in this way.[10] In the *Timaeus* Plato offers a physiology, but his [theory of] Ideas is insufficient for the task.[11] His profound sense of nature makes possible his lively observations, but he does not comprehend the spirit of organism as a whole. Consequently it is of no interest to grasp his principles in all their details.

The stages [of philosophy] essentially have a negative relation to one another. One stage passes beyond another and people call this 'refutation'. When they do this, the usual way of depicting the diversity of philosophies, mentioned previously, gets disregarded. But it does make the point that one philosophy is not what the other is, and that, since each is a particular mode

9. On the Renaissance revival of ancient philosophies, see n. 13, p. 59 above. Remarks on the revival of Cicero's philosophy appear in Buhle's *Lehrbuch* 6, pt. 1, pp. 286–7, and in his *Geschichte*, vol. ii, pt. 2, pp. 665–6. See also Brucker, *Historia critica philosophiae*, vol. iv, pt. 1, p. 90. See also Vol. III, pp. 57–9.

10. See n. 22, p. 65 above.

11. See *Timaeus* 69a–92c; see *Timaeus, Critias, Cleitophon, Menexenus, Epistles*, trans. R. G. Bury (Loeb Classical Library; Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1929; repr. 1961), pp. 176–253. See also Vol. II, pp. 215–18; also *W.* xiv. 265–9.

of grasping the truth, they must be distinct. As for refutation, | we can say 119
that 'no philosophy has been refuted' but equally so that 'each one has been refuted, and is true'.

First, no philosophy has been refuted with respect to its idea. The idea is in all of them and makes all of them philosophies. Each one is, however, a particular way of presenting one moment of the idea. But this one way is not refuted, because these presentations are necessary transitional points and necessary moments of the idea. So even the particular forms are not refuted. People who say a philosophy has been refuted do not understand this to mean that they find its own form inadequately presented. They intend instead to deny the substantial [element] in it and its underlying ideas too. But what is *undeniable* is that this is impossible. Two philosophical systems can seem quite opposed to one another, yet precisely because of that be in mutual agreement at a deeper level. One example is Kant's idealism and the realism opposed to it.[12] According to Kant's idealism all universal categories belong to subjective thinking, whereas according to realism things are actually outside us and we take into ourselves the representations of them. When examined more closely, these positions essentially have [a] common standpoint. Both disavow necessary knowing and involve only subjective categories, the validity of which, in and of itself, must first be shown, for, to realism everything is of course fact, given from without. Our day has a multitude of so-called philosophical systems, each maintaining that it is original. But when we examine them more closely we find them all operating within the same circle of ideas. (Thus after Kant there are Fries, Krug, and Bouterwek.) This is also in part the case with ancient philosophy, for instance with notable men among the Peripatetics who depart from Plato on individual points but whose modifications are too trivial to be presented in detail.[13] Most of them have merely external, historical significance.

To refute a philosophy one must first grasp it and then, in the second place, discern its inadequacies. The usual procedure is to begin with the inadequacies, which only involves grasping the form, whereas refuting the philosophy calls for knowing the content. When we undertake the refutation of a system we already possess | a particular system, our own views. What 120

12. The reference here is perhaps to the opposition of real and ideal principles in the post-Kantian era, perhaps to C. L. Reinhold who, in his writings from 1799 on that were directed against Fichte, espoused a 'rational realism'. See *Reinhold an Fichte* (Hamburg, 1799), and also Fichte, *Gesamtausgabe*, iii, 3. 307–20, as well as other materials gathered under the heading 'Realism vs. Transcendental Idealism' in *Philosophisch-literarische Streitsachen*, ed. Walter Jaeschke, 3 vols. (Hamburg, 1993–4), vol. ii. 1, 3–181.

13. Most likely Hegel actually spoke of departures of the Peripatetics from Aristotle, not from Plato. Compare the corresponding passage in Vol. II, p. 262.

strikes us initially is the difference between the other system and our own. For that not to happen we must first relinquish our own specific form [of thinking]. This, however, is the more difficult route and is taken only by more highly cultured persons, those whose form [of thinking] is universal and who discover themselves in each philosophy. This holds good not just for philosophy but for life in general. At first we take a negative stance toward everything. We are the fixed point and anything different is of no significance. Thus in youth we begin by finding fault with anything different from us. This is the starting point of education. Becoming versed in what is inward comes only later. Age is generally more moderate in its judgment than is youth. This difference can have various causes. On the one hand age may have become habituated to what is inferior, having surrendered its ideals and given up hope of finding something acknowledged to be eternally right. On the other hand, and putting things in a better light, age may have educated itself to the point that it no longer holds fast to anything in one particular form, that it has put aside its own narrow-mindedness. Thus what is other to it no longer appears so antithetical. Age relates itself freely to the other and lets it be. So someone first becoming acquainted with philosophical systems seizes on their shortcomings, their unsatisfactory features. But that is not dealing with the subject matter itself, not in its positive aspect, since the shortcomings occur where the subject matter comes to an end. To judge a subject matter truly we must turn away from its shortcomings and toward what is positive and real in it. We must come to know its truth, its justification, and that is by far the more difficult task.

It is the same with the various religions as it is with philosophy. It is not difficult to point out their inadequacy, the superstition in them. Whoever knows only the error in the various religions has not grasped them. Religions are the means by which [different] peoples possess absolute being in their immediate faith and know themselves to be identical with it. This is the state next highest to philosophy, and is truth itself under its particular forms. The religion of a people is its truth, and not merely truth in the relative sense but instead their substantial truth itself. We call 'truth' as such
121 the subject's concurrence | with the object, and in religion this concurrence is the essential thing. In religion, however, the absolute is directly present in such a way that the heart conforms itself to essential being, comes to oneness with it. After all, it is foolishness to suppose that a people or anything else could be lacking in truth.

Concept and existence generally relate to one another as soul and body. In body without soul there is no actuality. There is a great effort in our

day to comprehend what is true and rational in the earlier religions. We must first find the truth in them, and then their limitations. It is the same with philosophies; we grasp them only when we have seen their justification. Discerning the limitations of a philosophy is always secondary. The abstract antithesis presented between truth and falsity gives way entirely to the genuinely thoughtful mode of consideration. From the very fact that a philosophy exists, it is true. What is false in it belongs to its limitations, which can be of a twofold sort. Initially they appear as a naive lack of the idea's higher development. To that extent the philosophy appears to be a whole that has not yet arrived at its development, its depth. A philosophy appearing in such a mode is not yet one-sided and even less so erroneous. A child is like this too. A child is something incomplete, does not yet know itself as a person, yet is a harmonious whole. The Platonic philosophy has somewhat this shape. The highest idea is expressed as Plato's Idea and is presented as the result of dialectical development. But this Idea still is the universal that has not yet developed its own antithesis within itself. [It] still has the form of abstraction, set forth in a predominantly naive way.[14] But this deficiency, appearing as a kind of immediacy, nevertheless also becomes an antithesis—something that is determinate over against an other. So the Platonic philosophy seems to be complete, although from its deficiency there emerges the antithesis to it, the philosophy of the Sophists, which maintains that we do not know truth but only appearance, that subjective particularity is what is ultimate, certain, and our goal.[15]

The deficient character of a philosophy, however, can also consist in an actual one-sidedness in which the idea is grasped in a single principle, with the missing element grasped as something contrary to it. The universal idea must necessarily | pass over into the contrary, into the determination 122
of finitude, and this one-sidedness is then necessary too. In the antithesis, God (the term representation uses to express the idea) must undergo primal division, must have finite nature as the contrary over against himself. After

14. Neither in the 1825–6 lectures nor in the 1819 lectures do we find in Hegel's treatment of Plato precise expressions to this effect. Here Hegel is probably referring to the lack of a principle of subjectivity in Plato's political philosophy, rather than to his philosophy in general or to his theory of Ideas. It is in the political context that the 1825–6 lectures designate Plato's procedure as 'artless'; see Vol. II, p. 219.

15. Hegel's contention that the philosophy of the Sophists grew from a deficiency of the Platonic philosophy reverses the historical sequence. In his presentation of the philosophy of this epoch in Vol. II, he treats the Sophists before Plato. In the 1825–6 lectures he remarks, with reference to Plato's *Republic*, that 'the opposite to Plato's principle is the principle . . . that what counts is the will of the individual, *as* individual', and yet he mentions in this context not the Sophists, but Rousseau; see Vol. II, p. 225.

knowledge of the idea in its universality, what emerges is knowledge of the idea in its antithesis, in the form of distinctive shapes that stand opposed to one another. The opposed philosophies together constitute the whole of philosophy. When a one-sided philosophy emerges its antithesis necessarily soon makes its appearance too, because the totality must always be present. The determinate being of the absolute idea [must] be complete. The deficiency of the Platonic Idea is its abstraction from the particular. Standing opposed to the deficiency of Platonic philosophy are the Sophists, as the principle of subjectivity and of finitude. In this way, later on, we see Stoicism in antithesis to Epicureanism. For its truth Stoicism wants the positive as thought [*Positiv-Gedachte*], and Epicureanism wants the positive as felt [*Positiv-Gefühlte*]. The third to these two emerged first as negative Skepticism, later as Neoplatonic philosophy.[16]

Spinozism has come on the scene in modern times. With its doctrine of substance, it corresponds on the whole to the Platonic system, albeit as substance in stark identity with itself. Spinozism lacks the moving, driving principle, the principle of subjectivity, a principle that arose over against it though still in the superficial form of individuality, as the Leibnizian monad. Each of these modern philosophies is one-sided. Each constitutes a contrary to Locke's philosophy with its principle of so-called realism, which affirms that what is true is only received from without, that the basis of truth is things discovered in sense perception.[17] Francis Bacon had appeared not long before Locke, and he is the hero of modern empirical philosophy. As a counterweight to Lord High Chancellor Bacon, it fell to the lot of the shoemaker Jacob Boehme in Seidenberg to be a philosopher and to propound (crudely, forcefully, confusedly), over against Bacon, the principle of the profoundest inwardness. Boehme's principle is the burning of spirit within itself. Even from afar and without external connection, the antithesis

16. See Vol. II, pp. 264 and 289, for these contrasting views of the 'positive'. This classification of the schools does not agree with the 1825–6 account of the epochs. There Hegel places Stoicism and Epicureanism together, under the single heading 'Dogmatic Philosophy' and set in opposition to a second group comprising Skepticism and the New Academy. Neoplatonism constitutes the third epoch of Greek philosophy, the first comprising Thales to Aristotle, and the second the Dogmatism–Skepticism opposition. In 1819, in contrast, Hegel groups the three—Stoicism, Epicureanism, Skepticism—together under the not very suitable heading 'Dogmatism', to which Neoplatonism is juxtaposed as the third epoch. The *Werke* grouping corresponds to that of 1825–6.

17. For this criticism of Spinoza, as well as the discussion of Leibniz and Locke, see Vol. III, pp. 121–30, 134–9, 145–55. Although this passage opposes Spinoza and Leibniz to Locke's 'so-called realism', in the body of the 1819 lectures Hegel treats Descartes and Spinoza first, then Locke and Leibniz together, as he does in 1825–6. Here he places Leibniz in opposition to Spinoza as well as to Locke (Ca. and Me. agree on this). See also n. 14, p. 61.

arises and the totality | is present.[18] In the necessary consequence of this 123
one-sidedness, the opposed principles enter into a struggle with one another and unite with one another. A purified truth emerges from this antithesis, not indeed a truth prior to it but truth following upon it, as result of it. So the antithesis gets contained in the result, which is now the more profound and more determinate truth. This same pattern occurs in a formal way in scientific knowledge on the part of the understanding, for instance in geometry, where the theorem prior to the proof is kept quite distinct from the theorem after the proof. In geometry, however, there is only a subjective result [the same theorem, now proven to be true] that plays no part in the content. In the progression of philosophy, on the contrary, the result is no longer something immediate but is instead the universal that nevertheless has the particular within itself. The Platonic philosophy invoked the idea in such a way that thinking must not stop with the true or the good in single instances, but must move on to the universal. The principle of mobility, of unrest, of finitude, then comes on the scene as the principle of the Sophists. The third to these two is the Aristotelian philosophy, in which they have not vanished but are freed of their one-sidedness. In Aristotle too the idea is what is greatest and highest, is truth, the universal foundation (Tennemann does him an injustice).[19] Aristotle expresses this foundation as possibility, as potentiality. Still required is actuality, a drawing-out [*Abstrahieren*] by the form of individuality as such, a process he grasps as energy, as activity or efficacy. The idea is the unmoved mover. The unmoved is the Platonic Idea; the activity or movement is the principle of the Sophists, no longer one-sided, however, but instead as reconciled [with the idea], enriched, more determinate.

This, then, is what constitutes the so-called refutation. In the education received through philosophy one recognizes that antitheses of true and false, of good and evil, are abstract, and that what is true as such must be essentially something concrete. Philosophies antithetical to one another in the manner indicated enter into controversy with one another. People find this troublesome and opine that we must be tolerant, leaving each to his own opinion. The rabble laughs, the moralistic rabble trots out its maxims

18. Vol. III discusses extensively both Bacon and Boehme, pp. 88–103.

19. Designation of Aristotelian philosophy as the third in the series is not carried out in the body of the 1819 lectures, which only cite Aristotle's use of the principle of motion over against Plato, and without mention of the Sophists in this context. For Hegel's criticism of Tennemann's presentation of Aristotle's philosophy, see pp. 100–1 above, as well as n. 68 to p. 98 above, and the remark in Vol. II of this edition, p. 232. These criticized features recur throughout Tennemann's presentation in his *Geschichte*; see, for instance, iii. 47–8, as well as his summary in vi. 487–8.

124 or concludes that knowledge of truth | is unattainable, seeing therein justification of its own view. (These external phenomena matter not in the least. Philosophers can pay the price, for the world spirit exacts this of other things too.) One can also stay out of the controversy. Fools and dullards will never be converted, and the truth creates its own breathing space. So singularity [of viewpoint] is relegated to the single individual. The more the antithetical philosophies attack one another and enter into controversy, the less rapprochement there is, and only greater obstinacy. The consequence is fatigue, loss of interest in the object of the controversy. What is done is done, and indifference sets in. But the true outcome is the inner one, the fact that, seemingly on its own account, a third shape arises, a higher stage of development containing both of the preceding ones within itself. The true result of refutation is that the forms of the idea that arise as the highest become subordinate elements. So the philosophies have restricted roles as stages in the course of the whole. Their deficiency is in their form, not in the idea. The deficiency is that the one-sided principle passes itself off as what ought to be determinative of the whole.

Thus the result so far is that the history of philosophy is philosophy itself and its development. This development is a logical whole, something organic, the living tree of knowledge, indeed thoughtful knowledge of the highest kind that, in each moment of its unfolding, is fully alive. Each higher moment proceeds from what precedes it, but can at the same time also become a refutation of the preceding moment. The blossom is the higher form of the leaf, the fruit higher than the blossom. The whole of this unfolding, however, yields the idea of the plant, which is found already in simple form in the seed, and was contained in every single
125 moment. |

2. The Relationship of the History of Philosophy to the Other Aspects of External History, namely, to the History of Art and of the Religions

The character of an era, comprehended in its highest configuration, is given in the history of philosophy. The constitution, government, and ethical life of a people all emerge from *one principle*. So external history stands in the closest connection with the history of philosophy. Philosophy is the highest flowering of the principle from which the destinies of a people emerge. Spirit knows and expresses all this in a simple principle. Thus the whole mirrors itself in philosophy, which is the concept of the entire shape of historical life in each era. This concept constitutes what, in the true sense, we call 'the spirit of the age'. Philosophy is then neither the cause of history nor vice versa, for the communal element, expressed better as *one life*, pervades

all aspects in such a way that one of them does not cause the form of the others. Each aspect is itself the restlessness or driving force that presses on to its consequences.

It is not the province of the history of philosophy to exhibit the ways in which the principle of spirit pervades the individual phenomena of external history. We have to deal simply with the history of self-conscious spirit. The particular sciences are likewise the history of the world spirit grasped in the form of thought. In part they are compilations of information drawn from sense perception, and so quite opposite to philosophical cognition. The properly systematic sciences also involve universal propositions under which they subsume what is particular. But these sciences presuppose the objects that they treat; they do not conceive the objects themselves, but take them from external experience or from psychological experience. They do not just stop with this presupposing of the object, however, for they have a method of ratiocination about it. But this method too is presupposed. These sciences are finite cognition, and so too is their method or the logic from which they draw it, the logic of the finite, the logic of the understanding. Philosophy, however, makes no presuppositions and has to know what is true, what is in and for itself, not what is | finite. 126
Finite logic just passes over from one limited circumstance to another. Hence even the ordinary logic of the finite can find no application to philosophy.

Art stands in closer connection with philosophy. Art described in its true dignity shares with philosophy the spiritual grasp of the eternal, imperishable idea as well as the producing of it, [although] art presents this idea in sensible form. Excluded from consideration are imitative art and art merely for the sake of entertainment. Accordingly, true art is essentially something intellectual, in which the artist must engage in abstraction from all that is outwardly given, just like the philosopher. Art grasps the eternal idea, though not in the form of inwardness but in shapes for intuition, therefore in an element other than that of philosophy. So in art the genuine idea is not able to be presented fully to spirit, especially because art is given over to individuality. To attain its completion art must produce an array of deities. Hence art too must be excluded from our treatment.

The religions of the peoples stand in closer connection with philosophy. They too are located within this sphere of inward spirituality, not of just sensation and intuition but also representation and thought. Often religion and philosophy work so closely together that it is difficult to distinguish them. In their religions the peoples have set down the way they represent to themselves the essential being of the world and the relation of human

beings to it. But religion stands over against human beings as something other to them. In it the essential being is an object of consciousness but also something more or less alien, whether friendly or hostile. For that reason this opposition must be transcended. Devotion and the cultus lift up subjective consciousness to its essential being and confer upon it the feeling and enjoyment of oneness with that being. Greek religion, for instance, was not so much a striving for unity as it was the cheerful enjoyment of it. The concept of religion involves gaining for oneself the consciousness of this
127 unity (procuring God's grace for oneself). The | essential being that peoples represent to themselves in religion is, as such, reason subsisting in and for itself—the spirit of the human being that sets itself over against itself, as regards not its particular being [*Besonderheit*] but its essential nature [*Wesentlichkeit*]. It follows that what is rational is necessarily contained in religion, in this essential being. Here too it should be reiterated that something rational must be recognized in each religion if we are to grasp it. To imagine that a religion could be invented and perpetuated by priests is absurd. Although peoples and persons can be deceived about individual points, in their religion they envisage what is innermost for them. Moreover, religion does not involve deception simply because one religion stands on a higher level than others. The foundation [of religion] is spiritual essence, or rationality as such. Our age is strongly inclined to recognize this.[20] When we single out this rational element in religion, we can treat it as involving philosophical themes. Nevertheless the religions themselves are not yet philosophies. A philosophy cannot rest on, and be comprised by, something else, but instead must be known, must be brought forth. What is rational, the idea, is in every human being, in every nature, but not self-consciously so.

In considering more closely the forms that philosophical themes take in religion, we have the forms of (1) art, (2) the cultus, and (3) representation or knowing as such. Works of art in their various configurations are expressions of spirit, the manner in which spirit has grasped itself. Poetry is excluded chiefly because it has for its object language, verbal representation, and thought. The work of art simply has a meaning and expresses an idea. In it, however, this meaning is something inward, not something thought and articulated. The cultus is the action subjects undertake to become conscious of their identity with essential being itself. Individuals make offerings of

20. For criticism of the hypothesis of priestly deception, see n. 37, p. 75 above. Hegel attributes to Creuzer's influence (see above, p. 83 with nn. 46 and 47) the contemporary recognition that the foundation of myth is 'spiritual essence, rationality as such', although its roots lie with Christian Gottlob Heyne (see n. 28, p. 157 below).

their possessions and thus purify themselves from their finitude. The cultic acts take place in a setting of specific, external actuality. Since these actions stand in a perpetual, unchangeable relation to the divine, they must also have a fixed character and be devoid of subjective caprice. The actions | of the cultus are especially the locus and expressions of superstition. The 128
significance of these actions constitutes philosophy too, indeed of the highest kind. It has been the prophets and poets who have expressed their people's religion in language and representation (as, according to Herodotus, Homer and Hesiod did for the Greeks).[21] Of course people of a higher culture no longer practice their devotion in a lifeless way and so with dull sensibility; passing beyond that lifeless state calls for further cultivation, such as that of prophets and poets. Also, the works of art in an advanced period are authentically art. The images, representations, and the like contain philosophical themes, though not yet [in the form of thoughts]. When the outward aspect given for sensible representation becomes significant, not in virtue of its outward representation but as a meaning, it is a symbol. Grasping these symbols and expressing them in thoughts has not yet come to pass in the religions as such. Mythology has a double form in which its content either is a predominantly external object, or else something spiritual predominates. External existence is more prominent in the nature religions, where sun, moon, fire, or natural being come to be revered as divine. One cannot say that those regarded as gods are this natural being immediately. They have the significance of something non-material.[22] To the extent that such objects are religious, they present the idea, the still-immediate unity. The mode of existence is a natural element, which, in its immediacy, is an unworthy form for spirit. Religions of immediacy cannot contain their own explanation, else they would be marked by internal discord. Their spiritual or higher aspect is something indefinite and has the mode of its existence in the natural object. So there can be no philosophy present in such religions, because philosophy calls for complete intellectual abstraction. Everything is still in images in the other religious form too, the mythological, although the image is no longer said to have meaning in its immediacy. There what is sensible is reduced to a mere sign of the spiritual. They are the religions in which the gods have individuality, spiritual individuality, as do the Greek | gods— 129
a meaning or idea, but one present in the work of art itself as something

21. See Herodotus, *The History* 2.53, trans. David Grene (Chicago and London, 1987), pp. 154–5.

22. See Hegel's account of the religions of nature in *Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 98–122, 238–381, and 521–639, which he there calls 'immediate religion'.

inward only and not as something thought. For that reason this is not philosophy.[23]

The cultus is the action of the subject undertaken to gain faith, the certainty of identity with the divine, and to enjoy it. In the cultic offering individuals relinquish some of their possessions, their finitude, their particular purposes; it is the act of purifying oneself from finitude, of conforming oneself to what is highest, of feeling one's identity with it. In relating themselves to what is fixed, constant, and immediate, these feelings become actual as actions that themselves must be fixed, must be linked to their intention. Consequently such actions are specified with the greatest precision. No mishap, chance, or caprice is to intrude on them. They should be above and beyond all chance occurrences. So these actions of the cultus are specified precisely and pedantically (especially among ancient peoples where the external features are still valued more highly than they are in the religion of inwardness). The specification extends to costume, color, and the most inconsequential details. These features are the pre-eminent locus and expression of superstition, because the cultic action plays out in the realm of actuality in such a way that temporality and finitude coincide with what is absolute and pure, and superstition crops up at this interface. Understanding cultic actions is then of great interest. Their significance constitutes a philosophical theme that is, however, not explicit in the cultus as such. When *we* express it we engage in philosophizing.

The third form [of religion], that of representation and thought, produces doctrines, which are even closer to the object of philosophy.

Athena is the spiritual aspect of the Athenian people as well as being the deity.[24] In these myths, however, the natural element occupies a subordinate place. So the Greeks stand infinitely higher than the Egyptians, because they see the divine in the human shape and not, like the Egyptians, in animal figures; even Osiris and Isis were merely the nature deities of the Nile. Oceanus and Helios, the ancient nature deities of the Greeks, were associated with the ends of the earth.[25] Although this anthropomorphic

23. The division of mythology into two distinct forms corresponds to the distinction of religions of nature from religions of spiritual individuality, a distinction Hegel drew using other terminology in his first (1821) philosophy-of-religion lectures, where he calls the latter type 'the religion of sublimity and beauty' (*Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 122–89). In the next (1824) series he placed Jewish, Greek, and Roman religions under the new title, 'religions of spiritual individuality' (ii. 381–512). The third form, which, shortly below in our text, Hegel says has doctrines closer to the object of philosophy, is not Roman religion (which is 'third' within the second division), but Christianity.

24. On Athena, see *Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 171–2 *et passim*.

25. Hegel's inclusion of Osiris and Isis among the nature deities may be seen in *Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 371, 524, and 744–5, with notes on those pages. His reference to Oceanus

aspect is indeed its defect, this religion involves a higher principle than, on the one hand, religions using animal symbolism or, on the other, the religions that designate God for us in general terms as | the highest being, 130
as unspiritual and lifeless with vapid abstract attributes.[26] The anthropomorphic religions, in contrast, recognize the spiritual element, albeit in an external, sensible way. Although the anthropomorphic mode is superior to abstraction, it has not yet gotten away from this [natural] element, because the spiritual aspect in it is still immediate and has sensible characteristics. So in expressing the divine deeds and operations it utilizes relationships applicable to outward existence but not to thought. Uncovering the rational aspect in these religions is a most important study and a topic for a science in its own right. Creuzer in particular has accomplished wonders along these lines. Those learned pagans, the Alexandrians and Neoplatonists, began [such an investigation] partly to discover, in their philosophical treatment of mythology, a defense against Christianity.[27] Some scholars even sought to credit mere historical factors as the foundation of mythology. They constitute the strictly prosaic camp in the treatment of mythology; one of them is Heyne in Göttingen.[28] A historical element is unmistakably involved in the temporal and geographical setting of the mythological figures; but it simply touches on their outward, individual aspect, not their true or religious aspect. Mythology has been construed in many other ways too, for instance from the perspective of alchemy, so that the Homeric history of the gods is taken as depicting chemical processes.[29] Some have looked for philosophical themes in mythology, but quite often sought to find them

and Helios recalls the victory of Zeus over the Titans, in Hesiod, *Theogony* 715–21. The *Philosophy of Religion* (ii. 151, 464, 646) mentions their exile to the ends of the earth.

26. Designation of God as the highest being occurs in well-known modern authors that Hegel may have in mind, such as Herbert of Cherbury, Christian Wolff, and Friedrich Schleiermacher.

27. On Creuzer and the Alexandrians, see nn. 46 and 47, p. 83 above.

28. Only the Me. transcript mentions Christian Gottlob Heyne. Although Heyne emphasized the historical factor, he did not in any event advocate the view of myth found, for example, in Euhemerism, the view that myths of deities derive from traditional accounts of human beings and historical events. In many writings and lectures Heyne understood myth to be a thought form of its own that derives from earliest human times, a view also adopted by Schelling in his early (1793) essay, *Ueber Mythen, historische Sagen und Philosopheme der ältesten Welt* (*Sämtliche Werke*, i. 41–83). As an example, see Heyne's preface to *Handbuch der Mythologie aus Homer und Hesiod*, by Martin Gottfried Hermann (vol. i; Berlin and Stettin, 1787), sheet a3.

29. This statement alludes to the Stoics, who read Homer as treating physical processes, and in particular to Crates of Mallos (second century BC). Editions of Homer by Heyne and others passed on such allegorical interpretations. Cicero distinguished between historical and physical interpretations of Homer by the Stoics in his *De natura deorum* 3.24.

in external features originating simply from the cheerfulness of the Greek disposition. Mythical portrayal frequently keeps us in doubt as to what in it is meaningful and what is just supposed to belong to the external features.

Plato too made use of myths in presenting philosophical themes for the senses. People often take this portrayal to be most sublime and most perfect, although for Plato too myth is always the most subordinate means of portrayal.[30] The most worthy presentation of philosophy is just the pure element of thinking. Everywhere there crops up this ambiguity between what is symbolic and what is introduced merely by the external arrange-
131 ments of the story. Thus the famous myth of the | Fall has a very sublime philosophical significance, even though it is quite difficult to recognize what in it is the external element. For instance, does the sequence, in which the serpent tempts Eve and the temptation of Adam only comes afterward, have higher meaning, or is it just the trappings of the story?[31] One could say that the cleavage or sin stems from without, from the beast. One could even contend that consciousness of the cleavage is said to have risen first in Adam, for the woman's nature is beautiful unity. The quest to find a meaning in everything mythical has prompted many learned inquiries but also trivial ones, even ones ending up in foolishness. The mythical element consists of the sensuous image that gives thought the shape of individuality. In addition, the characteristic mode of connection and transition found in myth is a 'happening', whereas philosophical knowing must surmount this contingent element.

The form of the happening, found also in the Christian religion, the religion of higher spirituality, is portrayed here in the shape of the divine decree, but the necessity of the event is neither crystal clear nor demonstrated. So-called orthodoxy persisted in sticking to this form. What goes by the name of 'myth' is not a one-time event but takes place eternally. The biblical myth portrays this eternity as a condition inherited by the descendents and not as their original nature. The mythical element expresses its content directly as a primordial 'first'—but as a first in time. That is how cosmogony and theogony handle it. Even philosophical terminology employs the expression 'principle' (Aristotle's ἀρχή), but that term designates not temporal priority but instead what is 'first' conceptually.[32] In the Christian religion the particular circumstances are not mythical; the actual occurrence is seen as no mere mythical shape, but instead as something true, something historical.

30. On Plato's use of myth, see Vol. II, pp. 182–4. Hegel disparages this aspect of Plato, unlike his friend Creuzer, who applauds it.

31. See Gen. 3: 1–7.

32. See Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, in particular 1003a.22–31, and 1059a.18–1060a.2.

It is not just a symbol of something else, but instead is an actuality. So it seems to be out of the question to take the idea of the Christian religion in a mythical sense; it presents a quite different aspect. This is precisely the most speculative point, | this uniting of actuality with the idea that confronts us 132
in Christianity. In religion generally the uniting of the individual with the idea is called 'the mystical'. Ordinary consciousness interprets 'mystical' as meaning something mysterious [*Geheimnisvolle*], in the sense of a hidden knowledge. But 'mystical' has an entirely different meaning; it is precisely the philosophical aspect and, quite specifically, the speculative. The Platonists called philosophy 'mystery' [*Mysterium*] in this sense, and [it] is then indeed a secret [*Geheimnis*] for the mere understanding.[33] So the Christian religion too must be grasped in this speculative aspect, except that in it this aspect bears the form of actuality. Actuality as such must be taken up as an element in speculative philosophy. One part of this actuality, the single individual, has its setting in history. But the antithesis necessarily comes into play above all when philosophy, or thinking as such, encounters the Christian religion, since the philosophical idea had been grasped in abstract universality. Philosophy as it pertains to the Christian religion is not our present focus, although the struggle and the antithesis will be the topic later.

While the stance of philosophy and religion vis-à-vis one another is free and easy in the Greek world, it is constrained in the Christian religion for the reasons given, namely, that a particular existence in time and space came to be seen as an essential moment. In the period before this distinction took hold, self-consciousness had not yet raised itself up to the abstract heights of philosophical speculation, although the religions were philosophical in character. 'Oriental philosophy' is the usual term for it in the history of philosophy. Here vacillation still occurs between the two forms, the philosophical on the one hand, and the mythic and religious on the other. For this reason Oriental philosophy should be mentioned first, and also because of the significant inroads it made into Greek and Roman culture, even into the Christian religion. We can treat it as a preliminary topic.

The examination of Oriental philosophy has to indicate which religions have greater affinity with philosophy. They are the ones that have more specific thoughts about the being of God and consider the antithesis in it. From these religious representations we must | set apart others that 133
are sublime, to be sure, but express the characteristics as divine attributes [*Eigenschaften*]. The mere compilation of divine attributes involves nothing

33. See Vol. II, pp. 344–5.

speculative. An attribute is something external to the subject by which it emerges from itself. This is how the Jewish religion ascribes characteristics to a subject; the substrate is one, the fixed subject, and it has attributes, which are particular features or particular characteristics, but each is taken by itself and just appended to the subject. The subject with its attributes is not *for itself* because the understanding isolates the subject and makes the attributes external to it.[34] So the ascription is abstract and does not belong to the speculative domain. The pagan religions of the Orient are of greater interest for philosophical examination in this connection than is the Jewish religion. For the Jews, God ever remains something essentially substantial and in the form of representation, and does not enter into the form of thinking. God has created the world, is one, is good and just. Here are attributes in the mode of the understanding, in the mode of outwardly directed characteristics. The Jewish abstract teacher says that the name 'Jehovah' alone befits God. Of course the Jews do not speak this name, but instead utter *Schemham phorasch*, the name in the text, the tetragrammaton. This name designates God's substance. All the other names refer to God's attributes and are just derived from God's works.[35] In the Oriental view the name bears the meaning of the characteristic (of the endlessly nameable one!). This one determination applies to that name alone. The prophet Zechariah declares: 'On that day the Lord will be one, and his name one.' The rabbis interpret this passage to mean that God must put aside these names, and they conclude from it that the names were devised subsequent to the world's creation and do not apply to God's substance.[36] This was the reason that the Jews could not arrive at philosophy on their own; they learned it only through acquaintance with the Eastern spirit and the Alexandrians.[37]

So, under the heading of Oriental philosophy we are not to think of Jewish philosophy, but of Indian and ancient Persian philosophy. Also to be

34. For this account of Judaism, see *Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 425–7, 673–5.

35. The reference is to Moses Maimonides, *The Guide of the Perplexed*, also cited in Hegel's treatment of medieval philosophy in Vol. III, pp. 30–2. The Latin text of Maimonides (Basel, 1629), pt. 1, ch. 61, gives the phrase as *Schem hammephorash Nomen*. See the translation by Shlomo Pines (Chicago, 1963), p. 147, which reads: '... *Yod, He, Vav, He*. This is the name of God, may he be exalted, that has been originated without any derivation, and for this reason it is called the *articulated* name. This means that this name gives a clear unequivocal indication of His essence, may He be exalted. On the other hand, all the other great names give their indication in an equivocal way, being derived from terms signifying actions the like of which, as we have made clear, exist as our own actions.'

36. The quotation from Zech. 14: 9, and the ensuing comment in our text, are based on a continuation of the chapter from Maimonides cited in the preceding note; see Pines, pp. 148–9.

37. See the discussion of Philo of Alexandria in Vol. II, pp. 323–7.

mentioned in this context are a few other nations that gained the reputation for higher culture, in particular China and Egypt. We can simply say about these two peoples that they have had no philosophy, | or that at least we 134
have no concept of it, or else that they have had no philosophical impact on the history of European culture.[38]

3. The Three Periods of the History of Philosophy

Where does philosophy begin? It begins where what is universal is grasped in the form of the universal, but in such a way that it comprises the concrete within itself, and is fulfilled by it. We have seen that in Oriental history self-consciousness either persists quite abstractly within itself while all determinations remain outside it, or else it abandons itself in them and tosses about in a bacchanal.[39] Philosophy begins where thought expands itself in the element of its freedom. Where thinking exists in the East, self-consciousness is still just the flame that consumes, not the flame focusing itself into light. An ancient author declared to humankind: 'You have taken the stuff of your passions to be your gods.'[40] Philosophy takes its gods from thinking. So the beginning of philosophy is the emergence of thinking with the significance that thinking ought to be what is absolute. The first philosophies, however, are still wholly abstract. The universal that they express ought to embrace all things but is not yet posited as such. The task of philosophy is to carry out this development. But the distinctions must be thoughts too. In religion the individual is accustomed to devotion, and to thinking in the context of devotion, although its characteristic form is a particular representational shape. The shapes of the gods and their predicates involve a non-philosophical relationship because the particular aspect is just attached to the universal, not posited by it nor portrayed as developed from it. The advance therefore comes in positing the content of the absolute. Here there are both extremes; the universal comprises everything within itself, though still in abstract form; everything is not yet *posited* in it. Knowing the absolute as spirit is a development containing

38. At this point Hegel incorporates materials—more briefly stated in Ca., more expansively in Me.—that present the philosophies of the Chinese, Egyptians, Indians, and Persians, as well as an overview of the literature on the history of philosophy. The German edition omits these passages because they are substantially the same as their counterparts in the *Philosophy of Religion* and in the 1825–6 lectures respectively. See also the following note.

39. This sentence refers to Indian religion. Comparable accounts occur in *Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 335–42, 348–50, 600–1. Hegel's 1825–6 remarks on Indian thought in this volume (pp. 110–33 above) are, in contrast, based on Colebrooke's 1824 publications on Indian philosophy.

40. The reference is to Clement of Alexandria, *Protrepticus* ('*Exhortation to the Heathen*'), ch. 2, 26.4, which mentions fear, love, joy, and hope as 'idols' of the philosophers.

for the first time the development of thought-determinations, but in such
135 a way that they are | mutually opposed, that each develops internally into the totality, that the distinctions themselves are concretely developed. But the logical element is universal or all-pervasive, and the goal of the presentation is thus [to know] spirit as absolute spirit, which is the other over against nature but comprehends itself in nature. The principal stages in this development are, first, that the positing [*Gesetzsein*] of the idea's determinations takes place abstractly, and then that each aspect becomes the totality. These stages constitute the two periods of philosophy as such. The first period is Greek philosophy, and it includes Greek philosophy in the Roman Empire. The Romans have no philosophy of their own because they did not attain the speculative level. The second period is modern European or Germanic philosophy.

The first philosophizing is an uncomplicated approach that takes thinking immediately as objective, whereas the antithesis as the subjective aspect comes into play only in the second period. So in Greek philosophy the most universal or all-embracing reality is only something thought. The concept does not appear as such in nature, and the universal appears here as something singular. Hence the foundation of all philosophy is expressed in such a way that conceptual thought alone contains the universal. What it contains is what is true. Desires and the like in their immediacy are not what is true; right, duty, and so forth, carry no weight in the way that I sense them (for, although it is the foundation in feeling, there the universal is in the form of something merely subjective, in the form of something commingled with what is contingent). The unity of conceptual knowing and objectivity as such constitutes an antithesis not yet to be found in ancient philosophy, where their unity is the presupposition and foundation. On the whole it is the same situation as in the Oriental outlook—light that is also truth. But it is transfigured and elevated to thought by the presupposition that, to be universal, everything first has to be posited in the form of thought. So here thinking does not stand over against the thing that one thinks, and the characteristics thinking brings forth are viewed not as something
136 subjective but as characteristics | of the thing itself. So Greek philosophy lacks antithesis and complexity. The antithesis must be present, however, for it is a moment of the idea; where thinking lacks it internally it is nevertheless present, but falls outside of thinking. We see here a philosophy confined to the absolute in the form of thought, and alongside it its other confined to the sensible, the immediate. So Greek philosophy has the thinking that determines itself within itself. It develops itself into a totality of the idea (the world spirit does nothing by half measures). Its consummation comes in

Neoplatonic philosophy, with which the history of Greek philosophy draws to a close. So too ends the spiritual activity of this people who are already in decline.

The defect of Greek philosophy drove spirit beyond it. Greek philosophy lacks the absolute form, self-determining unity, subjectivity. Hence the two sides of the antithesis did not develop themselves into the concrete totality. So Aristotle, the most systematic thinker, juxtaposes his materials rather than proceeding sequentially, although the totality is completely present. He takes over the characteristics of things from empirical consciousness, one by one.[41] Whereas the divine idea is the province of ancient philosophy, it merely describes the idea's configurations but does not develop them. For example, Plotinus and Proclus present admirable content, but express it more in the manner of a history.[42] As a byproduct of this deficiency, the sphere of ideality gets established whereas the sphere of actuality remains barren, because actuality has self-determining thinking as its content. With the Romans we find, alongside the sphere of ideality, a sphere of right, and a sphere of religion no longer at all rationally satisfying in its current form, for philosophy sought to import into the myths a rational element not expressed there. The resulting [thought] was the feeling of contradiction, and called for its annulment. Thought not yet possessing the principle of subjectivity stood alone and withdrawn [*abstrakt*]. The Christian religion expressed this gulf and recognized that it was bridged by the heretofore ideal God's self-manifestation in human shape.

What is this inward element that becomes | manifest? The being of 137
thinking resides in its manifesting itself, determining itself, coming on stage, but only as sublated ideality. The intuition, at first only immediate, of the unity of divine and human nature, comes about in this way. This positing in unity is the very thing lacking in the Greek ideal. The ideal is determinate being *and* concept, not something set out for external apprehension though inanimate; it has its spiritual animation only in what stands over against it, in what is intuited and revered. In the Christian religion the intuiting is in the recalling of the actuality. This enlivened ideal enters into external existence, takes on in turn the lowly aspects of finitude and, as the determinative factor, posits this distinction and with it the whole realm of temporality and finitude. The enterprise of Germanic philosophy is the comprehension of this idea, which was at first just immediate intuition, *as spirit*. The absolute idea of spirit is the fact that the universal is

41. See Hegel's criticism of this aspect of Aristotle in Vol. II, pp. 233 and 236.
42. See Vol. II, pp. 335–7 and 342–5.

at the same time subjectivity and actuality. Spirit as such has essentially the moment of being-for-itself, though essentially as the universal. This is the idea as immediate consciousness (which is always what comes first) [and] as an individual actuality in a specific space and location. In this form of its immediately intuited existence, the idea is at once removed from thinking consciousness and made accessible to feeling. The task at that time was to bring into thinking consciousness what had appeared in this way, to grasp it in thinking fashion. Initially this idea belongs to the sphere of religion. By failing to comprehend it, religion sets this idea in opposition to a worldly actuality. The religious element is this inward aspect, the feeling of being raised up beyond finitude. Inasmuch as this idea was only immediate it was not yet itself the world, not itself actuality as such.

Human beings have free will. The natural will is inherently free in the individual or in a people, although, owing to its natural status, it appears as something unrefined, immediate, and dependent on its proximate external
138 and internal conditions. So it has an existence | of the most unrefined sort. Because the immediacy or unrefined character was present in religion too, religion comes forward with a host of duties, although they emerge in diverse forms. The sphere of religious ideas contains sensible representations and only knows how to express itself in those terms. Therefore the primary task of thinking is to express them, and doing so brings theology to the fore. Thinking in this context takes in part the shape of reflection, a formal thinking in which freedom plays a role. This thinking contains the idea, though not the idea in its freedom but instead as something static. So occupied, thinking ventures forth into the abstract realm and thus constitutes Scholastic philosophy, a thinking constrained by having its truth before it as a given. But thinking reason emerges in its freedom too, and so comes into conflict with the form of faith. Our task, then, is also to grasp this fermentation. Thinking in its free activity is then what has the antithesis within itself. Its foundation is thinking as the unity of the universal or the divine with singularity, with what initially appears as an other. This antithesis of thinking to itself is what structures modern philosophy.

Accordingly, we have three periods:

1. Greek philosophy beginning with Thales, in the era of Croesus and earlier, six hundred years before Christ and about an equal number of years after the Trojan War. It continues up through the Neoplatonic or Alexandrian philosophy to the time of Proclus, into the fifth century

[after Christ]. Christian philosophy belongs to this era too. Proclus died in 485, about the time of Attila and Odoacer.

3. Descartes. (Bacon and Jacob Boehme are somewhat earlier, although we first find thinking in the proper sense with Descartes.) He died in the middle of the seventeenth century (1650).

The second period just contains Scholastic philosophy and the efforts of Arabs and Jews. It is only a transitional period, of more historical than philosophical interest.

The third period gives us Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, who marks its conclusion.[43]

B. THE 1820–1 LECTURES

The German edition presents the 1820–1 lecture materials by placing the 1820 manuscript in parallel with the 1820–1 transcript. It also puts the fragmentary 1823 manuscript in parallel with the opening section of the 1820 manuscript. Our English edition includes the 1823 manuscript in the next section along with the other 1823–4 lecture materials. Some passages in the two manuscripts are identical or substantially the same, although not all of these parallels occur in comparable places relative to the other contents. This English edition includes all of the 1823 manuscript in the following Section C. The first part of the 1820 manuscript, and the beginning of the second part, are translated in full. This makes possible comparison of the two manuscripts without segregating the 1823 manuscript from the 1823 transcript materials, so that the 1823 introduction can be seen as an uninterrupted whole.

Before beginning here, refer to the account of these manuscript materials in the Editorial Introduction (pp. 10–16). The German edition explains that the 1820 manuscript contains more expansive discussion of some issues than does the corresponding transcript. It may have been based on an earlier manuscript now lost, and Hegel may have revised it with a view to the next series and for possible publication. Thus possibly

43. This statement of the third period, from Me., is erroneous. Hegel likely wanted to say that the third period, beginning with Descartes, concludes with Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. He could also have spoken of the philosophies of Kant and his contemporaries as a third subdivision of the third period, for he speaks that way according to Me.'s transmission of the introduction to modern philosophy, directly after which he introduces the same four subdivisions (the first being just preliminary) as those of the 1825–6 lectures.

some of the 1820 manuscript was not delivered orally. But since its fuller explanations, whether delivered orally or not, reflect Hegel's thinking between 1819 and 1823, our translated text, unless indicated otherwise, is from the manuscript rather than the transcript. The manuscript stresses quite a few terms by use of capitals or widely spaced letters; perhaps many of these instances served for emphasis in oral delivery and would not have been a feature of a published version. The translation eliminates much of this emphasis, to avoid an excessively cluttered text.

The manuscript commences (p. 5 of the German edition) with the notation Berlin, begun on 24 October 1820 and the salutation Gentlemen!

Introduction

These lectures have the history of philosophy for their topic.

This history presents us with the series of noble spirits or gallery of heroes of thinking reason who, in the strength of this reason, have delved deeply into the essence of things, into the essence of nature and of spirit, into the essence of God, and by their labors have acquired for us the greatest treasure, the treasure of rational knowledge. [6] What we are in historical terms, what we of the contemporary world possess, did not arise immediately, and grow only, from the soil of the present day, for this possession is the heritage and result of labor, indeed the labor of all preceding generations of the human race. The skills of our external life, its multitude of instruments and techniques, its structures and practices of social union and political life, are a result of the deliberation, discovery, travail, exigency, and ingenuity of the history preceding our own day. [7] Our present position in science, and more specifically in philosophy, is similarly indebted to the tradition that weaves itself as a sacred chain throughout all that is transitory and so is past, preserving and handing down what former ages stored up.[44] But this tradition does not simply function like a housekeeper who faithfully secures what she has but received, maintains it unaltered for her successor, and passes it on like something cut in stone; that would resemble the course of nature in the endless alteration and activity of its configurations and forms, a course that always sticks to its original laws and makes no progress. In the domain of spirit, on the contrary, the tradition of what the spiritual

44. The 1823 manuscript repeats this image of a 'sacred chain' of tradition, and explicitly attributes it to Herder. See Johann Gottfried Herder, 'This too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity (1774)', in *Philosophical Writings/Johann Gottfried von Herder*, trans. and ed. Michael N. Forster (Cambridge, 2002), p. 358.

world has produced swells as a mighty river that grows greater the further it presses on from its source.

Spiritual nature is the content of this tradition, and the universal spirit does not stand still. The culture, art, and science, the spiritual capacity as such, of an individual nation might well become static, as seems to be the case, for instance, with the Chinese, [8] who may have been as advanced two thousand years ago as they are today. But the spirit of the world does not sink into such an apathetic repose and, on account of it, be content with its own simple nature. Its life is action, and the action has an existing material to which it is directed, which it works on and recasts. So what each generation has garnered in its science and spiritual production is its legacy to the following generation, for which that legacy constitutes its soul or spiritual substance, serving as its own principles, presuppositions, and wealth, but at the same time as an inheritance received, a material made available to it. Because the subsequent generation is itself spiritual vitality and activity, it works on what it has received and, in doing so, enriches the reworked material.

So we in similar fashion have to grasp the available scientific knowledge, make it our own, and then build upon it. What we produce essentially presupposes something already at hand; our philosophy [9] exists essentially only in connection with it, and has proceeded from it with necessity. History does not portray for us the genesis of things foreign to us, but instead portrays our own genesis, the genesis of our scientific knowledge.

[13][45]A more precise elucidation of our stated thesis will constitute the introduction to the history of philosophy; it will contain and furnish the concept of the history of philosophy, its significance and concerns. The 1820–1 transcript commences with this issue and largely parallels the manuscript, though much more tersely. The manuscript continues. We can dispense with a discourse on another history, namely political history, before taking up the history of the concept itself; such a treatment of events would approximate what is already generally available in the ordinary portrayal of history, so we can assume it. As ordinarily portrayed, however, history and philosophy appear separately, with each having quite distinctive [*heterogene*] characteristics. Philosophy is the science of necessary thoughts, of their essential connection and system, the knowledge of what is true, hence eternal and everlasting. In contrast, history in the usual view deals with what has taken place, thus with something contingent, transitory, and past.[46]

45. A marginal notation alongside the beginning of this paragraph reads (as a possible section heading?): 'Introduction to philosophy itself'.

46. In the margin: 'How it comes to pass that philosophy has a history'.

Bringing together two such heterogeneous things, in light of the various extremely superficial ways in which each is represented in its own right, [14] particularly in the case of philosophy, in any event introduces distorted and false images that need to be corrected right from the outset, lest they impede our understanding of what we should be discussing, indeed make it impossible.

The manuscript next presents four topics for the introduction, although the German edition has separate section headings only for the first two.

I will start with an introduction (a) concerning the concept and the definition of the *history of philosophy*; consequences for treating it will emerge directly from this discussion. (b) As the second topic [of the introduction], I will establish the concept of *philosophy*, so that we may know what to highlight and select from the endlessly manifold materials, from the diverse aspects of peoples and their spiritual formation—from religion of course, and the thoughts about religion, the state, duties and laws. One might suppose that the history of philosophy must take into consideration all of these thoughts—for what has not been called 'philosophy' and 'philosophizing'? We must set definite boundaries to our field and exclude from it what does not belong to philosophy.[47] In specifying what is philosophy, we have just reached the point of departure for its history. (c) In addition, then, this history is divided into *periods*, a division that must exhibit the whole as a rational progression, an organically advancing whole. Philosophy is rational knowledge; the history of its development must itself be something rational; the history of philosophy must itself be philosophical. (d) Finally come the *sources* for the history of philosophy. [15]

What follows translates the very full discussion of the first topic in the manuscript. The parallel version in the transcript is much more succinct, perhaps indicating that Hegel abridged this material considerably in his oral delivery.

1. The Concept (and Definition) of the History of Philosophy

The usual superficial views of this history crop up here, so they have to be mentioned and corrected. At first glance history in fact comprises the narration of contingent events down through the ages, events befalling peoples and individuals, events contingent with respect to both their chronological order and their content.[48] We will speak later about chronological contingency, because we wish to deal first with the concept of

47. In the margin: 'Introduction to philosophy itself—study of philosophy itself'.
48. In the margin: 'Contingent actions'.

the contingency of the content. The content of philosophy is not the actions and external incidents of the passions and of fortune; instead it is thoughts. Contingent thoughts, however, are but opinions, and philosophical opinions are said to be opinions about the more narrowly defined content and proper objects of philosophy, opinions about God, nature, and spirit.

At this juncture, then, we run into the everyday view of the history of philosophy, namely, that it has to recite the stock of philosophical opinions as they have arisen and presented themselves over time. When spoken of with forbearance, these materials are called 'opinions'; people believed competent to express a more profound judgment also call this history a gallery of follies or, at the least, of aberrations, on the part of those who absorb themselves in thinking and in mere concepts. [16] Such views can be heard not only from those who confess their ignorance of philosophy—who confess it because, according to the common viewpoint, this ignorance is said to be no obstacle to sitting in judgment over philosophy. On the contrary, all persons deem themselves capable of judging philosophy's value and essential nature despite not understanding anything about it—not just those who themselves write, and have written, the history of philosophy. So, as a recital of all sorts of opinions, this history becomes a matter for idle curiosity or, if you like, for scholarly erudition, especially for the erudition that knows a host of useless things, namely, the sorts of things that otherwise have no intrinsic value or hold no inherent interest, apart from the possession of information about them.

The ensuing extended discussion of opinion, and of puzzlement at the many philosophies, is an expanded version of points made in the transcripts of 1819 (pp. 138–9 above) and 1825–6 (pp. 57–8 above).

People suppose, to be sure, that it is useful to be conversant with the different opinions and thoughts of others, that this activates the power of thought or even leads to many good thoughts, that having an opinion[49] leads in turn to something further, that scientific knowledge consists of spinning out opinions from other opinions.

There is, however, another aspect, a different consequence evidently connected with this view, a consequence one can, as one chooses, take to be either detrimental or useful. With the spectacle of such varied opinions, of so many different philosophical systems, looms a difficulty that ought to give one pause; one sees with regard to the vast material to which people feel drawn and [17] the knowledge of which philosophy seeks to impart,

49. In the margin: 'Opinions—withdrawal to oneself'.

that the greatest minds have gone astray, for they have been contradicted by others. Since this has happened to such great minds, how then [should] *ego homuncio* [I, this little man] seek to reach a decision here?[50] People take this consequence drawn from the diversity of the philosophical systems to be the detrimental factor, and yet it is also something subjectively useful; this diversity is the usual pretext for those who, in seeking to gain the reputation of being interested in philosophy and doing so with apparent good will, indeed acknowledging the necessity of the effort applied to this science, nevertheless in fact wholly neglect it. Yet this diversity of philosophical systems is far from serving as a mere pretext; instead it counts as a serious, genuine rationale, in part opposed to the seriousness with which philosophizing sets about its business—as a justification for one's not engaging in it and as a quite irrefutable instance of how fruitless it is to seek to attain philosophical knowledge of truth. When, however, it is also conceded that philosophy is supposed to be an actual science and that one philosophy will indeed be the true philosophy, then the question arises as to which philosophy is true and how that is supposed to be known. Each philosophy certifies itself as the true one—each itself offers different signs and criteria by which truth is said to be known. A sober, circumspect thinking must therefore be reluctant to reach a decision. [18]

I will express briefly what needs to be said about these most current views with which you gentlemen are also doubtless acquainted—for they are in fact the first reflections that can enter one's head along with one's first casual thoughts about the history of philosophy; further clarification concerning the diversity of philosophies will then be incorporated into the subject matter itself.

The *first view*, that the history of philosophy sets up a gallery of opinions—albeit opinions about God, about the essential being of natural and spiritual things—would, if this is all that this history does, make it a very superfluous and tedious science; even so, one might infer many uses said to be derived from such intellectual activity and erudition. What can be more useless than becoming acquainted with a series of mere opinions, and what more tedious? One needs only to glance at literary works that are histories of philosophy in the sense that they introduce and treat philosophical ideas in the mode of opinions, in order to discover how arid, tedious, and devoid of interest the whole thing is. An opinion is a subjective representation, an arbitrary thought, an imagining, that I can have in this way or that, and another person can have differently; an opinion

50. See n. 1, p. 139 above.

[*Meinung*] is mine [*mein*]; it [is] not something inherently universal, not a thought subsistent in and for itself. Philosophy, however, involves no opinions—there are no philosophical opinions. One [should] attribute a lack of elementary cultivation to a person who speaks of philosophical opinions—even though that person himself be a historian of philosophy. Philosophy is objective knowledge [*Wissenschaft*] of truth, knowledge of its necessity; it is conceptual knowing—not opinion and not the spinning-out of opinions. [19]

As to the *second view*, however, it is of course a sufficiently established fact that there are, and have been, different philosophies. *Truth*, however, is *one*—the instinct of reason has this invincible feeling or belief. So too only one philosophy can be the true one, and because philosophies are so diverse, the conclusion is that the rest of them must simply be erroneous. Yet [each] affirms, substantiates, demonstrates that it itself is the [true] one. This is the customary argumentation and seemingly correct insight belonging to sober or prosaic thinking. With regard to this sobriety of thinking or this shibboleth, we know from daily experience of sobriety that when we are sober, we feel empty [*hungrig*] at the same time or soon thereafter. Yet that sober thinking has the talent and knack of passing over from its sobriety, not to hunger or craving but to being internally satisfied and remaining so. The thinking that speaks that language accordingly betrays itself by its being lifeless understanding, for only what is lifeless is sober, is content and remains content in that sobriety. Physical vitality, however, like the vitality of spirit, does not stay content in sobriety but is a drive, passes over into the hunger and thirst after truth, after knowledge itself, presses toward satisfaction of this drive, and does not let itself be done eating and be satiated with sober reflections of that sort.

The next thing to [say] about this reflection, however, is that however diverse the philosophies may have been, they still share the feature of being philosophies. So whoever studies some philosophy or other, who is or would be so occupied—providing that it is one (a philosophy)—would accordingly be occupied with philosophy. [20] The pretext and argumentation that holds fast to the sheer diversity [of philosophies], and (from loathing or apprehensiveness in face of the particularity in which something universal is actual) will not apprehend this universality or recognize it, I have in other places compared to a (pedantic) patient whom the physician advises to eat fruit, and for whom he prescribes cherries or plums or grapes, but the patient, having a pedantic understanding, does not comply, because none of these things [*Früchte*] are 'fruit' [*Obst*]; instead they are cherries

or plums or grapes.[51] [This way of] showing what is universal is not yet satisfactory.

It is essential to have an even deeper insight into how things stand with the diversity of philosophical systems. Philosophical knowledge of the nature of truth and of philosophy allows this diversity itself to be captured in a quite different sense than that of the abstract antithesis of truth and error. Explanation of this point will disclose to us the significance of the entire history of philosophy.

The account of the remaining topics under the first heading of the manuscript is far more detailed than its parallels in the 1820–1 transcript and the counterpart passages in the 1819 and 1825–6 transcripts. It makes stronger connections between these lectures and Hegel's systematic philosophy, his logic.

For purposes of this explanation it is necessary to speak about the idea of the nature of truth and to introduce a number of propositions about it, ones that cannot, however, be proven here. Doing so will only make them clear and understandable[52]; a convincing case and their more specific grounding cannot be produced here, where the intention is simply to put them forward in a historical sense; knowledge of them as true and solidly grounded is the subject matter of philosophy. [21]

So, the first concept stated briefly in advance here is a proposition already introduced before, namely, that *truth is only one*. This proposition, formally in our thinking consciousness as such, is in a deeper sense philosophy's point of departure and its goal. That goal is to know this one truth, but to know it as the source from which all else, all laws of nature, all phenomena of life and consciousness, just issue forth, and to know that they are only reflections of it. Put in an apparently reverse direction, the goal is to know that all these laws and phenomena lead back to that one source, but to know this in order to conceive them on the basis of it, namely, to know their derivation from it.[53]

(*a*) This proposition, that the truth is only one, is itself, however, still abstract and formal. The most essential thing is to know that, on the contrary, the one truth is not just a simple abstract thought or proposition but is instead something internally concrete. People commonly assume that philosophical science just deals with abstractions, with empty generalities,

51. See n. 11, p. 58 above.

52. In the margin: 'Only to become *clearly* acquainted with the views'.

53. In place of the latter part of this statement, the transcript has instead: 'We say that God alone is the truth, and so we ascribe to all else only a relative truth.'

and that intuition, our empirical self-consciousness, our feeling of self, the feeling of life, is, in contrast, something internally concrete, is a specific domain of its own. Philosophy does in fact take its stance in the sphere of thought; it deals accordingly with generalities and its content is abstract, but only as to its form or element. The idea, however, is essentially concrete within itself; the idea is the unity of distinct determinations. [22] Rational knowledge distinguishes itself in this respect from mere knowing by the understanding. The business of philosophy is to show, over against the understanding, that what is true, the idea, consists not in empty generalities but in a universal that, within itself, is something particular, something determinate. What I say here bears essentially on what I said at the outset, that those not yet well versed in the study of philosophy must first take it up in merely historical fashion. From the instinct of thinking it surely follows that truth is only one, that philosophically cognized truth exists in the element of thinking, in the form of universality; that is in keeping with our customary view.

The fact that the universal itself contains its own internal determination, that the idea is internally the absolute unity of distinctions, marks the beginning of a properly philosophical proposition. At this point the consciousness that is not yet philosophically discerning steps back and says it does not understand. In saying that, it means, first of all, that this is not yet part of its customary views and convictions. As indicated previously, here is not the place to go into what plays a part in conviction, brings it about, provides proof for it, forms consciousness into this knowledge [namely, conviction].[54] Grasping something in the understanding, in representation, however, is easy. For instance, although 'red' is an abstract, sensible representation, ordinary consciousness speaks of 'red' without realizing it is dealing with an abstraction. [23] A rose that is red is a concrete redness, a unity of petals, shape, color, and fragrance, something living and blossoming in which many features can be abstractly distinguished and isolated, something susceptible to destruction and dismemberment; nevertheless it is one subject, one idea, in the manifold that it contains. So the pure, abstract idea within itself is not an abstraction, not empty simplicity like 'red', but a flower, something internally concrete.

54. In the margin, alongside this sentence and the next one: 'Nevertheless I only needed to refer to feeling—life, spirit, truth, the divine, are abstractions—each of them—although simple abstractions—it is not a thought *complete* in itself—fullness—something solid within itself, an abundance—But more precisely this, to seek to elucidate, by a few examples, what is in feeling, with reference to appropriate *representations* and thoughts'.

An example of the foregoing taken from a category of thought is the proposition 'A is A', the proposition of identity, a wholly abstract onefoldness, a pure abstraction as such: 'A is A' is wholly indeterminate, without distinction or particularity. Every determination or content must fall outside it, for 'A is A' is empty form. If, in contrast, I proceed to the category of the understanding that is 'ground', I have indeed an internally concrete determination. 'Ground' or 'grounds', what is essential to the thing, in fact is as such something identical with itself, what has being within itself, although 'ground' is at the same time defined as something going out from itself that relates itself to something grounded by it. So the simple concept comprises not only what is the ground but also the other, something grounded by it—in the cause, also the effect. Something said to be ground without naming what it grounds is no ground; thus something supposedly defined as cause without its effect is just a fact as such and not a cause, and the same, vice versa, applies to the effect. So something is concrete therefore when it contains within itself not only its one, immediate determination but also its other.

(β) Now that I have explained in this way the nature of the concrete as such, I add concerning its significance that [24] what is true, and thus determined internally, has the drive to develop itself. Only what is living, what is spiritual, moves or stirs itself inwardly and develops itself. So the idea, as internally concrete and self-developing, is an organic system, a totality containing within itself an abundance of stages and moments.

(γ) Philosophy is then explicitly the knowing of this development and, as thinking that comprehends, is itself this thinking development. The further this development progresses, the more complete is the philosophy.

Also, this is not an outwardly directed development, as into externality, for instead the separation marking the development is, as such, a going-within, which means that the universal idea remains the foundation, remains what is all-embracing and unchangeable.

Inasmuch as the going-forth of the philosophical idea in its development is not a change into, or a becoming of, an other, but instead is, as such, a going-within-itself, a becoming more internally profound, the progression makes the previously general, indefinite idea more determinate within itself.[55] The further development of the idea is one and the same thing as its greater determination. Here what is most extensive [25]

55. In the margin: 'This is a difficult point—reduction of the development of what is differentiated to simplicity, to specificity.' The root of the Latinism *Reduktion* is *reducere*, which means 'to lead back'.

is also what is most intensive. Extension as development is not a dispersal and disintegration but instead is, as such, a cohesiveness all the stronger and more intensive as the expansion and cohesion are richer and broader.[56]

These are the abstract propositions about the nature of the idea and its development. The refined philosophy is internally constituted in this way. One idea is in the whole and in all its parts, just as in a living individual one life or one pulse courses through all the members; all the emergent components in the living individual and their systematic arrangement proceed from the one idea, because all these particulars are simply mirror and images of this one vitality. They have their actuality only in this unity, and all their distinctions or diverse characteristics together are themselves just the expression of the idea and the form contained within it. So the idea is at once central point and periphery, the light source that in all its diffusion does not come outside itself but instead remains present and immanent within itself. So the idea is the system of necessity and is its own necessity, which accordingly is likewise its freedom.

Just as philosophy is system in its development, the history of philosophy is system too, and that is the main point, the basic concept that this discussion of this history will present.

a. The Concept of the History of Philosophy

To explain this [concept], attention must first be directed to the distinction applicable to the mode of appearance. Emergence of different stages in the [26] progression of thought can in fact be accompanied by consciousness of the necessity with which each stage follows in turn, and only a certain characteristic and shape can emerge at a given stage. Alternatively, the stages can emerge unaccompanied by this consciousness, like a natural or seemingly contingent process in which the concept brings about its consequences inwardly[57] but not explicitly, like what happens in nature, in the stages of a plant's development, where branches, leaves, blossoms, and fruit each emerge on their own, although the inner idea guides and determines this succession. It is like this too in the way that a child's physical abilities and, most especially, its spiritual activities, appear simply and naturally. For parents experiencing such a thing the first time it is a wonder to behold, that all this emerges from within on its own and is now evident, and

56. In place of this last sentence, the transcript simply has the phrases: 'Intensive human being, more concentrated character, most widely effective.'

57. In the margin: 'inner overseer'.

the entire sequence of these phenomena has just the shape of temporal succession.

The task and business of philosophy itself is to present the one mode of this emergence, the derivation of the configurations, the necessity of the determinations as it is thought and known. Because doing so involves the pure idea and not yet its further particular configuration as nature and spirit, this presentation is pre-eminently the task and the business of *logical* philosophy.

The other mode, however, in which the distinct stages and moments of development emerge as events in time and in particular places, among a particular people, under specific political circumstances and their attendant complexities [27]—in short, with a particular empirical form—is the spectacle that the history of philosophy exhibits for us. The only worthy perspective for this scientific knowledge to take is that it is, within itself, the true science in virtue of its concept of the subject matter; the fact that it also exhibits and proves itself in the realm of actuality is what the study of this very history will establish.

In keeping with this idea, then, I contend that the historical succession of the systems of philosophy is the same as the succession in the logical derivation of the idea's conceptual determinations. My contention is that, by stripping away from the basic concepts of the systems appearing in the history of philosophy whatever pertains to their external configuration, to their application to particular concerns, and the like, we are left with the different stages of determination of the idea itself in its logical concepts. Vice versa, by taking the logical progression on its own terms we have, in accord with its main moments, the progression of the idea's historical appearances, although one must of course know how to discern these pure concepts within what the historical shape contains.

The temporal sequence in history also differs in one respect from the sequence in the order of the concepts, although showing in detail what this involves would lead us too far afield from our purpose. I simply remark that our previous statement makes clear that the study of the history of philosophy [28] is the study of philosophy itself, and cannot be otherwise. Whoever studies the history of physics, of mathematics, and so forth, is surely engaged as well in becoming acquainted with physics or mathematics itself. Yet to recognize the progression within the empirical shape and appearance of philosophy's historical emergence, to recognize it as the development of the idea, one must of course introduce knowledge of the idea, just as one must introduce concepts of what is right and proper when judging human actions. Otherwise, as we see in so many

histories of philosophy, readers innocent of ideas get offered merely a disorderly heap of opinions. The task of the history of philosophy is to demonstrate the philosophical idea to them, accordingly to explain its appearances.

Because the observer must introduce the concept of the subject matter in order to see that subject in its appearing, and to be able to interpret the topic authentically, we need not be amazed that there are so many shallow histories of philosophy, that the sequence of philosophical systems is represented in them as a series of mere opinions, errors, games of thought [*Gedankenspielen*]—games contrived, to be sure, with a great deal of acumen and mental effort, which receive nothing but accolades for their formal aspect. How can such historiographers, who lack philosophical minds, be capable of grasping and presenting something that is rational thinking?

From what has been indicated about the formal nature of the idea[58] [we see] that only a history of philosophy that grasps the idea as a system of the development of the idea deserves to be called [29] a *science*; a collection of information does not constitute a science. Only as a succession of phenomena grounded by reason—a succession having reason for its content and disclosing what it is—does this history exhibit itself [as] something rational; it shows that it is a rational occurrence. How could it be that anything that takes place in the affairs of reason is not rational itself? It surely must be a rational faith that chance does not prevail in human affairs. The very subject matter of philosophy involves knowing that, howsoever much philosophy's own appearance is history, it is determined only by the idea.

We now examine the aforementioned universal concepts in [their] more precise application to the history of philosophy—an application that will bring to our attention the most significant aspects of this history.

[59] The most pressing question that can be posed at this point involves the distinction already drawn concerning the appearing of the idea itself, namely, how it transpires that philosophy appears as a development in time and has a history. An answer touches on the metaphysics of time, and providing more than just the elements [*Momente*] on which the requisite answer depends would at this point be a digression from our intended purpose.

Previously we said about the essential nature of spirit that [30] its being is its activity. Its nature is *the way it is*, and for that reason its changes are

58. In the margin: 'this alone is what I concern myself with, give lectures about'.
59. In the margin, at the beginning of this paragraph: 'Justification'.

but reiterations, its movement only a circle. More precisely, its activity is *self-knowing*. I exist, but my immediate existence is simply that of a living organism. I exist as spirit only insofar as I know myself. *Γνῶθι σεαυτόν*, 'know thyself', the inscription above the temple of the god of knowledge at Delphi, is the absolute command that expresses the nature of spirit.[60] Consciousness essentially involves my being *for myself*, my being *object* to myself. By this absolutely primal division, the distinction of me from myself, spirit makes itself into determinate being, posits itself as outside itself; it posits itself in the externality that is the general and differentiated mode of nature's existence. One of the modes of externality is *time*, a form discussed more specifically in the philosophy of nature as well as in the philosophy of finite spirit.[61] This determinate being [*Dasein*], accordingly a being in time, is not only a moment of the essentially finite, single consciousness as such, but also a moment of the development of the philosophical idea in the element of thinking. When thought in its immobility, the idea is indeed timeless; thinking it in its immobility is the holding fast to it in the shape of immediacy, is synonymous with the inner intuition of it. As concrete and as a unity of distinct elements, however, the idea, as noted before, is not essentially immobility and its determinate being is not essentially intuition, because the idea, as distinction internally and thus as development, within itself enters into determinate being [31] and into externality in the element of thinking. So, in thinking the pure philosophy appears as an existence [*Existenz*] stepping forth into time. But this element of thinking is itself abstract, is the activity of a single consciousness. Yet spirit exists not only as single, finite consciousness but also as spirit that is universal and concrete within itself. Its concrete universality comprises all the developed modes and aspects in which spirit is, and comes to be, object congruent with the idea. Thus its thinking self-apprehension is at the same time the completed progression of all developed actuality, a progression that does not run its course in the thinking of one individual nor present itself in a single consciousness. Instead, in the richness of its configuration, it is the universal spirit presenting itself in the history of the world. Hence in this development a form or stage of the idea comes to consciousness in one people such that this people and its age express only that form, and within it construct for themselves their universe and work out their worldly condition, whereas a higher stage becomes visible centuries later in a different people.

60. See Vol. II, p. 150.

61. See the discussion of time in the 1817 *Encyclopedia*, §§ 200–3, 208, 373–6. Cf. the 1830 *Encyclopedia*, §§ 257–9, 452–5 (*GW* xx. 247–51, 446–8).

Now that I have indicated the general basis, the development of the idea in time as such, we are faced, first of all, with

(α) the view that the perfection of [32] philosophizing, a pure beholding, thinking, and knowing,

(αα) falls outside time, not within history—

(ββ) a view, however, contrary to the nature of spirit, to the nature of knowing.

The original, unaffected unity with nature is none other than stupified intuition or condensed [*konzentriert*] consciousness, which is for that very reason abstract and not organic within itself. My sensibility is that life or God surely ought [to be] concrete, but nothing in that sensibility is distinct. The general feeling or the general idea of the divine surely bears upon all things. But that calls for articulating the infinite richness of this worldview and positing it as necessary in its place, not just relying on one and the same representation. For instance we see pious intuition in the Bible, [33] in the Old and New Testaments, above all as universal reverence for God in all natural phenomena. Job sees God in the thunder and lightning, in the light of day and that of night, in the mountains, the cedars of Lebanon and the birds on their branches, in dairy animals, lions, and whales, as well as in a universal providence over human affairs and conditions, over lowly creatures, and so forth.[62] But the pious soul's beholding God in nature is quite different from the intelligible fathoming of nature and of spirit. This piety does not speak of philosophy, of the being of God as thought or known. Thinking distinguishes itself from this so-called immediate intuition, feeling, faith, or whatever name one gives it, by departing from this immediacy, from merely simple and general intuition or feeling. Thinking is spirit's going-within-itself; it makes what it is, as intuiting, into the object, by collecting its thoughts within itself and thereby separating itself from itself. As we said, this separation is the initial condition (and the element) of self-consciousness, and only from this collecting within itself as free thinking can there emerge the development of the universe in thought, namely, philosophy. This very process constitutes the endless labor of spirit, in withdrawing from its immediate existence, away from blissful natural life and into [34] the night and loneliness of self-consciousness, and by its energy and power reconstructing in thinking the actuality and intuition separated from it. This being the case, it is clear that immediate natural life is opposite to what would count as philosophy, a realm of intelligence, a transparency

62. See Job 38–9.

of nature for thought.[63] So insight into spirit is not easily accomplished. Philosophy is not sleepwalking but waking consciousness, a progressive awakening that is precisely this elevating of [consciousness] itself above the conditions of immediate oneness with nature, an elevation and a labor that—as an ongoing distinguishing of itself from itself in order, through the activity of thinking, to bring forth the unity once again—takes place over the passage of time, indeed over a long time. These are the moments on the basis of which that philosophically natural state is to be judged.

(β) Spirit utilizes a long time, to be sure, for working out philosophy by its labors; the length of time involved can be surprising.[64] I have said from the outset that our contemporary philosophy is the result of the labor of all the centuries. Anyone surprised at the lengthy timespan must surely know that it [35] has been devoted to acquiring these concepts, and not so effectively in former times as today. One must know in general that the worldly condition of a people depends on the concept that it has of itself. In the realm of spirit nothing sprouts up overnight like a mushroom. That spirit has utilized such a long time can surprise those who for their own part are ignorant and heedless as to the nature and importance of philosophy, [not recognizing] that it constituted their interest, the interest of their labor too. Later on we will see the relationship of philosophy to the other sciences, to the arts, to political configurations, and so forth. When people are amazed at the length of time involved they speak of it as something surprising to cursory reflection, just as is the vastness of space affirmed by astronomy.[65]

As for the slow pace of the world spirit, one should be mindful, first of all, that spirit is in no hurry, that it has time enough—'a thousand years to Thee are as one day'.[66] Spirit has time enough just because spirit itself is outside time, because it is eternal. Time-worn, ephemeral beings do not have enough time for their so numerous purposes—no one dies having accomplished all of one's goals. Sufficient time is not the only factor, because time is not the only thing utilized in the acquisition of a concept; there are many other costs. Spirit also uses many races and generations of humankind in its labor of becoming conscious, in a vast expenditure of coming-to-be

63. At this point the transcript reads: 'In no way are human beings free by virtue of their immediacy and naturalness, [i.e.] free in will or in intelligence. Freedom is essentially something one acquires, or works to achieve.'

64. In the margin: 'Concept of Philosophy'.

65. The transcript adds: 'The vastness as such is of no interest to spirit. Only astronomy's laws and relationships are in fact of interest.'

66. See n. 5, p. 142 above.

and passing away; these too are matters of no consequence to it. Spirit has wealth enough for such [36] an expenditure; it carries out its work on the large scale, and has nations and individuals enough to consume in doing so. It is a cliché, but true, that nature takes the shortest path to its goal. The path of spirit, however, is mediation, the roundabout path. Time, effort, and expenditure are characterizations drawn from finite life that have no place here.

For a concrete example of spirit's slow pace, as well as of the vast expenditure and manner by which it grasps itself, I need only cite the concept of spirit's freedom, a principal concept. The Greeks and Romans, not to mention the Asians, knew nothing of the concept that the human being as such is born free, that the human being is free. Plato and Aristotle, Cicero and the Roman jurists, did not know it or have this concept, and the populace even less so, although this concept alone is the fount of legal right. They of course knew that an Athenian or a Roman citizen, an *ingenuus* or native-born person, is free, that there are free persons and those who are not free. But they did not know in this regard that the human being as such is free, which means the human being universally, human beings as they grasp themselves and others in thought. The Christian religion gave rise to the doctrine that all human beings are free before God, that Christ has freed them; the stipulations 'equal before God' and 'liberated for Christian freedom' make freedom independent of birth, social standing, education, and so forth.[67] The numerous social advances in the latter areas are, however, distinct from what constitutes the *concept* of the human being as a free being. [37] Over many centuries, for millennia, the feeling of freedom has been an impulse bringing about the greatest revolutions. But the thought or the concept that the human being is free by nature—not nature in the sense of our natural life but as our essential being or concept—is a cognition or knowledge that is not very old. Yet we take it as self-evident that no human being ought to be a slave, and that no people or government thinks to wage war for the purpose of enslaving people. Only with this knowledge is freedom a legal right and not a positive privilege exacted by force, necessity, and so forth. Freedom is right in and for itself, a concept identical with life itself.[68]

67. The phrases within quotation marks allude to Gal. 5: 1 ('For freedom Christ has set us free; stand fast, therefore, and do not submit again to a yoke of slavery') and 2 Cor. 3: 17 ('Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom').

68. The development of the concept of freedom in the course of history, as recounted in this passage, constitutes the main framework of Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*. See also n. 96, p. 195. Since in the present work Hegel is engaged in a form of history, philosophical history, it is not surprising that a number of connections exist between these

It is essential to bear in mind these factors regarding the slow pace of spirit. But we have to touch on another aspect of spirit's slow progress, namely, spirit's concrete nature, what connects spirit's thinking with all the other wealth of its determinate being and its relationships. The shape of its concept, of its own thinking, is at the same time the configuration of spirit's entire surroundings, its concrete totality within history. The idea that the philosophical system of an era expresses is related to the rest of that era's [38] configuration as the substance or flowering of that universe, as its universal essence—its intelligent life in the pure thinking of simple self-consciousness. But spirit is more than this because, as stated earlier, the multifaceted development of its determinate being and the level of self-consciousness it has attained constitute the principle that spirit reveals in history and in the conditions of its being. Spirit clothes this principle with all the wealth of its existence. This principle exists in the shape of a people whose customs, constitution, and private, civic, and public life, whose arts, political institutions, and so forth, enshrine that principle, a people whose concrete history in every external aspect of its entire determinate form bears its impress. The principle of a people has to work through this material, and that is not the affair of a single day, considering all the requisites, historical factors, relationships, laws, constitution, arts, and sciences that spirit has to cultivate to that end. No foray into a void, this is instead an advance into an era of boundless fulfillment and struggle; spirit does not venture into abstract concepts of pure thinking, for it moves forward only as an advance in its entire concrete life. Doing so involves cultivating a people to the stage where philosophy can emerge among them. The pace is slowed even more by apparent backsliding, by eras of barbarity.[69]

(γ) It is time, however, to move on to the more precise universal distinctions that reside in the nature of development. These distinctions, [39] to which attention has been called in this introduction, involve only the

lectures and those on the philosophy of world history. A new edition of the latter is envisaged for this series of Hegel Lectures.

69. At this point the transcript (pp. 38–9) has a fuller account of the barbarian era: 'Spirit often seems to stand still for long centuries, or even to retrogress. Backsliding of this kind happens when spirit has utterly exhausted a stage and made it objective to itself. When this occurs death ensues, for there is no longer any interest or any resistance. Old age is worldly wise and knows all there is to know; nothing novel happens to it. So life is tedious and people grow numb in the routine of living. This utter routine, this death of the present, also has concealed in it the seed of a new stage. The forms still plod on and traditional ways are upheld, though vitality and interest have slipped away. That transitional state, then, constitutes the stage of barbarism. So we often see splendid epochs or great ages founder, and individual preference and opinion make themselves the norm.'

formal [structure] that emerges from the concept of development as such. Awareness of the determinations residing here gives us a more precise clarification of what is to be expected from the particular philosophies as such, and the more specific concept of the circumstances regarding the diversity of philosophies.

I note, first of all, that what the specification of spiritual development has provided is essentially no mere inert emergence, like the one we represent to ourselves as the rising of the sun, the moon, and so forth, a mere movement in the unresisting medium of space and time; instead it is a labor or activity directed toward something at hand [by] reconstituting it. Spirit goes into itself and makes itself into the object, not immediately [but as] medium, and the directing of its thinking [40] to that medium gives to it the form and character of thought. [By] this concept in which spirit has grasped itself and which it *is*—this cultivation of itself, its own being newly separated from it and made into object for it and to which its activity is applied anew—this deed gives further form to what was formed previously, gives it more definition, makes it more determinate, more developed and profound within itself. Each era has another era preceding it, and is a reworking of that era—and in the process, is a higher culture.

[70]It follows from this necessity that the beginning is the least refined, is inherently what is least determinate and developed, is rather what is poorest, most abstract; the first philosophy is the wholly universal, most indeterminate, thought, the simplest; the most recent philosophy is the most concrete, the most profound. We must know this so as not to seek behind the ancient philosophies more than they contain, not seek in them answers to questions or the satisfaction of spiritual needs that they do not have and that belong only to a more cultivated era. By the same token this insight deters us from finding fault with them for omitting specific points [41] not yet an issue for their culture. It also deters us from burdening them—either to their detriment, so to speak, or to their benefit—with consequences and contentions they never affirmed nor thought of, even though such things can be deduced correctly from the thoughts of their philosophies.

(aa) So, in the history of philosophy we will discover the ancient philosophies to be, like children, the poorest and most meager in their attributes,

70. In the margin, next to the beginning of the paragraph: 'Consequences of [this] view as well as for the treatment of the history of philosophy as such.

a) not to *seek* in the ancients concrete determinations that were not yet present—*objective* determinations—a content'

with simple thoughts that we in hindsight view as unsophisticated, as lacking the sense of mutually antithetical contentions. For example, people have posed the question whether the philosophy of Thales was in fact theism or atheism, whether he affirmed a personal God or merely an impersonal, universal being, namely, a god in a sense we do not normally recognize as God.[71] The characteristic of the subjectivity of the highest idea, the personality of God, is a far richer and more intensive concept, hence a much later concept.[72] As imaginatively represented, the Greek deities surely had personality, as does the [42] One God in the Jewish religion, although imaginative representation is quite different from apprehension by pure thought and the concept. Philosophizing has to operate completely on its own (or rather, must begin its work this way[73]), by isolating thinking from all folk beliefs and regarding itself as a quite different domain. Philosophy leaves the world of representation to one side, with the two coexisting entirely peaceably or, put differently, without yet any reflection on their opposition, because their contradiction occurs only much later. Little thought was given to seeking to reconcile them by setting forth conceptually what is found merely in a different outward shape in folk beliefs, and by explaining and justifying the folk beliefs in such a way as to be able to express the concepts of free thinking itself in turn in the mode of folk religion itself. Later that effort constituted one of the aspects and concerns of Neoplatonists, as a principal method of their philosophizing.[74] We still see the peaceful coexistence of the domain of folk representations with that of abstract thinking in the later, more cultivated Greek philosophers. Their speculative [43] impulses coexist

71. Hegel may have been familiar with the debate about Thales' atheism from the dissertation of his teacher, Iohannes Fridericus Flatt, *Dissertatio inauguralis philosophico-historica de Theismo Thaleti Milesio abiudicando* (Tübingen, 1785). Michelet cites it in a footnote to the first edition of the *Werke*, xiii. 55. Brucker discusses the issue (*Historia*, i. 469), as does Tennemann (*Geschichte*, i. 62–3), who says there is insufficient evidence to decide it.

72. At this point the manuscript inserts phrases we omit from the main text because they interrupt the flow and are more like marginal additions: 'Atheism—comparison with the definition we have of God. All the ancients—not Christian—to that extent atheists.'

73. In the margin: 'It can indeed be more in [the mode of] imaginative representation than in [that of] thought—belonging to the free substantiality of the subject—Like the Trimurti of the Indians'. On Hegel's information about the Trimurti, see *Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 327 with n. 238.

74. Here Hegel points to the interrelation between allegorical interpretation of the prevailing Greek mythology and of the Bible, in Hellenism and late antiquity on the one hand, and in the later Neoplatonic identification of philosophical concepts with those of the folk religion on the other. He explains these tendencies in his accounts of Philo of Alexandria and of Proclus; see Vol. II, pp. 323–4 and 341–5. Proclus says the philosopher must be 'the universal hierophant of the whole world' (that is, have a thinking understanding of the cultus); in his *Theologia Platonis*, Proclus refers to the universal concepts as 'gods'.

quite honorably and not hypocritically with observance of the cultus, the pious invocation of the gods, sacrificial offerings, and the like, as in the last words of Socrates, spoken to his friends, that they should sacrifice a cock to Aesculapius.[75] This request cannot be squared with Socrates' consistently conveyed thought about the essence of God, above all with his principle of morality. When *we* notice such consequences, that is another matter.

b. Treatment of the Ancient Philosophies

[Our topic is philosophical] knowledge, its consequences, and what has actually been thought. [76]This is the place to remark that we can see included in [the published] histories of philosophy a host of metaphysical propositions regarding a philosophy, recounting contentions the philosopher allegedly made but lacking either textual backing or the slightest historical evidence to support them. Brucker's vast philosophical history propounds in this fashion a series of thirty, forty, a hundred philosophical propositions pertaining to Thales and others, though with no historical evidence that these philosophers had such thoughts. Propositions and even citations for this purpose from argumentative thinkers of a similar stripe can be sought at length. Brucker's actual procedure is to outfit a simple philosophical expression of an ancient thinker with all the consequences and auxiliary theses that, from the perspective of Wolffian [44] metaphysics, must be its presuppositions and corollaries, and thus to trot out ingenuously such a blatantly false attribution as if it were an actual historical fact.[77] Whether or not such reflections, categories of thought, and conceptual relationships have entered into consciousness is precisely what constitutes the progressive development, the differences of the periods, their cultivation and their philosophies.[78]

Even Ritter's *Geschichte der Jonischen Philosophie*, p. 13, [states that] Thales 'treated the world as the all-embracing, living animal, which has developed from a seed as all animals do; the basic intuition of Thales is therefore that the world is a living whole that developed from a germ and, in the manner of an animal, lives on by means of a nourishment suited to its

75. On the cock for Aesculapius, see above, p. 80 with n. 41.

76. In the margin: 'Distinction of thought—not further developed—*necessary* presuppositions—just sticking with the categories that they themselves have—'.

77. See n. 72, p. 100 above.

78. In the margin, next to the paragraph division: 'People [act] like children: if you do so and so, I will become ill

Thinking relationship of cause and effect—Tennemann's—consequence—subject and object—Here the thought is the main thing—not, what sort of concepts govern one's life—the thoughts themselves emphasized—'

original essential being. Thales did not yet employ [the term] ἀρχή—instead Anaximander [did]—therefore [he did] not [say] that the principle of the world, of everything, is water.'[79] This very distinction resides wholly in—whether outside—the development of thought; surely in it—not outside it—interpretation of the Bible—held for it [what is] recognizably the subjective view.[80]

Thales: water is cause of the world—world is eternal. To the contrary, [for] Thales the seed of all things is moist. 'Ex nihilo nihil fit.'[81] One [must] stick with the strictest precision, with historical precision, [to] the actual words—not draw a different conclusion from them.

Directly connected with this consequence of the concept of development, with the fact that the most ancient philosophies are the most abstract ones for which the idea is the least [45] determinate, is another consequence—that inasmuch as the progression of the development involves further determining, which is a deepening and grasping of the idea within itself, accordingly the latest, most recent, newest philosophy is the most developed, richest, and most profound; it must preserve and contain all that at first appears to be something bygone; the newest philosophy must itself be a mirror of the entire history. What is the first is the most abstract because, being the first, it has not yet moved forward; the last shape [of philosophy] that emerges from this forward movement, as an ongoing determining, is the most concrete one. It is noteworthy that this [view] is no presumptiveness on the part of the philosophy of our era, for this is precisely the spirit of this whole presentation, the fact that the more refined philosophy of a later era is essentially the result of the preceding labors of thinking spirit, that it is fostered and propelled by these earlier standpoints, is not sprung from the ground in isolation, on its own. The other thing to remember is to not hold back from what needs to be said in the nature of the case, namely, that the idea as grasped and presented in the most recent philosophy is the most developed, the richest and most profound. I point this out because the

79. The materials within quotation marks are nearly exact reproduction of Ritter's own words, though with omitted portions, from a passage on pp. 12–15. See also the discussion of Thales on this issue in Vol. II, pp. 26–8.

80. This passage, and the following paragraph, consist of phrases or sentence fragments, akin to the marginal notations and unlike the rest of the manuscript proper, which is written out (for the most part) in complete sentences.

81. Hegel is referring to two interpretations, namely, that water is the cause of the world, and that the world is eternal. His statement that 'to the contrary, [for] Thales the seed of all things is moist' corrects the first interpretation. To the second he appends 'Ex nihilo nihil fit', while conceding that it is inadequate as a formulation. The two interpretations are found in Vol. II, pp. 26–8. Brucker (*Historia*, i. 516) does not attribute the latter formulation explicitly to Thales, but instead to Diogenes of Apollonia.

expressions 'new, newest, or the very latest philosophy' have become veritable catch phrases. Those who suppose they have said something by these labels can all the more readily dispose of [*kreuzigen*] the many philosophies, either by regarding not only each shooting star but each flash in the pan too [46] as a sun, or by proclaiming each silence to be a philosophy too, adducing as proof the fact that there are so many philosophies and each day's philosophy displaces the one before it.[82] With this they have at the same time discovered the category by which they can transpose a meaning to obtain what seems to be philosophy (and this has already been done); they call it a 'philosophy in vogue' [*Modephilosophie*]:

> In mocking words you call it a passing fad [*Mode*], when ever anew
> The human spirit earnestly strives for cultivation.[83]

I have stated that the philosophy of an era has its shape as the result of what precedes it. The basic feature of development is that one and the same idea lies at the foundation of all philosophy, for there is but one truth; each subsequent philosophy contains the characteristics of its predecessors and is itself only the more advanced determination of them. This shows that, although the history of philosophy is of course history, it is not dealing with something bygone. The contents of this history are the scientific products of rationality, and they are not something [47] transitory. Labors in this field have yielded what is true, and this truth is eternal, not existent at one time but no longer at another. The physical bodies of those spirits who are the heroes of this history, their lives in time, have indeed passed away, but their works have not gone away with them.[84] The content of their works is something rational, not something they imagined, dreamt, or opined. What they did was simply bring what is implicitly rational out from the depths of spirit where it subsists at first only as substance, as inner being, by bringing it into the light of day, into consciousness and knowledge. Hence their deeds are not simply housed in the temple of memory as images of what once was, for they are just as much contemporary, just as much living today as at the time they first occurred. They are effects and works that are not annulled and destroyed in turn by their successors; they are not preserved by canvas or marble or paper or representation and memory, which are

82. The transcript adds: 'So they see the philosophies sprout up like mushrooms.'

83. The nearly exact quotation is from Friedrich Schiller, ed., *Musen-Almanach für das Jahr 1797* (Tübingen, [1796]). See *Schiller-Nationalausgabe*, ed. Julius Petersen and Friedrich Beissner (Weimar, 1943), i. 333, the entry entitled 'Modephilosophie'.

84. See Rev. 14: 13: 'Write this: "Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord henceforth." "Blessed indeed," says the Spirit, "that they may rest from their labors, for their deeds follow them!" '

transitory elements or the substratum of what is transitory. Instead their element is thinking, the immortal essence of spirit, impenetrable to moths and thieves.[85] The legacy of thinking, as given form [*eingebildet*] for thinking, constitutes the being of spirit itself. For that very reason these studies are not scholarship or information about something dead and gone, buried, decayed. The history of philosophy deals not with antiquated matters but with what is living today.

Just as each category [*Gestaltung*] in the logical system of thinking [48] has its place, at which alone it is valid and by which it is reduced to a subordinate moment by the progressive development that follows it, so too each philosophy is a particular stage of development in the whole process and has its specific place, at which it possesses its true value and significance. Its particularity is to be grasped essentially in accord with this character[86], acknowledged partly according to its place, and given its due. By the same token, more [must] not be required or expected from a philosophy than it has to offer, nor satisfaction sought in it that can be gained only from a more fully developed knowledge. Because each philosophy presents a particular stage of development, it therefore belongs to its time and is caught up in the limitations of its time. Individuals [are] the offspring of their people, of their world; no matter how much they may wish to reach out they do not get beyond their world; they belong to the one, universal spirit that is its substance and essential being. How could they get beyond it? This same universal spirit is what philosophy grasps in thinking, for philosophy is spirit's very own thinking and is, accordingly, its specific substantial content.

For this reason, however, an earlier philosophy does not satisfy that spirit in whom there lives a more profoundly defined concept. [49] What one seeks to discover in it is the concept that constitutes one's own inner character and the root of one's determinate being, grasped as object for thinking—one seeks to know oneself. But the idea is not yet present in this specificity in the earlier philosophy. Of course the Platonic, Aristotelian, and other philosophies live on and are with us; yet philosophy is no longer in the shape and stage it had as Platonism or Aristotelianism. For this reason there can be no more Platonists, Aristotelians, Stoics, or Epicureans today. To wish to awaken them, to bring the spirit that is more cultivated, and has gone more deeply within itself, back to such philosophies would be an impossibility, likewise a foolishness, just as when a man strives to be a youth, or the youth strives to be a boy or a child, even though man,

85. See Matt. 6: 20: '... but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust consumes and where thieves do not break in and steal'.

86. In the margin: 'c) not for *our* satisfaction'.

youth, and child are [stages of] one and the same individual. The era of the revival of the sciences, the new epoch of the (fourteenth,) fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, not only set out to study the ancient philosophies but also to resuscitate them. Marsilio Ficino was a Platonist, and Cosimo de' Medici even founded a Platonic Academy, installing Ficino as its head. Pomponazzi [was] a pure Aristotelian. [50] Gassendi later philosophized in Epicurean fashion in his physics, Lipsius sought to be a Stoic, and so forth. People generally thought of ancient philosophy and Christianity as being antithetical, and no proper philosophy would have developed from, or within, this setting; they did, and could, regard philosophy in Christianity as being one of those philosophies one might take up once again in the aforementioned sense.[87] But mummies brought among the living cannot be sustained there. Spirit has long since had a substantial life within itself, has long since borne within itself a more profound concept of itself, and accordingly has a higher standard for its own thinking than those philosophies satisfied. Such a resuscitation is therefore to be seen only as a course of self-instruction in conditioned, antecedent forms, as a protracted meandering through requisite stages of culture; as imitation and reiteration for oneself, in a distant time, of principles in history that have become foreign to spirit, entered upon as a bygone phenomenon, set forth moreover in a dead language. Such things are only translations, nothing original, and spirit finds satisfaction only in the knowledge of its own proper originality.

When our day is exhorted once again to return to the standpoint of an ancient philosophy,[88] as some do [51] in particular to the Platonic philosophy, precisely as a deliverance from all the complexities of the eras that followed it, that return is not the naive phenomenon of Plato's original theory of recollection [*Wieder-Einlernen*].[89] This counsel of modesty has instead the same source as the summons to cultured society to return to the savage life of the North American forests, to its customs and corresponding outlook, and the same source as the endorsement of the religion of Melchizedek. Fichte once pointed to the latter (I believe in his *Vocation of Man*) as the purest and simplest religion, and so as that to which we must revert.[90] A backward step of this sort involves, on the one hand, an

87. For these Renaissance figures, see Vol. III, pp. 57–9. For this view of Christianity in relation to ancient philosophy, see Vol. II, pp. 131–3.

88. In the margin beside the beginning of this sentence: 'not antithesis of *being* and *thinking*, concept of subjectivity—objectivity, *not* autonomy of thinking, of the subject—Descartes'.

89. See n. 12, p. 58 above, on the return to Plato.

90. Hegel's first allusion here is to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Discours sur l'origine et les fondemens de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (Amsterdam, 1755). See *Discourse on the Origin*

unmistakable longing for an origin and secure point of departure, which is, however, to be sought only in thinking and the idea itself, not in an authoritarian form. On the other hand, taking a developed and abundantly endowed spirit and directing it back to such simplicity, namely to an abstraction, to an abstract condition or thought, can only be viewed as the refuge of impotence, which feels unable to be satisfied with the abundant material of the development that it sees before it, that exhorts it to become governed by thinking and embraced in its depth. So this impotence seeks its solace in flight from all this into a meager state.

From what has been said it is clear why so many people, whether motivated by a particular recommendation of this sort or else attracted [52] by the reputation of a Plato or ancient philosophy in general, in turning thus to draw philosophy from these sources, find themselves dissatisfied by this study and unjustifiably abandon it. One must know what to seek in the ancient philosophers or in the philosophy of every other specific age, or at least know that in a philosophy of this sort one sees a specific stage of thinking's development, and that only those forms and needs of spirit lying within its horizons are brought to consciousness in it. More profound ideas lie dormant within the spirit of the modern age, ideas requiring an environment and contemporary setting different from the abstract, obscure, hoary thinking of ancient times, if they are to know themselves in wakefulness.[91] In Plato, for instance, questions as to the nature of freedom, the source of ills and evil, the nature of providence, and so forth, find

of Inequality, ed. Patrick Coleman, trans. Patrick Phillip (Oxford, 1994). Hegel does not take into consideration Rousseau's distinction between those to whom the divine voice has not yet spoken, and whom Rousseau counsels to return to the forest, and others like himself, who, for the sake of knowledge and virtue, renounce such a return. During his student days at Tübingen Hegel read Rousseau's *Émile*, his *Confessions*, and his *Social Contract*, but there is no evidence he read this *Discourse*. The second allusion, to adopting the religion of Melchizedek, applies not to Fichte's *Vocation of Man* but to his *Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters* (Berlin, 1806), pp. 211–12, in comments on the account of Christ as 'a priest forever, after the order of Melchizedek' (Heb. 7: 17). There Fichte does not, as Hegel states, advocate a return to the simple religion of Melchizedek, but instead juxtaposes Johannine theology, which he links with Melchizedek, to Pauline theology, and rejects both Catholic and Protestant dogmatic theology as inadequate outgrowths of Paulinism, favoring instead a Johannine perspective. Fichte refers to Melchizedek also in the sixth lecture of his *Anweisung zum Seeligen Leben, oder auch die Religionslehre* (Berlin, 1806).

91. In the margin: 'Athenian knew himself as free—his freedom is object [*Objekt Gegenstand*] to him—he is conscious of himself as *free*—that this [is] his being

Freedom as his essential being—knowledge that the Oriental does not have—But only he, the Athenian—freedom is objective to him as determination of ***human beings*** universally—

Spirit something essentially *individual*, personal—and of infinite, absolute *worth*—God wills, that all human beings will come to be availed [of it]'.

no philosophical resolution. Popular, pious notions about these topics can of course be drawn to some extent from his beautiful portrayals,[92] [53] in part, however, by abandoning completely any philosophical resolution, deliberation, exploration, and the like of these issues, or else by considering evil and freedom as just something negative. But neither approach gratifies spirit when issues of this kind arise for it, when the antithesis of self-consciousness has become so intense for it that spirit is absorbed with such concerns.

How the different philosophies are considered and treated, however, is a consequence of the aforementioned distinction.

This distinction also has a further consequence for the way in which the philosophies are considered and treated in their historical presentation.

The transcript continues with material not in the manuscript. It states that the history of philosophy deals with what is actually of interest, where the idea is more fully and profoundly developed, which is why discussion of such abstract philosophies as Atomism and Cartesian mechanism need only include the principles and not the details. The transcript then recounts at length how one-sided philosophies correct one another, chiefly by its drawing various contrasts between Plato and Aristotle, similar to those in the other introductions. It includes interspersed comments that are perhaps the auditor's own. It also provides an overview of the stages in the history of philosophy, one similar to those found in the other introductions. Our text resumes where the manuscript takes up again, on p. 57.

2. The Concept of Philosophy

The history of philosophy has to present this discipline in the shape of the era and the individual figures from which a coherent form [*Gebilde*] emerged and with which that form is connected. Such a presentation has to exclude the external history of the era, however, and must call to mind only the general character of the people, the times, and the prevailing conditions.[93] In fact, however, the history of philosophy itself presents this [58] character, indeed the apex of it; it stands in the most intimate connection with it, and the specific shape of the philosophy that belongs to an era is itself only one aspect or one element of it; it is *one character*. In considering more closely this intimate contact, strict attention must be paid in part to the relationship [philosophy] has to its historical surroundings, but also in

92. This vague reference could possibly have in mind remarks on Plato in Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, *Von den Göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung* (Leipzig, 1811), pp. 92–3, 146–8, 208–9, 216–22.

93. In the margin: 'a) connection'.

part especially to what belongs to philosophy proper, whereby it therefore stands apart from what is nevertheless so closely related to it.

A) The specific shape of a philosophy is therefore not only contemporaneous with a specific shape by which a people makes its appearance, contemporaneous with its political institutions and form of government, its ethical life, social life, skills, customs and conveniences, with its endeavors and labors in its art and science, with its religion, its military and external relationships, with the downfall of states in which this specific principle has been the norm, and with the emergence and prospering of newer states in which a higher principle finds its gestation and development.[94] In each instance spirit elaborated and extended, in the fulness of its many dimensions, the specific stage of its self-consciousness. Abundant spirit, the spirit of a people, its organization, is one dome with manifold arches, [59] passageways, rows of columns, rooms [*Hallen*], and compartments—all emergent from one whole, one purpose—which [is] the structure [*Halle*]. Philosophy is one form [derived] from these manifold aspects. Which one? Philosophy [is] the highest flowering; it [is] the *concept* of spirit's entire shape, the consciousness and the spiritual essence of the entire condition, the spirit of the age as it thinks itself, spirit as present. The many shapes of the whole are mirrored in it as the simple focal point, as its self-knowing concept.

(α) At a certain stage of spiritual cultivation people take up philosophizing as such. They begin to philosophize after they have provided for the necessities of life. According to Aristotle philosophy is a free activity, not an activity concerned with oneself. When the anxiety of desire has vanished, the free strengthening, uplifting, and establishing of spirit within itself occurs—a kind of luxury insofar as that term designates enjoyments and occupations unconnected with external necessity as such. Philosophy is the spirit of a people who have extricated themselves from the apathetic stupor of merely natural life and also from concern with the passions, and so have exhausted this preoccupation with the single individual as such.[95]

It can be said that a people removed as such from its concrete life, disconnected or separated from its situation, is nearing its downfall, indifferent to its vital existence or dissatisfied with it, and so taking refuge from it in the realms of thought. Socrates and Plato no longer took pleasure in the Athenian state, and Plato sought to bring about a better state with Dionysius in Syracuse. In Rome philosophy became widespread, as the Christian

94. At this point the transcript adds: 'Spirit is not merely pure thinking and relating, for it is at the same time willing, both universal willing and willing directed to what is particular.'

95. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 982b.19–27 (Barnes, ii. 1554–5).

religion did too under the Caesars, in that age of worldly unhappiness and the decline of political life. Science and philosophy exist in modern European life of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, during the decline of that life in which the Christian religion had been identical with political, civic, and private affairs.

(β) There comes a time, however, not only for philosophizing as such but when a specific [60] philosophy emerges in a people, and this specific standpoint of thought is precisely what pervades all other aspects of that age.

For this reason political history is not related to philosophy as its cause. One specific, essential nature pervades all aspects [of the age], presenting itself in the political sphere and the other spheres, as in different elements; there is one condition that coheres in all its parts, and however manifold and contingent its different aspects may appear, it contains within it nothing contradictory to it. But a demonstration of the way in which the spirit of an age places the impress of its own principle on that age's entire actuality and its destiny, and on its history, would be a philosophy of history as such. We, however, are concerned only with those configurations that place the impress of the principle of spirit into an intellectual element related to philosophy.

More specifically, the histories of the other sciences and of culture, especially the history of art and that of religion, are related to the history of philosophy in terms of both their [common] element and their own proper objects. [They have] representation and thinking in common, but also [61] universal objects and representation or thoughts about these universal objects.

As for the particular sciences, their element is of course knowledge and thinking, as is the element of philosophy. Their objects, however, are chiefly finite objects and phenomena. An amassing of information about this content is automatically excluded from philosophy; neither this content nor a form of that sort belongs to it. When, however, they are systematic sciences embodying universal principles and laws, and proceed on that basis, they bear upon a limited circle of objects. The ultimate principles are presupposed, as are the objects themselves, which means that outward experience or the sensation of the heart, the natural [62] or cultivated sense of right or duty, constitutes the source from which they are generated. In their method they presuppose logic, the definitions and principles of thinking as such.

The forms of thought, and the viewpoints and principles too, that are valid in the sciences and constitute the ultimate support for the rest of their

subject matter, are not peculiar to them but are, as such, common to the culture of an era and a people. The general culture consists of the universal representations and purposes, the environment of specific spiritual powers, governing consciousness and life. Although our consciousness has these representations and counts them as the ultimately defining characteristics of things, relying on them as its guiding links, it does not *know* them, does not make them as such into topics and matters of interest for its consideration. One abstract example is that each consciousness has, and utilizes, [63] the wholly abstract category of 'being'—'the sun *is* in the sky', 'this grape *is* ripe', and so on ad infinitum. Another example, at a more advanced level, involves the relationships of cause and effect, of force and its expression, and so forth. All knowing and representing is interwoven with, and governed by, this metaphysics; it is the network within which we grasp all the concrete subject matter that occupies our consciousness in its actions and endeavors. In our everyday consciousness this web of connections is embedded in the many-layered stuff comprising our known concerns and objects, the things of which we are aware. We do not single out its universal threads and make *them* into objects of our reflection in their own right.

With art, on the contrary, and especially with religion, philosophy shares the feature of having the entire scope of universal objects for its content. These are the modes in which the highest idea is present to the non-philosophical, empirical, intuitive, [64] representational consciousness. Inasmuch as in the course of culture their appearance precedes in time the emergence of philosophy, it is essential to mention this relationship and it has to be linked with the specification of the beginning of the history of philosophy precisely in order to show in what way the religious element is to be excluded and the beginning not be made with it.

The rest of the 1820–1 manuscript (pp. 64–81) consists mainly of discussions of the mutual relations of philosophy and religion, of religion in its own right, and of Oriental philosophy, all of which is replicated variously in the 1819 and 1825–6 introductions, in the 1825–6 section on Oriental philosophy, and/or in the philosophy-of-religion lectures.

The concluding part of the manuscript (pp. 66–81), or what has survived of it, has no parallel in the transcript. In it Hegel contrasts the religions that see the work of God in animal form (Egypt, India) with the religion that sees it in human attributes of will and spirit, and in doing so he contrasts representation and imaginative thinking with apprehension in thought. He goes on to state that, whereas Freemasonry and ancient mystery cults allege mythology to be the outer shell (*Hülle*) concealing great truths, in fact what they say is inside that mythological shell turns out to be just commonplace

content. God is revealed as spirit in both nature and the spiritual universe. So the representations of mythology and religion essentially are not just concealment (*Verhüllung*) but in fact disclosure (*Enthüllung*).

Concluding the 1820–1 introduction (pp. 82–108) are lengthy materials from the transcript having no parallel in the manuscript (which ends with p. 81). Following an overview of the stages of religion in relation to the concerns of thought (pp. 82–5) is a discourse on Oriental thought (pp. 86–96) that combines issues treated in the philosophy-of-religion lectures with topics in what becomes a distinct Oriental Philosophy division of subsequent series of these history-of-philosophy lectures. Finally, the transcript provides (pp. 96–108) an extended discussion of the divisions of the history of philosophy, one fuller than its counterparts in the other introductions, although with many parallels to them. A very general account of successive stages in the development of the idea precedes a broad-brush portrait of the stages of cultural history, which is followed by a detailed treatment of the way many philosophers fit specifically into this framework. Despite the overlap with the other introductions, this final section is interesting as a compact, yet explicit, account of what Hegel endeavors to show in these lectures. Beginning on p. 96.

3. Division of the History of Philosophy

We will establish the divisions according to the same principle we have given for the concrete condition of the nations—the principle of freedom—as follows. In the Oriental world *one* is free, namely, God or the despot. The Greek principle embodies the extension that *some* are free. Although the Greeks contrasted themselves with the barbarians [for they regarded the Persian Empire as a despotism], they had slaves. In the third stage *the human being as such is free*. This third principle emerged essentially with the Christian religion, in its representation that human beings are freed through Christ and everyone has access to freedom.[96] All external contingencies of birth, wealth, and so forth, thus fall by the wayside. Human beings are inwardly infinite, in and for themselves.

96. The three stages of freedom attained in history constitute the larger framework of Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*. See *Introduction: Reason in History*, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1975), p. 54: 'The *Orientals* do not know that the spirit or man as such are free in themselves.... They only know that One is free.... The consciousness of freedom first awoke among the *Greeks*,... but... they only knew that *Some*, and not all men as such, are free.... The *Germanic* nations, with the rise of Christianity, were the first to realize that man is by nature free, and that freedom of the spirit is his very essence.... World history is the progress of the consciousness of freedom.' See also n. 68, p. 181 above.

The initial idea of philosophy must necessarily still be wholly abstract. Then it develops itself and makes itself determinate. Its determinate character has its locus in the distinction lying within the idea itself. The diversity of its configuration cannot be introduced from without. In the positive sciences a general concept is first made the foundation, and then subdivided according to distinctions discovered and introduced from without. Understood philosophically, however, distinction must have its beginning in the idea itself. The philosophical idea was expressed as the universal that is also in reality as the universal, such that it is all being. On closer examination we see, first of all, that universality too is distinct from the particular. Philosophical [97] universality is the unity of distinctions, and the authentic existence of the universal as universal is in the particular that is subjective thinking. In nature the universal does not have its existence as universal, for the species is not the single individual. Then, however, the universal as being-in-and-for-self we distinguish from subjective thinking. This gives us the distinction of subjective from objective. Further development now takes place with respect to this distinction. The idea is the unity of subjective and objective. This initially very formal and arid expression can also be stated as the identity of thinking and being. Talk of thinking first calls to mind of course particular, contingent thinking, or perhaps simply imagining. 'Thinking' is to be taken wholly in its universality. Likewise in the case of 'being', one should not then think of particularized being, but purely and simply of being as such. Being is not something ostensible, to be grasped by one's hands or seen with the eyes, but instead something completely universal and abstract. So this unity of being and thinking calls for more precise examination. The things we seek to know exist for us directly in their mutability, transitoriness, and particularity. We are then generally convinced that things are not in their truth as we have them before us in their immediate being, that we must instead think them. This is a fundamental point for all positive knowing too. In the particular sciences too one comes to know the universal aspect of things, that is, the way they are in thought. People are generally convinced that they only know things in truth when they think them. So, although at first it can seem strange for the unity of thinking and being to be the expression of truth, we nevertheless evidently hold the same conviction in our everyday consciousness. Only actuality that is thought is truly subsistent actuality.

Therefore the thought aspect of things is their subsisting being. So then, things are [98] therefore [objects of] thought. Spirit (though not in its contingent inclinations and fancies) is for us what is true. Some philosophers called things that are thought *νοούμενα*, and they counterposed *φαινόμενα* to

them. Things are noumena in their metaphysics and, in contrast, phenomena in their physics.[97] Things are in their objectivity as they are thought and, in contrast, their immediate, contingent status pertains to subjectivity. We must now remark that these very things as noumena are in our thinking. This thinking of ours, and the way the things are in it, is something subjective too. It is our activity. In our thinking the relationship is reversed, for what is thought is thus itself something subjective, so that the objectivity of things would be the way they are outside us, as the way they are no longer after we have directed the activity of thinking to them and assimilated them. If the expressions are not completely reversed in this way, and if we first posit that the things as noumena exist in our thinking and then are outside it too, this presumptive element outside us is not even material for the senses. The way things are in themselves is of no consequence whatsoever for us. The way they are immediately is their sheer relativity. What they are in thinking does not involve things in and for themselves. Thus everything is simply in the subjective element. The terms 'subjective' and 'objective', are thought to have provided suitably firm distinctions, although on closer examination the two flip over into their opposites and one does not know how that happens.

In our immediate consciousness it is fundamental that when things are thought they are grasped simply in their essential nature. So, what is thought about things is their truth. We are not directly conscious of this presupposition. The next step, then, is reflection upon it. The initial procedure is not self-conscious. In thinking about the thing I assimilate it, I give it a form and thus do not leave it just as it is. So I do [99] the exact opposite of what I sought to do, which was to have the thing. Thus consciousness of the antithesis is now established. This is in fact the very reflection that thinking spirit carries out in the history of philosophy. The entire division of philosophy rests upon it. Hence the general division of the history of philosophy determines itself in accord with the nature of the idea. First there is naive philosophizing, natural and unaffected, not in the least reticent about the fact that it thinks. So this first philosophizing as such brings forth a realm of ideality devoid of the abstract antithesis of thinking and objectivity. The universal is first developed by means of distinctions, but only distinctions within this universal realm. The second step, then, is the consciousness of the antithesis between thinking and being. This second part is thus the consciousness of the antithesis together with the effort

97. Hegel is not taking these terms in the sense they are used in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* B294–315. Instead, for the noumenon as known by spirit, and for this concept of phenomena, see Plato, *The Republic* 509d, 517b, 598b; trans. Paul Shorey, 2 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; London, 1963), ii. 108–9, 128–31, 430–1.

and labor of overcoming it, of bringing it to unity. These two parts of the history of philosophy comprise the whole of it. The freedom of self-consciousness and of the philosophical idea arose for the first time in the Greek people. So we can characterize the first part of philosophy as Greek philosophy. This initial, unselfconscious philosophy found its consummation as a realm of ideality lacking any reflection on the antithesis and leaving actuality out of consideration. The second part of philosophy is Germanic, or modern European, philosophy. Modern European philosophy and the modern European world emerge from the Germanic peoples. This second part labors mightily with the antithesis of being and thinking. Between these two parts falls the transitional period of the Middle Ages, of the initial spread of Christendom, extending to the time when thought emerged once again as free and autonomous. This transitional period involved thought too, but thought in the service of the church and, to that extent, formal thinking. [100]

Modern philosophy commences with free thinking: 'Cogito ergo sum'.[98] The first period involved philosophizing or thought as such. The universal was the foundation and was then defined. So the universal, divine idea is the sphere of the ancients. The determinations of the idea were not yet known then according to their necessity. Necessity requires the principle of subjectivity, of self-determination, and hand-in-hand with it, the determinations should be presented as contained within this one idea and as its activity. It requires the universal to be comprehended as the activity of self-determining, of self-distinguishing. So the systematic progression is contained for the first time in the principle of subjectivity. This principle, which appears according to the system as necessity, was not yet present in its totality in the unselfconscious ancient philosophy. The idea must necessarily make up for this deficiency. With the ancients we find mainly a recital of attributes. In the higher stage the self-developing idea that was at first unselfconscious gives itself the character of subjectivity; the idea posits itself in its character as infinite. The determinations are something distinct from the idea as itself universal, and they constitute its particularity. What emerges in the first place is the idea itself now determining itself. The determinations can, of course, be depicted initially as belonging simply to subjectivity, but that does not yet show how we ourselves arrive at them. Reflecting itself within itself, the idea is posited as infinite, and so it is what was previously called subjectivity. So the idea is posited as having the moment of the actuality of singularity [*Einzelheit*]. The idea positing

98. See Vol. III, p. 110.

itself as the negativity of the determinations, as subject, as being-for-self, is the negativity of its differentiation, what is called 'singularity'. By sublating the distinctions or the mediations, the idea posited itself as immediate, as actual. In ancient philosophy [101] the idea did not appear as totality, because ancient philosophy did not arrive at this negativity and did not posit the moment of singularity or actuality in itself. Thus actuality remained outside that philosophy, disregarded by it. That is the status of the Platonic Ideas, which set actuality aside. Immediacy comes into play such that the determinations, which are mediations, become reinstated and this brings about the establishment of immediacy, which is then the principle of the modern world. So the philosophical idea is not simply what is universal, but what is self-determining.

This idea, then, is necessarily embodied in world history, present there as the self-consciousness of spiritual existence. It came on the scene prior to its being grasped as thought. The appearance of this principle is the emergence of the Christian religion, which represents the divine as the divinity that came down into the world and took on the very shape of human actuality. This is the principle of reconciliation, that thought is no longer an 'other world' but is a presence. So the divine is no longer otherworldly but has taken on flesh and blood; the realm of ideality has thereby entered into the world. The realm of ideality is an actual realm, what we call the church. In it the subject as such is taken up into the realm of universality, and the actuality is a sanctified realm, the kingdom of God that has come upon the earth. This union means that subjectivity or the person has an infinite worth, and that freedom has been acknowledged as the principle. Prior to this the subject was subordinated to a fate that takes no regard for the individual; but now the subject is represented as an object for absolute will, one that is an end in itself.

The next thing to say is that this principle made concrete actuality fundamental, although in fact this realm of ideality itself was at first only an abstract actuality [102] and did not carry over into reality as such. So at first it had concrete actuality set over against it. A worldly realm stood over against the church, with the two externally related to one another. For the principle of the church to carry over into the worldly realm, the principle of rationality had to have developed itself into the principle of actuality, the state had to have become within itself a rational organization. Innermost feeling, or the heart, was said to find its place in the church; the principle was not yet ingrained as such in other spheres. Passions and desires apart from the religiosity of the subject had yet to have their power legitimated. Only later on is it necessary for the principle of truth to pervade actuality

and not simply remain enclosed within subjectivity. Worldly actuality had to become an organized realm of rationality. An opposition of this kind existed between the church and the realm of actuality because that principle was at first present only as an abstraction. People engaged in thinking within the church too, but there thinking only developed itself in a formal way. Truth was at first present in an immediate way. The church did of course position itself at the pinnacle of art, but it disavowed science. It committed Giordano Bruno to the flames. Galileo had to make abject apologies for constructing the true system of the motion of the heavenly bodies. So, faith and reason entered into mutual opposition. Free thinking took its stance on the side of the state, for that is where actuality made its claims felt. In the state human beings count for something just as they are, and the principle of free thinking is that 'thinking' means one's own thinking. In Germany philosophy has long been called 'worldly wisdom', a term unfortunately implying that philosophy [103] is simply the science of the mundane, of the transitory. In the state, or in worldly authority, what is rational is to be found within objective existence. So free thinking has extricated itself from that opposition, and independent thinking has grasped the principle of the unity of thinking and being. This principle thus appears in the modern world as the philosophical idea. All of modern philosophy revolves around this principle.

The time the world spirit employed in bringing the idea to its determinate form in our day amounts to approximately three thousand years. So we have: (1) the period of Greek philosophy; (2) the middle period, a time of exhaustive formal thinking; (3) the period in which the idea emerged in its specificity.

The Asian worldview therefore remains in the background, and we start where free thought emerges on its own account, grasping its object as thought. Anything else does not deserve to be called philosophy. Aristotle says it is not worth the effort to take seriously those who engage in mythological expression.[99] The beginning is then the simple emergence of thought, where thought is what is absolute, and the conclusion is the absolute realm of thought.

We begin with Thales (born in 615 or 629, 640 years before Christ).[100] This is the era in history when the internal revolutions of Asia constituted the beginning of a more stable shape of the world. The Neo-Assyrian Empire conquered the Phoenicians and cast the Jews into the so-called

99. See p. 86 above, with n. 52.

100. For the correct dates for Thales, as well as for information about specific philosophers mentioned in the remainder of this introduction, see Vols. II and III of this edition.

Babylonian Captivity. Elsewhere Cyrus gained control over Lydia and the coastal regions of Asia Minor. At this time East and West came into mutual contact. It is a very long road from this beginning up to the realm of intellectuality constructed by the Neoplatonists. There are three main epochs of Greek Philosophy: (1) from Thales to Aristotle; (2) Greek philosophy in the Roman world; (3) Neoplatonic philosophy.[101]

So Thales marks the onset of the universal thought that is wholly abstract and internally indeterminate. [104] The need is for this internally indeterminate thought to determine itself. Details about [the stages and epochs] of the three periods are as follows. (a) [The first stage of the first epoch extends] from Thales to Anaxagoras. [In this first stage] the universal came to grasp itself in what Anaxagoras expressed as νοῦς, a term for which we have no corresponding expression in German. Νοῦς is the wholly universal thought. So the first [stage] runs from Thales to Anaxagoras. (b) [Next in this first epoch are] the Sophists, Socrates, and the Socratics. Νοῦς now goes within itself and takes on the form of the subjectivity that does the determining. The principle of the Sophists was that the essential thing is particular thinking, and the Sophists were well versed in it. Socrates took his stance with the same principle, that the essential thing is the subjectivity of thinking, as subjectivity in the form of universality. So Socrates is the founder of morality; the subject is obliged to adhere to universal principles that, however, have their source in subjectivity.

(c) [Last in the first epoch come] Plato and Aristotle. With Plato subjectivity raised itself up to the Idea. This Idea is what is universal, is νοῦς, although as determined within itself. This internally determined universal is the immanent, eternal aspect of spirit itself. So this Platonic Idea is something at rest, a universal intuition of the divine, of the beautiful, the true, the good. Aristotle did not stick to static categories, for he grasped these essential forms in a way that the universal is inherently energy, unlimited activity. That is how Aristotle grasped the concept or, above all, necessity in the proper sense. For Aristotle necessity constitutes the summit of reality [*die höchste Spitze*], with the endlessly manifold particularity of the world existing, as it were, just alongside it. Aristotle was dominant for more than a

101. Hegel divides the history of philosophy into three large periods: Greek, Medieval, and Modern. Here he subdivides the Greek period into three epochs. Shortly below the transcript somewhat confusingly speaks of a 'first period' within the first epoch. To keep things clearer, our translation adds phrases not in the German to further identify the periods, epochs, and stages that are mentioned, and employs the terms 'epoch' and 'stage' (in place of 'period') when referring to the subdivisions of a period and of an epoch respectively.

thousand years, throughout the Middle Ages, because he took his stance at the heart of the concept and comprehended the universal as what is living. Aristotle and the Aristotelians philosophized about the objects of nature and of spirit; they did not make the concept itself the object, nor did they develop those concrete objects from it.

The next task, then, must be to elaborate this principle consistently. [105] Philosophy must assume the shape in which a universal form is introduced throughout all things. The issue, then, concerns the shape of the universal principle, and that calls for further investigation. By its determinate character the universal principle takes hold of the particular things and penetrates them. This determinate character is what the principle has in common with what is particular. So in modern times, for instance, the specific features of hydrogen and oxygen—polarity, contraction and expansion—have been what counted. The determinateness of the universal principle must first cast itself into distinct, particular form. So we see the universal principle emergent in two opposed forms, in the first instance in the form of thinking, and then in the form of being; these are the two determinate forms the universal can have, and they correspond, respectively, to Stoicism and Epicureanism. Both these philosophies lay claim to being based on universal principles, and to the universality of the concept they give forthwith the shape of one of the two antitheses. This is the era of dogmatism. Each of the principles is now formal and one-sided. Each in its one-sidedness wants at the same time to be the universal. It is the era of fragmentation and cleavage, the era of the world's unending pain, the Roman era. Each is a specific principle to be put into practice, not merely the universal implicitly. Each is said to explain the world, although with only a formal effort at explanation. What must come to accompany these two principles is Skepticism, which acknowledges neither the principle of thinking nor that of being, and allows for no truth.

The third [epoch of the first] period takes the shape of Alexandrian philosophy (Neoplatonism, but likewise Neo-Aristotelian philosophy too). The consummation of Greek philosophy as such, it established the realm of noumena, the ideal realm. This philosophy therefore incorporated all earlier forms of philosophy within it. Plotinus lived in the third century and Proclus in the fifth. By choosing to regard Proclus as the culmination of this philosophy, [106] the entire period of Greek Philosophy then amounts to about one thousand years. Neoplatonic philosophy carried forward into the Middle Ages, into the tenth to twelfth centuries. This [first] period began with the flowering of Greek freedom, and concludes with the fall of the Roman Empire. In 446 Odoacer even did away

with the title of Roman Caesar. Attila's era is the first half of the fifth century.[102]

The second period is a brief interlude that has Christendom for its foundation. The realm of ideality was expressed directly as a realm of actuality. The unity of the universal and the single individual is its foundation. A long time passed before thought worked its way up out of inwardness and into the form of the objectivity of thinking. In that inwardness the idea is still something enclosed within itself and has not yet pervaded concrete relationships. So this second period is a transitional period. Also evident in that period in addition to formal thinking there is, to be sure, a vitality of feeling, as we see it in the mystical philosophers. For them, however, the configurations of the idea are still on the whole those of the Neoplatonists.

The third period, which begins with the onset of the sixteenth century, is that of modern philosophy. Thinking, one's own spirit, became valid once more. Human beings once again stood on their own two feet, once again looked to their own hands; no longer were they utter laymen. Authority not attested to by the authority of one's own spirit carried no weight for them. Human beings once again began to take delight in themselves and in the world. Before this they had been strangers on the earth; now they circumnavigated the globe, discovered America, studied the heavens, and so forth. [107] The self-confidence of thinking disclosed the principle of freedom and made it the norm; it first comes to light in the form of the opposition between reason and faith. This transitional time also encompasses the period of fermentation; the ancient philosophies were revived, whereas in the Middle Ages they had been practically unknown. Two men especially deserve mention at this point. Francis Bacon of Verulam [St Albans] was known pre-eminently for examining nature. Because it involves seeing for oneself, his examination of nature was also called philosophy. The other aspect (of the fermentation) is the human being's delving into the depths of its own spirit. This aspect is the province of Jacob Boehme, who was even called the *philosophus teutonicus*. We have no reason at all to be ashamed of Jacob Boehme, who is the first German philosopher. Descartes lived especially at the time of the Thirty Years War, in an age when the different churches took firm stands that brought about the separation of church and state, with the result that the state for the first time became independent. The determinate nature of thinking and that of being, first expressed by Descartes, were then elaborated more enduringly and consistently by

102. The correct date for the downfall of the last of the western Roman emperors, Romulus Augustulus, and thus for the end of the western empire itself, is 476. The time of Attila's dominion is from 434 to his death in 453.

Spinoza. The unity of thinking and being initially had for Spinoza just the form of the absolute substance. This is the modern idea as such, although, as substance, this idea is still one-sided, such that personality, subjectivity, and so forth, ever just perish in it.[103] In contrast, the principle of subjectivity necessarily gained its own validity; the Spinozist philosophy directly created the need for the Leibnizian philosophy, in which that took place.

The second [stage of the third period], then, is formalism, which passes over into a separation of form from content. Formal metaphysics stands on one side, empiricism on the other. To the former belongs in particular the metaphysics of the understanding that originated with Leibniz and took its full shape with Wolff; on the other side falls the observation of nature, as well as the practical and moral sciences. [108] In this formal impulse philosophy has, in a word, gone astray. The speculative element still maintained itself in the form of being, especially in French philosophy. Skepticism attached itself directly to that merely formal philosophizing, to observation and drawing conclusions from observation.

The third [stage of the third] period is then the most recent one. In it spirit has gone within itself and has sought and found stability there. This marks the advent of the Kantian philosophy, which brought about the more recent revolution in thinking. Kantian philosophy goes together with political revolution, in the endeavor to find the absolute form of the idea. Kantian philosophy found and exhibited this absolute form in reason, in self-certainty. My own thinking is the absolute form of absolute substance. One must, to be sure, find Kantian philosophy unsatisfactory, although its indisputable merit is to have located the starting point of absolute knowledge. That the absolute form exists in thinking is linked to the fact that I cannot hold to be true what is not essential being. The concurrent conviction evident in the political world is that I cannot exist except within a rationally ordered state, under a just system of government. Fichte gave prominence to that absolute form with its logical implications, albeit still in the form of subjectivity. The only remaining requisite was to unite the content or absolute substance with the absolute form, so that both are freed from their one-sidedness. This unification and totality has been established in Schelling's philosophy. All the preceding philosophies and shapes are contained in this final idea, in this totality.

This, then, is the result that the world spirit has brought about today, with respect to its consciousness of itself.

103. In Vol. III, p. 122, Hegel says this about Spinozism: 'If thinking stops with this substance, there is then no development, no life, no spirituality or activity. So we can say that with Spinozism everything goes into the abyss but nothing emerges from it!'

C. THE 1823–4 LECTURES

Materials for this introduction consist of a partial manuscript that the German edition identifies as belonging to 1823, and two transcripts (Hotho and Hube). Taken together, these materials are nearly as lengthy as the very extensive 1820–1 introduction, and about the same length as the 1825–6 introduction. There are, however, considerable differences among these three introductions. The 1823 manuscript begins with several pages that precede the starting point of the 1820 manuscript, and then parallels it in part, down to where the 1820–1 transcript version commences. The German edition places the 1823 manuscript in parallel with the 1820 manuscript's opening section, in synoptic fashion, hence separated from its collated version of the 1823 transcripts. This English edition, in contrast, treats the 1823 manuscript as the first part of the 1823–4 introduction, so that the reader can get a sense of the whole in one place. The manuscript is likely Hegel's reworked parts of the 1820 manuscript in preparation for possible publication. Although he may not have delivered some of it orally, we can assume that it reflects his thinking as of 1823, and so is of interest in its own right as 1823 datable material. Following the brief 1823 manuscript, this translation takes up the German edition's presentation of the collated 1823–4 transcripts that, for simplicity's sake, is referred to here in the singular as 'the transcript'. All but one of the section headings are provided; the transcript has none itself. The text begins on page 1 of the German edition.

Introduction

While the history of philosophy is surely a topic of great interest when approached from a worthy perspective, one cannot help remarking that the topic itself is also of interest to those who latch onto it in a wrong-headed fashion. Their interest even seems to intensify in proportion to how perversely they represent philosophy and its historical accomplishments, because they draw from the history of philosophy especially a proof of the futility of this science.

It is admittedly justifiable to require that a history of any topic whatsoever recount the facts without partiality, without seeking to validate some particular interest and aim. Yet a commonplace requirement of this sort does not amount to much because the history of a topic is necessarily linked very closely to the view one forms of that topic. In light of that view, one decides for oneself what counts as important and pertinent. Then the way one relates what has taken place to that decision brings selectivity

into the narration of events. It introduces a method of grasping them and perspectives that govern their arrangement. For instance, depending on the view adopted as to what a political state is, readers of some country's political history may find in that history nothing at all of what [2] they seek from it. This can be even truer of the history of philosophy, and may be illustrated from portrayals of this history in which one could expect to find everything but what counts as philosophy. Histories of other topics establish their view of the topic at least in its principal features, whether that topic be a specific land or people, or the human race as such, or else the science of mathematics or physics, or an art form such as painting. In contrast to other sciences, however, the science of philosophy has the distinctive feature or, if you like, the disadvantage, that there are the most diverse views even about its concept, about what philosophy could and should be accomplishing. If the initial presupposition or perspective regarding this history's object is not firmly established, then the history itself as such is necessarily a flimsy undertaking. The history of philosophy maintains its consistency only by presupposing a specific point of view, and yet comparison with divergent views of the topic readily invites the reproach of being one-sided. While this is a disadvantage only when we look at philosophical historiography superficially, a different and more profound disadvantage is connected with it.

Although there are diverse concepts of the science of philosophy, only the true concept puts one directly in a position to *understand* [*verstehen*] the works of the philosophers who have labored within its framework. For thinking, and for speculative thinking in particular, 'understanding' [*Verstehen*] means something entirely different from simply grasping the grammatical meanings of the words on their own terms, and doing so merely within the scope of representation.[104] Hence someone can be familiar with the philosophers' contentions and propositions or, if you like, with their opinions, can have dealt extensively with the bases for those opinions and their elucidation, and by all these efforts have missed the main thing, which is to *understand* the propositions. There is no shortage of multivolume, [3] and so-called scholarly, histories of philosophy that are not knowledgeable about the very material with which they have dealt at length. A compiler of this sort of history can be compared to an animal capable of hearing all the tones of a musical piece but insensible to the one important thing, their harmony.

104. Here Hegel is using *verstehen* (verb and noun forms) in a quite positive sense, in contrast to his usually critical view of *Verstand*.

The aforementioned circumstance makes it even more necessary than for the other sciences that the history of philosophy be preceded by an introduction firmly establishing the object whose history is to be set forth. The question is how to begin the treatment of an object when its *name* is indeed familiar but one does not yet know what that object is. To handle the history of philosophy in that way is to have no other guideline than to search out and accept whatever has been called philosophy at any time and place. In fact, however, a treatment establishing the concept of philosophy scientifically, rather than capriciously, will be the science of philosophy itself. The characteristic feature of this science is that its concept only apparently consists of the starting point, for only the complete treatment of this science is itself the demonstration, one can even say the very discovery, of its concept, a concept that is essentially a result of this treatment. This introduction therefore directly presupposes the concept of the science of philosophy, the concept of its history's object. So while this introduction supposedly pertains only to the history of philosophy, it is on the same footing as that which just now has been said to belong to philosophy itself. What can be stated in this introduction is not so much prefatory in nature as it is something that can be justified by the treatment of the history itself, and demonstrated from it. This is the only basis on which these preliminary explanations can escape categorization as capricious presuppositions. [4] Setting out beforehand what has its justification essentially as result, however, can only be of interest as an advance indication of the universal content of a science as such. In that sense it must serve to ward off the many questions and challenges that can be posed to such a history, based on the usual prejudices concerning it.

The first task will be to discuss the *character* of the history of philosophy, from which follow *consequences* for how to deal with it. The second, based on the concept of philosophy, is to be more specific about what, from the endless materials and manifold aspects of the spiritual formation of peoples, is to be excluded from the history of philosophy. Doubtless religion, with the thoughts it involves and the thoughts about it, especially in the shape of mythology, in virtue of this material lies so close to philosophy—as does the formal development of the [other] sciences too—that at first it seems the history of this philosophical science must be of quite indefinite scope. But when the terrain of this history has been appropriately specified we obtain its *starting point*, which is to be distinguished from the beginnings of religious intuitions and thoughtful presentiments.

In the third place, the division of this history in its necessary periods must be given based upon the concept of its object itself—a division that

must exhibit these periods as an organically progressing whole, as a rational connection, through which alone this history itself is worthy of being a science.

The second and third of these topics do not correlate well with the organization of material in the 1823–4 transcript presented below where the manuscript leaves off. The transcript has no headings of its own. So, all headings after the first are not Hegel's or his auditors', but ones created for this English edition. The manuscript continues.

1. Characterization of the History of Philosophy

Topics of interest in this history can be examined under multiple aspects. We grasp the heart of the matter when we seek it in the essential connection this [5] ostensible past has with the stage our contemporary philosophy has attained. This connection is not one of the superficial considerations one can mention in examining the history of this science; instead it expresses the inner nature of philosophy's character, namely, that while the events of this history, like all events, of course have their effects, these are productive in a characteristic way. That is what calls for further clarification at this point.

The history of philosophy presents us with the series of noble spirits or the gallery of heroes of *thinking reason* who, in the strength of this reason, have delved deeply into the essence of things, into the essence of nature and of spirit, into the *essence of God*, and by their labors gained for us the greatest treasure, the treasure of rational knowledge. The events and actions of the history of philosophy do not have the kind of content that includes issues of personality and individual character. In political history, however, the subject of deeds and events is the individual as such, according to the particular features of the person's disposition, genius, passions, and energy or weakness of character, that is, according to the features constitutive of *this* individual. [6] The products of philosophy, in contrast, are all the more excellent the less they are attributed to the particular individual and that individual's merit, and the more they belong instead to free thinking, to the universal character of the human being as such, namely, the more this thinking itself, devoid of individualistic traits, is the subject producing those contents.

As historical, these deeds of thinking at first appear to be an affair of the past, remote from *our actuality*. In fact, however, what *we* are, we are at the same time historically. Put more precisely, just as in this domain, in the history of thinking, what is past is only one aspect, so too in what we are, our common immortality is inseparably linked with the fact that we are historical beings. The self-conscious rationality belonging to us

and to the contemporary world did not arise directly and grow simply from the soil of the present day; instead it is essentially an inheritance and, more specifically, the *result* of labor, indeed the labor of all the prior generations of the human race. The arts of external life, the array of resources and skills, the institutions and customs of the social and political commonwealth, are all a *result* of the deliberation, the discovery, the exigencies, the necessity and misfortune, the endeavor and accomplishment, of the history prior to our present day. [7] So, what we are in science, and more specifically in philosophy, is likewise indebted to the *tradition* that, in Herder's expression, weaves itself as a *sacred chain* throughout all that is transitory and that is therefore past, what former ages have brought forth, maintained for us and transmitted to us.[105] But this tradition is not just a housekeeper, who simply preserves faithfully what is received and so passes it on unaltered to her successor; no immobile statue, it is instead living, and it swells as a mighty river that grows greater the further it presses on from its source. The content of this tradition is what the spiritual world has brought forth, and the universal spirit does not[106] stand still; we are essentially dealing here with the universal spirit. The culture, art, and science of a single nation, namely its spiritual capacities, might well become static, as seems to be the case, for instance, with the Chinese, [8] who may have been as advanced two thousand years ago as they are today. The spirit of the world, however, does not sink into an apathetic repose. It relies on its simple concept; its *life* is *activity*, and the activity has for its presupposition a raw material at hand to which it is directed, and which it does not simply increase or expand by added material; instead it essentially *reworks* and *transforms* this material. Inheriting involves receiving and possessing the heritage, and at the same time reducing this heritage to a raw material that becomes transformed by spirit. In this way what is received is changed and enriched, and at the same time maintained. This is the situation and the activity of our age and of every age, in grasping the available scientific knowledge and adding to it, and by doing so developing it further and raising it to a higher standpoint; in making it *our own*, we make from it something characteristically ours, in contrast to what it was before. This kind of producing, which has an extant spiritual world as its presupposition and which transforms that world in the process of appropriating it, entails that our philosophy essentially [9] comes into existence only in its connection with its predecessors, and has

105. On this image, see n. 43, p. 166 above.

106. The German edition lacks the word *nicht*, and that apparently is a error, not an omission in the manuscript. The *nicht* is found in the *Gesammelte Werke* edition of this text (*GW* xviii. 101).

proceeded from them with necessity; its historical course does not present the coming-into-being of things foreign to us, but is *our own becoming, the coming about of our scientific knowledge.*

The views and questions about how to characterize the history of philosophy that can crop up hinge upon the nature of the relationships just discussed. Insight into them at the same time explains more precisely the subjective purpose to be introduced into the knowledge about this science through the study of its history. It involves in addition the specifics for how this history is to be treated in this connection, the fuller discussion of which should therefore be a principal purpose of this introduction. To that end, it must of course incorporate the concept of philosophy's intention, indeed must make this fundamental. Since, as already noted, the scientific explanation of this concept cannot take place at this juncture, the discussion cannot undertake to demonstrate conceptually the nature of the concept's coming-to-be, but only to bring it provisionally before us.

From the outset we run up against the fact that the topic of the history of philosophy involves an inherent tension. Because philosophy's intent is to know what is unchangeable and eternal, what is in and for itself, philosophy's goal is *truth.* But its history tells of what once was, in a different era that has vanished and been replaced by another. If our starting point is that truth is eternal, then truth does not fall within the sphere of transitory things, and philosophy has no history. But if philosophy does have a [10] history, and that history presents us merely with a series of the past shapes that knowledge has taken, then no truth is to be found in it, because truth is not something dead and gone. One could say that this general line of argument applies equally well not only to the other sciences but also to the Christian religion itself, and then finds it contradictory that there should be a history of this religion and of the other sciences. But it would be unnecessary to pursue this line of argument further on its own terms because it is directly rebutted by the fact that such histories exist. To get a more precise sense of this tension, however, we must distinguish the history of the external fortunes of a religion, or of a science, from the history of its object itself. To do so introduces the consideration that, because of the particular nature of its object, the history of philosophy involves different circumstances than those of the histories of other topics. It is clear that the aforesaid conflict cannot be a matter of philosophy's external history, but only of the inner history, that of the concept itself.

There is a history of the dissemination of Christianity and of the fate of its adherents; by constructing its existence as a church, it thus has the sort of outward existence that is involved in the most diverse temporal interactions,

has diverse fortunes, and essentially has a history. Christian doctrine itself is of course not without a history, although of necessity the doctrine developed rapidly, attaining its definitive formulation in an ancient creed holding good in every age and said to be still valid today, as the truth in unaltered form, even though such validity is only a semblance and the words [of the creed] only an empty verbal formula. The wider history of Christian doctrine includes, on the one side, the many additions to, and deviations from, that established truth and, on the other side, the battle [11] against those errors, the expunging of them from the enduring foundation and the return to doctrinal simplicity.

The other sciences, including philosophy, have an external history comparable to that of religion. They have a history of their origin, spread, flowering, decline, and revival, and they have a history of their teachers, patrons, and opponents too. Often they also have an external relationship to religion, and sometimes to the state as well. This aspect of their history likewise raises such interesting questions as, among others, why philosophy, as the doctrine of absolute truth, has apparently confined itself mainly to a limited number of individuals, to particular peoples, and to particular historical periods. Things are similar with regard to Christianity, where the truth has a much more general shape than it has in philosophy, and where the difficulty has been posed as to whether there is an inherent contradiction in that this religion emerged so late in time and remained for so long confined to particular peoples, as it still is today. This and other similar questions, however, are already much more specific than to hinge merely on the general conflict alluded to, and only when we come to touch on the proper nature of philosophical knowledge can we go more fully into the aspects more pertinent to the external existence and external history of philosophy.

However the history of religion compares with the history of philosophy in respect to the inner content, philosophy, unlike religion, does not have for its content a truth specifically fixed from the outset and taken to be immutable in its history. As the truth, Christianity's content as such has remained unchanged, and for that reason Christianity's truth has had no history, or practically none. So, in the case of religion, controversy regarding the fundamental definition [12] of Christianity falls by the wayside.[107] The deviations and additions raise no difficulties, for they are changeable things, entirely historical in nature.

107. In a marginal note at this point, Hegel refers to Philip Marheineke, *Lehrbuch des christlichen Glaubens und Lebens* (Berlin, 1823), §§ 133–4.

The other sciences of course have a history with reference to their content. In part their history even discloses changes in the sciences themselves, when they abandon theses previously held to be valid. But perhaps the greater portion of their content is of a lasting kind, for innovations do not alter previous advances, but supplement and augment them. These sciences progress by juxtaposing the new with the old. The progress of mineralogy, botany, and others, of course calls for many adjustments to their previous knowledge. But the far greater part continues on and, without changing, enriches itself by novel additions. In the case of a science such as mathematics, the content of its history tells principally of the gratifying practice and increasing scope of mathematics. Elementary Euclidean geometry, for example, can be regarded as being without a history from Euclid's day onward.[108]

In contrast, the history of philosophy exhibits neither a simpler content persisting without additions to it, nor just the routine of calmly attaching new stores of knowledge onto its prior heritage. It seems instead to provide a drama of perpetually recommencing changes of the whole, ones ultimately no longer even having the mere goal of a common thread; for the abstract object itself, the rational cognition, vanishes, and the edifice of scientific knowledge must finally share with this empty abode the pretention of philosophy and its name ['love of wisdom'] now taken in vain.

The manuscript ends and we turn to the transcript (pp. 139–203). Initially it parallels elements of the other series, except for the following passage (p. 141), set within the larger discussion of philosophy as 'opinion'.

... The history of philosophy has two antagonists. Previously its antagonist was piety, which declared that rational thinking is powerless as thinking in order to know truth. It said that reason must bow to authority if it is to attain truth, that thinking for oneself is misguided and leads to the abyss of doubt. (The relation of philosophy to religion will be discussed later on.)

The other antagonist expressing its opposition to philosophy as knowledge of truth is the so-called reason that turned mainly against faith, against religious doctrine, by taking the lofty position that human beings should be bound only by their own conviction when they take something to be true for their intellect, or obligatory for their will. A strange thing happened when this contention made an about-face, by coming to the conclusion that reason cannot know anything true. It began by battling religion in the name of reason, yet became reason's enemy by contending that presentiment or

108. Hegel possessed *Euklid's Elemente funfzehn Bücher*, trans. from Greek by Johann Friedrich Lorenz, 2nd edn. (Halle, 1798). See Hegel's remarks on Euclid in *Science of Logic*, pp. 807–11; *GW* xii. 221–3.

feeling should be the only norm for what counts as knowledge.[109] So it has once again formed an opinion as to what ought to be ultimate for human beings, but in doing so it contends that truth is unattainable. We must therefore take exception to this view as well. The general culture of today has made it a fundamental thesis that what is true cannot be known. This thesis is to be taken as a sign of the times, for such perspectives are signs. So, it has come to pass in theology that individuals no longer seek in the church for what they ought to believe, and that a creed is no longer fundamental in faith, because people tailor church and faith to fit their own convictions. Theological science simply confines itself to historical research in which one can learn no more than diverse opinions, for that research does not speak of truth. Its furtherance is viewed likewise as a confluence of opinions, such that truth is not the goal. Philosophy calls for conviction, but distinguishes the merely subjective bases for conviction, in presentiment and feeling, from insight into the nature of the thing, [142] from the concept of the object. The subject's particular conviction is opinion....

The ensuing account of philosophy's object, and of thinking reason's historical deeds, partly omitted here, we take up with a striking paragraph (p. 144), which is then followed by some very concise definitions.

Consequently, the deeds of thinking reason are not some romantic adventure. World history is not simply romantic, and its knights do not toil fruitlessly for the sake of some arbitrary object.[110] World history is not about incidents in which individuals, with their particular natures, capriciously hit upon solutions. Its events are not deeds of heroes in which, by chance, they exert and sacrifice themselves. Instead there is a necessary and essential connection in the entire movement of thinking spirit. The same holds for the history of thinking. Each thinker has discovered something in keeping with the particular aspects of his own spirit. But we are dealing here with spirit's activity, its pure activity and necessity. With this faith in the world spirit, we have to see a necessary, essential connection in what has taken place.

To this we conjoin a topic calling for more careful and specific consideration. It is necessary to go into several abstract, wholly universal concepts, inasmuch as we have to speak about them later on. They are the characteristics of 'development' and 'the concrete', [145] and we must turn our

109. The statement in the previous sentence, 'that reason cannot know anything true', refers to Kant's view that it is impossible to know things as they are in themselves, and that when reason goes beyond the domain of experience it produces antinomies, not knowledge. The view that feeling or presentiment (*Ahndung*) is the only norm for knowledge refers to the view of J. F. Friess.

110. Perhaps an allusion to Don Quixote.

attention to them at this point. The product of thinking, which is thought, is above all the object of the history of philosophy. To us 'thought' at first appears to be formal, but 'concept' is something absolutely concrete. 'Idea' is thought determined in and for itself, what is true as such, what is true by itself. The nature of the idea, then, is to be self-developing.

The first question is: What is development? There is a familiar image of development that does not seem to call for any discussion. But the very thing said to be familiar is just what is unfamiliar to someone lacking a philosophical education. Something employed unawares pervades this image of development, establishes it, and illuminates it, for this familiar feature is precisely something unfamiliar. When we just set forth a few concepts there is no mention of fuller insight into them, for that pertains to their further elaboration. Such characterizations apparently do not say much, and it seems that only the entire study of philosophy must shed light on their emptiness. The idea as development must first make itself into what it is. This seems to be a contradiction for the understanding, yet the very essence of philosophy consists in resolving the antitheses of the understanding.

We must distinguish between two states pertinent to development: first, natural tendency, ability, δύναμις, *potentia*, implicit being, and then explicit being, actuality, *actus*, ἐνέργεια.[111] For example, we say that a human being is rational, and we distinguish quite well between the newborn and someone whose developed rationality is evident to us. A child does not yet act rationally or know what is rational. The newborn child has what is called a natural tendency or potential for rationality, but not yet the real potential for it. In gaining the latter the child becomes what a human being is implicitly, and only then, as this explicit being, does the child have actuality in any of its aspects, in whatever form they take. We can express this point in abstract terms as follows. What a human being is implicitly must become object to it, [146] must enter into consciousness; it comes to be *for* the person, who comes to be *for himself*. In this way a human being becomes twofold. A person is reason or thinking, but is so implicitly, and then thinks, so thinking becomes the object to and for him. What one is, therefore, is what one is for oneself. In thinking, the thinking is itself the object, for rationality produces what is rational, and what the implicit being is comes to be seen in the explicit being. When we reflect on these statements we see that the human being, who was implicitly rational and who makes this rationality into the object, is nothing in addition to what he was at

111. On these terms in Aristotle, see Vol. I, pp. 235–6.

the beginning. What was implicit maintains itself and remains the same thing, and yet there is a vast difference. This seems to be an unnecessary duplication. Yet all insight, all scientific knowledge, all action, hinges on these definitions, because what is of interest is for this inwardness to set itself forth outwardly.

The subsequent discussion of development draws upon the familiar Aristotelian example of the seed, but soon reverts (p. 147) to a more general account of spirit's development.

... Spirit's development is a mutual separation [*Auseinanderlegen*] and, by means of it, a coming-to-itself. This presence-to-self, spirit's coming-to-itself, can be expressed as spirit's highest goal. Whatever takes place in heaven and on earth takes place only in order to attain this goal, which is spirit's eternal life, its finding itself, its coming to be *for itself*, its coming together with itself. In its forward movement there is an estrangement, a cleavage. But it is spirit's very nature to become estranged from itself in order to find itself once again. This movement constitutes freedom. We can say, somewhat superficially, that what is free is what is not derivative from, nor dependent on, another; it is what is not under the control of another, nor entangled with another. In drawing itself together with itself, spirit attains the goal of being a spirit that is free, that is present to itself. This is its absolute, its highest, goal. By reaching this goal spirit truly comes to possess its own self.

The fact that spirit reaches this goal in no other element than thinking is the salient point. When I have intuition, I always have an 'other' that remains an other. In feeling, likewise, [148] I am determined or find myself determined, for in feeling I am not free. When I am conscious of feeling, I know only that I feel it, that I am determined; thus I have not posited myself. In my willing I have a specific interest. To the extent that this is 'my interest', it is not something other to me. Yet my purposes do always include something other, something over against me, the sort of thing that, in a natural way, also determines me. It is something extraneous to me. In each of these states I am not fully present to myself. Thinking is the only sphere in which everything extraneous vanishes and spirit is absolutely free, is present to itself. The interest of thinking, of philosophy, lies in reaching this goal.

About development, one can ask what it is that is developing itself. It is the content of philosophy—the absolute. The development must nevertheless have a substrate. What develops itself can in fact be none other than what is in the activity. Through the activity the universal nature of the content is determined. We have to grasp the distinct moments in development,

namely, the in-itself and the for-itself. The very act of developing, then, contains these distinct moments within itself and, as such, is essentially what we call 'the concrete'. To this point we can add that the in-itself is indeed something concrete, and the activity is the setting forth of this concrete element. The in-itself is the starting point of development, the beginning factor, the driving force. The idea in itself is concrete too. What we speak of as 'one', namely, the in-itself, is the content. So, the concrete is a 'one', an other, and the unity of the two. The 'one' is present to itself in the other, for it does not have the other outside it; in the other it has turned back into itself. We must keep this definition of the concrete firmly in mind.

The idea is concrete, is true, for what is true is not abstract, and what is abstract is what is untrue. Even though philosophy is in the domain of pure thinking, it has all its content as something concrete. It is perhaps difficult to grasp the fact that the distinct or different [149] characteristics exist in a unity. The understanding is especially resistant to what is concrete and wants to render it superficially, for reflection by the understanding introduces vacuity and clings to it, whereas sound human reason calls for what is concrete. As 'one', the idea is, as thinking, of course abstract, although within itself it is absolutely concrete. Philosophy is directly opposed to the abstract and struggles in a constant battle against reflection by the understanding. We had to set before you these introductory historical points, in order to place what follows in its proper light.

The next two (omitted) paragraphs continue the account of concreteness and introduce examples from the natural world. Then come these remarks on spatial continuity (p. 150).

When, for instance, we speak of matter and of space, we know that space is continuous, uninterrupted. I can fill up space in various ways, but space cannot be fragmented. Yet another aspect of space is that we can designate all manner of points throughout it; we can punctuate it. In similar fashion, matter is composite throughout, [151] is divisible throughout, [and yet] throughout it is always utterly continuous, is a continuum within itself. The understanding says, to the contrary, that either matter is continuous or it is punctuated, is atomistic. The atoms are said to preclude the continuity. But reason grasps the opposites and says that matter is both. So we uphold the twofold characterization of divisibility and continuity, and we firmly posit both aspects in their mutual opposition. Matter is in fact neither of the characteristics taken absolutely by itself, because every continuum is atomistic [*Atom*] and every atomistic state is continuous. Analogously, and

at a higher level, we say that a human being is free, while from another angle we speak of a person's being subject to necessity.

With such characterizations we take the distinct aspects to be mutually exclusive. But truth is the unity of opposites, and we have to say that spirit has its necessity in its freedom, and that in its freedom spirit is necessitated. So, in this case the distinct aspects are posited in unity. It is more difficult indeed for us to grasp this unity, and the understanding does not wish to; but one must strive for it and succeed in doing so. It is always easier to say that necessity excludes freedom. We concede that this holds good for sensible things. There are in fact things, or existences, that are subject to necessity. They are natural things, but they are not true existences capable of apprehending their ultimate truth. This is not to say that such things do not exist at all. But spirit cannot be one-sided. If spirit is not necessitated, it becomes caprice, becomes abstract or formal freedom, empty freedom, and that is nothing concrete.

The categories that we will consider in the history of philosophy are defined in this way. These are the definitions and relationships that constitute the concept of the history of philosophy.

So we can remark that, by adhering to these concepts of development, we set aside our ordinary view [152] of multiplicity. That is because people view multiplicity as a reciprocal rigidity, as a many, as autonomous elements, whereas development is the movement that makes all rigid distinctions fluid.

The foregoing has these consequences for the concept of the history of philosophy. First, the idea, which constitutes the object of the history of philosophy, is concrete. The idea develops itself, is activity, the activity of development. It is supposed to set forth the distinctions it has in itself, so that they appear outside one another. Philosophy develops these distinctions as thoughts; in nature they are sensible existences.

The further point is that the distinctions thus produced and set forth must come into existence [*Bestehen*] as distinctions, must appear as existing[112]; they ought to be explicit, not abstract. They must be a totality when they make their appearance; they must be concrete. Only what is concrete is something actual, something true, the bearer of distinctions. They must be

112. Throughout this paragraph, *bestehen* in its verb and noun forms is rendered with the sense of 'existing' rather than 'subsisting'. In the final complete sentence on German p. 152, 'existence' renders *Existenz*. Philosophies 'exist' as elements in history, although as conceptual systems (except for their presentation in books) they do not 'exist' in the same sense as do physical objects in space and time. Their status lies somewhere between subsistence (*Bestehen*) and existence. In this paragraph 'existence' seems the more natural rendering.

for themselves, and to be that they must not be an abstraction, but instead must contain within themselves a totality of the idea. The philosophies are entire configurations of distinctions, presented as shapes of thought. A philosophy is the entire idea posited in one of its distinct aspects, and thus existent. So the different philosophies are specific thoughts. If they are said to be existent they must be concrete; they must contain the idea. This is how the idea exists in different forms. Whoever says otherwise, that it is more reasonable to suppose that every philosophy contains the idea but the forms the idea takes are inconsequential, has misunderstood the point. Then one looks upon the distinctions as external, as contingent, because they are just forms and not the subject matter itself. Yet everything essentially comes down to these forms; they are not external, but are none other than the original idea itself. They are its forms in such a way that the idea is what it is only through them, for only through them can the idea be concrete. Therefore they are not inconsequential; they constitute the idea's content. Dispersing itself, the content enters into the forms. But each determination grasps the idea within it, and the totality of the forms is the content. So the idea itself is the governing principle in the dispersal of philosophy into the existence of many philosophies. The totality of the philosophies [153] is what constitutes philosophy. Yet each, as a specific philosophy, is not the entire idea but is only a member of the whole, and this whole exists only for us, not for the specific philosophy itself. These specific forms are destined to be grasped together in the unity and to be relegated to the status of elements, and not to remain as autonomous wholes. The 'other' to the expansion is the contraction into the original form.

The next part of the text (pp. 153–64) is omitted because it presents an array of issues in much the same terms as the previous introductions. The main issues are: the necessary progression of the idea; why the earliest philosophies are the most abstract and are not to be resuscitated as such because they are inadequate to our contemporary concerns; the circumstances in which philosophies originate; the relations of philosophies to other aspects of cultures. We pick up the thread (p. 164) on this last issue.

2. The Relation of the History of Philosophy to the Other Aspects of Culture: Science, Religion and Mythology, and Popular Philosophy

The second observation that can follow from the first about philosophy's general connection with history is that we can separate off from the history of philosophy the various aspects related to it; that is, we can grasp it in distinction from those branches closely related to it and with which it can so easily be confused. Philosophy's very close affinity with the culture in

general is what so readily gives us difficulty in the history of philosophy. Therefore we must give our keenest attention to what philosophy is. The other sciences share with philosophy [165] the same form, namely, thinking as universality....

Three related areas of culture call for special mention, in order to underscore their distinction from philosophy.

The first is what we can in general reckon as culture or scientific knowledge, as the beginnings of the understanding's thinking about natural and mental things.

The second is religion, a domain of more specific interest because philosophy stands essentially connected in part to mythology, in part to religion, although in an antagonistic relation to them.

The third domain is argumentative philosophizing. What used to be called the metaphysics of the understanding falls under this heading. A kind of thinking with characteristics suited to these three domains arose, and passed for philosophical thinking.

The first of the domains is the stuff of general culture. At least in today's Germany we have less difficulty with it, because we do not count the particular, empirical sciences as philosophy, although in universities the 'philosophical faculty' does include other sciences that are simply disciplines preparatory for government service. [166]

We encounter this blending of domains in the early stages of a culture, when [its other aspects] were not yet so disparate from what is properly philosophical. When an era of a people begins in which they contemplate universal issues, when they bring natural objects and laws within the scope of understandable relationships, we say that a people has begun to think. These beginnings of thinking are called 'philosophizing'. One can still hear it said today that philosophy is the thinking that investigates the causes of things. The term 'cause' expresses a relationship of the understanding. Or, when universal, fundamental propositions get expressed in ethical life, the sages who enunciate them are called *σόφοι*, *φιλόσοφοι*.

We find this to be the case in the beginning period of Greek philosophy, namely, in Ionian philosophy, in which a number of discoveries are portrayed for us as 'philosophy'. Thales is credited with the view that the moon is eclipsed when the earth stands between the moon and the sun. Although this was surely a very important discovery, one cannot accept it as being philosophy. Pythagoras discovered the principle of tonal harmonies, and it too gets called 'philosophy'. Many views of all kinds were advanced about the stars; some maintained that the firmament consists of metal with holes

in it, through which the eternal fire streams forth.[113] These are the kinds of things people usually import into the history of philosophy. They are products of contemplation or of the understanding that go beyond what is known to the senses, and even exceed the representations of fanciful imagination. The heavens and the earth became depopulated of their deities, and the understanding set universal principles and laws in place of fanciful images. We find something comparable in the universal aphorisms about [167] ethical duties or general happenings in nature and the world, aphorisms of the seven sages, and so forth.[114]

At this point it is pertinent to direct our attention to the epoch of scientific revival in the Middle Ages, when deliberative thinking about nature resumed. Here we will exhibit a moment that belongs to the concept of philosophy but does not exhaust it. We find this era's philosophical works embracing many topics not belonging to what today is considered to be philosophy. Thus in the system of Hobbes we find not only metaphysics but also what we call physics. In Descartes' writings too we find natural philosophy that is in fact just physics. Spinoza titled his book 'Ethics', because it sought to emphasize only the ethical aspect. Noteworthy is the distinction current then in the sciences. Topics pertinent to the Christian religion were on one side, with their norms set by the authority of the church. On the other were the sorts of topics grounded in state and civil law. Like the laws established by religion, these civil laws made what is universal their basis, in that the authority of kings derives from God. Their starting point was the Mosaic Law, the anointing of kings.[115] So, theology and jurisprudence were in this manner positive sciences, while medicine was partly crass empiricism, partly a melange of astrology, miracles, and the like.[116] People held that healing the sick was for the most part subject to planetary influences.

Observation of nature as such came to oppose that mode of knowing or cognition by taking nature in its immediate being, and setting out on

113. This statement about the firmament may be taken from the attribution of it to Anaximander, by [Pseudo-] Plutarch, *De placitis philosophorum* 2.13.7. The preceding examples in this paragraph concerning the Presocratics are mentioned specifically in Vol. II, pp. 17 (Thales and the eclipse) and 47–9 (Pythagoras on tonal harmony).

114. The seven sages are discussed in Vol. II, pp. 17–23.

115. Hegel discusses each of the points made here in Vol. III. See pp. 141 (Hobbes), 116–18 (Descartes), 128–30 (Spinoza), 90–1, and 142 (Mosaic Law and the authority of kings).

116. This may refer in particular to the astrological theories of Girolamo Cardano, for Hegel discusses him in this context in Vol. III, pp. 60–1, in an interpretation likely influenced by Brucker, *Historia*, iv, pt. 2, pp. 74–5.

that basis to discern what is universal in nature. Thinkers sought to derive legal right from a different source than they had relied on previously. They derived the universal element from what had been the laws of the peoples. In similar fashion they sought a different source for the authority of [168] kings, one based on universal principles.[117] A different kind of wisdom emerged, one opposed to given, revealed truth. This new knowledge was accordingly a knowing of earthly things; the world had become the content and this content had been created from human reason by seeing things for oneself, not according to received religious representations. Human beings looked to their own devices. Although on one hand they respected authority, on the other they also respected seeing and thinking for oneself. They called this knowing 'human wisdom' or 'worldly wisdom', meaning by these terms a wisdom deriving from the world and taking the world as its object. That was its philosophical significance.

We have pursued this topic in order to separate off what belongs to philosophy. In what was just described we do not of course find the entire concept of philosophy. But we do find here, as a fundamental philosophical principle, a knowing that relies on itself, on cognition by spirit, that keeps to no given. But we cannot say that this formal characteristic comprises the concept of spirit. It comprises finite objects, and even confines itself to them. So it is finite knowing as such. These particular sciences even then came to be separated from philosophy. The church disparaged them as leading away from God because their object is a worldly object. But they too involve the moment of thinking for oneself, which belongs to philosophy. Their defect is that they are a merely abstract thinking, and their object itself is, accordingly, something abstract, something finite.

Next is an extended discussion of religion and the closely related topic of mythology (pp. 168–87). Most of what is translated (beginning on p. 168) consists of passages that do not appear as such in the introductions of 1819, 1820–1, or 1825–6.

Religion is the second of the domains related to philosophy. The relation of the first domain [empiricism] to philosophy involved the formal aspect of thinking, whereas religion is related to it in terms of content. Religion opposes the first domain as being its contrary with respect to content, for religion is directed to the infinite....

[169]... Philosophy has the same object [as religion]—reason subsisting in and for itself, the absolute substance. In it spirit directly makes this object

117. Hegel has in mind here the early modern tradition of natural law, which is indebted to Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, and Samuel Pufendorf, as he discusses them in Vol. III, pp. 140–3.

its own. But while religion seeks to accomplish this through devotion, by the route of feeling, philosophy, in contrast, seeks to bring it about in thought, through thoughtful cognition. Devotion is the feeling of divine and human unity, although thinking is surely embedded in the expression 'devotion' [*Andacht*]. Devotion expresses a pressing toward thinking, a thinking on oneself [*sich-Andenken*]. This makes it the case that these two spheres coincide in content and goal, while differing only in form. Philosophy is knowing or cognition, and that is where its distinction from religion begins....

[170]... The church and folk religion have been hostile toward philosophy, and have often condemned it. For that reason philosophy was from its very beginning expected to justify itself. Greek folk religion clashed with philosophy, and many were exiled or executed because they seemed to teach something different from the folk religion.[118] In the main the Christian religion expressed this opposition too. Accordingly, religion seemed to require people to renounce rational thinking because such an activity is mere worldly wisdom, mere human activity, mere knowing by human reason as opposed to divine reason. Human reason produces only inferior human products, as opposed to the works of God. Former ages came to that conclusion, and ours does too. We will now take up the topic of this opposition.

The following can be stated about it. This opposition disparages the human sphere in contrast to God's acts. To be more specific, it compares the proof of God's wisdom as seen in nature with human works to be devalued as ungodly.[119] One way to put it is to say that nature's works are pre-eminently divine, whereas what human beings produce, [171] especially what human reason produces, is to be regarded as just human. But this view is false, for we can ascribe a value to reason's products at least as high as the value we ascribe to natural things. We include human activity in this comparison. If natural things or animals are said to be pre-eminently divine, then human activity must be regarded as even more divine, for human activity is, in an infinitely higher sense, a divine activity, the work of God's spirit. So this is a poor excuse for a contrast when taken as stated, because the distinction between human beings and animals is readily apparent. The answer to the question, 'where is the divine to be sought?', is that it is to

118. This is an allusion to the trial of Socrates, and perhaps also to the accusations against Anaxagoras. See Vol. II, pp. 99, 148–50.

119. The physico-theology of the Enlightenment sought to know the wisdom of God solely through nature. In a different context (see *GW* xviii. 150) Hegel instead points to history, in which this wisdom can be found too, if one is serious in one's thinking about God.

be found most especially in human productions. This opposition that gives preference to the natural sphere is to be rejected out of hand.

Now we propose to pass over to the other issue, that of the Christian religion's content. As for the relationship of thinking reason or philosophy to religion, we have already pointed to the contention that, in justifying itself in terms of its own objectives, philosophy makes itself all the more contrary to religion. This contention presupposes a limitation of the human spirit, by holding that this spirit is incapable of knowing God [on its own]. Reason is instructed to know God from nature. But spirit is something higher than nature. Christ says: 'Are you not more than the sparrows?'[120] So human beings can know God better from themselves than they can from nature. In fact, though we are pointed toward nature in order to know God, we can produce knowledge of God much more from out of ourselves, where the divine manifests itself more than it does in nature. This is one aspect of the issue, the fact that reason is revelation of God.

The other aspect concerns whether religion, and the Christian religion especially, has a content superior to thinking reason, a content that [172] reason can only accept as something given. If so, then religion is God's revelation and truth is revealed to humanity, for reason is incapable of generating revelation out of itself; it has to acquiesce humbly and accept revelation passively.[121] We must now address this aspect in a more specific way, in order to have an unimpaired grasp of the relationship, rather than relegating this principal issue to the shadows as if it were a delicate matter not to be spoken about openly.

So, religion takes the stance that the truth it contains is something externally given, something encountered. This is also more or less the circumstance in the pagan religions. Where folk religion came from, or how it came about, is unknown. The characteristic of religion as a given, as something above and beyond what we call reason, is accentuated even more in the Christian religion—the fact that religion is something positive. The truth is professed to have been revealed through some divine prophet or other, through an emissary, although it [is] immaterial to the religion's content just who is the prophet. All peoples of course held their teachers in grateful respect. Moses, Abraham, and Muhammad are revered. But this external aspect is something historical; the individuals who were the teachers were not themselves part of the truth that is subsistent in and for itself. Faith directed to such an individual is not faith in the religion itself.

120. See Matt. 6: 26.

121. See 2 Cor. 10, where Paul declares his humility with respect to his own powers, and says (v. 17): 'Let him who boasts, boast of the Lord'.

The Christian religion, however, is a different matter. The person of Christ is itself a determinate quality within the divine nature, and so Christ is not historical in that respect. To the extent that Christ is said to be no more than a teacher, however, he is put on the same level as Socrates or Columbus. Yet the Christian religion specifies that, as Son of God, Christ belongs to the divine nature itself. A 'who' having no part in the divine nature would be of no consequence, for what matters is the 'what' of the content. This revealed content is said to be something human reason could not have come to on its own. [173] It is noteworthy that of course absolute truth, or knowledge of God's nature, initially comes to people in an external mode, generally as consciousness of truth in the form of sensible objects that are present, or are presented externally. Thus Moses saw God in a burning bush.[122] And the Greeks portrayed their Gods in marble statues, or else in the images found in their poets. The beginnings are generally in an external mode of this sort, with the content appearing as a given, as something that we hear or see. This external mode must be accepted as the initial one. The fact that one does not, and should not, stay with this external mode, either in religion or in philosophy, is another matter. Such shapes, whether historical or representational, ought not to remain in this external relationship, but instead ought to become something spiritual for spirit. They should cease having a merely external, unspiritual guise. Spirit and reason are one and the same thing. It is true that we depict 'reason' to ourselves as abstract. But reason that is active and knowing is spirit, although we usually take that reason to be subjective spirit. We are supposed to pray to God in spirit and in truth; so the content of religion is spirit.[123] ...

[174] ... Authentic universality is not simply one aspect to which the particular is counterposed, for it pervades the particular and comes to itself in it. Universal spirit is object to itself, and this very self-apprehending is something twofold; it is itself, and it is what it apprehends. Spirit is their unity; it is what apprehends and what is apprehended. The apprehended, objective side is apprehended by the subjective side. Spirit comprises not only the passivity of coming to be apprehended—which must be ascribed to it as just something momentary—because spirit is also the annulling of this distinction of subjective from objective. Spirit is one, is substantial unity. Objective spirit is itself this activity of self-apprehending, and subjective spirit that apprehends the divine spirit is itself the divine spirit. This is the authentic, fundamental definition, that in religion spirit apprehends

122. See Exod. 3: 1–6.

123. See John 4: 24, which reads: 'God is spirit, and those who worship him must worship in spirit and truth.'

itself. This apprehending is itself religiosity, is what we call faith. But it is not an inferior, historical faith; we Lutherans have a better faith than that because we relate ourselves to ourselves within the divine spirit.[124] The distinction in this faith is simply one of form, a distinction that is perpetually self-annulling. In the relation of faith to itself there is no distinction, no separation. Spirit's relating to itself is not the primordial, abstract unity, not merely the Spinozistic substance, the subjectively substantial element.[125] It is instead the self-knowing, individual substance, the consciousness that knows itself and, in doing so, becomes infinite itself; it is the self-consciousness of the divine spirit....

[180]...The more profound study of mythology seems inevitably to be drawn into the history of philosophy. The mythology of a people is the product of a fanciful imagination, though not an imagination of a capricious sort. On one hand, the caprice of fanciful imagination has its locus here. On the other hand, however, the main features or fundamentals are the work of imaginative reason, which brings to consciousness in that form what is essential, even though the fanciful imagination itself employs no other instrument than the sensible mode of representation. For instance, Greek mythology depicted the gods in human shapes, and spirit represented itself within sensible existence in this manner. This is even more the case with the Christian religion, which is anthropomorphic. So mythology falls within the domain of fanciful imagination, although in mythology the inner element is also rational. We can study mythology from the perspective of art; thinking spirit has to seek out the substantial content in art. It is every bit as philosophical to study art as it is to study nature.

The Neoplatonists studied mythology philosophically. In our day Creuzer does this too, and many denounce him for it.[126] They demand that the art and the history of the mythological form be left undisturbed. They say it is unhistorical to suppose that any specific philosophy underlies mythology. They say people just import philosophies into it, for the ancients would not have thought in such terms. But this objection, that there is no philosophical content implicitly present in mythology, is based on an abstract, external understanding, and it is absurd. Mythology must be accepted as the work of reason, albeit the work of a thinking unable to express reason otherwise than in a sensible mode. Nevertheless we exclude mythology from our

124. See the elaboration of this principle of Lutheran faith in Vol. III, pp. 24–5.

125. On Spinoza's substance, see Vol. III, pp. 121–5.

126. On Creuzer and criticisms of him, see the following authors, all included in the Bibliography to this volume because the works listed there were in Hegel's personal library: Creuzer, Hermann, Müller, Voss. Also, see above pp. 83–4.

consideration on account of its representational form; in philosophy we deal exclusively with *the* content that has brought itself into existence in the form of thinking as well. Art can present spirit in only a rudimentary way, because art always involves many extraneous external features. That makes the interpretation of spirit in art difficult because the idea has its absolutely worthy form exclusively in thought. Philosophy deals with what is true only insofar as truth is overt, is in the form of thought....

The ensuing account of myth (pp. 181–6) repeats ground covered in the other introductions and in the 1825–6 treatment of Oriental philosophy. The topics include: Plato's use of myth, and Aristotle's criticism of him for doing so; the inadequacy of Pythagorean number theory and the use of the Gua in the *Yi-jing* for expressing spiritual relationships; philosophical deficiencies of Confucius and of abstract Indian philosophy; the church fathers in relation to Scholasticism. This part concludes with a summary discussion of three spheres that are related to, but distinct from, philosophy, beginning on p. 186.

We wish to reflect on these elements [that are related to philosophy]. One sphere comprised the empirical sciences. As a way of thinking for oneself, people counted them as philosophy because we engage in them as the ones doing the judging and reflecting, and this engagement [*Dabeisein*], this conviction on the basis of reasons, is looked upon as the ultimate thing. For experience, reasons, and the like, the principle is thinking for oneself. In the second sphere the content establishes the relationship—God, and the universal topics that occupy spirit's interest. For the first sphere the relationship resides in the form; for the second sphere in the content. Now we have to distinguish these two related spheres because each stands unilaterally by itself, sharing with philosophy either form alone or content alone. Because its content is not universal nature, the thinking for oneself that marks the first sphere is not part of philosophy. Because thinking for oneself is only a formal factor, it is thinking only in its subjective shape. The other sphere, where the relationship resides within its object, has the defect that the element of thinking for oneself is not essential to it. In this second sphere the first element is absent because the religious content, the truth, is something beheld, represented, believed. One's conviction about this content does not rest [187] upon the thinking for oneself that is free and self-reliant. From this we see that the concept of philosophy calls for both, the one element and the other; it calls for their unity, their interpenetration. From history we see that faith in the content of truth, which now bears a mythical and imaginative form, once had a historical shape. In contrast, we see efforts directed to nature and mind as thinking, but as a thinking

about finite matters. Philosophy grasps these moments together; it unites the 'Sunday' and 'weekdays' of life, moments that are separate from one another in ordinary consciousness. For their 'Sunday', human beings are linked to the deity, but their own selves remain in the background; their individuality, their thinking and activity, all vanish when consciousness turns toward what is eternal. For their 'weekdays', human beings are the masters, and their actions are based on their own purposes, thinking, and interests. Philosophy unites orientation toward the eternal with the thinking that generates the form of this content out of itself. In philosophy these moments must interpenetrate one another. Hence, in order to determine philosophy's goal, we intend to examine its history.

Next we take up a third sphere to which philosophy is connected, namely, popular philosophy. It treats general topics, and in them especially endeavors to grasp universal laws. So it involves one of the elements, the universal element. Yet it also embodies the other element, the thinking that actively knows such objects. Here what is said to count [as] true is generated from the understanding. Nevertheless we must set this popular philosophy aside. Cicero's writings can on the whole count as instances of it. His philosophizing can yield fine and admirable results as the philosophizing of a man who has been observant and knows what is worthwhile, what the world takes to be true. He presents his heartfelt experiences of the world, speaking with a cultivated spirit about the absolutely most important topics. Also belonging to this group in a different aspect are those mystics and enthusiasts who give voice to their [188] visions, their pure love, their devotion. They have had experiences in the higher regions of the soul, and they were even able to give an account of the objects that elevated them to this devotion. Theirs can be a portrayal of the profoundest and most interesting content, as are the writings of Pascal, which offer thinking's deepest insights.[127]

Such works nevertheless still have a defect, even though they seem to unite both elements in them. Let us consider the ultimate thing to which, for example, the writings of Cicero make their appeal. It is that the sort of drives and inclinations many more recent authors call the 'instinct of morality' or the 'feeling of law and duty' are innate, and that religion rests upon a particular feeling, on the immediate consciousness of God. These are the ultimate grounds, called by Cicero 'the agreement of peoples', the

127. The first edition of the *Werke*, iii. 110, mentions in this context Pascal's *Pensées*, perhaps based on Michelet's own notebook. There is no evidence up to now that Hegel was acquainted with Pascal's writings through his own reading and not simply at second hand.

consensus gentium.[128] More recent philosophy of this kind has dropped this appeal to general validity. Since each subject is supposed to be based on itself, this newer philosophy points to each individual's feeling, to immediate feeling or to a basis that always has that sort of immediate character. So this popular philosophy does indeed promote thinking for oneself, or being convinced on one's own. It wants the content of the things that are said to be valid—duty, religion, law, and the like—to depend on the self. But we must exclude this mode of cognition from philosophy because the source from which its content gets generated is similar in nature to the source for the first of the spheres [related to philosophy]. In the first sphere the source was experience, in the second, spirit, though in the second sphere the content appeared in the form of authority, as a given for consciousness that has its apparent origin in authority. Here in the third sphere too the source is our natural being, our feeling, our disposition, our inner being as impelled toward God. The content that is called God, law, duty, and so forth, is in a merely natural shape. Just as the content is not in a true mode in mythology, so too it is not in its true mode when it is only gained from feeling. Where the content rests on feelings, it is in me in one way, in another person in a different way. The arbitrariness of subjectivity and contingency is evident here. So this content cannot [189] belong to philosophy because it is not determined by thinking....

Next Hegel takes up philosophy's starting point in history. The following translates substantial parts of his extended account, beginning on p. 190.

3. The Starting Point of Philosophy in History

When we say that the consciousness of spiritual freedom belongs to the emergence of philosophy, a people is required that has this principle as the foundation of its existence. For spirit to be free, we insisted that it have broken loose from the natural domain, that thinking be present to itself, which means spirit's severance from its immersion in material things, in intuition, in the naturalness of desire....

[191]... A people that wills itself as free is a people that wills laws, wills what is universal. It wills to subordinate its desires to the universal will. Contrariwise, when the object of willing and of representation is not yet a universal object, the standpoint of freedom is absent because what is willed and envisaged is merely something particular. Spirit's oneness with nature is burdened with finitude because universality begins only where thinking freely comes to be free for itself. In light of this it is evident that

128. See n. 35, p. 73 above.

the Oriental character is spirit's immersion in nature. From the aspect of will we thus have nature's finitude. The will wills itself as finite and not as universal. From this aspect two conditions arise, those of lord and servant. Here we have the sphere of despotism. Put in terms of sensibility, fear is the dominant category. Still immersed in the natural domain, spirit is one with what is particular and can be caught up in it. Spirit is conscious that this particular element is destructible, that it can be taken away, that it can come to be posited negatively. This feeling of negativity is fear as such. People feel themselves to be finite and vulnerable, and so are afraid, for freedom is not [192] to be sought in the finite. Freedom is instead existence in a being-for-self, in an infinite being-within-self, which is something that cannot be taken away. So fear and despotism prevail. The human being either stands in fear or rules by fear, is either servant or master. This is a formal distinction regarding the energy of the will. Human beings have purposes that are merely finite and contingent, and so are capricious. The despotic will is free will caught up in finite purposes and operating by means of fear. The dominant category of the Orient is, in general, fear of the master.

Religion has the same character. Fear of the Lord is its principal moment. But religion is not simply derived from this fear, for religion neither proceeds from fear nor relinquishes it. Scripture says: 'The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.'[129] One must pass through fear, must see something negative in one's finite purposes; one must have felt fear but have overcome it. Whoever has renounced the ultimacy of these finite purposes, however, is no longer bound to something negative, and becomes free through the conquest of fear. The shape of despotism and servitude is posited when fear is not only the starting point but the endpoint. Religion too will therefore bear this trait within itself. On the one hand, then, as imparting satisfaction, religion will, at that level, be of a kind that is in the grip of the natural realm. These are the natural drives personified in Oriental peoples. On the other hand, to the extent that consciousness lifts itself beyond the natural shape and up to the infinite, its fundamental condition is the fear felt by individuals who know themselves to be only non-essential [*Accidentel*] over against this infinite power. These are the general characteristics that we have to examine further in their concrete shape. . . .

[193] . . . Freedom arises only with the Greeks. In the West, spirit goes within itself for the first time; spirit becomes free, and for itself. In the glare

129. See Ps. 111: 10. See also discussion of this fear in *Philosophy of Religion*, ii. 442–4, 537–8.

of the East the individual, as merely a semblance, vanishes. Only in the West does the light become the lightning flash of thinking that strikes home within itself, going within itself, spreading out from there and creating its world from within. [194]

We have seen that in a universal principle of this kind the historical configuration of a people is most intimately connected with philosophy. The determinations or elements forming the bond between philosophy and concrete existence are what we wish to exhibit briefly. We said that a world of freedom begins in Greece. The fundamental characteristic of freedom is that spirit thinks itself, that individuals as single persons grasp the intuition of themselves as universal, that each one in his singularity knows himself as universal, that one's being is one's universality and universality is one's being. The universality, then, is this relation to self or this presence to self, not presence to another as something alien, not having one's essential being in an other, not being dependent. Hence one's essential being is present to itself; it is, as something universal, present to itself and to the universal. This presence to self is infinite personality. Spirit that grasps itself in this way has this characteristic of its freedom as its own being; it exists this way, and cannot be otherwise. A people in which this spirit is present exists simply as this self-apprehending, and constructs its world accordingly. Consonant with knowing that it is free, it constructs for itself its own norms for law and ethical life, and in this setting it knows itself as essentially universal. A simple example shows us what it means to say that the very being of a people is its knowing itself as free. We know that the individual is free, is personally free, that one's being resides simply in having personal freedom as its fundamental character, and that there is nothing whereby this character can be violated or go unacknowledged. It is constitutive of our being, of our existence, and only thus do we exist and know ourselves.

So, if we hypothesize, for example, that a European sovereign might act capriciously and form the notion of making half of his subjects into slaves, he would not succeed, despite seeking to bring maximum power to bear in the effort. Such a notion would not be tolerated, for every individual, every farmer, knows he is no slave and cannot be a slave—that freedom is our essential being. We are of course [persons] of a certain age, are Silesians, are alive, are civil servants; but we know that these are [195] superficial traits and that freedom alone is the foundation of our being. Freedom is our essential being. All the other characteristics of our age, our life, and so forth, are transitory and changeable, but freedom is not. Our innermost being, our universal aspect, is what makes it the case that I cannot be a

slave. Slavery is antithetical to my consciousness. This is the sense in which spirit's knowing itself is constitutive of its being, and the basis from which it creates and elaborates all of its circumstances.

It is noteworthy that universality constitutes the consciousness of freedom. In knowing myself as universal, I know myself as free. When I am dependent on some drive or on some person, then I am present to an other; in its being my drive or my inclination, I am something particular and not something universal. In that case I exist in a condition of particularity and I situate my being within a particular condition, for I find myself bound up with a particular content, one that is other to me. I am unequal to myself, for the I is the universal element and the drive is, in contrast, something particular. In existing as something particular, I am not universal to myself. Free choice is formal freedom; it makes singular drives or purposes into its object. But the will that is free is the will whose purpose is something universal, something essential. I have my essence, my very being, in what is universal. In what is universal I am equal to myself. Connected with this point is the fact that other people are like me, are free, for others are just as universal as I am. I, as universal, am essential to myself. Therefore I also know others as universal, as my equals, from which it follows that I am free only insofar as I posit the freedom of others, and I am free only insofar as others acknowledge me to be free. Freedom is actual, existing freedom only when shared with others. Hence the relationship of free person to free person is posited in the norms of ethical life and in rational [196] laws. The will that is free wills only what specifically belongs to essential will. Civic freedom and rational laws or governance are posited together with the characteristics of essential will. We find this concept of freedom emerging first in the Greek people and, along with it, the beginnings of philosophy. In Greece, however, real freedom has a limited scope, for we know that the Greeks had slaves. Their civic life could not be conducted without slaves. So freedom is still of limited scope. This feature differentiates the Orient from Greece, and both from the Germanic peoples. In the Orient only one is free, in Greece some are free, and in the modern world all are free, for in the modern world the human being as such is free.[130] Ours is a nobler freedom than that of the Greeks. We will take a closer look at this point later on. For now, we simply declare it to be a fact that when in the Orient only one person is free, then that one is indeed not free. That one's freedom is arbitrariness, the abstract freedom of formal self-consciousness, the 'I am I'.

130. On these three stages of freedom as the structural principle of Hegel's *Philosophy of World History*, see p. 195 above, with n. 96.

In Greece a restrictive thesis holds good: that only some are free. It is a particular feature of Greek thinking and Greek intuition. We wish to examine this particular modification, however, in its application to our purpose regarding the history of philosophy. We will have to observe the concrete meaning of the abstract thesis that 'some are free'.

4. Division of the History into Periods

The first point was the concept of the history of philosophy, the second the concept of philosophy, and the third is the division of the history of philosophy. For the latter we have to set to work scientifically. It must be shown how the development of the history of philosophy is to be grasped according to the necessity of the concept.

On the whole we have only two periods in the history of philosophy, namely, Greek philosophy and Germanic philosophy, together with their [197] dissemination to other peoples. We encounter the same division of art into ancient art and modern art. Insofar as the European peoples belong to the world of thought, we can call them 'Germanic peoples'. The Romans, who stand between them and the Greeks, have no philosophy of their own, and no poetry of their own either. Even Roman religion is outfitted with Greek concepts. The Romans do have their own distinctive trait, but it is not a trait that surfaces in art and philosophy. Quite the contrary, what typifies them is something non-artistic and non-philosophical.

At present we intend to examine the point of departure for our science, and its goal. God is grasped initially as immediate universality, as what is immediate and first, but the inquiry gets carried no further. We find God characterized in this way by Thales. The ultimate goal is to grasp God as spirit, and that is the goal of our own day. Reaching that point is the labor of the world spirit over two and a half millennia. The world spirit works slowly. For us it is easy to go on from one determination to another. History portrays for us what a labor spirit has undergone in progressing from one category to another in order to achieve self-consciousness.

Now that we have indicated the general boundaries of the topic, we wish next to present its particular moments in their sequence. The content is the universal as such in the sense of 'being'—that is, in the sense that what is, is the universal, in concrete determination: God. The first universal is immediate being. The object is thus objective thought, the thought that *is*. Thought is a 'jealous God' who expresses himself as what is essential, and can abide no others besides him.[131] This incipient content is indeterminate,

131. An allusion to God's declaration, in identical statements in Exod. 20: 5 and Deut. 5: 9: '...for I the LORD your God am a jealous God'.

and the progression is, first of all, the unfolding of the determinations implicit in it. The objective sequence involves the fact that the universal is, that this substance stays the same and just goes within itself and manifests itself. The going-within-itself is the bringing of its innermost nature to consciousness, and this is the manifestation. Its self-manifestation [198] is the being of spirit. This is the baseline for determining the beginning. Its characteristic is immediacy, or indeterminacy. The development in the first period of philosophy is in the nature of a natural and unaffected [*unbefangen*] emergence of determinations that come forth from its entire ground. The development is the natural unfolding of this abundance.

These determinate qualities (immediate thinking—immediate determinations) emerge in the initial stage in this first period. The next stage combines the emergent determinations in an ideal unity, a concrete unity. It grasps the absolute as self-determining—not as the universal under one or another of its determinations, but as the totality of its self-determining. This is the first concrete concept. We will see this self-determining in the form of νοῦς. The third or further stage is then the self-determining, the concrete individuality as it posits itself in its different determinations. This concrete individuality contains determinations that belong to it, for it is their unity. They are not separated, for each is in the unity, each is the totality, each is in each. That is how this totality is posited in its different determinations. For instance, when we say that the concept is the unity of the universal and the singular, then the further point is that what is both universal and singular within itself is posited as internally concrete, as being, within that concrete state, the unity of universality and singularity, such that the universal itself is at once in the form of singularity, just as the singular is in the form of universality. The wholly concrete universal is spirit, the wholly concrete singular state is nature, and both together are the unity.

The second stage is grasped as the νοῦς, the self-determining universal. In the third stage the distinctions themselves are totalities. That is the case, for example, in Stoicism, where thinking develops itself on its own account to totality, where it is systematized as one principle. On the other side stands sensation as the totality, where each determination is elaborated so as to be the totality. The elaboration of the abstract in the concrete, and of the concrete in its own determinations, is what constitutes the further development. In their natural and unaffected character [*Unbefangenheit*], these two principles appear independently, as individual philosophies.[132] But inasmuch as the entire idea delineates itself in their [199] distinctive

132. See n. 58, p. 93 above.

features, each of them elaborates itself as a philosophical system. When we compare them, we see that they are implicitly identical, but that is tantamount to the idea. The whole, or the idea, is within them in the way it becomes conscious, in a one-sided determination. The fourth stage, then, is where these differences get resolved, where everything is conjoined in a concrete unity comprising a systematic grasp of the particular, a unity in which the determinations are concrete but are grasped as a whole. At first the unification takes place again in a universal mode, in this initial, unselfconscious element, in an ideal way.

We can make this progression clear to ourselves by turning to the representation of empty, abstract space. We start with the abstract representation of space as such. In this space we first place undefined lines and angles, which are individual figures. Next we combine them to form a triangle, which is the first totality; it is something defined, enclosed, completely bounded. This is the first concrete thing. We continue by making each line of the triangle into a surface, into a totality. Here we have the abstract determinations in this whole, for each line is a totality, as is the triangle itself. The final step is for these surfaces to come together again to form a solid, which is the first spatial totality. The triangle is the initial totality, but just formally so. Only the second, the spatial totality, becomes the completed whole. By a more precise comprehension of this conclusion, and by raising up the conjoined surfaces to form a totality, we have the redoubling of the triangle, and this is now the concrete totality in contrast to that abstract totality. The foundation is redoubled, is intensified on all sides.

So the determinations are first of all totalities, and only as such are they united within the element of the universal. This is the culmination of Greek philosophy in Neoplatonism, which accordingly [200] marks its endpoint. The business of the world spirit now passes over to another people. Here the ideal world is found but not the actual world, for [Greek philosophy] operates only in the element of universality. Its world is the divine world, the world of thought but not the actual world, because the world of thought only exists in the determinate form of the universal. Individuality as such is an essential element of the concept, and individuality is absent from this [Greek] world. Subjectivity or being-for-self is lacking here. Two triangles on a prism are not only two but must become the pervasive unity, the self-pervasive unity, the absolute negativity, something they first become in subjectivity.[133] So, missing here is the moment of negativity or, as we have put it, the fact that this ideal is *for itself*, that it should be object not

133. Here the transcript adds: '(Absolute unity.) (Negative unity.)'

only for us but also for itself. That principle first appears in the Christian world. Then God is known as spirit, as the one who redoubles himself for himself and likewise annuls the redoubling, who is the being-for-self in this distinction—thus that he is infinite. (What is made distinct is finite. Only the annulling of this distinction is infinite, and that annulling is the concept itself.) The business of the world is to know God in spirit, and that is the task of the Germanic world. The first appearance of this principle, the immediate revelation of it, is in the Christian religion. This principle exists prior to its being grasped by thought; it exists antecedently as faith, as intuition, before coming to be known. For thought sets the immediacy before itself and from it reflects itself within itself.

The first factor in this determination of spirit, one related to the foregoing, is that there are two totalities, a redoubling of substance. But this redoubling has a different character, in that the two totalities no longer fall outside one another; instead they are thought utterly in their relation to one another. When early Stoicism and Epicureanism arose independently (with Skepticism being their negative counterpart), [201] and each of the two ultimately was held to be the universality subsistent in itself, these moments came to be known as distinct totalities, and should be posited as one in their antithesis. Here, then, we have the speculative idea proper, as the concept in its authentic determinations; each of them expanded to be the totality but not as subsisting alongside one another, for they are interconnected and make up one totality. Comprehended in a universal way, their antithesis is the antithesis of thinking and being, of subject and object, of spirit and nature (though only of a spirit that is finite because it stands over against nature). It is requisite to grasp these related elements as a unity. They should be grasped in their opposition as a unity, and should not be taken to be mutually external.[134] This is the foundation for the modern philosophy that got its start in Christianity.

134. This conception of the antithesis is not presented as clearly in the 1825–6 lectures (see Vol. II, pp. 264–316, 330–1) as it is in the discussion of Greek philosophy in the Hotho (Ho.) transcript of the 1823–4 series, which is not included in the German edition or in this English edition. Ho. reads there as follows: 'The third period [of ancient philosophy] involves the principal moment of the transition, when we see in Skepticism the nullification of all the specific principles that established themselves in Stoicism and Epicureanism, under the aspect of the specificity of the antithesis. The idea must come forth directly from this setting, as the negation of the one-sidedness of these principles, but as producing, along with this ideal stance, the unity in which they exist as definite ideal positions. Put otherwise, the idea must come to consciousness as what is internally concrete' (Ho. 106a). 'If the one-sidedness of the principles is annulled, then their mutual distinction is recognized to be simply an ideal characteristic of the pure idea' (Ho. 109a).

This specification clarifies what was previously called natural and unaffected philosophizing, which is the kind not yet involving the antithesis of subjective knowing with objective being. The Greeks philosophized, thought, and reasoned, with a thinking marked by the unconscious presupposition that what is thought also *is*, that everything is just as it is thought. Thinking and being are not separate. One must be constantly aware of this point because in the Greeks we find issues that seem to be like our own. For instance, we find there a sophistical, skeptical philosophy. One can even say this philosophy taught that truth cannot be known. This philosophy can seem to be the subjective method of modern times in its holding that thought categories are only subjective modes by which the truth cannot be known. Despite the similarity between these philosophies, however, there is an essential difference in their assertions.[135] The result, [202] according to this ancient philosophy, was in fact that we only know appearance [*Schein*], that thinking has no access to being. Hence there is no wholeness because there is no further dimension beyond these appearances, none toward which to strive, or that can be known. For these ancients there is nothing in the background in addition to appearances—perhaps an appearance that could even be known albeit not in a cognitive manner. Nothing lies beyond the appearance itself. These philosophers concede that in practical matters one must be guided by rules and norms in keeping with appearances. But the rules one follows are posited as being themselves mere appearances.

There is a very great distinction between the ancient and modern philosophies. Modern philosophy is the philosophy of subjectivity, or simply subjective idealism. In addition to maintaining that knowing is subjective, modern philosophy includes a different, immediate element that is not carried out by thinking, namely, a beholding in revelation, a faith, a longing for another world. Behind appearance stands something that is true although not known. There was no such other world for the ancients, who were completely content with the world of appearance. This is the specific meaning of 'unaffectedness' [*Unbefangenheit*]. Doubts about thinking as compared to what is objective did not enter their minds. Ancient philosophy held that what is essential is in the appearance. Modern philosophy has two antithetical, though related, aspects. One is the antithesis of reason to faith in the ecclesiastical sense (which is not what we have taken faith to be), namely, the antithesis of one's own insight, or knowing of the truth, to objective doctrine (together with the renunciation of reason). The other

135. For analogies between the modern (Kantian) doctrine that truth cannot be known, and the Sophists, see Vol. II, pp. 121–3. For analogies with Skepticism, see 309 and 313.

aspect is the antithesis of cognitive knowing to immediate knowing taken as revelation. This is the principle of the modern era. The goal, then, is the thinking of spirit; it is thinking the absolute as spirit, as what is self-determining. The idea is the infinite goodness, fully communicating all its moments, imparting itself fully in them, so that within it they are the whole. It is likewise infinite justice, in that these totalities are one: they are identical not only for us but [203] also for themselves; they are this one itself. This unity must be the idea's being-for-self. This concept of the idea, the grasping of its own redoubling and unity, is its goal.

So we have in the main these two philosophies, first the Greek and second the Germanic. In the case of Germanic philosophy, we must distinguish the time when it emerged as philosophy from its time of fermentation or preparation. So we have kept three periods. The first is Greek philosophy, extending from Thales, some six hundred years before Christ, to Neoplatonic philosophy or to Plotinus in the third century AD. But one could say that this period carries on into the fifth century and continues with the church fathers. That constitutes a period of one thousand years. The second period is the intervening period of fermentation, to which belong the Jewish, Arabic, and Scholastic philosophies. This period also lasts for a thousand years. The third period, beginning with the Thirty Years War or with Descartes, marks the formal appearance of modern philosophy. With Descartes, thinking began to go within itself. 'Cogito ergo sum' are the first words of his system, and these very words constitute the distinctive feature of modern philosophy.[136]

D. THE 1827–8 LECTURES

The German edition (pp. 277–312) constructed this introduction from three transcripts. It is slightly fuller than the 1819 introduction, but considerably briefer than the other three that precede it in time. Some of the section headings for it are provided here because the German edition has only one of its own. We begin on p. 277.

Introduction

The history of philosophy can be read either as an introduction to the study of philosophy, because it presents philosophy's formation, or as the conclusion of this study. In any event, the aim of the history of philosophy

136. On the 'cogito' in Descartes, see Vol. III, pp. 109–12.

is to become acquainted with philosophy's formation and with philosophy itself as it appears in different persons and in their temporal sequence.

What can be stated here by way of introducing the purpose and method of the history of philosophy, its concept, definition, and mode of treatment, properly belongs within the history of philosophy itself. The complete presentation of its purpose is the history of philosophy itself. Yet in order to explain how to grasp it, and to indicate more precisely the standpoint from which the history of philosophy must be considered, a few points about purpose, meaning, method, and so forth, might well be set out in advance here. (By inquiring about its purpose, we seek to become acquainted with the universal as something distinct from the content and as that by which multiple elements can be brought together.)

History takes the form of considering what has transpired in a sequence of events and deeds. Therefore we have to indicate the kind of deeds that we have to consider. They are the deeds of thought. With this as our intention, we have to distinguish between two things.

First, the thought that the history of philosophy presents is essentially *one*. The developments of this history are just diverse configurations of one and the same thought, and their sequence is what the history of philosophy ought to portray. Thought is the universal substance of spirit from which everything else develops; thinking or thought is the operative power in human beings. Animals are living too and have needs and feelings as do human beings; but since human beings should distinguish themselves from the animals, theirs must be human feelings and not those of animals, that is, their feeling must involve thought. Religion, law, ethical life, science, and art, are all fruits of thought. [278] Animals lack thought, and so lack those fruits of thought too. An animal has sensory feeling, sensuous desires, and the like, but no religion, no science or art, no imagination, because thought is the operative power in all these things.

Second, the particular task is that of explaining that all of human intuition, memory, feeling, will, and the like, has its roots in thinking. We have will, intuition, and other aspects, and we contrast them with thinking. However, thinking determines not only itself but the will and these other aspects too. With more precise knowledge we gain the insight that thinking is not something particular, some specific power, but is the essential, universal power from which all else is produced.

Therefore the history of philosophy is the history of thought. The state, religion, the sciences, arts, and so forth, are likewise productions or consequences of thought, but they are not philosophy; their content is something other than philosophy. So we must draw a distinction regarding the form

of thought. The history of philosophy, then, is the history of what is universal and substantial in thought. Sense or meaning, and its presentation or external aspect, coincide in thought. There is neither external nor internal thought, but only the thought that, as it were, is itself what is innermost. In the other sciences the presentation and what is presented by it are separate from one another, whereas in philosophy thought is itself its own object, is occupied with itself, and determines itself from out of itself. Thought realizes itself by determining itself from out of itself; it is process within itself; its characteristic is its self-producing and its existing therein. Thought has activity, vitality, and multiple connections within itself, and posits itself in its distinctions. It is just ongoing, self-moving thought. Closer examination of these determinations shows us that the configurations of philosophy present themselves as development....

After a brief discussion of development, Hegel turns to an extensive and already-familiar account of the freedom of philosophical thinking. The following passages are excerpts from it, beginning on p. 279.

[279]...Philosophy teaches us to think; it teaches us how we have to conduct ourselves in our thinking. Philosophy deals with topics of a characteristic sort; its object is the essential being of things, not appearance, not things on their own account as they are in representation. Philosophy considers not the representation but the essential being of the object, and this essential being is thought itself. So philosophy has thought itself for its object. Therefore spirit is free, in that thinking is occupied with itself, is present to itself.

We can add a further remark at this point. As we have just said, essential being is none other than thought itself. We oppose appearance, change, and the like to essential being. Hence it is what is universal and eternal, just as it is not momentary but always is. Although people represent God to themselves in various forms, God's essential being is what is universal, is ever abiding, what is pervasive throughout all representations. The essential being of nature is its laws. [280] (The mechanical laws taken as the essential being of nature are, however, particular laws in contrast to what is universal.) The universal is the product of thinking. In desiring and the like, the universal element is intermixed with many particular, sensible features. In thinking, on the contrary, we are dealing with what is solely universal. When the object for thinking becomes, so to speak, removed from what is universal, then we have the product of thinking, which is particular thoughts.

Everybody concedes that one who wants to know the essential being of God must think meditatively [*nachdenken*]. The product is then a thought.

When we say 'thought' [*Gedanke*], we are representing to ourselves something subjective. We say that we think in accord with [*denken nach*], or have thoughts about, the thing; they are not the thing itself, but are thoughts put forward about the thing. But these are not true thoughts; they are merely subjective and hence contingent. Through meditative thinking we first experience what the thing is. What is true is the essential being of the thing, the universal. Inasmuch, however, as thought is the universal, it is objective; it cannot be now one way and now another; it is unchangeable. So philosophy has what is universal for its object and, in our thinking it, we ourselves are universal. Hence too philosophy alone is free, for in philosophy we are present to ourselves and not dependent on something other. Lack of freedom consists simply in our being present to something other, not to ourselves. Those who are thinking are present to themselves, are therefore free....

1. The Concept of the History of Philosophy

Hegel then takes up the familiar objection based on the existence of many philosophies, as well as the contention that philosophies are mere 'opinions'. The following paragraph occurs within this discussion, in the middle of p. 281.

The other objection consists in saying that thinking reason lapses into contradictions. The error of every system is said to lie in the fact that thinking reason strives to grasp the infinite, yet can only employ finite categories in the endeavor and so makes the infinite into something finite; as such, its grasp is limited merely to the finite. But this sort of argument involves the empty abstraction of wanting to avoid falling into contradiction. Thinking begets contradiction as a matter of course. It is important to notice, however, that such contradictions do not occur in philosophy alone but are present everywhere, even in people's representations where they lurk unconsciously. People contradict themselves, unaware that they do it. They only become conscious of the contradictions that thinking produces, ones that thinking alone knows how to resolve....

Next Hegel very helpfully defines and explains his basic terminology, in an extended account (pp. 282–5) not replicated fully in the other introductions. He concludes it with a discussion of the freedom of spirit as self-knowing and self-determining. Appended, by way of examples, are remarks on the topic of development. We resume in the middle of p. 282.

...To bring the significance [of the history of philosophy] into a little clearer perspective, some general concepts will serve as a preface. These

concepts are presuppositions not subject to logical or philosophical debate and proof. The categories are those of *thought*, the *concept*, and the development of *reason*. Philosophy is thinking, and we have already examined that point. Thinking is what is innermost of all things, the ἡγεμονικόν [ruling power].[137] Philosophical thinking is thinking of the universal, of essential being. The product of thinking is thought, which can be subjective or objective. We call thought as objective 'the universal'; the νοῦς of Anaxagoras is this universal element. But we know in this case that the universal is something abstract, and what is particular is distinct from it. The universal is then just form, and what is particular, the content, stands in contrast to it. If we get no further than thought as universal we do not dwell much on that point, or else we are conscious that the abstract is insufficient, unsatisfactory. Hence the expression, 'those are just thoughts'. Philosophy [283] deals with the universal that comprises the particular within it. What comes first, however, is the universal as such, and it is abstract. It is thought, but as pure thought and abstraction. 'Being', 'essence', 'the One', and so forth, are wholly abstract thoughts of this sort.

Second is the concept, which is something other than mere thought. (In everyday life 'concept' is usually taken to mean simply a specific thought.) The concept is a genuine knowing, not thought as merely universal; concept is instead thought insofar as it is self-determining, thought in its vitality and activity, or thought inasmuch as it gives itself its content. In other words, the concept is the universal that makes itself particular. (For instance, 'animal' is universal, and 'mammal' is the supervening, external specification as to the kind of animal.) The concept is thought become active, able to determine itself, to be creative and productive. So the concept is no mere form for a content; instead it forms itself; it gives itself a content and determines its own form. (The determination of the concept will emerge in the history of philosophy itself.) We use the term 'concrete' to capture the point that thought is no longer abstract but is determinate, inasmuch as it determines itself. The concept has given itself a content, has become concrete, that is, has coalesced, with its different characteristics not to be separated. (Here 'coalesced' means that several characteristics are grasped in unity and bound together indivisibly.) The two abstract characteristics that the concept forms into one are the universal and the particular. Everything actually living and true is thus something composite; it has within it multiple characteristics bound together by something external to them. The living activity of spirit

137. The term *hegemonikon* is used by the Stoics for the ruling or guiding principle of the universe, the *logos spermatikos*. See Vol. II, p. 271.

is thus concrete. Therefore, the abstraction of thought is the universal, whereas the concept is what is self-determining, is particular.

The idea, or reason, is concept too. But just as thought determines itself as concept, so reason determines itself as subjective thought. When we say about a concept that it determines itself, it is still abstract. 'Idea' is the fulfilled concept, which fulfills itself with itself. Reason, or the idea, is free, rich, internally filled with content; it is the concept that makes itself filled with content, that gives itself reality. [284] I can indeed say 'the concept of something', but not 'the idea of something', for the idea has its content within itself. The idea is the actuality in its truth. The idea, or reason, is therefore more concrete than the concept; it is its own content. God, state, ethical life, family, and the like, are ideas, namely, are rational. Insofar as this content is thought, it must be in the form of thought. This is the content of philosophy. These three stages of development will become evident in turn in the history of philosophy itself. So reason is the concept giving itself reality, that is, reason consists of concept *and* reality. The soul is the concept, and it gives itself actuality in the body, in reality. When concept and reality are sundered, the human being is dead. This unification must not be grasped as unity as such, for reason or idea is essentially vitality, activity. Its essential activity consists in the concept bringing itself forth, making itself into the content, but in such a way that what is brought forth is always congruent with the concept. The reality is always dependent on the idea, is not something on its own. The reality seems to be another concept, another content, but it is not. The distinction, how the object differs from the concept, resides only in its outward form. The reality is posited as identical with the concept.

An example of this is the seed and the plant. The seed is the concept of the plant; if we cut up the seed, we find in it only a starting point. This seed is active, and the plant originates from it through the activity. The seed is active, and the activity consists in its producing the plant. The plant is just this very life that is the activity. What remains as lifeless and motionless is the wood; becoming wood is its death. The actual plant is the ongoing producing, the bringing-itself-forth. The plant has completed a life cycle when it is in turn in a position to bring forth a seed. The seed is endowed with the entire formation of the plant; its energy and what is brought forth are one and the same thing. Nothing comes forth except what was already there. This unity of the starting point or impulse with what is brought forth is the essential thing to be kept firmly in mind.

The other noteworthy aspect of this example is that [285] in the progression from seed to seed, midway between starting point and endpoint, lies the

determinate being [*Dasein*], this being of divergence [*Auseinandersein*], the development or unfolding as such, which then gathers itself once again in the simple seed. All that is brought forth, the entire plant, lies enveloped in the power of the seed, likewise the entire form of the tree, but merely as enveloped and invisible, for only the unfolding gives the tree determinate being. This must be kept firmly in mind. In similar fashion a whole world of representations, tendencies, and so forth lies hidden in the human soul or spirit. These representations are enveloped in the quite simple I, a term that thus designates only their seed; yet all these representations develop themselves from out of the I and return again to it. This is the movement of the idea, of the rational. Our spirit's activity is our striving to restore this host of representations to this unity, to this ideality [of the I], just as rationality as such, in its fundamental character, is to be grasped as the doubling of the concept, taking it back into its onefold state, and maintaining it therein. So what we call determinate being [*Dasein*] or existence [*Existenz*] is a laying-out of the concept, of the seed, of the I. Nature is such an outlay because each of its determinate features seems to exist as something separate and particular. Determinate being in consciousness, within spirit, is what we call knowing, the thinking concept. So spirit is what brings itself to determinate being, to consciousness. As consciousness as such, I have an object, in that I am there [*da bin*] and have something standing over against me.[138] Inasmuch as the I is the object for thinking, however, spirit is self-producing, self-positing, the knowing of what it is. Therein lies the great difference. Spirit only *is* when it knows that it is. Without this knowledge, freedom amounts to nothing. Its possibility is given in children, but only adults know, through education, *that* they are, and only as such are they, in a proper sense, human beings.

Thus the Oriental person is by nature capable of freedom but does not know it, and so is not free. As human beings, the Oriental peoples are inwardly free, but they are nevertheless not free. Because they lack the consciousness of freedom, they allow themselves to fall into despotism in religion and the political sphere.[139] Europeans know [286] themselves, are object to themselves; the characteristic that they know is freedom; they know themselves as free. Human beings have freedom as their substance. When people speak disparagingly about knowledge they do not know what they are doing. Of course few people engage in self-knowledge, in making themselves their object. But human beings are free only when knowing

138. The German *Dasein*, rendered here as 'determinate being', literally means 'there-being'.
139. See n. 96, p. 195 above.

themselves. Therefore, however much people may in general terms speak disparagingly about knowledge, this knowledge alone is what makes human beings free. So knowledge alone makes human beings to be what they are. Consciousness is therefore spirit's determinate being.

The movement constitutive of actuality is the passage from the subjective into the objective. This passage is in part onefold or immediate, and also in part not onefold but instead a passing through many stages. It is thus with the duplication of the plant from seed to seed. Examples of the lowest plant forms include filaments and tubers; their passage is from germ cell to germ cell, from nodule to nodule, from bulb to bulb, and is therefore immediate. But the duplication from seed, through the plant to a new seed, is something mediated. In the intermediate stages come the roots, stem, leaves, blossoms, and so forth. So this is a developed, mediated passage. So also in spirit there is also something immediate, comprising sheer intuition, perception, and faith, but something else mediated by thinking; this mediation emerges in the appearance [of spirit] too....

Hegel turns next (on p. 287) to the topic of reason and philosophy in history, including the issue of whether philosophies 'refute' one another.

There is only one reason, since even the divine reason is simply reason, and human reason is what is divine in human beings. Philosophy is reason that grasps itself in the mode of thinking, that brings itself to consciousness in such a way that it becomes object to itself or knows itself in the form of thought. This producing, such that its knowing is knowing of itself, is likewise only one as well—only one and the same thinking. Hence too there absolutely is only *one philosophy*. Of course much that is not philosophy can call itself philosophy. We have no special agenda in saying that philosophy is thinking spirit in world history. This spirit is free, and far removed from particular concerns. Thinking spirit, or thinking reason, has nothing to do with petty commerce in knowledge and worldly wisdom; thinking spirit has rather to do with itself. Thousands who dealt in particular concerns are forgotten, and only a hundred names are preserved as such for us. World history's goddess of memory (Mnemosyne) does not bestow her fame upon the unworthy; like the deeds of the heroes in external history, so too in the history of philosophy she acknowledges only the deeds of the heroes of thinking reason....

[288]... It is especially noteworthy that successive and separate concepts are united in the knowledge of singular systems. The concrete concepts of reason structure themselves into singular systems, without earlier systems of thought perishing in later ones. This history resembles the development of the single individual. We learn by degrees. Skill in writing, the main thing

for us to learn as youths, is retained in adult life. But this elementary skill of an earlier stage joins with subsequent skills to form an educated whole, just as, in employing the profoundest theorems of [mathematical] analysis, we still add and subtract. What came beforehand is likewise preserved in the history of philosophy; nothing is cast aside....

[289]...As for the view that the philosophies have been refuted and are now passé, we must say that the truth in them still maintains itself, that it is but one and is the same in all of them. So 'refutation' has no other meaning than the following. Although the philosophy of an era occupies the highest standpoint of spirit's ongoing self-development in those circumstances, it cannot be said that it has attained the highest standpoint of all, one that is unsurpassable. So such a philosophy's one-sidedness consists only in the fact that it takes itself to be philosophy's ultimate standpoint, its ultimate goal. Progress beyond that point, which is [what gets] called 'refutation', is only that such a philosophy comes to be demoted from this highest standpoint and becomes a stage or a subdivision of the whole. The refutation does not affect its content because that content remains as an element of the whole, just as the blossom is an element in the case of the plant. Refutation *must* take place, and so there appears the fruit, which unites all within itself. The progress of spirit's self-intensification therefore occurs when a philosophy that has been the pinnacle of its era, that has for a time [290] had universal import, is demoted to the status of a particular moment. So, for example, the lecturer on logic begins with 'being' and proceeds by retaining it but building upon it. Initially something wholly universal, being receives a particular determination as thought. So thought grounds itself in being.[140] The concept is in turn a higher stage, that of self-determining thought. So thought remains upheld as what is universal, but only as interpreted according to one aspect. It is likewise with the principles of philosophy: the universal content always remains, and the principles have just acquired a different setting.

Further comments (pp. 290–1) about refutation, in the context of development, include specifics about the historical sequence from Stoicism to Epicureanism to Skepticism. Then Hegel introduces (p. 291) other phases in the history of philosophy.

Thus the essence of the history of philosophy is that the earlier principles are made into moments, and what takes their place is a more concrete philosophy such as Platonism, which unites within itself the Pythagorean, Eleatic, and Heraclitean philosophies [so that their one-sided principles] get

140. See Hegel, *Science of Logic* (Miller, pp. 79–82).

preserved in a single complex. The principle of the later philosophy is higher or—what is the same thing—more profound. Eclecticism is not to be condoned, because it often goes hand-in-hand with vanity. Platonic philosophy is no eclecticism, but instead a union of the preceding philosophies into a living, concrete whole, a binding of them into a living unity of thought. Neoplatonism too, or the Alexandrian, Neo-Aristotelian philosophy, is no eclecticism but a uniting of its predecessors; the contradiction of Platonic with Aristotelian philosophy, found in Neoplatonism, is just a one-sidedness of the determinacy that regards itself as absolute.[141]

The essential thing, therefore, is first to discern the principles of the philosophical systems, and second to acknowledge each principle as necessary. Because each is necessary, it emerges as the highest principle of its time. After further progress, the earlier one is only an ingredient in the more recent and more definitive position; but it is carried along rather than cast aside. All the principles are upheld in this way. For instance, oneness, or unity, is the all-pervasive [292] foundation; whatever develops itself in reason proceeds only within its unity. We cannot dispense with the category of oneness, even though the philosophy that made oneness into the highest principle, the Atomism of Democritus, is for us vacuous.

The next few paragraphs explain that the philosophies of the past, although not just dead and gone, nor just refuted, are simpler and more abstract, and as such do not satisfy us today. The translation resumes on p. 294.

One must be impartial in any history, and that is especially the case in the history of philosophy. This stands as the principal requirement among many, because otherwise one would proceed based on one's own system and would judge the others accordingly. This seems to be a reasonable requirement. But in the present instance impartiality involves a special circumstance. The impartiality to be observed here is quite different from that in political history. In a historical biography or portrayal, for example of Rome or Caesar, one must of course take a particular stance; there one has in view a specific object and seeks to narrate its history; so this is indeed partiality, else the history would be written thoughtlessly. So one must be partial to this specific topic, must judge what is important, essential, and appropriate to its goal by disregarding what is not pertinent to it. Judgments about right and

141. In Vol. II Hegel speaks of Neoplatonism and the Alexandrian philosophy as synonymous (pp. 330–1), where he says it 'does not constitute one particular school over against the others; instead it united all principles within itself, but in a higher, authentic, way'. He also says (p. 334): 'We can call Plotinus a Neoplatonist and, with equal justification, call him a Neoaristotelian.'

wrong also come into play, for one must take the side of what is right and good. The alternative is to recount everything chronologically, without any order and connection. Without the element of judgment, the history lacks interest. So here too a stand must be taken. In the history of philosophy as well one must be partial, must presuppose something, must have a goal, which is that of pure, free thought. What is pertinent to this goal must be brought into play. Yet the history of philosophy is in fact said to have no such goal, and ought to be treated impartially. But wanting impartiality in the history of philosophy is no different from wanting that history to be devoid of thought and content, to be just one thing after another, a narration leading up to the present day without connecting its various parts, with no reference to the necessity of the concept—all on the assumption that this history offers no knowledge of truth. All would be just random opinions. We, however, as our first topic, want to grasp the principles of the history of philosophy in orderly fashion, [295] and to seek to develop their necessary connections.

2. The Connection of the History of Philosophy with the Other Expressions of Spirit: Mythology, Religion, the State

The second topic is a brief account of the history of philosophy's connection with the other expressions of spirit—what unites it to them and what in them is to be disregarded. The configurations of spirit that are connected with philosophy include the religions of the peoples and their art and culture in general, as well as the other sciences, the government, law, political history, and the remaining external relationships. This presupposes that all these elements stand in a necessary connection, such that only a certain philosophy and a certain religion can coexist with a certain form of government or with a certain condition of the sciences. All these topics are necessarily caught up with philosophy. It is not by chance that Socratic philosophy originated in Athens, for there is but one spirit that produces and arranges all things. The development of spirit is *a single progression*; one principle, one idea, or one character expresses itself in the most diverse configurations. This principle is what we call the spirit of an age....

[296] A people's initial mode of existence is one of simple custom, simple religion, a life in the context of particularity (hence a self-seeking). The uplifting of spirit comes later in time than the actuality of a people's immediate, singular existence. A people must start to emerge from its concrete life, from satisfaction with its actuality, before it begins to philosophize. In philosophizing, I set myself over against my life and my self, for doing so presupposes that I am no longer satisfied with that life. Philosophy makes its

appearance when there is a cleavage in life, a separation between immediate actuality and thought or reflection about it. These are the times of a people's incipient decline and ruin, when spirit takes flight into the expanses of thought that philosophy constructs for itself.

What always has to come first is a disconnect from the outward circumstances of life. Socrates stopped taking part in public affairs, for actuality no longer satisfied him and he sought satisfaction in thought. Roman philosophy developed in similar fashion under the Caesars, in times of the empire's distress. Philosophy was revivified in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when the spirit of the peoples was no longer satisfied in the way it had been previously. Philosophy comes on the scene when there is an inner incompatibility between what spirit wants and the circumstances in which it can find satisfaction. So, in each instance the flowering of philosophy makes evident the decline of a previously satisfying condition. . . .

Hegel next takes up the topics of mythology and religion. Because the first part of the discussion (pp. 296–301) largely parallels its counterparts in the previous lecture series, some novel excerpts from it, beginning on p. 297, will suffice.

. . . The history of philosophy, however, does not just have to look all over for truth; extracting the content from the mythological form and converting that content into thought is not philosophy's task; [we] must rule that out. [298] Philosophy instead examines thought only where it can be found as such. Therefore we take no account of the philosophical elements that are contained in the myths.

. . . We accept into the history of philosophy only those ideas that express themselves in the specific form of thought. In some histories of philosophy, to be sure, the religious element is taken over from mythologies, in others not.[142] . . .

[299] . . . It is difficult, however, to indicate the boundary between what belongs only to sensible representation and what is adequate to the divine. Anthropomorphisms raise an issue not merely for the sorts of representations that yield knowledge pertinent to sensuous relationships, but also for more important representations, such as that of the Trinity; it is difficult

142. Brucker employs the 'ethnographic' method of treating the history of philosophy, and so includes in his history the myths and religions of ancient peoples. The first part of his *Historia* ('Barbarian Philosophy') begins with antediluvian accounts from the Bible and concludes with Scythian philosophy and theology. Buhle's *Lehrbuch* includes, in similar fashion, the philosophies of the Egyptians, Hebrews, Phoenicians, Chaldeans, Persians, Hindus, Chinese, Celts, and Scandinavians. See also Ast's *Grundriss*, 2nd edn., pp. 16–44. Hegel agrees with Tennemann's critique of this method, stated in the preface to vol. ii of his *Geschichte*.

to ferret out and exclude from the latter the finite features applicable only to the human spirit. (In considering God, different categories or forms of thought must be the foundation.) In the final analysis religion does contain propositions that address wholly universal issues, such as the statement that God is the Almighty. Religion grasps God as creator [*das Setzende*] and cause. These are thoughts that belong directly to the history of philosophy because, as we said, religion and philosophy have one and the same object and content. They differ only in how they consider that object and content.

What belongs to philosophy is brought forth from the form of free thought and not via authority. Based on this principle—form of thought, rendering by thought—philosophy remains steadfast in its distinction from religion or in contrast to it. What differentiates philosophy from religion is that philosophy gives its assent solely to what thought on its own has brought to consciousness. When consciousness has progressed to the point of knowing its innermost self as thinking, what transpires is that reason wants to give its assent knowingly to what it recognizes as true. If it [300] is unwilling to surrender this role to any authority whatsoever, then the idea would be the object of philosophy. The one [reason] gives the right of assent to philosophy, while the other [authority] does not. Today philosophy can no longer be disparaged because religion, at least the religion of our Protestant Church, lays explicit claim to reason by saying that religion must proceed based on one's own conviction and thus not rest on sheer authority. Nevertheless some have asserted recently that there can be no insight into things religious, that religion should exist solely in the mode of religious feeling, solely as sincere and authentic feeling.[143] Doctrine itself requires that one's religion proceed from one's own conviction and thus not rest on sheer authority. When, however, all insight into concepts of religious content is repudiated, then all theology is repudiated too. Theology as science should be knowledge of God and of the human relationship to God, a knowledge determined by God's nature. Otherwise theology would be just historical information. To be sure, people have recently called feeling the source of scientific knowledge, of reason; it is, however, devoid of knowledge. If feeling is said to be true, then reason must be present in it; indeed, this feeling itself must have proceeded from conviction and insight.

The right of free thought over against authority as such calls for closer consideration in the case of philosophy, because the religion that has content

143. A reference to the contemporary and widespread theology of feeling, rooted in the Pietist tradition. In the *Philosophy of Religion* Hegel directs particular criticism at the theology of Schleiermacher, as put forth in his systematic theology, *The Christian Faith*. See, for instance, *Philosophy of Religion*, i.136, n. 52.

in common with philosophy is distinct in form from philosophy insofar as this religion rests on authority as such and therefore is positive. In another respect, however, religion itself calls upon people to pray to God in spirit, namely, to be present with one's own mind and heart to what one holds to be true.[144] This principle is now acknowledged by all, and to that extent this principle of one's own conviction, of inner intuition, and so forth, is the feature philosophy has in common with the rest of our era's culture, including its religion. We should bear in mind, however, [301] the kind of authority that particularly concerns us. Authority is a factor in every presupposition. But where human thought as such is banned in religious matters, or where religion's authority is propped up by worldly means, such authority is of no particular interest to thoughtful reason....

After further comments about the testimony of the spirit comes an extended discussion of issues of faith and reason (pp. 301–6) that is unprecedented in the preceding lecture series, and so is presented here in full.

Faith or conviction is mediated in each person by instruction, by education, by acquired culture, and then by adoption of the general views of an era, its basic tenets and convictions. An essential feature of this instruction that we receive is its bearing on the human heart and soul, but also on one's consciousness, spirit, understanding, and reason, so that instruction leads to conviction of one's own accord. Our faith in the truth, our conviction regarding truth, should be our own conviction, our own insight. So no authority seems to play a role in it. But a very essential authority plays a role here because the very fact of its deriving from our own inner revelation is a mode of authority. This is the case in consciousness, is a fact of consciousness. We know of [302] the being of God; this knowledge too is present within us in such an immediate manner that it itself becomes the authority, the inner authority of conscience. When we discover something within us in this way we are directly convinced that it is also right, true, and good. Yet superficial experience shows us that we have within ourselves a great many immediate representations of this sort, and we must consequently concede that they could be erroneous. When we accept these inner representations and feelings directly as authoritative, a quite contrary content can turn out to originate in us in the very same way too. By our granting validity to this principle, the contrary content is validated too. Depending on how we feel, we can quite readily pronounce something good to be false, evil, unjust. The other side of the coin is that evildoers believe what they do has been implanted in them, has been an inner revelation; for almost all crime springs

144. See n. 123, p. 224 above.

from an inner conviction of right. Acceptance of one's own judgment always involves insight or conviction regarding what is held to be true, and so always involves the form of this inner authority, which can often lead one far astray. Scripture says: 'Out of the heart come evil thoughts'.[145] For that reason this judgment cannot be accepted as true.

Authority, or at least the form of authority, can likewise be a factor in the more reflective modes of insight when some established points are presupposed; this applies to the individual's immediate thoughts as coming from within, but also to products of thinking for oneself. Authority plays a part inasmuch as we accept these ultimate points of view as true. This is usually the case with what we call the perspective [*Vorstellung*], conviction, or culture of an era as a whole. This perspective is one's foundation, and everything in us is determined according to it or from it. For example, at a given time we have a specific view of God, of the state, and so forth. The unwarranted adoption or unconscious presupposition of all these insights that one has can prove to be the basis of all that follows from them. Of course people say that they have thought for themselves, and thinking for themselves can even have taken place; but [303] this thinking for oneself has definite limits, without our being aware of them. In addition to the fact that the spirit of an age is the same for all, and that the individual is unable to get beyond it, this thinking for oneself is found to rest on presuppositions often discovered to be false. A philosophy free of all authority, one carrying out its principle of free thought independent of all internal as well as external authority, has arrived at the concept of free thought, proceeds from free thought, and has free thought as its principle. So, having one's own thinking or one's own conviction does not yet make one free from authority.

The history of philosophy examines free thought in its development. This thought opposes the authority of religion, of folk religion, of the church, and the like; it opposes positive religion as such. So, in one aspect the history of philosophy portrays the conflict of free thought with this authority. But the fact of their conflict cannot be the ultimate thing, the highest standpoint. Philosophy must finally make possible, and bring about, the reconciliation of this conflict, must have this as its absolute goal, but in such a way that it, thinking reason, finds satisfactory. Any reconciliation must emerge from the latter.

There is such a thing as a false peace, one in which the peace between philosophy and religion can be portrayed as each going its own way, each

145. See Matt. 15: 19, where the full sentence reads: 'For out of the heart come evil thoughts, murder, adultery, fornication, theft, false witness, slander.'

operating in its own isolated sphere. In this fashion some have called for philosophy to go its own way without colliding with religion, by contending that philosophy acts wantonly and dubiously when it infringes upon religion. This view is often advanced particularly from the side of thinking, in order to have peace; however, we regard it as a spurious concession. It may be clever, but it is misguided because philosophy and religion have one and the same need, which is to ascertain what is true. Philosophy is thinking, and thinking spirit is what is pure, simplest, most inward. There can only be one inwardness, and also only one satisfaction of this inwardness through itself. When philosophy or thinking reason satisfies itself, it cannot [304] also concede a parallel religious satisfaction. Each can to a certain degree find satisfaction in its own sphere. But reason cannot allow a satisfaction that would be in opposition to reason.

Another call for, or means to, peace, would be for reason to subordinate itself to faith, to either external or internal authority. There was a period in philosophy, particularly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when people advocated this subordination, but in such a way that it was obviously a sham. They put forward philosophical theses contrary to the Christian religion, ostensibly on the basis of reason, but then added that reason subordinated itself to faith (see Bayle's *Philosophical Dictionary*, for instance, the article on 'Manichaeans').[146] Vanini was burned at the stake for philosophical theses of this kind, although he affirmed that they were not his own convictions. When the Catholic Church condemned him to the funeral pyre, it demonstrated its own conviction that it is impossible for active thought to renounce its freedom. So this subordination is an impossibility.[147]

In yet another mediation people sought to establish, philosophy was accorded the status of natural theology. They said that reason does indeed know any number of things, but that revealed religion has additional teachings beyond the scope of reason, the kind of teachings that transcend

146. See Pierre Bayle, *Philosophical Dictionary*, article on the Manichaeans, part D, in which Bayle presents a fictional debate between two pagan philosophers, with Melissus the opponent, Zoroaster the defender, of Manichaeism. How does one resolve the contest between affirmation of one ultimate principle, and of two principles? Bayle's text states: 'Let us say the same of reason; it can only discover to man his ignorance and weakness, and the necessity of another revelation.... The Manichees were sensible of what I have just observed, and therefore they rejected the Old Testament... Now since Scripture affords us the best solutions, I can not be blamed for saying, that it would be difficult to gain the victory over a Heathen Philosopher in this cause.' See *Selections from Bayle's Dictionary*, ed. E. A. Beller and M. duP. Lee, Jr. (Princeton, 1952).

147. On Vanini, see Vol. III, pp. 72–4.

rational cognition, so religion need not be opposed to reason.[148] This circumstance is entirely of a piece with the aforementioned one; for reason, like God, will have no alien deities alongside it, much less over it.[149]

In still another mode of reconciliation, religion for its part relinquishes the positive element; especially in modern times this happened to the positive standpoint often and on a broad scale. In one respect this positive element only involves the form, which is historical, [305] mythical, and so forth. Religion relinquishes this positive element by bringing it into the form of thought. But the latter is then just argumentation, abstract thinking, abstract understanding. In this way religion, for its part, can most effectively remain firm in its inflexibility over against philosophical thinking. But though it says that 'the gates of Hell cannot prevail against it', the gates of reason are stronger still.[150]

From the latter standpoint religion has no objectivity within me as a subject, namely, as a faculty; it has no objectivity within feeling. So religion no longer involves anything capable of clashing with philosophy. The contention is that religion ought to rest on nothing but feeling, but of course not simply because thinking or cognition is injurious to faith; rather such a contention is itself the result of cognition, of insight. Religion lays claim solely to feeling because in feeling there is nothing to know, nothing to cognize. Thinking or conceiving opposes this form of feeling because reason cannot be satisfied merely by the desire to sense or feel. Yet self-conscious feeling, or thought, cannot spurn feeling, for thinking is not antithetical to feeling. (In the history of philosophy itself we will take a closer look at the antipathy between cognition and the non-cognitive, or 'not-knowing'.)

This is the latest standpoint, one that has become very prominent today in Germany. Enlightened understanding, abstract understanding, or abstract thinking, calls only for what is abstract. What it knows about God is only that God is, that God is essential being, but not *how* God is; [it] has an undefined view of God.[151] Therefore it is abstract thinking devoid of

148. This refers to the so-called 'double truth' doctrine attributed (perhaps erroneously) to medieval Averroists, and which Hegel introduces in Vol. III in discussing Vanini and, later on, Bayle; see pp. 56, 72–4, and 147.

149. See p. 224 above with n. 122. This is a play on God's statement in Exod. 20: 3 ('You shall have no other gods before [or besides] me!), and 20: 5 ('... for I the LORD your God am a jealous God ...'); cf. Deut. 5: 7, 9.

150. See Matt. 16: 18, which states the commission to Peter: 'And I tell you, you are Peter, and on this rock I will build my church, and the powers of death shall not prevail against it.' The Greek says: 'the gates of Hades'.

151. Hegel's criticism here is not specifically directed against the Enlightenment natural theology that grasped God as essential being, for its God is not presumed to be sheer *ens* (abstract being), but is conceived as *ens realissimum, necessarium, summum*, and so forth

content. Theology resting in this way merely on abstract understanding has as little content as possible, and has made a clean sweep of dogma, which has been reduced to a minimum. But the religion that is to satisfy the human spirit must be essentially and internally concrete, must be something full of content, for spirit is essentially concrete. It must have as its content what is revealed about God in the Christian religion, that is, it must be dogmatic theology. Christian dogmatics is the range of teachings that present the distinctive features of the Christian religion, that proclaim God's revelation, the knowledge [306] of what God is. Opposed to it is so-called 'sound human understanding' that, with the help of the abstract understanding, pointed to the contradictions in this dogmatics and reduced its content to a minimum by, as it were, emptying it of that content. This vacuous theology called itself 'rational theology'. But it has been merely exegesis, that is, deliberation about some set topic, or argumentation, not the concept of the subject matter. It passes over arbitrarily from the views under discussion to further determinations of views and thoughts. The rational concept opposes this so-called 'enlightened' theology, in that the concept presents the concrete content of religion, and justifies it, from out of itself, thus knows it as thought, as purified of forms reliant on sensible representations, such as the relationship of the Son of God in the Christian religion. Therefore concrete, thinking reason opposes abstract understanding. But inasmuch as thought has thus grasped itself profoundly, in that its own characteristic is the developing of itself out of itself, is grasping itself concretely, so the attainment of the absolute goal is also possible, namely, the reconciliation of religion with philosophy, of truth in the form of religious representation with truth in the form in which it is developed by reason. This is the relationship of the two that develops itself through oppositions in the history of philosophy. Both forms have one and the same truth as their foundation.

As for the connection of philosophy with art, in its sublimity and authentic character art stands on the side of religion. It has given outward expression to what religion contains inwardly.

Still another topic would be the connection of philosophy with the state. Religion and state too are essentially interconnected. In the history of philosophy we have to mention political history in specific cases, although more in terms of external connections. Religion and state, however, are

(namely, being that is most real, is necessary, is highest), hence being with a content that one thinks. Instead, following upon his discussion of feeling in the previous paragraph, his target is the abstract thinking in the garb of immediate knowing, which has only the sheer facticity of God to hold onto. See his critique of immediate knowing in Vol. III, pp. 195–201, in his discussion of Kant and Jacobi.

essentially and necessarily interconnected. The political constitution bases itself on a specific principle of spirit's self-consciousness, on the way in which spirit knows itself with respect [307] to its freedom. In the state freedom is to be distinguished from arbitrariness. The essence of the state is that the rational will in and for itself—the will that is universal in and for itself—this universal, substantial character of willing, is actual. The laws are the expression of what is rational with respect to willing. What matters is the consciousness that a people has of its freedom, of its rational will, and this in turn depends on the view that the state and the people have of God. (The universal truth is that there is one God, and the representation of freedom evidently incorporates this general truth.)

Inasmuch, then, as the constitution of the state is connected with religion, philosophy is connected with the state through religion too. Greek philosophy could not have originated in the Orient. Freedom did indeed emerge among the Oriental peoples, although in the Orient the principle of freedom was not yet the principle of law too. Just as little could modern philosophy have originated in Greece or Rome. Germanic philosophy arose within Christendom, and has the Christian principle as its foundation, a foundation that it shares with religion. Therefore this connection is important.

Philosophy also has, however, another more specific relationship with the state and with the external, historical relationship between the state and religion. Religion is thinking about the divine. The sphere of religion is separate from that of the state. In contrast to religion, the sphere of the state can in fact be viewed as a secular sphere and so, in a certain sense, as something ungodly or profane. Yet what is rational, the law, rational law, refers to truth and so must also refer to religious truth, indeed must be in exact agreement with what is truth in religion and in philosophy. Religion and state, the spiritual and secular realms, must be in harmony with one another.

This mediation can be found in manifold modes, for instance in the form of theocracy as we see it particularly in the East. There freedom, as subjective, moral freedom together with law and will, is wholly absent. A principal feature of theocracy is that religion has posited itself and its sphere on its own account, [308] has denigrated secular freedom, and has taken a negative stance toward the secular sphere, as in the Roman Catholic Church where the religious element, a spiritual caste, cut itself off wholly from the laity; also as in how the Roman patricians controlled the sacral roles to the exclusion of the plebeians. In a theocracy the secular realm, the sphere of human freedom, is viewed as something lawless and profane, as incompatible with the religious realm. What we call law, morality, and

ethical life, then has no value. But secular law on its own, the secular order, can be an altogether divine order too. Yet when the religious aspect keeps to itself and regards truth as something not possibly immanent in the sphere of human freedom, that is a negative stance taken against human freedom itself.

Philosophy is an immanent, present [*gegenwärtiges*], ready-to-hand [*präsentes*] thinking, involving the presence [*Gegenwart*] of freedom in the subjective domain. What is thought and known, however, belongs to human freedom. Because the principle of freedom is found in philosophy, it stands on the side of what is worldly. Philosophy has what is worldly for its content, and so has been called worldly wisdom. (Friedrich Schlegel and his followers have once again promoted this expression.[152]) Philosophy by all means requires that the divine be present [*präsent*] in the secular realm, and that what is ethical and legal has, and should have, its locus [*Gegenwart*] in the actuality of freedom. Philosophy cannot allow the divine to waft away into feeling, into the haze of devotion. So long as the commandments and will of God subsist in human feeling, they are contained in the human will too, in the rational will of human beings. Philosophy is cognition of the divine, but also of how this divine element relates to, and is actualized in, the secular side of things. So philosophy is in fact also worldly wisdom, and to that extent philosophy appears on the side of the state and opposes presumptions to religious dominion over the world. On the other side, however, philosophy is equally opposed to the caprice and contingency of worldly dominion.

This is philosophy's place in history in this regard. Philosophy makes us aware of the divine being within the sphere of human [309] thinking and willing, namely, the substantial element of the political constitution, particularly in recent times when the state is said to be based on thought.

3. General Division and Manner of Treatment

Following this heading, the only one provided in the German edition, is a brief account (pp. 309–11) of the beginnings of philosophy in the West and its main historical phases. The 1827–8 discussion of the literature on the history of philosophy, omitted in the German edition, would come after it. We pass over material that duplicates the previous lecture series, and conclude with the final paragraph (pp. 311–12) of this introduction.

In the history of philosophy we are not looking mainly at the biographies of philosophers. So the individual life circumstances of all the individual

152. See n. 33, p. 73 above.

philosophers will not be discussed. Likewise, owing to the shortness of time, we must leave aside the literature and confine ourselves to a few dates. Also, in presenting the history of philosophy we can include only the principal philosophers. Each system has a number of teachers and adherents, and so a great many names could come to our attention, names of men who in part rendered great service as philosophical teachers. But we must likewise omit consideration of the way a philosophy was disseminated. We have in the main to examine just the principles of the philosophical systems. These of course will lead on to concrete topics. [312] But when the principle itself is abstract or one-sided, and we see this one-sidedness, we can state forthwith that the principle is unsatisfactory in its application to what is concrete, and so that application is of no interest to us. In this history as such we must stick to the achievements, by which I mean the specific thoughts. Put plainly and simply, we are examining these thoughts as they expressed themselves at each stage. Twenty-three centuries have been spent in coming to this consciousness of them [*Bewusstsein über sich*], in grasping the concept of 'being'.

E. THE 1829–30 LECTURES

The German edition constructs this introduction (pp. 313–50) from a number of transcripts. The section headings, except for the Introduction to it, appear as given in the German. It is translated here in its entirety, despite some repetition from the previous introductions, because it is the last one Hegel managed to complete. Since it is presented without omissions, we return to the practice of indicating pagination in the German edition by numbers in the outside margins and vertical rules within the text.

Introduction

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We treat the history of philosophy not as something fixed or static, but instead as mobile, for we are dealing with something that takes place. We have to recount deeds of thought, voyages of discovery, the taking possession of the intelligible realm. In this science we are dealing with the realm of thought. Another point to note is that all human activity is human insofar as it is a thinking process, is a product of thinking and proceeds from thinking, comes forth from thinking, in that thinking is active in it. To say that human beings distinguish themselves from animals by thinking is also to say that everything human, what belongs to being human, has its source and seat in thought. Scientific knowledge, religion, state, laws, art, and so

on, all belong not to animals but to human beings, for all of it is essentially thinking. The human realm constructs itself solely on the field of thought, in the soil of thinking. While all that is human also belongs to thinking, it is nevertheless not the case that all the structures of religious representation, sense experience, constitution, laws, and states, although having their roots in thought, belong as such to philosophy.

To clarify the extent to which thought belongs to philosophy, we must make a distinction. We must ask whether the substance [*Gehalt*] that belongs to spirit has its root in thinking, whether it is also elaborated in the form of thinking. Though the content [*Inhalt*] of religion must be sensed, still its substance has its root in thinking. But this content is in the form of feeling, of feeling per se, of religious representation, and so forth. The content in the particular sciences is in the same situation, is indeed permeated by thought, for thought is what is operative there; but this content is not yet in the form of thought, or else the thought there is not yet as such free, the thought is not yet pure. Philosophy deals with pure,
314 free thought, with the elaboration of | thought from the concrete materials. So its object is free thought. One can indeed say that religion contains philosophical themes, that mythology contains the ancient philosophical themes; but this is taken to mean that the thought there is not yet in the form of thought. The content is still in the mode of the imagination, is not yet pure thought. The Christian religion has the character of being bound to a historical person, Christ. For representation, his death, life, and birth are something historical, and this involves further intuited configurations—namely, intuitions of what has existed in time and space and is to be grasped accordingly. Even though such a content is inherently rational, it is not yet in the form of thought. Philosophy deals with thought as such. The kind of science that contains the content elaborated in the form of thought is philosophy. This is only a contrast regarding the form, not a distinction regarding the content. This distinction is far-reaching, and we will return in particular to it with the issue of where we should begin the history of philosophy. All of religion involves philosophical themes; so the history of philosophy must make reference to religion.

In the history of philosophy we have to examine thoughts in the form of thought, and these are specific thoughts, ones full of content. Thought can be present even though the content is of an inferior sort. Thus in natural history species are something universal, though the form alone is what is universal there. The content is something different, is an individual animal or plant. But in philosophy the content is not distinct from the form; we must not first endeavor to make the content into a species. Philosophy is not

essentially dealing with the formal aspect or mere form of thought, for the content must belong to the thought itself. So in philosophy we are dealing with thought that is full of content. The content consists of God, nature, soul, spirit. Such things are something substantial within themselves. God, however, is a thought, and is so only for spirit; we can grasp God only in thought. We do form images of God, but we do not grasp God correctly by doing so. [We] take nature to be true, although in our philosophizing about nature we seek | to conceive it, to discern its inner character, not 315
the sensible aspect that lies on the surface. What is inner to nature are its laws, and they are the essential thing. Scientific knowledge consists in our converting what is essential into the form of thought, so that these laws are not mere empty imaginings but genuinely are what is authentic and actual in nature. So we are dealing with specific, content-filled thought, indeed with the kind whose substance (the characteristics of the thought) is brought forth by thought itself. Such a content we in general also call 'reason', what is full of substance, is subsistent in and for itself. It has its source in thinking, in νοῦς, not merely in subjective thinking (insofar as we represent thinking within our own consciousness) but in thought as such, in the divine νοῦς. Reason in the form of thought, or reason as it is thought, is our topic.

Putting the point in general terms is to say that we are treating the history of reason, which brings itself forth in the form of thought. Accordingly, in the history of philosophy we have for our object rationality, thought, or thinking reason, as something that has a history, namely, has come forth in time, has undergone multiple changes, has multiple events and deeds behind it—a series of constructs on the part of thinking reason. So the history of philosophy seems right away to be a contradiction in itself. Reason or concrete thinking is eternal, an eternal realm of truth, a realm of eternal stillness, eternal rest; it has been, is, and will be, and it is unchanging. Yet we have a history of thinking reason, and what takes place in it, what we have there, is the emergence of a great many such thoughts about what is rational, so many instances of thoughtful reason.

When we venture into the history of philosophy we encounter this multitude of philosophies. People say there is only *one reason*. The philosophies do not seek to present it through feeling, as | religion does, but in thinking 316
fashion; thinking is the active work of the rational itself. So there ought to be only one philosophy as well, the thoughtful knowing of the rational, and yet there are so many different philosophies. This multiplicity of philosophies is a favorite theme of those who impugn philosophy and disregard it. From the fact that there are so many philosophies they conclude that philosophy has nothing to offer. Or else they say that one cannot know truth, namely,

attain rational consciousness. So cognition is once and for all shown to be a chimera [*Nichts*].

Those who assume there is no philosophy, or who say one cannot cognize the truth, are in part deceivers [*ganz magisch*]. When people hear the word 'cognize' [*erkennen*] they turn away as if the matter is settled. Whoever says such a thing has not put two and two together. The word 'cognize' is deceptively off-putting. But 'cognize' means no more than 'know', or 'have insight into', something, and 'believe' [is] its opposite. Cognition is a specific knowing of, or insight into, the necessity in an object and its relationships. Those who say that one cannot cognize truth, that one cannot know truth, draw their support especially from the multitude of philosophies. They welcome the history of philosophy to the extent that they believe they can show by it that thinking reason has just set out on misadventures and erroneous paths. They say that thinking reason just wanders about; that it has not discovered the realm of thought; that there is no path to truth. They add that there are so many errors because what is true is inaccessible to cognition. The history of philosophy only presents the spectacle of miscarried and failed attempts to arrive at truth. It is a
317 battlefield where nothing is to be seen but the slain. |

[153]Reason is only one, and there can likewise be only one grasping of thinking reason; so there is only one philosophy. And yet there are multiple philosophies. We, however, want to be clear about this antithesis. That calls for introducing perspectives not able to be proven here, which are to be settled upon before we go into the subject matter itself. So we will provide an introduction concerning the relationship of the diverse philosophies to the one philosophy. Another topic is the connection the history of philosophy has with the history of other sciences. Surely mention of the sheer numbers, of the eras in which philosophy has developed itself, involves a connection with great peoples. We will see philosophy migrate from one people to a different people. We have to consider the general aspects of the connection with other histories—those of religion, art, and political institutions, of the political history of peoples, and so forth. Our anticipation is that the spirit pressing toward unity is connected inwardly not only with the forms of religion, political constitution, art, and so forth, but also in the same way with philosophy. This presupposition must be set forth in greater detail.

The third topic will be the point where for us philosophy has its beginning. It also includes a division of philosophy into periods, one that is not

153. The next three paragraphs indicate four topics to be covered. The first three correspond to the three subsequent sections of the text, each with its own heading. The fourth topic, on the literature of the history of philosophy, is omitted by the German edition.

simply external. Thereupon we have to indicate the extent to which the different philosophies are necessarily grounded in the concept. Since the history of philosophy is the history of thinking reason, and the governing belief is that things occur rationally in history, and if in addition we believe in providence and must accept that history has not taken place apart from providence, we also have to accept that we do not have before us a series of chance constructs—we have to accept that one reason governs the progression. So the necessary connection will be exhibited in the division into periods.

The fourth topic will add a few points about the literature. We are dealing with the history of philosophy, however, and not with | the history of the 318
philosophers. We also leave to one side the history of the dissemination of their teachings, which is a function of external conditions.

1. The Relation of the Many Philosophies to the One Philosophy

The first task is to place in perspective the circumstance that thinking reason has had a history. We cannot go deeper into the concept of the matter here, into its logical aspect. Instead we must just seek to gain a perspective on it, one that is only preliminary or introductory. Then this perspective has to stand the test of what the history of philosophy itself has had to offer. It is therefore a general synopsis of what presents itself in separate elements in the history of philosophy.

Whereas the history of philosophy looks to be a series of contingent appearances supplanting one another in turn, our object for consideration is the activity, deeds, or history of thinking reason and its consciousness of itself in the form of pure thought. The first point is that the consciousness of thinking reason is above all something foundational, something primary (*ὑποκείμενον*).[154] The second point is that this consciousness is not full-blown all at once, but has worked itself out, has brought itself forth. We can capture this self-production on the part of thinking reason with the general expression 'development'. We can say that, by grasping itself in the form of thought, thinking reason first of all makes itself into what it is, namely, it develops itself. This image of development is a simple representation that we have to hang onto. It has in fact two aspects: first, the fact that thinking reason must develop itself; second, what that development is. What the development involves, in philosophical terms, is that philosophy must undergo a series of appearances. The fact that thinking spirit must develop

154. *Hupokeimenon* is a term Aristotle uses for the element that persists throughout the changes a substance undergoes. For Aristotle, that is matter. See Vol. II, p. 236.

itself will not be enlarged upon here. Reason is in and for itself, while
319 consciousness must be brought forth. |

Every living thing, the seed, must develop itself, and what is rational in the child must do so too. The child is not an adult. We say that a child is rational but not yet so, inasmuch as its reason is of course present as aptitude, though not yet elaborated. Inorganic or dead things do not develop themselves. The living thing must make itself into what it is implicitly. Spirit is something living; it must first externalize itself, must posit itself outwardly, must have itself as its object, in order to have a consciousness of itself. That is the general character of development.

The further point is that this development is a series of stages. We have the example of it in the human being, who is infant, child, youth, adult, and elder. It is likewise with a plant—seed, stem, branch, leaves, blossoms, fruit. Determined in the seed is the kind of shape, color, and blossoms the plant shall have, although these features emerge sequentially. Their emergence passes through a series of stages, and these stages are necessary. There can be no fruit apart from provision of the preceding stages. We have to represent the development of spirit, of thinking reason, to ourselves according to this analogy too, in order to become conscious of it; and the form of thinking what is true is what we call thought. This self-development of spirit is the object of the history of philosophy, and the development passes through stages. Each stage is necessary, is a condition for what follows it.

But a negative moment or a negative determination comes into play. The plant has leaves and gains blossoms. The blossoms may be what specifically interests us because we take pleasure in them, because to our mind they are the ultimate goal, though they are not the ultimate goal for the plant itself. The plant seeks fruit and the blossom must fall off, which is the negative moment. The fruit develops itself from the blossom, which is cast off, is negated [*negiert*], in order for the seed-buds to develop. The plant that has sprouted above ground has a stem and leaves, and these are its shape, its existence. Then the branches develop, which is something different, a different shape from that of the stem; this is like a line that disperses into multiple lines and so is negated. Then the buds emerge. These buds are
320 refuted [*widerlegt*] by the blossoms. | The blossoms are refuted by the fruit. So we have a series of stages, each of which is negated and yet also not negated. The bud is refuted by the blossom. The meaning of its refutation is not that it ought not exist; the blossom is essential, and yet it must fade away. The fruit, however, then contains the entire energy of this preceding structure.

We can grasp this negative moment in a different way too. The stages of development follow one another chronologically. It is the same with our developing knowledge of an external object that has spatial components. Thus the Europeans discovered the Canary Islands to the west, and they took these islands to be the outer limit of the world. This view was refuted when people subsequently discovered the Azores. They too were the outer limit, until that was refuted by discovery of the islands and continent of America. Columbus discovered America and took it to be part of Asia, and that too was refuted. All of this has been refuted, and yet the Canary Islands, the Azores, and America, remain and are essential parts of our knowledge of the earth. In 'development' a single structure is a negative moment.

Consonant with these images, we have to comprehend as well the development of reason that grasps itself in the form of thinking. It is the development of self-thinking reason. In the history of philosophy there are diverse forms and stages; a new intellectual world is discovered, and it is taken to set the boundaries of the intelligible realm. For instance, the Eleatics regarded God as 'the One', a term that stands for what is ultimate, is true.[155] This discovery was held to be the boundary of the intelligible world, and yet it has been refuted. People have gone beyond it, just as the seafarers went beyond the Canary Islands and the Azores. The discovery that God is the One has been refuted, and yet this definition endures nevertheless because what has been refuted is only that it is the ultimate definition, the highest stage. This is how we have to grasp refutation. All the philosophies have been refuted; the principles of all the philosophies have been negated. But the refutation or negation is only one aspect: these principles are at the same time thoughts, essential thoughts, necessary | definitions on the part 321
of thought. So they likewise endure. The history of philosophy is the voyage of discovery into the world of thought, into the truth that is eternal, simple, resting in itself. But this world of thought is not such a simple thing as the One of the Eleatics. They grasped the whole with one representation, one thought, and yet the whole is not grasped by it. The realm of thought is not captured in this way by such simple abstractions, just as in America there are many islands.

This perspective constitutes the foundation for how we expound the history of philosophy: that reason has a development, that the development is truth, that present in the development are negations, which rise up against one another, that it therefore involves a negative moment although a positive moment remains as well, and that this course of development is necessary.

155. On the Eleatics and 'the One', see Vol. II, pp. 57–8, 61–2.

This is what is to be shown. The demonstration consists in the history of philosophy presenting itself as being this course of development.

But the course of development in philosophy nevertheless seems to be of a different sort. What develops in it are not in fact spatial objects, a number of which can exist as elements within space, where the whole then appears as an aggregate of single things. The circumstances are in fact different with philosophical principles. So the previous image, the comparison with a voyage of discovery, in which the Azores peacefully and tolerantly allow the Canary Islands to exist alongside them, seems unsuitable. Each principle of philosophy, however, is something single or onefold [*einfach*], is the sort of principle that excludes others. What this onefold character involves is something that calls for a closer look.

Each philosophical principle is single, but abstract. Philosophy deals with what is single, what is existent as present to itself. Because of this onefold character, each principle seems to be irreconcilable with all the others. When we hold this view we have to struggle perpetually with the abstraction of onefoldness. The Eleatics said 'God is the One', that is, what is onefold. The One, or what is onefold as such, is wholly empty. But the further point is that even what is onefold can also be internally concrete, internally manifold, such that the unity remains without detriment to the
322 differentiation. We have the closest example | in our own spirit. In saying that 'God is the One', or that 'I am the one, I am onefold, a concentrated point', or 'I am one with myself', then [by the latter] we envisage the I as what is perfectly onefold; nothing is as simple as this I. Yet we know that, within itself, this I is at the same time a world of representations, drives, and so forth, that it is an infinitude. Each person has a world (the whole world) within; in this onefoldness each person is an abyss enclosing an endless multitude within it. Reflecting on oneself or turning attention to oneself draws forth the abundance that is implicit within. So the I is what is wholly onefold and is at the same time such a multitude or abundance within itself. When we say 'spirit' in place of 'I', then from the outset we have the representation not of an abstraction, but of a living organism. Spirit must be a totality, and yet the totality must be as onefold as the I. This must be kept in mind when saying 'onefold'. Spirit is onefold but is internally abundant, is an organic abundance without loss of its unity. This spirit, or the idea, is onefold, although we have indeed the image of it as an internal abundance, an internal concreteness, not just being abstractly by itself. Spirit is something actually, vitally, concrete.

When we hold fast to the definition that what is onefold need not be what is empty, then we are rid of the aforementioned illusion that what is

onefold excludes differentiation. Inasmuch as it is in fact internally concrete, it is internally differentiated. In that what is onefold is something concrete, it also contains within itself what is differentiated, and thus it is not essentially exclusive of what is manifold or differentiated; instead it can also contain within itself what is differentiated, insofar as it is concrete. The same point applies to the mutual relations of the different principles of philosophy. They negate one another, but instead of excluding they only sublate one another, that is, the subsequent principle includes the previous one within itself. We make these definitions our foundation.

An additional and related point is that this development is necessary, and that it consists in what is onefold making itself ever more concrete. Necessity is present in the progression of thought's development. | Just 323
as there is reason in the world in general, so too there is necessity in the development of what is rational; that is, what is true has developed itself in accordance with what it is. A series of thought-determinations or categories [*Gedankenbestimmungen*] follow one from another. The same sequence of thought is also found in the logical development that presents [philosophical] science in its pure form. The course of development in the science of logic and in the history of philosophy must, in and for itself, be one and the same. This is evident when we grasp correctly the progression of self-developing thinking and draw a proper distinction with respect to what emerges historically and what is scientific. For instance, in one respect they are different, and yet there must be *one* progression in the principal moments or nodal points in both what is logical and the history. So the progression of logic is a verification for the history of philosophy, and vice versa. The configurations in the historical development display themselves in more concrete form. In order to grasp them, one must be able to single out the logical principles and to recognize the one development in the other.

We are not dealing with chance appearances such that at any given time any one philosophy could have arisen as well as another. A philosophy was able to arise only at the time in which it did arise; that is to be proven. We have before us the progression of thinking reason. Reason is not given over to adventures and contingencies. The individuals we see emerging in the history of philosophy do of course have the air of particularity. As in world history generally, however, these individuals are bearers only of something in and for itself necessary. Individual greatness consists in having made what is necessary in and for itself to be one's own interest. Today it would be a vain undertaking to seek to resurrect the Platonic philosophy anew. Platonism has had its day, and it sufficed for what was needed at that time.

The more developed spirit has plumbed more deeply within itself. What was necessary according to the subject matter was what was needed at the time. What is needed is contained in the forward movement of the subject matter itself; a time needs only what is necessary in and for itself. Each philosophy
324 is to appear at its authentic time. Individuals cannot get | beyond their own time; that is as difficult as jumping out of their own skin; their era embodies the principle of their spirit. We can of course be concerned about the future and make various predictions about it. We surely do long for the future, [but] the future is nebulous. Its roots are in the present, yet if we knew what lies within the present we would want to have a different present, and so the future would already be the present. No individual and no philosophy has stood above and beyond its time. Schelling's philosophy could not have been introduced in Plato's day, nor could Plato's philosophy have been introduced today.

What is necessary in itself readily appears to us as contingency when in the history of philosophy we look upon its configurations as the deeds or perhaps just the pastimes of individuals. The alternative is to consider the necessity of the progression. We have now to investigate what kind of progression it is and to inquire into the extent to which what comes afterward already lies in what went before it. In doing so we notice, first of all, that the beginning point as such is something simple or onefold [*das Einfache*], a term that is to be taken in the sense of 'abstract'. What is first is precisely something undeveloped or unelaborated that has not yet advanced. Further progress constitutes enrichment, the truth of determinations. What is most ancient is the most abstract. The first philosophies have quite simple, abstract principles. What is most abstract is most superficial, and a sensuous understanding proves to be the most superficial. The sensible element in it can be rich, but the thought in it is, as such, poor. The first philosophies are the most abstract ones. Contrasted to these deficient first thoughts were the mythologies in their abundance, although that was an abundance of beautiful or wild fantasy. The thought, the specific thought, is still most deficient, is abstract, is most general. The beginning is simple abstraction. Progress consists in passing over to further determinations. What takes shape is a multiplicity or abundance of determinations, with the
325 unity | of course remaining, but determining itself within itself, deepening itself internally. The deepening itself internally is by the same token a going-outside-itself, but one that maintains the determinations in unity. Thought holds them together within itself. The progression is therefore from the abstract to concrete principles—a progression that precisely accords with necessity.

The phenomenon we see in the history of philosophy is that a sequence of principles takes form in time, principles seemingly quite diverse from one another but that, more closely examined, so relate to one another that the later ones are simply more determinate than the former and contain the former within themselves. This sequence constitutes itself in accord with the necessity of the subject matter. The principles appear to be simply diverse. Then ensues an epoch in which consciousness unites the previously erected, disparate principles. They come to be arranged in a bouquet, united under one idea. In that way Platonic philosophy united its predecessors in one philosophy. Plato studied the earlier philosophies and took them up within his own, not externally but by combining them in a concrete concept. Even so, his philosophy is no 'eclecticism',[156] a disparaging term in the history of philosophy for a view too clever by half, that of plucking out for oneself all that is best. The philosophical idea is essentially unity—it is not that one must pick up one thing here and another there. We will, to be sure, see periods in which the principles have been juxtaposed in reflective diversity, set in mutual opposition, and yet the totality of the spheres is still present. Such principles are one-sided inasmuch as each one sets itself in opposition to the others. So we see Stoicism saying that what is true and right is only true insofar as it is determined by thought. The second position is Epicur e-anism, for which perception is the truth; and finally the third is Skepticism, which assents to neither but takes up a negative stance toward both instead of uniting their determinations concretely.[157] Thus once more we find a nodal point in the Alexandrian or Neoplatonic philosophy, which wrestles with the antithesis of Platonism and Aristotelianism, with the outcome that they are harmonized.[158] A higher consciousness recognizes that they are only elements. In this sense the principles of all | the philosophies are 326
embraced, although they have a different status, namely, that their thought-determinations or categories are only something particular and not what is ultimate, not what is universal. So, just as the Azores are not the end of the earth but only a part of it and retain that status, the principles of all the philosophies are necessarily maintained. It follows that the philosophy of our day must necessarily be the most concrete philosophy. The progression is not a chase after a will-o'-the-wisp but is something necessary and rational. It is the advance from the most abstract to the concrete. Each philosophy presents a necessary stage of thinking, with the proviso that it is

156. On Platonism as not an eclecticism, see Vol. II, p. 182.

157. These features of the three schools are stated in Vol. II: Stoicism (p. 270); Epicureanism (pp. 282–3); Skepticism (pp. 294–5). See also p. 93 above, with nn. 58 and 59.

158. See Vol. II, p. 334, on the uniting of these two philosophies in the thought of Plotinus.

not the final one. The philosophy of our day is necessarily the most concrete, for our philosophy is essentially the historical result of all the preceding philosophies. It is the work of two and a half millennia.[159] Spirit itself has worked it out. The progression from abstract to concrete is self-determining. That is the second thing we wanted to note.

The differences among the philosophies are therefore entirely necessary. No philosophy has been refuted; the negative dimension is just that philosophies are demoted to the status of particular instances instead of being definitive, as they were before. So the history of philosophy is the justification of all philosophies. It is not the callow cleverness that knows better than all its predecessors. All the philosophies are one-sided, but the one-sidedness gets stripped away and the content remains. What follows unites within itself all that precedes it. When we explicate thought purely we find it containing all the principles of philosophy. No labor of spirit gets lost; and a third noteworthy characteristic follows from this, namely, that in the history of philosophy we are not dealing with something past or with the thought of others. We are dealing with the present, and with the most vital present. There are categories of thought. Inasmuch as we philosophize, we have to give an account of thoughts. We too are thinking, and the thoughts of earlier philosophers are our thoughts too; hence we are always in a present, unlike in the histories of other disciplines. Although the substantial element is of course present as well in the histories of morals, of religions, and the like, in them we can no longer be contemporary with a particular past era, for
327 | that is a matter of sensibility and not of pure thought, and sensibility is conditioned by time and circumstance. We cannot with our own spirit fully envisage ourselves in such particular settings. We can of course envisage the lives of Romans and Greeks. But we cannot think ourselves capable of bowing down before the statue of Olympian Jupiter and envisaging it as God. Greek philosophy and thought, however, is something pure. We can enter into it fully; it is our thought. In philosophy we find ourselves in the present because we find ourselves in the realm of thought, in which the earlier systems are reduced to elements.

In modern times the historical tendency has gained the upper hand, has become predominant. Historians of theology and of law are not dealing with contemporary matters but with something foreign to them that does not concern their own lives. They seem to be very occupied with their topic and take great pains with it. They busy themselves diligently and suppose

159. The German text employs an archaic expression (*dritthalb tausend Jahren*) for 'two and a half millennia' (*zweieinhalbtausend*).

they must be accomplishing something by researching this information, the opinions of others. With all this industriousness, however, they seek to stick to the topic itself and to keep their own heart out of the picture. This procedure does away with truth because it surrenders the ability to grasp truth itself. Someone may well possess extensive historical information about religion and yet, when asked 'What do *you* make of it?', proceed as if this question is of no concern, as if the only pertinent task is to know what others have held about religion.

So, in the history of philosophy we are in the present. What comes later in this history is more profound, and the greater the profundity, the more universal it is. We must be contemporaneous with what we initially regard as past. 'Nostra res agitur' ['Our concerns motivate us']. This history is not about notions foreign to us, because occupation with notions of that sort is not worthwhile. What matters is deeming ourselves worthy of possessing all that is thought as *our own* thinking. This is not meant in the clever sense that, lacking thoughts of our own, we must cast about for foreign thoughts because doing so is supposed to prevent groping around in ignorance. We are justified in regarding something different as foreign to us when the humanity that must be inherent in it is bygone. But in the present case | we are dealing with pure thought, and in pure thought all people 328
are equals. In pure thought we are removed from all particularities.[160] People ascribe to philosophy the arrogance of wanting to know what is true, and over against this pride they pit the humility and resignation of ignorance. Yet pride resides in the subject that imagines itself to possess, in contrast to others, a particular feature more excellent than that of the others. In philosophy we are dealing with thought that is free on its own account and in virtue of which human beings set themselves apart from the animals. Thought is what all human beings have in common, and in virtue of this they put themselves on a par with others. They do not make the features peculiar to their own heart and genius normative; in thought all such things are set aside. Thinking is what is universal in and for itself. All particularities are effaced in this universality. To dwell on this soil is the ultimate humility; for humility means setting aside all distinctiveness, all characteristics of brilliance, genius, and the like, and immersing oneself purely in the universal subject matter. In this way we are dealing with what is contemporary, namely, with the universal, in which private matters vanish;

160. The German *Partikularitäten*, rendered here and elsewhere as 'particularities', refers to individual characteristics of things; in this case specifically to the those characteristics of individual philosophers (and cultures) that are to be distinguished from insights and institutions that express universal thoughts.

what pertains only to some is of no importance. A work of art presupposes genius, but everybody acknowledges that. Its creator does not call attention to his genius, since the work presents the subject matter. So all personal elements in the work of art are subordinated to its objective. This is even more the case in philosophy, where no natural element intrudes. Art involves a natural ingredient to be sure, the medium and the talent, but there is no such philosophical talent. Philosophy's standpoint is something wholly universal, the talent that makes a human being to be human, namely, the activity of thinking. We are not dealing with particularities but with the universal, with what is contrary to particularity.

There is one more thing to mention about the impartiality required of the historian of philosophy. People cleverly state that one must proceed in historical fashion, by which they mean that the historian of philosophy should just recount the given materials and not subscribe to any particular philosophy. They say that historians should not seek their own systems in
329 the philosophies they describe, nor | should they judge the philosophies from their own standpoint.[161] This demand for impartiality has a twofold sense. It is correct in one sense, when someone takes sides and has a particular, narrow-minded interest, makes a one-sided case that is based on some extraneous source or is given validity contrary to what lies at hand. Of course what we already said rules out such a stance, inasmuch as we wish to consider thought in its own ongoing determination. Another sense of impartiality, more specific and commonly held, is that one should in no way be a party to philosophy, but instead should hold the view that the history of philosophy merely recounts erroneous ideas and opinions. 'Opinion' [*Meinung*] is related to 'mine' [*mein*], and is what I hold to be the case; it is δόξα. In the history of philosophy we are said to be dealing only with opinions or private viewpoints of that sort. This is an impartiality of a sheerly negative kind, and it is pointless.

Over against this impartiality, every historian must exhibit a partiality. The object described must be of interest to the historian. A proper presentation comprises what is pertinent to the topic and is essential. Partiality of this kind is necessarily found in every political history. When I portray Roman history, what interests me is the state, its internal political institutions, its relation to other states. This is the essential thing. What I say must have reference to this state, and I must know what is essential regarding it if I am to write a succinct history. Chroniclers today record everything that has to do with the state. The essential thing must be what establishes

161. See n. 19, p. 63 above.

it as distinct from other states—thus, a political constitution. In writing chronicles I can recount endlessly many things that have nothing much to do with the state. An intelligent historiography, however, must know what is essential; it takes sides regarding the essential point and holds firmly to what has reference to it. So too in the history of philosophy, sides must be taken on behalf of the formation of thought, and the highlighting of what pertains to it. So the goal is not individuality and how it maintains and positions itself, but rather thought itself. In the history of philosophy the only | goal is thought and the free development of thought. For that 330
one takes sides. People say: 'One must emphasize what is important and essential.' Words to this effect often fill many pages and say nothing. The question is whether or not we know what is important, what is essential. In the history of philosophy the goal is the development of thought, and the narrative must be about that. Here too we find an impartiality that says: 'Adopting the role of spectator lets us see how the development proceeds. One must be disengaged, without prejudice.' This impartiality is merely negative, and amounts to nothing. One who has no interest in thought and does not recognize the goal of the history of philosophy, the development of thought, cannot even present that history. Tennemann is that kind of historian of philosophy. His presentation has been reproached for being flawed. He responds that he is a Kantian philosopher and knows that cognitive knowledge is completely impossible.[162] What is inconceivable is how anyone can take such pains without having a goal in doing so. With impartiality of this sort the truth has no hierarchy, no distinctions, no connection with a purpose.

These are the principal factors that come under consideration when one ought to speak about the meaning and purpose of the history of philosophy.

2. The Connection of the History of Philosophy with the Histories of Other Disciplines

Our second point is the connection of the history of philosophy with other histories. Although this connection is very extensive and is interesting for its own sake, we must confine ourselves here to its general aspects.

We have already indicated that philosophy as such has determinate | thought or the concept for its object—therefore what the subject matter is 331
in and for itself.

(a) A further assumption, stated now, is that the spirit of a people is, on the one hand, individual. Spirit is always different in each people—in the

162. See n. 20, p. 63 above.

Greeks, the Romans, and the Germanic peoples. On the other hand, it is one and the same spirit of a people that realizes itself in all this branching out and stamps its character on all the spheres of its existence. We see the abilities of a people, its art and religion, its law, political institutions, and so forth, as the principal divisions or visible spheres of spirit's existence. We shall have to leave it to the philosophy of the state, or of politics, to examine how these spheres are specifically interconnected. We must just accept it as an assumption that the spirit of an age pervades all these different branches. We are looking now at one of them, at scientific knowledge as such, at philosophy in particular. In philosophy spirit brings to consciousness the pure concept of its own essential being. So philosophy is the noblest blossom among the branches that spirit brings into existence and in which it elaborates itself. Philosophy is spirit's innermost self—its own proper foundation, the authentic being that comes to consciousness in philosophy, indeed in the purest and most universal way, namely, in the form of thought. In the other spheres we have determinations of spirit's rationality in particular forms. Art, religion, legal right, and so forth, do not make their appearance in thought as such. Philosophy is the concept or substance of the entire shape of spirit, of the whole of essential being, which the concept brings before itself in it, the single focal point that draws together all the radiations of its vitality. Let this serve as a general remark.

(b) The second observation to be made now is that, inasmuch as philosophy has for its element what is ideal, or thought, it has directly in that element a negative aspect, an antithesis to living actuality. Ideality stands in antithesis to the reality on which the principle places its stamp. With the ideal as its element, philosophy is in itself antithetical to actuality. The consciousness of spirit that philosophy provides is not the living consciousness that a people has in its customs, religion, law, and so forth, not the living
332 actuality of a people, not its actual | activity. The consciousness of spirit is not itself the virtues of this actual activity, which have the state as their interest, which have the interests of their native land as their goal. Instead it is an inward, abstract consciousness of the whole, the ideal form of this spirit, which appears as the form of non-actuality [*Unwirklichkeit*]. This is an essential antithesis. So we see philosophy's more specific link to history in the fact that it emerges in a people, and gains currency, when the need for the ideal has become intense. This need becomes pressing when a breach in the life of a people has taken place, when their best times are past and decay sets in, when individuals no longer find satisfaction in the concerns of existence, that is, satisfaction in their state and in actual political life, and they no longer see their highest vocation in this activity. The actuality and

ethical life of a people are no longer satisfying, for satisfaction resides then in the ideal realm. Spirit flees from the present and seeks a locus that is not present-day existence but instead a world apart from it, and that is the locus of thought. These are the times when we see philosophy come on the scene for a people.

Therefore we have to mention briefly the historical epochs in the history of philosophy, and that will make evident what we just said about this aspect. When Ionian life in Asia declined, Ionian philosophy came into being. Athens was the center of Greek philosophy in the age of Pericles, when the Peloponnesian War marked the onset of decay in the beautiful Athenian life. In Rome philosophy first appeared in the age of the Caesars, when political life declined, caprice took hold, and the law was not a politically uniting factor but pertained only to the interest of the single individual, only to the freedom of individual persons. We see philosophy first emerge in similar fashion in the history of the Germanic peoples when a specific condition, a specific elaboration of their religious and political life, passed over into a different shape because the former condition had of its own accord become unsatisfactory and an old way of life perished, as happened in the fifteenth century. We see philosophy revive as well, albeit merely as resuscitated, when pagan | philosophy was brought into 333
the picture.[163] Only later on did philosophy revive again, in our two most recent centuries, the seventeenth and eighteenth, for philosophy had its place when political existence was overturned by revolution. Thought as such not only resumed but also took the lead in this political upheaval, and it transformed actuality. Philosophy helped bring about the destruction. That is because, when a shape of spirit is no longer satisfactory, philosophy sharpens our ability to perceive this unsatisfactory condition. Philosophy aids and abets the impending destruction. So we could reproach philosophy for helping to augment the damage, for helping to promote the decline through its specific insight. But this is no basis for reproaching philosophy: the destruction is necessary; it only negates a specific shape of spirit that has a fundamental defect in it. To that extent philosophy is consolation in this state of actuality, in this worldly misfortune. Philosophy is escape into free ideality, into a free realm of thought, for the very reason

163. A likely allusion to the view still advanced in the early eighteenth century (for instance, by Thomas Stanley) that there is just ancient philosophy, that the Christian era developed no philosophy of its own. See the reference to Stanley in Vol. III, p. 105, in the opening discussion of the First Period in modern philosophy, which Hegel regards as beginning not with Renaissance humanism but with Bacon and Boehme as its precursors, and with Descartes as its explicit onset.

that when spirit does not find its satisfaction in existence, it is driven back within itself. This congruence between political revolutions and the emergence of philosophy is something we will mention and touch upon in general terms. But we will not present it as if philosophy were the cause and revolution the effect, because the progression runs deeper than that.

In relation to the political sphere, we can also ask about the political institutions or religion in which philosophy as such is to be found. That amounts to saying that philosophy as such is to be found only where freedom of spirit is the principle. In the Oriental world or the substantial world, where freedom of conviction can but perish and barbarity rules, there is no philosophy and there can be none. Here everything remains in a state of wholly general abstractions. Only where spirit becomes conscious
334 of itself as free can | philosophy come on the scene. Freedom is the essential foundation for [its] existence; freedom brings forth for itself a world. Only in such circumstances can form even advance to this content, and the form of freedom, namely, the most appropriate and purest form for freedom, is that of thought, which is what is utterly universal and inherently free. So we will see the proper beginning of philosophy coming into prominence in the Greek world. The principle of Christianity is present in the Germanic world, and that is the principle of the freedom of spirit. Christ has freed the world, and this liberation is spirit, is essentially by means of spirit. Therefore the locus where philosophy must of necessity come on the scene is in this condition of higher freedom. In this Germanic world itself thought finally emerges in such an ascendent consciousness that it becomes, and ultimately is, what determines the political world, its laws and institutions, and brings about revolutions, the overthrow of states. This is the thought that is essential, that is for itself, that determines matters on its own account; it is legal right, something that is in and for itself. These are the general aspects that underlie philosophy's relationship to the political realm.

We can also consider philosophy in its relationship to art history. Art makes its appearance together with philosophy and religion. Beautiful, free art—that is, fine art—comes on the scene contemporaneously with philosophy or even a little before it, at a time when the wholesome, actual life of peoples no longer finds satisfaction in ordinary reality. Art too has the ideal as its aim. So Greek art blossomed at the same time as Greek philosophy. The unsatisfactory circumstances of life begat a realm of ideality, a realm of ideas, in the form of concepts or intuitions. The intelligible world of philosophy is simply a freer and more abstract one than the ideal world

of art. So, [for instance,] contemporary with the upheaval of the fifteenth century, with the passing away of feudalism, we see art coming to the fore as free on its own account, at first naturally in a religious aspect. Art seems to be a promoter of religion, although it has the same clandestine stance toward religion as philosophy has. Art's goal is for human beings to engender from out of themselves, to engender different configurations than those of religion, ones supposed | to be more satisfying for the human spirit 335
than the satisfaction that religiosity has to offer.

The additional topic we wish to remark on more fully, however, is the relationship of philosophy to religion, and of course how this relationship plays out in history. We grasp the relationship playing out in history in such a way that these two powers, the power of thought and that of religion, seem to be hostile to one another. Nevertheless, in and for themselves the two must be in mutual agreement. In religion various peoples have set down what they represent to themselves as the essential being of the world, of nature and spirit, as the substance of all things. They have set down in their religion what is authentic in the world. In religion people lift themselves up above their private circumstances and needs, fortify themselves in what is absolute truth, and enjoy communion with the absolute. Devotion, however, is simply a thinking about its object. Philosophy is a thinking that is true in and for itself. So the two have one object, one goal. Inasmuch as what is true—what is true in and for itself—is one, religion and philosophy must then in fact have one and the same content. Their relationship as exhibited in history, however, is thoroughly hostile.

The history of philosophy presents the history of the conflict of free thought with the authority of folk religion or of the church, the conflict with what we generally call positive religion. We see this hostility and opposition in Greece. In Athens, the focal point of beautiful Greek life, we see Socrates drinking from the poisoned cup. Many other philosophers were exiled or punished for being irreligious. Comparable outbreaks of this opposition occurred in the Germanic world, where we see the hostility between the Christian church and free thought proceed to the point of derision being heaped on the church and free thinkers burned at the stake.[164] After all, even today their mutual stances are still ambivalent.

This opposition is multifaceted; its nature presents many aspects that would lead us far afield. In general it may be said that we can grasp the opposition from two vantage points.

164. See Vol. III, on the fates of Bruno (p. 62) and Vanini (p. 72) at the hands of the church.

α) According to one, it seems to be a matter of the content. | The Christian religion speaks of an original sin, of a mishap befalling all human beings, one that came about through the act of a single human pair—therefore something historical that took place only once and so was propagated by heredity, like some natural illness able to transmit itself within a family and to rage on beyond the control of mind and will. We see philosophical thought ranging itself in opposition to this religious content. So to that extent philosophy seems to be in contradiction to the content of religion. Yet while philosophy seems to be attacking the content of religion, a distinction must be drawn between what is actually content, and what appears as form and is to be taken as such. The latter, the form, readily appears in religion as a content, goes over into the content. If what we have here is evil, and an action that happened only once, it may well be that philosophy stands opposed to these specific contents, but only insofar as philosophy grasps them as form. The essential content, however, is the fact that evil as such has its basis in spirit, not in a one-time action and not in a shared external, natural state [*äusserlichen Natürlichkeit*], but instead in a spiritual state in relation to nature [*geistigen Naturlichkeit*]. Therefore, in this respect content and form must be distinguished.

β) There is, however, yet another vantage point from which this opposition appears, one likewise called the formal aspect. It is the form of authority. Seen from this angle, religion is something positive. The principle of freedom of thought is what philosophy upholds in opposition to the form of authority. Were this an ultimate split, that would be a wretched plight to befall the human spirit. Religion is sacred to human beings, but reason or free insight is equally sacred to them. The question here concerns the reconciliation of these two aspects, the mediation of the conflict seemingly as old as philosophy itself.

There are false types of mediation for achieving this peace, a false harmony. Peace can generally be achieved externally in a twofold way, either by
337 one-side surrendering so that the other prevails, or by | each quietly going off on its own, each regarding itself as an isolated sphere for its own sake. This second way has often been represented as philosophy's obligation to let religion go its own way; philosophy of course ought to have freedom for itself, while leaving religion unchallenged. But the human spirit, or reason, is intolerant and cannot endure anything alongside it.[165] Philosophy and religion have one and the same need; both deal with what is absolutely true,

165. See n. 149, p. 253 above.

with what is most inward. There cannot be two most inward things; two most inward things cannot coexist; what is most inward is simply one. Yet each contends that it is what is most inward. Their collision and quarrel is thus unavoidable. That each is able to go its own way is therefore merely a delusion by which people wish to conceal the quarrel—one often employed so that philosophy may gain a respite from the onslaught of the church, that philosophy be left alone. This is a false way of representing the situation, for there can be but one truth.

The other route to peace would be for reason to subordinate itself to faith. This has often been attempted. In Scholastic philosophy most notably we see philosophy in the position of serving the church. There philosophy is just formal; it has a given as its presupposition; truth exists as something established on its own and philosophy simply has the task of reasoning about it. In part this philosophy is just formal, even with regard to its foundation. In part, where it deals with the content, philosophy relates only to ancillary content that has been emancipated from the church. So in this case we see reason essentially in the service (*famula*) [handmaid] of the church and the church's faith. But this thinking must not be represented as having been in utter servitude. The fact that thinking proved to be in agreement with the fundamental teaching of the church is no proof that thinking was in the service of the church and did not discover these results itself. But philosophizing was on the whole more unfree and more in the service of the church than it was free for its own sake; free reason had not discovered the truth. Yet to the extent that thinking becomes a freer and more analytical [*räsonierender*] understanding, it has by the same token adopted a stance in which | its results are divergent from those of the church. This possibility 338
is conceded particularly when one says that reason lets itself run free, that whether it discovers what is right and true is a matter of chance, and indeed the more likely outcome is that reason will take a false path. So then the circumstance arose in which analytical reason arrived at different theses than those of the church, and this disparity was also acknowledged. Then it is said that philosophy proves various things quite antithetical to the propositions of the church; that reason too realizes this contradiction; but because reason contradicts the church, it subjects itself to faith. Philosophizing took this turn long ago, and accordingly sought to preserve (external) harmony with the church.[166] So Vanini, Galileo, Bayle, and others, did indeed cast doubt on the church's teachings and come into opposition to the faith, yet

166. See Vol. III, pp. 32–54 for a general discussion of scholastic philosophy in relation to the church and theology; pp. 56, 72–4, and 147, on the doctrine of double truth in particular.

they gave assurances that reason must submit to faith and they even did so themselves. Yet Vanini, as one example, was burned at the stake.[167] Such assurances of submission to the church in fact gained no credence and were regarded as insincere. The church, which itself rests on authority, typically declared that those who arrive through thinking at insights contradictory to the propositions of the church cannot possibly subject themselves in that way, namely, that it is impossible after the fact to renounce these insights. Therefore the church itself did not accept such a submission to authority, a submission by the thinking that had formulated those specific insights. Accordingly the church itself declared the antithesis of faith and insight to be irresolvable. In this dispute the church ultimately appeals to authority exclusively and demands submission to sheer authority; the church intends to be supreme. Nevertheless it will not credit mere submission; it not only demands submission, but will give no weight at all to thinking or reasoning as such. This mediation or this kind of reconciliation, in which reason is supposed to submit to faith or to the form of authority, has of course come to pass; but it has no lasting value and is no genuine reconciliation.

339 The infinite | resilience of reason, when once the wings of thinking are strengthened, keeps it from being suppressed. Thinking reason ventures out and does not come to rest, either in opposition to the sheer pretensions of faith or of its own accord, for it must reach its goal. Its satisfaction must include finding itself reconciled with the faith of peoples, a faith springing from the free spirit. The Christian religion is, moreover, the religion of truth and of spirit. The highest authority in this religion resides in the fact that spirit bears witness to spirit. This is the religion of the Holy Spirit—the Spirit proclaimed by Christ, who said of it that only after his death, after his departure from the world of sensible, singular existence, will the Holy Spirit lead his apostles into the truth.[168] This human spirit that bears witness to the divine Spirit is essentially spirit in the form of thinking. Here reason has a twofold legitimacy [*Recht*], not only one that reason bases on itself, but also one based on religion and in virtue of religion itself—a legitimacy based precisely on that religion within which philosophy is said to appear, and with which it is said to come into conflict. Reason has its justification in following its own course; and it has the conviction that it must be reconciled with religion. Reason should have its ultimate confirmation through the

167. See Vol. III, pp. 72–4 (on Vanini). See above, p. 252, n. 146 (on Bayle), and p. 200 (on Galilei).

168. See Matt. 18: 20 ('For where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I in the midst of them'), 28: 20 ('... and lo, I am with you always, to the close of the age'), and John 16: 13 ('When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth...').

witness of spirit itself. So, the form of reconciliation through submission [to faith] is not the way to the goal.

On the other side stands the form of conciliation [*Aussöhnung*] in which religion is taught scientifically, just as it appears. Here religion for its own part relinquishes what has been called the positive element in it—therefore what seems to be its content as well as what has the form of authority. We have seen this particularly in the age of rationalism, in the Enlightenment. A certain kind of reconciliation with reason existed then too. It was rationalistic religion, enlightened or so-called rational religion, but the kind that abandons the fundamental teachings of religion itself, leaving only superficial or general teachings, such as that there is a God and that once upon a time a human being, Christ, appeared to teach God's commandments, that he is to that extent a divine human being, and so on.[169] Thus this reconciliation only | took place in a general way, only superficially. Religion 340
satisfied with such a content is as shallow and superficial as a like-minded philosophy. The understanding assigns to the positive domain everything that appears incongruent with the understanding itself. But philosophy then takes up what is authentically positive, what the Enlightenment has called 'mystical teachings', and knows it cognitively. Philosophy vindicates the more profound teachings, these religious mysteries, namely, the speculative doctrines, the doctrines of reason. Enlightenment reconciliation, which puts everything on the same level, proves satisfactory neither to the depths of religiosity nor to the depths of thinking reason.

These forms will occupy our closer attention in the history of philosophy. They offer a false conciliation. We will not tarry over this illusion of a hostile relationship between the two sides, nor over their spurious accommodation, but will instead examine the issue itself. If we just stop short with the hostility, and restrict ourselves merely to the antithetical phenomena, then the outlook is simply bleak; if we take up the false reconciliation, we are just left with a superficial existence. The history of philosophy is itself philosophical, and in it we have to proceed philosophically. It shows us that the principles of religion and those of philosophy agree at a deep level, and that the progress of religion and that of philosophy are commensurate, as is the case in the relationship of the state with philosophy.

169. Hegel's criticism of the reduction of religion to morals by the theological rationalism of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is not attributable here, or in other passages, to the reading of individual works—no doubt because he was familiar with it continuously from his student days on into his later years. Moreover, Hegel remained in close personal connection during his years in Jena, Nuremberg, and Heidelberg with Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob Paulus, one of the leading rationalists of his day.

Then harmony is established. Therefore in the case of religion we will not stop short with discord and false conciliation. Religion and philosophy unconsciously have the same spirit, the same spiritual principle, for their foundation. Greek religion and Greek philosophy have one principle, and the Christian religion and Christian philosophy are likewise one common progression. This harmony implicitly before us involves the possibility that the history of the consciousness of their antithesis also involves the impulse toward their harmony, the possibility that they must come to a fundamental reconciliation.

Now that we have indicated the principal aspect in this way, we will explore the matter further. Still another form of the antithesis of religion and
341 philosophy can be mentioned, namely, the form | in which philosophy has been called worldly wisdom. Placing religion in antithesis to the world made philosophy appear on the side of the world. Modern philosophy therefore came in turn to be called 'worldly wisdom', a designation connected with the specific and fixed opposition of religion to all that is determinate being, existence, the worldly realm.[170] Religion is said to involve the sacred, the eternal divine. In distinction from it, philosophy has for its content the profane, the worldly realm. Religion demands that living for the divine, or consciousness of the sacred, be one's governing or overriding concern, and that worldliness be subordinate to it. We can of course then view the universal goal as the divine having predominance and being valued over what is worldly, indeed within the worldly domain itself.

We are familiar with the reconciliation of these spiritual and worldly domains in the form of theocracy. There the religious dimension pervades every sphere of life and is the focus on which all other points are made to depend. The other spheres life divides into are particular spheres comprised under the heading of worldliness. Their main characteristic is that subjective will has legitimacy in them. When this subjective will attains freedom and becomes active, it wants validation but is not allowed to have it. This human self-will instead ought to be subject to the divine, to the spiritual side. What transpires in any event is that particular human will grows active and must do so. This particular human will grows active everywhere and must do so, even stirring incipiently in that center to which the sacred is entrusted, in those hands holding the knowledge of the divine. Such a will is unquestionably a feature of both sides of theocracy. One of those sides is the priesthood (in Rome, the patricians), who have control of holy things, and the other is the people (the plebeians). Inasmuch as subjective will now

170. See n. 33, p. 73 above.

stirs on both sides, the idea of theocracy, apparently the supreme form of rule, degenerates directly into despotism and oppression.

In the history of philosophy we will have to treat this antithesis in which sovereign authority over divine matters appears in opposition to the individual will. | The Platonic 'republic' occupies this standpoint. In 342
truth the worldly realm must instead shape itself on its own account, must represent the divine or the spiritual in the will's own element and sphere, giving it legitimacy in every personal domain. The divine must not stand above subjective will by suppressing it, but instead ought to reveal itself within the world. To that extent philosophy must be called worldly wisdom. In one respect it is worldly wisdom, even though it is also wisdom about the divine; it knows of God, of the divine; it has no other content than that which alone is true, and which is vitally true in the form of the knowing spirit. Philosophy has this object, but philosophy is concrete as well, having for its object the fact that this spiritual sphere [*das Geistige*] appears, gives itself determinate being, realizes itself, gives itself an existence that, precisely as something appearing, is what people have called worldly. The spiritual sphere must arrive at this worldliness that comprises ethical life and law, namely, the ethical life, probity, and morals of peoples. It is the ideal in its actuality. This aspect is the essential thing that philosophy knows insofar as philosophy is not abstract and does not just occupy itself with the divine; it is the essential thing insofar as the spiritual sphere elaborates itself within the human spirit and the latter conforms its own sphere to it. To that extent philosophy is in truth worldly wisdom. Because the peoples have become worldly wise, the power of religion over against them has waned. Because human beings have come to be conscious of their condition, the power of the church has begun to decline. This reconciliation is implicitly complete; as a consequence, if the church seeks to regard itself as something essential and authoritative for its own sake, it lacks the proper spiritual force.

Insofar as philosophy legitimizes freedom in contrast to the positive element, it is worldly wisdom. The otherworldly sphere, which relieves human beings from the burden and pressure of earthly things, is that of religion. Freedom is set against it, for everything deriving from freedom constitutes the worldly sphere. Freedom in one aspect is caprice. But insofar as freedom is inwardly rational, and the subjective aspect determines itself in accord with rationality, freedom ceases to be caprice and has truth within it. | Put differently, by its being what inwardly grasps rationality, freedom inwardly grasps the divine. So religion forfeits the external relationship in which it is the established authority as such; what is rational knows freedom inwardly and outwardly too, and with that knowledge the form of authority

has vanished. When philosophy then comes forward in opposition to religion, we presuppose, as we have said, that there is only one reason, one idea, and that this antithesis is only apparent, inasmuch as thinking reason has not yet grasped itself in its depth. Thus philosophy's goal is, within itself, to grasp spirit, its essential being, in its depth, and to discover itself in harmony with the depth contained within religion itself. We who possess the concept must see the history that portrays their severance as pointing to what that history not yet is: firstly, that the two principles are one; secondly, that one and the same principle is still foundational in both even in their severance, for the concept is rooted in unity; and thirdly, that philosophical history must point out the way to reconciliation, the path leading to consciousness of their unity—such that both know themselves to contain and will the same thing.

Philosophy can know and pass judgment on religion, whereas religion cannot do this on its own. Religion exists for sense perception, for inner representation, for the innermost spirit that makes itself explicit in representation alone. Since its principle is explicit in thought, philosophy grasps itself and its other too. To be capable of reconciliation, religion must elevate itself to thought. If it just persists in the form of inwardness and of representation, then religion presents the spectacle of proving itself irreconcilable—if it chooses not to grasp the hand that philosophy offers. Philosophy has a comparable relation to the worldly domain. When called worldly wisdom, philosophy stands on the side of the worldly domain, of law and the state as such. But even when positioned on this side of things, philosophy can still be antithetical to what else stands there. What we call
344 the state | proceeds from freedom. But there can also be free will or caprice [*Willkür*], a contingency in willing. What proceeds from free will is, so we believe, contingent with reference to the state. But the state only appears to proceed from free will. If it does indeed proceed from this appearance, the latter can nevertheless contain something rational. The state is the *law* of freedom. Certainly a cleavage can arise, one in which philosophy sets itself over against present actuality, that is, appears as a revolutionary principle. In grasping the situation in the form of thought, philosophy grasps it in a universal or substantial form. Philosophy's concepts can be quite different from what exists. The content of philosophy is then the freedom of reason as opposed to the freedom of capriciousness. Yet external history presses on of its own accord to what is essential, to reconciliation with truth, with thought, to what is true in and for itself—and that is the state, the rational worldly realm. Only to the extent that this worldly realm does not conform to what is rational, to thought, to the concept of the matter, does philosophy

come into opposition to it, and the goal is to rectify the opposition. As we said, however, history exhibits the reconciliation.

The goal of thought is to discover itself in the content of religion, and likewise in worldly actuality. Reaching this goal brings about the reconciliation. The goal of history is for the world to be rational in its actuality as in its depths, and for philosophy to know that this is the case.

This may suffice concerning philosophy's connection with the other branches of spirit. Additional concrete aspects are connected with the latter too, but not immediately with philosophy. They are directly related to the principle of the state, and so to the concept existent in it.

3. The Beginning of the History of Philosophy, and Its Divisions

The third matter to discuss is where to begin our topic and how to subdivide it. Where to begin has already been partially addressed. Philosophy | has 345
as its object the thinking of what exists, the comprehension of it in the form of thought. What we encounter in the history of peoples that has the value of truth we can, in general, conceive under the form of religion. More specifically, it is present in the form of representation, in that of fantasy. Awareness of the essential being of spirit has expressed itself in what we call mythological forms, as theogony and cosmogony. Though philosophy's object is what is true, the peoples have expressed what is true in shapes that are other than the form of philosophy, of thought. Those who expressed what is true have been the poets, that is, poets in the higher sense—not those who are presented with some material in the form of the understanding, as a prosaic thought, and have converted its content to the form of poetry, but those poets who are original writers, original prophets, in that they give direct utterance to what is inward. In this case it could seem that philosophy took over these truths originating in the shapes of mythology and cultic actions, thus that the history of philosophy took over this thought-content, adopted it, and set out for dissection what is contained in the mythological representations. Here we have extravagant Indian mythology and the beautiful Greek mythology. The echo of thought, of what we are conscious of as truth, is everywhere. There is, however, controversy about how mythology ought to be treated.[171] Those who surmise that reason is present in it and who seek to explicate mythology have been poorly treated. It does not matter to us that mythology presents contingent features. But it has to be recognized that mythologies have their origin in association with nature. The essential thing, however, is that the reason of peoples implicit in

171. A reference to Hegel's friend Creuzer. See n. 23, pp. 83–4 above.

mythology has come to consciousness in it. In any event these peoples, those of the fantasizing writers, have reason in their fantasy. One must recognize that the belief and superstition that seem to poeticize capriciously are doing so with reason. But we do not first have to seek out the thought embedded in the history of philosophy, the truth enclosed within it; that truth is not hidden but is disclosed; we seek to know it in the form of thought. Our
346 enterprise is not one of taking the kind of truths | contained or expressed in such depictions and reducing them to the form of thought; instead we have only to take up what has already produced itself in thought. Therefore we begin where thought already exists in the form of thought. We are dealing with the lucid consciousness, that is, the thinking consciousness, of peoples. Aristotle says: 'It is not worth the effort to concern ourselves with those who philosophize, σοφιζομένων, in a mythological fashion.'[172] But Plato philosophized in a mythological way. People praise him for making many things accessible in the form of representational images.[173] In part this attitude reflects how little energy of thought is involved in their awareness of it. This mythological philosophizing is not progress but just an artistic form, and alongside it issues are also presented in the strictest conceptual form. Either we have a pure work of art or we have philosophy, thought as such. We cannot take it [the work of art] to be something more sublime. Of course it is convenient for the philosopher to grasp his principle in an image, and more agreeable too, and convenient as well for its comprehension.

We leave aside religion as such, the mythological aspect and the like, and begin from the point where the content has grasped itself in the form of thought. We do not set store by the symbolic as something sublime, for it instead stands in contrast to the more profound form of thought. We are dealing with thoughts insofar as they are explicit. In our characterizing of thought, we first encounter the Orient. The form of freedom, of subjective freedom with respect to the state and freedom [as such], is absent there. We find what is substantial overriding individuality, and individuality present only as caprice. In this case the beginnings of philosophy can indeed only be paltry and wholly abstract.

Therefore we encounter first of all Oriental philosophy. We could regard it as the first division, therefore as actual philosophy, but we could also regard it as prefatory, as set forth antecedent to philosophy, and only make our beginning with Greek philosophy. The other division is then Germanic philosophy.

172. On this remark of Aristotle, see p. 86 above.
173. On Plato's use of mythological imagery, see Vol. II, pp. 182–4.

In the Orient we have elaborated before our eyes vast configurations of states and religions, of sciences and bodies of information. In the Oriental state, however, the universal or the | solidly substantial element is so 347
very overriding and preponderant that free thinking, subjectivity, subjective freedom, the freedom of the individual, is something pushed into the background. In the Orient substantiality stands on one side and subjectivity, which is present here too at any rate, on the other side, but subjectivity as the wanton caprice of the single individual or the despot, as individual will. This other side, which constitutes the concrete element, is found, however, essentially in the form of externality and contingency, in the form of something accidental over against substance. Here we have delirium, the extravagant oscillation between what is deepest or most universal and what is most external. The peaceful state of moderation, in which the universal sets limits for itself and thus exhibits itself explicitly in determinate existence as concrete—this concrete element, the true center, is precisely what is lacking here. In the elaboration of the Oriental world we do of course find thinking and philosophizing, indeed the deepest philosophizing. We find thinking operative in this world's most extreme abstractions and drawing its patterns. But by remaining only what is deepest in this way, thinking remains wholly abstract. Wholly universal abstractions of this kind are to be found in the Orient, and one should even take note of them; but they do not pervade what is existent, do not enliven it or bear fruit in it. Instead they remain wholly abstract and do not derive from the world their characteristics of the world and its configurations. Thus we can say that on the whole nothing is conceived here; thought remains abstract and does not advance to the conceptual level. We will mention the Chinese and Indian philosophies in this context, but only briefly.

For us, philosophy proper begins in Greece. There lies the beginning of proportion and lucidity, the self-determining universal by which thought becomes the concept itself. This concept, by uniting itself now with determinate existence, thus shows itself to be uniting with the concrete aspect of the spiritual and natural world, to be conceptualizing it. The determinate existence of the world with its configurations is not mere window dressing for what is substantial, not just something accidental in relation to it, not merely something transient or, to take it even further, not a nullity. Instead the Greeks surely dwell in their world and feel at home in it, and the concept is at home in their present circumstances, is | identical with it. For that very 348
reason Greek philosophy is plastic and shapes itself into a whole. Thought does not recoil from what is concrete. Here we have thought as the concept. In free Greek life the concept shows itself as free and thinks itself.

We will divide Greek philosophy into three main periods. The first period begins with Thales and runs up through Socrates.[174] It sets out from external nature or from determinacy taken as that of nature, from the determinacy of thought in its natural shape. Put conversely, philosophy begins with what is abstract. The concept finds its completion in Anaxagoras, in Socrates and his followers, as idea, as the subjectivity of the concept, and so as concrete, as self-determining, as the concept seeking to determine itself. The second period is the philosophy of the Roman world, which involves an antithesis on the part of the self-determining (determinate) concept. The third period comprises Alexandrian or Neoplatonic philosophy, wherein the concept completes itself as an intelligible world. The thought that began here too with the abstraction that had its determinacy in nature came to its completion as an intelligible world.

The second division is, on the whole, Germanic philosophy, which is philosophy within Christendom. Before the emergence of this philosophy proper, between the beginnings of Christendom in the wake of pagan philosophy and Christian philosophy as such, lies an intermediate period, one of fermentation. The course of development in Greek philosophy is wholly naive and natural [*unbefangen*]: it involves conceiving and something specific that is said to be conceived. The conceiving is specific and proceeds to its completion in a world. In the Greek world the point of departure is, on the one hand, religion and mythology and, on the other hand, the external
349 nature that the thinking person confronts. | Configurations of fantasy and of nature are said to present the divine. But Christian philosophy takes a quite different course. In it the principle or the object of interest is something itself directly inward; it is concrete inwardness, the concrete world of spirit, the concrete intelligible world, the reconciled world. In Christian philosophy, therefore, thinking has a quite different point of departure. Thinking seeks something completed, a reconciled world, a divine world, the realized spiritual world, the kingdom of God on earth, within the church. The point of departure is entirely different because it only concerns apprehending this spiritual world or this truth in thinking, translating it into the form of thought. Hence thinking is chiefly in the service of a truth that is simply present, is presupposed. To that extent thinking does not take place in freedom. (There are additional philosophical phenomena lying outside the

174. As David Friedrich Strauss remarks in his 1831 version, the mention of Socrates here arises from an oversight on Hegel's part. Socrates and the Socratics constitute the second of three divisions in the first part of Greek Philosophy in these lectures, which concludes with Plato and Aristotle. See Vol. II, pp. 13 and 262. See also n. 176 below, on the discrepant terminology of 'periods'.

Christian world, such as Arabic and Jewish philosophy, although they are not sufficiently independent as to be of interest to us on this point.)

After this era in which thinking knows that it has the substantial truth before it, and makes that truth into its own object, comes the time of fermentation, or of thinking's antithesis to substantial truth—up to the point that thinking's complete and clear consciousness of itself is established and there is a consciousness of the specific character of thinking, of the freedom of thinking. At this point thinking would have to proceed based not on a given but instead on itself, and it would have to understand everything in this way. Thinking now starts out from scratch (despite also setting out from something recognized as truth) in order to possess, from out of itself, the spirit of the truth of the world. This is the philosophy that begins with Descartes, the founder of modern philosophy.

We have the Oriental realm set forth first. Then we have Greek philosophy. It begins with Thales about 600 years before Christ. This period continues up to the sixth century after Christ. It has no [one] specific terminus; it extends to Plotinus in the second century,[175] and Proclus [in the fifth]. It covers an interval of one thousand years. Then comes the middle [that is, medieval] historical period that occupies approximately the | 350
thousand years up to Descartes. He was born in the sixteenth century but developed his philosophy in the seventeenth century. From this point on we have the third period, of some two hundred years' duration. These are the three periods.[176]

F. THE 1831 LECTURES

This very brief and fragmentary introduction (pp. 351–7 in the German edition) ended prematurely because of Hegel's untimely death soon after this lecture series got under way. Its transcriber, David Friedrich Strauss, appended to it material drawn from an 1829–30 series transcript. This fragmentary introduction repeats many of the same themes seen in its predecessors, albeit in a very succinct manner that may suggest Hegel was moving to the actual history of philosophy itself more rapidly than he did in the previous series. Translated here are several passages containing elements

175. Plotinus lived in the third century (AD 205–70), as correctly stated in Vol. II.

176. Hegel is inconsistent in his terminology. The division of the history of philosophy into three periods in this paragraph corresponds to the organization of the 1825–6 lectures in Vols. II and III, whereas shortly above here in this introduction Hegel divided Greek philosophy itself into three periods; see p. 286, and also Vol. II, p. 13.

augmenting what Hegel said in prior years, but no attempt is made to list the many topics just mentioned briefly in the intervening parts. The first passage, on p. 353, enhances previous accounts of religious feeling.

... People say that religion must be feeling. That is quite correct. When I feel something, I know it in immediate unity with myself. What I think becomes my own, as the specific subject I am when I feel it. So far, so good. But what then is missing in feeling as religious feeling? When my finger touches something, I feel it. Passion, anger, and the like are feelings too. What then is specific to religious feeling, when something is felt in it too, as in the other cases? What is felt in it is the divine, and this is its content, its specificity, just as the sensible element is specific to sensory feeling. But the feeling felt in religion only exists in the soil of thinking. So feeling and thinking are antitheses that, when examined more closely, in their negativity coincide. ...

Page 354 has observations on thought and language.

... There is a thought in each word. The whole of language is a work of thought. I say, 'This is paper'. 'Is' is being, the complete abstraction. In each word there is a specific thought or category. But in saying 'this paper', I know nothing of the category 'being', for only the paper is in my consciousness. The purpose of philosophy is to make into explicit objects the thoughts embedded in everything. Philosophy extracts the thought from the material at hand, just as in anatomy, for instance, one can dissect and display the nerves that are the actually vital part in all organized life. Philosophy carries out its operation by thinking. Thinking is present in each word and sentence. The article 'the' is a specific category of thought that we possess instinctively, even though I am unaware of it. That we now *know* what we do and say, is the proper fruit of philosophy. ... [355] ... Continuing in the same paragraph with the role of thought in another context: The objects for philosophy are God, the world, and spirit. These objects belong exclusively to thought, for 'the world' is a thought too, because existent things are just single individuals. I wish to look around in the world but I cannot see 'the world'. Plato said that we learn nothing, that our learning is just recollection.[177] By that he means we already have these things within us. Recollection requires external stimulation, which then brings forth from out of ourselves what is learned. Of course we do not have the individual things of the sensible world within us beforehand. But we do have the thoughts that spirit brings forth from us. The I is the well containing all this, and the history of philosophy labors to bring forth this treasure. ...

177. On Plato's theory of recollection, see Vol. II, pp. 188–9.

Near the end, the transcript speaks of development (pp. 356–7).

... Nothing emerges in this development that is not in the concept of spirit. So there are two factors. The concept of spirit remains something ethereal, all-pervasive, and development is a sequence of stages, the categories necessary in this sequence but that fall by the wayside in the drive toward a higher stage. So spirit has the absolute goal of bringing to consciousness what is in its concept. The process leads it to the goal. In this sequence of stages [357] the concept is self-sustaining, whereas one stage is ever annulled, but also preserved, by a higher stage.... The human spirit is wholly simple. The I is what is simplest, and yet it is so infinitely rich within itself, therefore concrete. The I is not an aggregation of external elements but a unity with manifold characteristics. What belongs to the earlier stages is carried forward, albeit in a subordinate position.

Following the text is a cross, and the notation: On the evening of 14 November Hegel died of cholera.

GLOSSARY

The glossary contains a selection of frequently used and/or technical terms, especially those posing problems in translation. General principles of translation are discussed in the Editorial Introduction. The glossary has served only as a guide, to which the translators have not felt obliged to adhere when context or English idiom has required different renderings. When more than one English word is given, the generally preferred terms are listed first, while terms following a semicolon may be suitable in less technical contexts. 'Cf.' indicates related but distinguished German terms, which generally are translated by different English equivalents. Adjectives are listed without endings. This glossary is indexed only on German terms; the indexes to each volume serve partially as English–German glossaries.

German	*English*
absolut	absolute
Absolute	the absolute
abzuleiten	deduce (cf. *herleiten*)
allgemein	universal, general
Allgemeine	the universal
Andacht	devotion, worship
Anderssein	other-being, otherness
anerkennen	recognize, acknowledge (cf. *erkennen*)
Anerkenntnis	recognition (cf. *Erkenntnis*)
angemessen	suitable, appropriate, commensurate, fitting
anschauen	intuit, envisage
Anschauung	intuition, envisagement (cf. *Wahrnehmung*)
an sich	in itself, implicit (cf. *in sich*)
Ansich	in-itself, implicit being

Ansichsein	being-in-self
Anundfürsichsein	being-in-and-for-self
Arbeit	labor (cf. *Werk*)
auffassen	comprehend, grasp (cf. *begreifen*, *fassen*)
Auffassung	comprehension
aufheben	sublate; transcend, supersede, annul
Aufhebung	sublation; transcendence, supersession, annulment
auflösen	resolve, dissolve
Auflösung	resolution, dissolution
Bedeutung	meaning, significance (cf. *Sinn*)
Begierde	desire, appetite
beglaubigen	verify, attest, confirm
Beglaubigung	verification, attestation
begreifen (verb)	conceive
Begreifen (noun)	conception, conceiving
Begriff	concept
bei sich	with self, present to self, at home
Beisichsein	presence with (to) self, self-communion, at home with self
beobachten	observe
Beobachtung	observation (cf. *Betrachtung*)
Beschäftigung	occupation, concern
besonder	particular
Besonderheit	particularity
bestehen (verb)	subsist, endure, consist
Bestehen (noun)	subsistence
bestimmen	determine, define, characterize, specify
bestimmt	determinate, definite
Bestimmtheit	determinateness, determinacy
Bestimmung	determination, definition; character(istic, -ization), destination, vocation, specification, attribute
betrachten	consider, treat, deal with
Betrachtung	consideration, treatment, examination, discussion (cf. *Beobachtung*)
Bewusstsein	consciousness
beziehen	relate, connect, refer to
Beziehung	relation, connection, reference (cf. *Verhältnis*, *Zusammenhang*)
Bild	image
bildlich	imaginative, figurative

Bildung	culture, formation, cultivation
bloss	mere, simple, sheer
Boden	soil, ground, territory
darstellen	present, portray, set forth
Darstellung	presentation, portrayal, exposition (cf. *Vorstellung*)
Dasein	determinate being, existence (cf. *Existenz*, *Sein*)
Denkbestimmung	category, thought-determination
denken (verb)	think
Denken (noun)	thinking, thought (cf. *Gedanke*)
denkend	thinking, thoughtful, reflective
eigentümlich	characteristic (adj.), proper
Einbildung	imagination (cf. *Phantasie*)
Eine (der, das)	the One, the one
einfach	simple
Einzelheit	singularity, single (or singular) individual (cf. *Individuum*)
einzeln	single, singular
Einzelne	single individual (cf. *Individuum*)
Element	element (cf. *Moment*)
empfinden	(to) sense
Empfindung	sensibility, sensation, sentiment, sense (cf. *Gefühl*)
entäussern	divest, externalize
Entäusserung	divestment, externalization
Entfremdung	estrangement
entgegensetzen	oppose
Entgegensetzung	opposition
Entzweiung	cleavage, rupture, severance; cleaving, split
erfassen	apprehend, grasp (cf. *auffassen*, *fassen*)
erheben	elevate, raise up
Erhebung	elevation, rising above
Erinnerung	recollection (cf. *Gedächtnis*)
erkennen	know, cognize, recognize, learn, discern, know cognitively (cf. *anerkennen*, *kennen*, *wissen*)
Erkenntnis	cognition; knowledge, cognitive knowledge (cf. *Anerkenntnis*, *Kenntnis*, *Wissen*)
erscheinen	appear (cf. *scheinen*)
Erscheinung	appearance, phenomenon (cf. *Manifestation*)
Erziehung	education
Existenz	existence (cf. *Dasein*—when the distinction is important, the German is given in square brackets)

existieren	exist (cf. *sein*)
fassen	grasp (cf. *auffassen*, *begreifen*, *erfassen*)
Form	form (cf. *Gestalt*)
für sich	for (by, of) itself, on its own account, explicit
Fürsich	for-itself
Fürsichsein	being-for-self, explicit being
Gebiet	field, realm
Gedächtnis	memory (cf. *Erinnerung*)
Gedanke	thought, thoughts (cf. *Denken*)
Gedankenbestimmung	category of thought
Gedankenbildung	ratiocination
Gefühl	feeling (cf. *Empfindung*)
Gegensatz	antithesis, contrast; antipathy, opposition (cf. *Entgegensetzung*)
Gegenstand	object, issue, topic
gegenständlich	objective
Gegenwart	presence, present
Geist	spirit (capitalized when clearly referring to God)
gelten	count, be valid
Gemeinde	community
Gemüt	mind, soul, heart (cf. *Gesinnung*)
Genuss	enjoyment, pleasure, communion
geoffenbart	revealed (cf. *offenbar*)
Geschichte	history; story (cf. *Historie*)
geschichtlich	historical (often synonymous with *historisch*)
Gesinnung	conviction, disposition
Gestalt	figure, shape
Gestaltung	configuration
Gewissen	conscience
Glaube	faith, belief
glauben	believe
Gleichgültigkeit	indifference, unconcern
Gleichheit	equivalence
Glück	fortune
Glückseligkeit	bliss, happiness
Grund	ground, reasons, basis
gründen	(to) base
Grundlage	foundation
herabsetzen	degrade, reduce
herleiten	derive (cf. *abzuleiten*)

hinausgehen	overpass, go beyond
Historie	history (cf. *Geschichte*)
historisch	historical (often synonymous with *geschichtlich*)
ideal, ideell	ideal
Idee	idea
Individuum	individual (cf. *Einzelne*)
in sich	within itself, into self, inward, internal, self-contained (cf. *an sich*)
jenseitig	otherworldly
Jenseits	the beyond, the other world
kennen	know (cf. *wissen*)
Kenntnis	information, acquaintance (cf. *Erkenntnis*, *Wissen*)
Kraft	force, strength, energy; power (in compounds) (cf. *Macht*)
Kultus	cultus
Lehre	teaching, doctrine
lehren	teach
Leidenschaft	passion
Macht	power (cf. *Kraft*)
Manifestation	manifestation (cf. *Erscheinung*)
Mannigfaltigkeit	manifold(ness)
Mensch	human being (to avoid sexist connotations, frequently: one, we, they, people)
Menschheit	humanity
mit sich	with self; integral
Moment	moment (cf. *Element*)
Moral	morals
Moralität	morality (cf. *Sittlichkeit*)
nachdenken	(to) deliberate, meditate, ponder
Nachdenken	deliberation, meditation, meditative thought
Natur	nature
natürlich	natural
Natürliche	the natural
Natürlichkeit	natural life, natural state, naturalness; simplicity, unaffectedness
offenbar	revelatory, manifest (cf. *geoffenbart*)
Offenbaren	revealing
Offenbarung	revelation
partikulär	private (cf. *besonder*)
Perzeption	perception

perzipierend	percipient
Phantasie	phantasy; fanciful imagination (cf. *Einbildung*)
Positive	the positive, positivity
Räsonnement	argumentation, reasoning
realisieren	realize (cf. *verwirklichen*)
Realität	reality (cf. *Wirklichkeit*)
Recht	right
reflektiv	reflective
Reflexion	reflection
rein	pure
Sache	matter, subject matter; thing, fact, case
Schein	semblance, show
scheinbar	seeming
scheinen	seem
schlechthinnig	utter, simple (cf. *absolut*)
schliessen	conclude, infer
Schluss	syllogism, conclusion
Schmerz	anguish, sorrow; pain
seiend (part. and adj.)	having being, subsisting
Seiende(s)	actual being (God and cognates): being, entity, subsisting being (finite objects)
sein (verb)	be: is (God and cognates); is, exists, occurs, etc. (finite objects)
Sein (noun)	being
setzen (verb)	posit
Setzen (noun)	positing
Sinn	sense, meaning (cf. *Bedeutung*)
sinnlich	sensible, sentient, sensuous, sense (adj.)
Sinnlichkeit	sensuousness, sensible nature
sittlich	ethical
Sittlichkeit	ethics, ethical life, ethical realm (cf. *Moralität*)
spekulativ	speculative
Spekulative	the speculative, speculation
Subjekt	subject
Subjektivität	subjectivity
substantiell	substantive, substantial
teilen	(to) divide
Teilung	division, separation (cf. *Urteil*)
trennen	(to) separate, part (from)
Trennung	separation

Trieb	drive, impulse, instinct
Übergang	transition, passing over
übergehen	pass over
übergreifen	overreach
überhaupt	generally, on the whole; altogether, after all, in fact, as such, etc.
Überzeugung	conviction
umfassen	embrace, contain
unangemessen	incongruous, unsuitable, inadequate, incommensurate
Unglück	misery, unhappiness
unmittelbar	immediate (cf. *unvermittelt*)
Unmittelbarkeit	immediacy
unterscheiden (verb)	distinguish, differentiate
Unterscheidung	differentiation, distinction (cf. *Unterschied*)
Unterschied	distinction (cf. *Unterscheidung*)
unterschieden	(past part. and adj.) distinguished, differentiated (part.); distinct, different (adj., cf. *verschieden*)
unvermittelt	unmediated (cf. *unmittelbar*)
Urteil	judgment, primal division (cf. *Teilung*)
urteilen	(to) judge, divide
Vereinzelung	singularization
Verfassung	(political) constitution, political institutions
Verhalten	attitude, comportment, behavior
sich verhalten	comport oneself, relate oneself, function
Verhältnis	relationship, condition (cf. *Beziehung*, *Zusammenhang*)
Verhältnisse (pl.)	conditions, circumstances, state of affairs
vermitteln	mediate
Vermittlung	mediation
Vernunft	reason
vernünftig	rational
verschieden (adj.)	different, distinct, diverse (cf. *unterschieden*)
Verschiedenheit	difference, diversity
versöhnen	reconcile
Versöhnung	reconciliation
Verstand	understanding
verwirklichen	actualize (cf. *realisieren*)
Verwirklichung	actualization (cf. *Wirklichkeit*)
vollendet	consummate; perfect, complete, final

Vollendung	consummation
vorhanden	present, at hand, extant
vorhanden sein	be present, be at hand, exist (cf. *sein*)
vorstellen	represent; imagine
vorstellend	representational, representative
Vorstellung	representation; image, imagination, view
wahr	true
Wahre	the true
wahrhaft(ig)	true, genuine, authentic, truthful
Wahrheit	truth
Wahrnehmung	(sense) perception (cf. *Anschauung*)
Werk	work (cf. *Arbeit*)
Wesen	essence; being
Widerspruch	contradiction
Willkür	caprice, arbitrariness; free choice, free will
wirklich	actual
Wirklichkeit	actuality (cf. *Realität*)
wissen (verb)	know (cf. *kennen*, *erkennen*)
Wissen (noun)	knowledge, knowing (cf. *Erkenntnis*, *Kenntnis*)
Wissenschaft	science, scientific knowledge
Zeugnis	witness, testimony
Zufall	chance
Zufälligkeit	contingency
Zusammenhang	connection, connectedness, nexus, coherence, correlation (cf. *Beziehung*, *Verhältnis*)
Zweck	purpose; end, goal, aim
zweckmässig	purposeful, expedient
Zweckmässigkeit	purposiveness, expediency

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The bibliography does not list specific works of many of the authors—e.g. individual dialogues of Plato—but rather editions or collections with which Hegel is likely to have been familiar. Works with both Greek and Latin titles are cited only with the Latin title. Some long titles with subtitles are abbreviated, and in some instances the gist of a Latin, French, or German subtitle is rendered in English.

The sources given in this bibliography fall into four groups:

* works listed in the Auction Catalogue of Hegel's library;
† works to which Hegel refers in these lectures or elsewhere, and of which he almost certainly made use;
‡ works probably used by Hegel but for which there are no explicit references;
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